THE 



SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



By R. A. ALGER 

SECRETARY OF WAR, MARCH 5, 1 897 
TO AUGUST I, 1899 



IV IT I I MATS 




NEW YORK AND LONDON 

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

MCMI 



THF LIBRARY OP 
CONGRESS, 

Tw' Copies Rec^ivep 

OCT, 10 '901 

COPVBIOHT rn-rtrr 

class a XXo. N». 
COPY A. 






\ 2- 



Copyright, 1901, by Harper & Brothers. 

All rights restrved. 
October, 1901 



THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED 
TO THE 

AMERICAN SOLDIER AND SAILOR 



PREFACE 

It has not been my purpose in the preparation of the 
manuscript of this book to write a full history of the 
war with Spain ; on the contrary, it has been to place 
on record some of the prominent facts connected with 
the organization, equipment, and movements of the 
army, together with the administration of the War 
Department, with the hope that such statement will 
serve a useful purpose as an example, should another 
crisis of the same kind occur. 

The statements in this volume are based upon either 
my own knowledge or upon the official reports, verbal 
and written, made during my incumbency of the office 
of Secretary of War. The descriptions of the fights of 
Las Guasimas, Caney, San Juan, and Manila are 
based upon official documents, conversation with par- 
ticipants, and letters from officers high in authority 
received since the war. A personal visit to the battle- 
lield of San Juan in the spring of 1899 has been of 
much service, making that field of operations some- 
what familiar to me. 

v 



PREFACE 

It has been my good fortune to have placed at my 
disposal the complete files of the correspondence re- 
ceived by and issued from the headquarters of the 5th 
Corps during the entire Santiago campaign. Many 
of these despatches are now published for the first 
time, and throw an interesting light on the history 
of the army which accomplished so much and which 
virtually ended the war with Spain. 

An account of the Santiago army and the move- 
ments of the land forces in Cuba would not have been 
complete without a discussion of the relations be- 
tween Admiral Sampson and General Shafter. The 
documents quoted in the chapter devoted to that 
matter should remove a great deal of misapprehen- 
sion. 

I wish to take this opportunity to thank numerous 
government officials and personal friends, in and out 
of the military service, for having materially aided me 
in the collection of data on various matters not coming 
under my direct observation. 

Should war ever again come upon this country and 
find it so totally unprepared as it was in 1898, I hope 
that those who have been so profuse in their criticisms, 
and eager to discover faults, may have the patriotism 
and pride of country to rise above personalities, and, 
instead of striving to tear down, may endeavor to 
strengthen the hands of those upon whom the burden 

may fall and whose only hope of reward is that 

vi 



PREFACE 

satisfaction which comes from the consciousness of 
having labored honestly and unremittingly to serve 
a government whose flag has never yet known 
defeat. 




Detroit Michigan, 1901. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Cuban Situation in 1898 1 

II. Unpreparedness for War 6 

III. Preparations for War 15 

IV. Appointments and Things Importunate ... 29 
V. Plans of Campaign 41 

VI. Embarkation at Tampa 62 

VII. Shafter Determines to "March on Santiago" 83 

VIII. The Affair of Las Guasimas 99 

IX. Results of Las Guasimas — Preparing for 

Caney and San Juan 112 

X. Caney 132 

XI. San Juan 151 

XII. After the Capture of San Juan 164 

XIII. "I Shall Hold My Present Position" .... 172 

XIV. Siege and Surrender of Santiago 181 

XV. Admiral Sampson and the Army at Santiago 221 

XVI. The " Round Robin " Incident 255 

XVII. Resume of the Santiago Campaign 274 

XVIII. The Expedition to Puerto Rico 298 

XIX. The Philippine Campaign 318 

XX. Our Relations with Aguinaldo 343 

XXI. The Tagalog Rebellion 364 

XXII. The Miles-Eagan Controversy 376 

XXIII. Camps and Disease 4" 

XXIV. Conclusion 455 



LIST OF MAPS 



FAC-SIMILE OF MAP, DRAWN BY GENERAL WOOD, 

OF THE FIGHT AT LAS GUASIMAS .... Facing page 106 
SAN JUAN BATTLEFIELD " 152 



THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CUBA 

PUERTO RICO 

MANILA AND ENVIRONS' 

NORTHERN LUZON 

EASTERN CUBA. POSITIONS OF CUBAN AND 
SPANISH FORCES PRIOR TO JULY 3 1898 . . 



182 
300 
334 
366 

462 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

CHAPTER I 
THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1 898 

THE thoughtful observer of public events during the 
years 1895-97 need hardly be reminded that both the 
Cleveland and the McKinley administrations sought 
by every honorable means to avoid complications with 
Spain, though protesting against the conditions prev- 
alent in Cuba. Deplorable as those conditions were, and 
shocking as was their effect upon the enlightened and 
humane mind, neither Mr. Cleveland nor Mr. McKinley 
seemed to feel that this country should, because of them, 
plunge into war. The conservative and responsible 
men at the head of the nation's affairs were profoundly 
averse to war, although they encountered, in holding 
to this course, the growing opposition of public sen- 
timent throughout the country. As the year 1896 
drew to a close this opposition became formidable.* 

* The Republican platform, as read and adopted at the St. Louis 
Convention, June 18, 1896, was as follows : 

" We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battles of the 
Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression (applause), and our 
best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for 
liberty. The government of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and 
being unable to protect the property or the lives of resident Amer- 

A I 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Even conservative newspapers began to complain, not 
wholly without a semblance of warrant, that the gov- 
erment was leaning to the wrong side in its effort to 
stand exactly straight, and to hint that the navy had 
been converted into a police force for Spain's benefit. 
Denunciations of eminent Senators who advocated 
peace took on the quality of violence ; indeed, towards 
the close of Mr. Cleveland's administration sympathy 
with the insurgent Cubans had become the popular test 
of human kindness, and protest against war the un- 
answerable proof of unchristian indifference. Presi- 
dent McKinley, therefore, inherited not only the problem 
itself — a problem which had been steadily intensifying 
for 3^ears — but a popular demand for intervention which 
had attained serious proportions and could be resisted 
only with extreme difficulty. Nevertheless, quite apart 
from the ideas entertained by the people generally, the 
facts, as they were made known to the President and 
his Cabinet, contained material enough for profound 
anxiety. It was only too evident that a state of ab- 
solute barbarity existed in Cuba, and that inhuman 
cruelties were of daily and contrived occurrence. 

President Cleveland had unfalteringly persisted up 
to the last hour of his term in the policy he had adopted 
two years previously. Apparently his purpose was 
to transfer the situation to his successor free from all 
embarrassments. The fact remains that the state of 

ican citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe tbat 
the government of the United States should actively use its influence 
and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island. 
(Applause.)" 

And on this same question the Democratic Convention of 1896 thus 
expressed itself : 

" We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic 
struggle for liberty and independence." 

2 



THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1898 

affairs could not have been more embarrassing if he 
had repeatedly modified his course between the spring 
of 1895 and March 4, 1897. It was, in fact, inherently 
intolerable, and it had been made needlessly painful 
and distressing by a policy on the part of Spain 
which had provoked the bitterest and deepest resent- 
ment of the American people. 

Negotiations, with a view to ameliorating condi- 
tions in Cuba, were inaugurated as soon as our en- 
voy, General Stewart L. Woodford, reached Madrid. 
The President and his Cabinet were, one and all, sin- 
cerely anxious to avert war, and to that end they 
labored in genuine harmony, although some felt that 
an issue which should be at once honorable and 
peaceful was impossible. The President's honest and 
persistent effort to avoid or avert war justly entitles 
him to the gratitude of the American people. 

Our negotiations at Madrid were encouraged, but 
they led to no result. A point was yielded here, an- 
other there. The diplomatic atmosphere was one 
of apparent friendship and conciliation, but the ef- 
forts were fruitless of practical results. It seems, 
however, to be characteristic of the Spaniard, as typ- 
ified by his government, that, whereas he is always 
fruitful of alluring promise, he is invariably barren 
of performance. 

The months dragged slowly on — months marked 
by honest and unselfish effort on the part of the ad- 
ministration, alternately darkened and illumined by 
Madrid's varying moods. It was obvious that Spain 
had grown weary of the disheartening and futile 
struggle in Cuba, and that she lacked either the power 
or the will to terminate it. It was equally obvious 

3 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

that the United States could not postpone indefinite- 
ly the discharge of its responsibilities to civilization 
and to itself. The difficulty consisted in discover- 
ing a common ground upon which the countries could 
meet without sacrifice of material interests, moral ob- 
ligations, or the pride of either. That discovery was 
never made. But the failure was not caused by any 
languor in the search — on our part, at least — and up 
to the very last, even after the destruction of the bat- 
tle-ship Maine, there were those who believed that 
war could be averted. 

Every one who followed the events of 1897 will re- 
member that at last the administration demanded 
the recall of Weyler and a revocation of his reconcen- 
trado edict. It is common knowledge also that Wey- 
ler was recalled, the edict revoked, and Captain-Gen- 
eral Blanco sent to Havana, charged with the task 
of reorganizing the government of the island upon a 
basis of autonomy. It is difficult to say how far the 
proposed measures would have fulfilled the necessi- 
ties of the situation. There is reason to believe, how- 
ever, that it met the plans and wishes of the Auton- 
omist party. No one can say with certainty that it 
would have failed, for it was never subjected to the 
test. The destruction of the Maine swept away for- 
ever this attempted adjustment. 

Our people, awed by the suddenness and horror of 
the tragedy, awaited in silence the result of an in- 
vestigation. It was the dignified self-control of a 
people accustomed to hear before it strikes. It 
was the calm of intense repression. The report of 
the Naval Board that the Maine had been destroyed 
by an explosion from the outside was followed by 

4 



THE CUBAN SITUATION IN 1898 

Senator Proctor's speech in the Senate Chamber — 
that deliberate, dispassionate, but thoroughly convinc- 
ing presentation of the Cuban horrors as he had seen 
them for himself. As the Senator spoke the most 
zealous optimist felt his hopes falling from him and 
saw at last the vision of the coming cataclysm. The 
sun had set upon the day of polite palaver and futile 
effort. Even those who had tried to deceive them- 
selves after the destruction of the Maine abandoned 
the endeavor then and there. 

It became apparent to the American people that 
the arts of diplomacy had been vainly exerted, and 
that Spain could no longer be tolerated by the United 
States as a neighbor in the West Indies. The time 
for debate had passed — the time for action had come. 



CHAPTER II 
UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

AMERICANS have not forgotten— they are not like- 
ly to forget — the splendid spectacle of the country's 
response to the government's ultimatum upon Spain 
which inevitably resulted in war. It was spontaneous 
and practically universal; it was sincere and enthu- 
siastic. One realized that thirty-three years of peace 
had made no change in the American character. More 
than 100,000 veterans of the Civil War — wearers of 
the blue and wearers of the gray — pleaded for an 
opportunity to serve the re-established Union. The 
sons of those who fought under Grant and Lee showed 
that the soldierly and patriotic spirit of their sires had 
lost nothing in intensity by the lapse of years. 

If Congress inspired the nation by its unanimous 
vote for the war fund, the country in its turn gave the 
whole world a picture of patriotic earnestness such as 
has seldom thrilled the hearts of brave and honorable 
men. 

Thousands of men offered to enlist before the formal 
declaration of hostilities. War was declared April 
21, 1898.* Under authority of act of Congress, on 

* On this day Minister Woodford was given his passports at 
Madrid. The formal declaration of war by Congress occurred April 
25th ; but that act also stated that " war has existed since the 21st 
day of April." 

6 



UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

April 23d the President issued a call for 125,000 vol- 
unteers. Within twenty-four hours the nation was 
aflame. Tenders of service came by the hundreds of 
thousands. It is safe to say that a million men offered 
themselves where 125,000 had been called. It is equal- 
ly safe to add that the administration was as over- 
whelmed by offers to meet the second call, issued May 
25, 1898, for 75,000 men. It was the apotheosis of 
patriotism. 

On the 1st of April our standing army consisted of 
2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, distributed over 
the entire country. This force may be classified as 
follows : 

Officers Enlisted Men 

General Officers and Staff Corps 532 2,026 

Cavalry 437 6,047 

Artillery 288 4,486 

Infantry 886 12,828 

Miscellaneous 653 

Total 2,143 26,040 

Here was the nucleus about which we had to gather 
the great army of 1898; and this was the organization 
with which we were to muster in, equip, organize, and 
mobilize not only the 125,000 volunteers called for 
on April 23d, but the subsequent levies, aggregating, 
with the regular army, approximately 275,000 men. 
The governmental machinery was altogether inade- 
quate to immediately meet the emergency. It had, 
during thirty years, been called upon only to plan for 
and meet the requirements of the regular army in 
time of peace, and naturally enough had become quite 
fixed in the narrow grooves of peace. However, the 
officers at the head of the various bureaus met, as 

7 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

fully as was possible in the existing environment, the 
crisis, and their zeal, devotion, and professional abil- 
ity entitle them to the grateful admiration of the 
people. Under the circumstances they worked won- 
ders, and I deem it a high privilege that I am here 
permitted to pay this just tribute to them and their 
assistants.* And I desire to especially mention my 
very able and conscientious Assistant Secretary of 
War, Honorable George D. Meiklejohn, to whom too 
much praise cannot be given. 

In order to understand the problem thoroughly, it 
will be necessary for the reader to acquaint himself 
with the details of the military situation on and up to 
April 23d. 

On March 9th Congress appropriated "for na- 
tional defence" the sum of $50,000,000. No part 
of this sum was available for offensive purposes- 
even for offensive preparation. The fund, though 
placed at the President's disposal, remained only an 
appropriation "for national defence," and he con- 
fined the employment of it literally within that limita- 
tion. Under this interpretation of the act, it was, of 
course, permissible to hasten the work upon our coast 
fortifications, the plans for which had been formu- 
lated by the Endicott Board of 1885 and duly sanc- 
tioned by Congress at that time. Allotments were 
made, therefore, out of the $50,000,000 fund to the 
Ordnance, Engineer, Quartermaster, Medical and Sig- 
nal corps, as follows: Ordnance, (about) $10,000,000; 
Engineer, $5,500,000; Quartermaster, $500,000; Med- 
ical, $20,000; Signal, $226,400. 

* The Inspector-General, Brigadier-General Breckinridge, was com- 
missioned a major-general of volunteers by the President, and did not 
serve in his department during the war. 

8 



UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

All of this was for purposes of coast defence — guns, 
mountings, emplacements, transportation, etc. — not a 
cent was used outside of the limits fixed by Congress. 
There was no disturbance of the status of peace be- 
fore the declaration of war. 

Meanwhile the War Department had been able to 
do nothing in the way of accumulating material for 
offensive war — for the emergency which, after the 
destruction of the Maine, was regarded by the coun- 
try at large as inevitable. Every arsenal in the coun- 
try, and every private establishment capable of turn- 
ing out guns, carriages, powder, ammunition, etc., was 
working up to its full capacity, day and night, for 
coast defence; but the War Department could not 
purchase or even contract for any of the material so 
soon to be needed for the new army. None of the bu- 
reaus had on hand reserve supplies. Being unable 
to increase its stock, each had produced only enough 
for the immediate, every-day needs of the regular es- 
tablishment on a peace basis. 

When the declaration of war finally came, the Ord- 
nance and Engineer corps, thanks to the allowance 
made from the $50,000,000 fund, were in full working 
order, and had already accomplished much towards 
the national defence. Regular troops had been moved 
to the coast and put in camps at various points, 
including Chickamauga. Within a very few days 
after the formal opening of hostilities, 1,535 torpedoes 
and mines, together with the electrical appliances 
necessary for their immediate operation, which had 
been provided from the National Defence Fund, were 
placed in various harbors; and the Signal Corps 
had been increased to the proportions needed for 

9 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

an effective and complete system of "fire control" in 
the forts. 

It is unnecessary to say that the condition of the 
coast defences was far from what it should have been, 
notwithstanding the extraordinary efforts of the Ord- 
nance and Engineer corps between March 9th and 
April 23d. The truth is that, whereas the Endicott 
Board of 1885 provided for a thorough system of arm- 
ament and fortification, Congress, which had sanc- 
tioned the plan, supported it so feebfy with appro- 
priations that the work had gone on at a snail's pace, 
and, in 1898, nearly thirteen years after its adoption, 
relatively little progress had been made. 

To illustrate : The plan required an expenditure 
of $100,000,000 for the construction and emplace- 
ment of the following guns: 8 -inch, 98; 10 -inch, 
194; 12-inch, 204; 12-inch mortars, 1,037; rapid-fire, 
829; making a total of 2,362 guns and mortars. On 
the 1st of April, 1898, only these had been emplaced: 
8-inch, 9; 10-inch, 44; 12-inch, 10; 12-inch mortars, 
88; rapid-fire, none. 

Thus, out of the 2,362 pieces of ordnance contem- 
plated in the project of 1885, only 151 were in posi- 
tion April 1, 1898." In thirteen years Congress had 
appropriated for this great national work less than 
one -fourth of the sum required for its completion. 
The War Department had expended the amounts 
which through successive administrations had been 

* There were completed, however, April I, 1898 : 

8-inch 10-inch 12-inch 12-inch mortars rapid-fire 
88 91 46 70 none 

But owing to the fact that the manufacture of carriages had not kept 
pace with the manufacture of guns, only 151 of these pieces of ord- 
nance were ready for immediate use. 

10 



UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

placed at its disposal, but could do no more. It was 
also straitened in the matter of ammunition. For 
the 8 -inch guns there were only twelve rounds 
each; for the io-inch, twenty rounds; for the 1 2-inch, 
fifteen rounds, and for the mortars, ten. With the 
belated aid derived from the $50,000,000 fund, the 
Ordnance and Engineer corps accomplished remark- 
able results, but, at the best, those results were sadly 
inadequate. Dilatory and grudging legislation had 
borne its fruit. 

In comparison with the other bureaus of the War 
Department, however, the Ordnance, Engineer, and 
Signal corps had been favored. They, at least, en- 
joyed an opportunity for effort, and had the means 
of utilizing that opportunity for a month and a half. 
On the other hand, the Quartermaster, Commissary, 
and Medical departments, up to April 23d, had been 
denied even the privilege of endeavor. Not one of 
these, under the President's interpretation of the 
term "national defence," had been permitted to take 
a step outside the ordinary routine; they could not 
either procure or order anything in the way of equip- 
ment — clothing, tentage, harness, commissary stores, 
medical and hospital supplies, camp furniture, and 
other material. Because of this, absolutely nothing 
had been added to the ordinary supply as it existed 
March 9, 1898. 

The emergency confronted us before we had been 
able to move to meet it. 

The personnel of the Quartermaster, Commissary, 
and Medical corps, numerically, was almost as in- 
adequate as the material. On April 23d there were 
only 22 trained commissary officers in the service. 

11 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

In the Quartermaster Department the number of offi- 
cers was limited by law to 57. Congress allowed 192 
medical officers, but when war came only 179 were 
ready for active service. On this point the Surgeon- 
General made the following statement to the War In- 
vestigation Commission : 

" The number of medical officers, 192, allowed by law to the army 
is inadequate in time of peace. This number includes 15 assist- 
ant surgeons authorized by the act approved May 12, 1898. 
Later in May there were 13 vacancies; 6 officers were engaged 
in administrative duties in the office of the Surgeon-General and 
in the superintendence of the library and the Army Medical Mu- 
seum ; 11 were on duty at medical-supply depots and as chief sur- 
geons of military departments ; I at the United States Soldiers' 
Home, Washington, D. C. ; 56 at general hospitals and at gar- 
risoned posts ; I as colonel of a volunteer regiment ; while 4 were 
disabled. One hundred officers were thus left for field service, 
5 of whom were placed on duty as chief surgeons of army corps, 
36 as brigade surgeons of volunteers, and 59 as regimental sur- 
geons and assistants with the regular troops. The insufficiency 
of the last-mentioned number was made up by the assignment 
of medical men under contract." 

It should be added that the hospital corps consisted 
of 723 men — a mere handful. There were many 
medicines that could be purchased at once in the open 
market, but a great number of articles indispensa- 
ble to an effective service in camp or field could not 
be so readily obtained. Medical chests and appa- 
ratus, surgical instruments, hospital tents and furni- 
ture, "first-aid packets," * etc., had to be ordered 
and manufactured. 

* A small envelope carried upon the soldier's person, containing 
antiseptic compresses and bandages for immediate use in emergency, 
pending the arrival of the surgeon. 

12 



UNPREPAREDNESS FOR WAR 

In one respect alone was the War Department able 
to make immediate response to at least a part of the 
sudden demands upon it. Including those already 
in the hands of the regular soldiers, there were 
53>5°8 .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifles, and 14,895 
.30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen carbines. This supply, 
however, was barely sufficient to meet the require- 
ments of the increased regular army. Nothing 
was left for the volunteers except 45-caliber Spring- 
field rifles, of which there were 265,895. For these 
weapons, and for the 7,893 45-caliber Springfield 
carbines, also in our arsenal, there was no smoke- 
less-powder ammunition, nor was any immediately 
obtainable. The government did not manufacture 
the article. Its supply was drawn from the only es- 
tablishments in the country making it — Peyton & Co., 
the Duponts, and Laflin & Rand, of which firms one 
was situated on the Pacific coast and the other two 
in the East. From the supply thus obtained the 
United States arsenal at Philadelphia was then turn- 
ing out .30-caliber ammunition at the rate of 50,000 
rounds per diem, but the remainder of the output was 
taken by the Navy Department, and, as we could 
not, after the inauguration of hostilities, draw upon 
Europe, there was no smokeless powder for the vol- 
unteer-army 45-caliber weapons. This constituted a 
serious drawback, as was illustrated in the Santiago 
campaign. 

The situation can be summarized in a few words : 
The W T ar Department had, on April 23d, accomplished 
some little extra work on the coast defences; it had 
ready for use enough .30-caliber rifles to arm the 
33,000 men added to the regular army, and enough 

13 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

45-caliber Springfields for the volunteers, but that 
was all. There was in the supply bureaus abso- 
lutely nothing for the troops included in the first call, 
and for the other troops provided for during the last 
days of April, nor for the additional forces created 
between the 10th and 25th of May, aggregating 249,- 
000 men, exclusive of the regular army in its orig- 
inal status. If the wording of the act of Congress 
had permitted the War Department to make use of 
some portion of the $50,000,000 for offensive prepara- 
tions, much could have been accomplished between 
March 9th and April 23d in the way of getting ready 
for the impending conflict. 



CHAPTER III 

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

ON the ist of April, 1898, the twenty-five regiments 
of infantry and the ten regiments of cavalry, all of 
minimum strength — less than sixty to the company 
— were scattered over the United States from the Ca- 
nadian border to the Mexican frontier. The heavy- 
artillery regiments were on the Atlantic, Pacific, and 
Gulf coasts, and the light-artillery batteries were sta- 
tioned at various posts in the North, South, East, and 
West. Few of these regiments were intact. Detached 
companies and troops were quartered at different posts 
at greater or less distances from their regimental head- 
quarters. 

Fortunately there was no law forbidding immediate 
mobilization. On the 15th of April, therefore, all of 
the regulars that could be spared from their stations 
were sent to New Orleans, Tampa, Mobile, or Chicka- 
mauga. Major-General John R. Brooke was as- 
signed to Chickamauga, Brigadier-General William R. 
Shafter to New Orleans, Brigadier-General J. J. Cop- 
pinger to Mobile, and Brigadier-General J. F. Wade to 
Tampa. The mobilization was effected at the South in 
order that the troops should be near Cuba in the event 
of immediate need. Moreover, it was considered de- 
sirable to acclimatize the men, as far as possible, pre- 
paratory to operations in a semi-tropical country. 

15 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

A great part of the regular army was, therefore, 
either mobilized or in process of mobilization when, 
on April 21st, the American minister at Madrid was 
given his passport by the Spanish government. The 
severance of diplomatic relations, under the circum- 
stances then existing, was rightfully interpreted by 
Congress as tantamount to a declaration of war. On 
the day following, April 22d, in anticipation of a formal 
declaration of war, Congress authorized the Presi- 
dent to temporarily increase the army of the United 
States in case of war by calls for volunteers. Four 
days later, April 26th, the day after the formal opening 
of hostilities, Congress provided for the increase of 
the regulars to the maximum strength. The army 
of 1898 was organized under the provisions of these 
two laws of April 22d and 26th, and that of May nth, 
which provided for thirteen volunteer regiments pos- 
sessing special qualifications. 

The act of April 26, 1898, increasing the regular 
army to approximately 61,000, also provided for a 
three - battalion formation and the development of 
companies of infantry to 106 men. This law did not 
augment the number of regiments of the regulars, 
but the number of enlisted men. Enlistments were 
made with the same care as in time of peace, although 
216,000 volunteers were entering the service at the 
same time. The 29,521 men" newly enlisted in the 
regular army up to June 30, 1898, were chosen from a 
total number of 127,798 applicants. Thus, 98,277, or 
77 per cent., were rejected. This was accomplished 
despite the fact that about one-fifth of the regular 

* The maximum strength of the regular army on a war footing 
was not reached until some time later. 

16 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

army officers had been given appointments or assigned 
to commands of volunteers — a serious obstruction to 
the machinery of recruitment. 

Within a week subsequent to the enactment of this 
law (April 26th), the War Department was engaged in 
the simultaneous preparation of three large armies 
for operation in foreign countries, separated from the 
United States by distances ranging from 100 to 7,000 
miles, and from each other by half the circumference 
of the earth. 

The act of April 226., authorizing the President to 
temporarily increase the military establishment in 
time of war by calls for volunteers, at the same time 
empowered the Secretary of War to recruit from the 
nation at large companies, troops, battalions, or regi- 
ments possessing special qualifications, not to exceed 
3,000 men in all. Under this authority were created 
the three volunteer cavalry regiments. The officers 
of these regiments were, by the law, selected and com- 
missioned by the Secretary and not by the President. 
Colonel Leonard Wood, Colonel Jay L. Torry, and 
Colonel Melvin Grigsby were respectively appointed 
to command them. On the nth day of May, Con- 
gress also empowered the Secretary of War to organ- 
ize a volunteer brigade of engineers, to consist of not 
more than three regiments, and to aggregate not more 
than 3, 500 men. The officers of these regiments were ap- 
pointed, under the law, by the President, with the con- 
sent of the Senate, and under such rules and regula- 
tions as might be prescribed by the Secretary of War. 
The same act authorized the organization of an ad- 
ditional volunteer force of not exceeding 10,000 enlisted 
men possessing immunity from the diseases incident 
b 17 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to tropical climates. For these so-called immune regi- 
ments the officers were to be appointed by the Presi- 
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

The first call for troops— 125,000 men— was issued 
on April 23d. This levy was apportioned by law among 
the States according to population, and was confined 
first to the militia thereof, where such organizations 
existed, and then to the citizens at large. The War 
Department was at once overwhelmed by tenders of 
service from every section of the country and every 
State in the Union. Numerous protests against this 
policy of limitation were received. Veterans of the 
Civil War— Federals and Confederates alike— were 
especially insistent. The applications were as uni- 
versal as they were enthusiastic. The question was, 
not what States would be called upon for troops, but 
how many of the thousands of men applying could 
be accepted? 

The War Department favored the recognition of 
the State militia. Considerations of justice required 
that those men whose enthusiasm had inspired their 
entrance into State military organizations should, 
when the crisis occurred, be given the first opportu- 
nity for active service. For this reason it was thought 
that they were entitled to preference above others who 
were eager to enter the service. The governors of 
the several States were therefore informed that mem- 
bers of the State militia would be the first mustered. 
The War Department especially enjoined the State 
governors to inform the members of the militia that 
enlistment must be entirely voluntary, and not through 
any feelings of esprit de corps or compulsion. This 
instruction was given to relieve from any reflection 

18 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

upon their patriotism or courage those who could not 
leave their homes except at great sacrifice. 

On the 25th of May the President issued the second 
call for volunteers — 75,000 men. Events proved that 
these additional troops were not needed, as 136,000 
volunteers did not leave the United States. Still this 
great force, of course known to the Spanish govern- 
ment, must have had its influence in bringing about 
so speedy a conclusion of the war. 

The number of men furnished by the several States 
under the first and second calls, including the sixteen 
regiments with special qualifications recruited at large, 
is given in the following table : 

Officers Men 

General officers and staff i.oio i,3 2 9 

Alabama 141 3.o6i 

Arkansas 9 1 1.934 

California 186 4,441 

Colorado 49 1,076 

Connecticut 100 2,436 

Delaware 47 969 

District of Columbia 49 922 

Florida 48 956 

Georgia 142 3.389 

Idaho 3 2 644 

Illinois 489 io,453 

Indiana 260 5.564 

Iowa 206 3,354 

Kansas 167 3.735 

Kentucky 186 4,559 

Louisiana 101 2,255 

Maine 61 1,444 

Maryland 91 1.979 

Massachusetts 277 5,515 

Michigan 233 5,185 

Minnesota 196 4. 22 2 

Mississippi 108 2,512 

Missouri 271 6,234 

Montana 48 \ 976 

4.589 79,144 

19 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Officers Men 

Brought forward 4,589 79, I 44 

Nebraska 137 3,232 

Nevada 15 481 

New Hampshire 47 952 

New Jersey 184 4,163 

New York 705 15,924 

North Carolina 145 2,840 

North Dakota 27 658 

Ohio 485 9,557 

Oregon 56 1,182 

Pennsylvania 619 11,696 

Rhode Island 54 1,170 

South Carolina 90 2,060 

South Dakota 46 983 

Tennessee 187 4,148 

Texas 231 5,054 

Utah 15 429 

Vermont 48 980 

Virginia 164 3,709 

Washington 60 1,379 

West Virginia 88 2 , 2 45 

Wisconsin . 198 4,293 

Wyoming 17 446 

United States Volunteers 763 16,992 

Total 8,970 173,717 



Individual enlistments and subsequent appoint- 
ments brought the totals of volunteers up to: 

Officers 10,017 

Men 213,218 

Total 223,235* 

With the calls for volunteers, and the apportion- 
ment of the troops among the several States, the mus- 
ter-in, equipment, and mobilization of the army for 
the war began. It is hardly necessary to say that the 

* This number includes the total number of men furnished by the 
several States up to November 30, 1898. 

20 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

task was neither a simple nor an easy one. The suc- 
cessful accomplishment of this undertaking in such a 
comparatively brief period is in itself the greatest 
tribute that could be paid to the officers of the regular 
army by whom the work was done. This statement 
applies to the line as well as to the staff. 

The governors of each State designated the rendez- 
vous for its allotment. To insure the muster-in of 
only able-bodied applicants, regular army officers were 
sent to these State camps. Each volunteer, after en- 
rolment, underwent a thorough physical examination 
before he was mustered into the service. For each 
individual soldier was prepared and forwarded to the 
War Department a description, giving his physical 
record and history of enlistment. 

The Quartermaster Department, immediately after 
the first call, was confronted with the proposition of 
assembling at the selected camps — Chickamauga, 
Tampa, Mobile, and Washington — this vast army 
from an area exceeding that of the entire continent of 
Europe. At Camp Thomas and Camp Alger almost 
every State in the Union was represented by a full 
regiment of infantry or other organization. Our sol- 
diers did not travel during the war with Spain as they 
did during the Civil War. In all contracts with the 
railroads it was expressly stipulated that in the day 
coaches each soldier should have an entire seat for 
himself and his equipment, and for over twenty-four 
hours of travel the troops should occupy sleeping-cars 
— Pullmans or tourists — three men to a section. Few 
veterans of the Civil War can recall having travelled 
during the sixties in any but box, cattle, or on flat 
cars. Even the horses and mules, in the war with 

21 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Spain, were nearly all shipped in patent palace stock 
cars. 

The arrival of the volunteers from their several 
States at the camps of instruction quickly demon- 
strated the fact that so far as equipment was con- 
cerned these militiamen were little better than recruits. 
Not a single regiment was fully ready for the field. 
They were deficient in regimental equipment of every 
kind. No less than 100,000 Springfield rifles and 
carbines were issued to volunteers who had been sup- 
posed to be well armed. Very many arrived in camp 
without uniforms, accoutrements, rifles, or anything, 
in fact, necessary for active service, except that en- 
thusiasm which is the invariable characteristic of the 
American volunteer. 

With empty military storehouses, the supply de- 
partments set to work equipping practically 250,000 
men. The two bureaus most involved in this task 
were, of course, the Ordnance and Quartermaster de- 
partments. The Ordnance Department, under the di- 
vision of labor for a long time obtaining in the army, 
not only provides the armament of the sea-coast and 
the weapons of the artillery and enlisted men, but also 
furnishes to each soldier his equipment.* Many of 
these articles are of special design and manufacture, 
and not only could not be purchased in open mar- 
ket, but could not even be manufactured by most es- 
tablishments. Reliance lay, therefore, almost exclu- 
sively upon the government plant — the Rock Island 

* One blanket-bag, one pair of blanket-bag shoulder straps, one 
pair of blanket-bag coat straps ; one bayonet scabbard ; one cartridge 
belt; one canteen, one canteen strap; one gun sling ; one haversack, 
one haversack strap ; one meat-can, one tin cup, one knife, one fork, 
and one spoon. 

22 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

arsenal. Congress had been repeatedly requested to 
appropriate the money necessary to equip this plant 
with special reserve machinery, so that it might be 
at all times ready to meet any emergency. But this 
request, so often made, was denied, and the especially 
designed apparatus for the arsenal had to be purchased, 
manufactured, and installed before work could begin. 
On the ist of April the output at Rock Island arsenal 
amounted to seventy sets of infantry equipment per 
diem. When the protocol was signed, on the 12th day 
of August, it was turning out daily 8,000 complete in- 
fantry equipments and 250 cavalry equipments. The 
record of the Springfield armory is no less creditable, 
for the daily output of that plant during the same 
period was increased from 120 to 363 Krag-Jorgensen 
rifles. 

The great supply bureau of the army, however, is 
the Quartermaster Department. In addition to pro- 
viding the soldier with uniforms, hats, suits of un- 
derwear, blankets, overcoats, rubber ponchos, and 
various other clothing, each regiment of infantry, 
squadron of cavalry, and battery of artillery must be 
supplied with the necessary transportation and field 
equipment, such as wagons, horses, mules, harness, 
tents, etc. Here, too, of the manufactured material, the 
articles were of army standard and unusual design, 
and could only be furnished by comparatively few es- 
tablishments in the United States. All of the mate- 
rial needed for the new troops had to be especially 
manufactured, and, as for the horses and mules, a 
careful examination and inspection of each animal 
was necessary, in accordance with the rigid require- 
ments of the military service. Some idea of the work 

23 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of the Quartermaster Bureau can be formed when it is 
stated that no less than an average of 4,000 pairs of 
shoes a day were required for the army between the 
period of April 22d and August 12th. The various arti- 
cles of equipment furnished by this department alone, 
during the same time, amounted daity to over 56,000. 

In the matter of tents was experienced the greatest 
difficulty. The supply in the United States, as well 
as material therefor, was utterly inadequate to meet 
the demand. The government standard of duck was 
unobtainable. Every city and establishment in the 
United States having tents or tent material of any 
kind was drawn upon. Much thus obtained, although 
the best that the markets of the country afforded, was 
naturally not up to the standard, and subsequently 
caused some inconvenience, but the government ex- 
hausted every effort to meet the needs, even going so 
far as to secure the aid of the force in the national Post- 
Office Department mail-bag repair-shop. 

The same embarrassment was experienced with re- 
spect to wagons and to the cloth for khaki uniforms. 
There was no khaki cloth in the United States, and 
no establishment familiar with its manufacture. Not- 
withstanding these conditions and the fact that there 
were but fifty-seven officers in the Quartermaster De- 
partment (and the work of this bureau certainly re- 
quires specialized knowledge and experience), at the 
close of hostilities in August, there had been manu- 
factured or purchased and issued 546,338 blankets, 
390,775 blouses, 523,203 trousers, 476,705 campaign 
hats, 153,167 canvas field uniforms, 782,303 shoes, 
588;8oo leggings, 622,211 dark-blue flannel shirts, 
1,257,002 undershirts, 1,210,682 drawers, 38,963 axes, 

24 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

4,888 trumpets, 34,344 camp-kettles, 58,662 mess- 
pans, 64,980 various kinds of tents, exclusive of shel- 
ter tents, 372,379 shelter-tent halves, 16,618 horses, 
20,182 mules, 5,179 wagons, 28,012 sets of single har- 
ness, and other articles of every kind in like proportion. 

The army, volunteer and regular, was organized 
into eight corps, each corps consisting of three di- 
visions, each division of three brigades, and each 
brigade of three regiments. These eight corps were 
thus commanded : First Army Corps, Major-General 
John R. Brooke, Camp Thomas, Georgia (Chicka- 
mauga Park). Second Army Corps, Major-General 
William M. Graham, Camp Alger (Falls Church), 
Virginia. Third Army Corps, Major-General James I. 
Wade, Camp Thomas, Georgia. Fourth Army Corps, 
Major-General John J. Coppinger, Mobile, Alabama 
(disintegration of this temporary camp began as 
early as June 2d; sent to Tampa and Fernandina, 
Florida, and then to Hunts ville, Alabama). Fifth 
Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter, 
Tampa (Santiago campaign). Sixth Army Corps, 
Major-General James H. Wilson, Camp Thomas, 
Georgia (not finally organized) ; Wilson subsequently 
commanded first division of First Corps and went to 
Puerto Rico. Seventh Army Corps, Major-General 
Fitzhugh Lee, Tampa; moved May 31st to Jackson- 
ville, Florida. Eighth Army Corps, Major-General 
Wesley Merritt, San Francisco and Manila. 

In addition to the corps, division, and brigade for- 
mations already described, about 12,000 volunteers 
were distributed on the sea-coast from New Jersey to 
Maine, and a large number of them instructed in the 
use of heavy artillery. A part was held as infantry 

25 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

supports for sea-coast defence, and large detachments 
of troops were sent to guard the powder plants. 

The War Department has been criticised for assem- 
bling so many troops in large camps. The reasons 
for such action may be stated as follows : 

1. The supply bureaus could not establish in each 
of the forty -five States depots for rationing volun- 
teers during the period required to manufacture and 
ship equipments for these recruits. Moreover, there 
were not enough regular army officers in the Quarter- 
master, Commissary, Medical, and Ordnance depart- 
ments to detail one of each kind to so many scattered 
State camps, and regular army officers alone at that 
time were qualified to do the work. 

2. It was desirable to place volunteer regiments in 
camps with regulars, in order that the former might 
have the example and instruction that seasoned troops 
would furnish. 

3. It was deemed inadvisable to have volunteer or- 
ganizations remain in their own States any longer 
than was absolutely necessary for the mustering-in 
process, in that home influences tended to retard mili- 
tary discipline. 

4. Immediate drill in brigade, division, and corps 
manoeuvres was of the first importance, as the ex- 
perience of the Civil War had demonstrated. This 
could be accomplished only in large camps of in- 
struction. 

5. Considerations of national moment, which sub- 
sequent events proved wise, suggested the brigading 
of regiments, not from the same State, but from the 
four great geographical divisions — North, South, 
East, and West. In this way clannishness and pro- 

26 " 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

vincialism were obliterated, and the result was a ho- 
mogeneous army. 

Here are a few typical brigades organized upon 
this plan: 

First Army Corps.— 1st South Carolina, 12th Min- 
nesota, 5th Pennsylvania, forming 1st Brigade, 3d 
Division. 

Second Army Corps.— 1st Rhode Island, 2d Ten- 
nessee, 3d Missouri, forming 3d Brigade, 2d Division. 

Third Army Corps.— 1st Maine, 52d Iowa, 1st Mis- 
sissippi, forming 3d Brigade, 1st Division. 

Fourth Army Corps.— 26. Georgia, 3d Ohio, 69th 
New York, forming 2d Brigade, 3d Division. 

Seventh Army Corps.— 1st North Carolina, 2d Illi- 
nois, 2d New Jersey, forming 1st Brigade, 2d Division. 

It has been my endeavor to fully and accurately 
present the condition of the War Department on April 
23d, and what was accomplished after the declaration 
of hostilities, solely with a view to showing the ob- 
stacles that had to be overcome, and to illustrate the 
intelligence, the devotion, and the patient courage of 
those who overcame them. If, between 1861 and 1898, 
our resources and our agencies of supply had been 
increased, the imminence of the emergency in 1898 
was correspondingly greater, and the results obtained 
during the first few months much more important and 
substantial. The first call for troops at the outbreak 
of the Civil War came in the same month as the first 
call for the war with Spain. By the end of May, 1898, 
we had mustered into service 163,626 new men. At 
the end of May, 1861, only 16,161 had been mustered 
in. In August, 1898, we had 274,717 men under arms. 
In 1861 that number had not been obtained until No- 

27 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

vember, three months later. All this took place not- 
withstanding the fact that after July the emergency 
of 1898 began to attenuate, whereas, in 1861, it grew 
in poignancy with every day. 

In a little over thirty days practically all of the 125,- 
000 volunteers of the first call had been mustered in, 
and, together with the available regular troops, were 
mobilized at Tampa, Mobile, Washington, and Chick- 
amauga Park. On May 25th, less than five weeks after 
the first call for troops, an expedition sailed from San 
Francisco for the Philippines. In less than seven 
weeks an army, 17,000 strong, set out for Santiago — 
our first invasion, with troops, of a foreign country in 
half a century. 



CHAPTER IV 

APPOINTMENTS AND IMPORTUNITIES 

THE life of the Secretary of War was not a happy- 
one in those days of active military operations. With 
over a quarter of a million men in the army, it seemed 
as if there was hardly a family in the United States 
that did not have a friend or relative in the service, 
and that for one reason or another some member from 
each of these found it necessary to write to, or personally 
visit, the War Office. Members of Congress, depart- 
mental and State officials cannot, as a rule, be denied 
audience. The office of the Secretary was daily visited 
by not less than one hundred persons whose business 
or position entitled them to a personal hearing. So 
urgent was the pressure that almost the entire day 
was given up to them. Therefore it became necessary 
to devote the greater part of the night and Sundays 
to the consideration of the administrative features 
of department work. The biographers of Secretary 
Stanton have testified that his experience was the same ; 
but the population of the country has nearly trebled 
since the Civil War, and, with the improved means of 
rapid transportation, every section has been brought 
within easy communication with the nation's capital. 
The pressure, therefore, was correspondingly greater 
than during the early sixties, when there was only 
the North to be considered. 

29 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Persons of all ages, conditions, politics, and ante- 
cedents — Senators, Representatives, national, State, 
and city officials from every part of the Union — visited 
the department. Many a disappointed contractor 
appealed his case to the Secretary, and usually pre- 
sented his claims for a hearing. There were men 
with advice as to plans of campaign, and many who 
came only to express their unsolicited opinion of the 
military conditions and affairs. 

Great and constant was the pressure for appoint- 
ments. Applicants, by mail and in person, would 
beg, appeal, and demand commissions. Before break- 
fast, and even after midnight, they besieged the Sec- 
retary's residence with a determination superb in its 
inflexibility. 

Once an applicant for office presented a card in the 
handwriting of Abraham Lincoln, which read: 

" Sec. of War, please see Major of the 6th Md. Regt., 

and give him good arms if possible. A. LINCOLN. 

"Oct. 7, 1862." 

This note, he claimed, had secured an audience 
with the Secretary of War in '62, and ought to entitle 
him to the same consideration in '98. One young 
seeker came from California to personally press his 
claim. When his disqualifications were explained to 
him, he replied, " But, Mr. Secretary, I have come all 
the way from the Pacific coast for this appointment, 
and that should certainly entitle me to some consid- 
eration." Still another applicant based his claims 
upon the statement that he " was a friend of the Prince 
of Wales." 

30 



APPOINTMENTS 

Of all the requests, however, received, perhaps the 
most unique was that which came from a young lady 
in Boston. Her note-paper, handwriting, and rhetoric 
vouched at least for the culture of the writer. Her 
request was simple and plainly worded. With much 
unfeigned earnestness she stated her case. The press 
despatches had announced that the volunteer regi- 
ment of which her brother was a member was to leave 
for Cuba on a fixed date. But the brother's birthday 
occurred two days after the date assigned for his em- 
barkation. A birthday box of cake, jellies, pies, etc., 
she said, had been forwarded to him, and would 
not be received if the regiment left on the date an- 
nounced. She naively asked that the regiment be 
detained until the sweetmeats arrived, as she was 
sure it would make no difference to the government, 
whereas it would be, "Oh, such a disappointment to 
my brother!" 

A majority of the young men seeking commissions 
in the army were animated by patriotic impulses, and 
most of them would have been a credit to the service. 
More than nine-tenths, however, had to be rejected. 
It became necessary for the President to make some 
appointments from civil life of second lieutenants in 
the regular army. These were equitably apportioned 
among the several States, and each candidate was 
required to pass a rigid mental and physical exam- 
ination. 

The number of acceptable young men desiring com- 
missions was so great that even minor bodily defi- 
ciencies were set up as disqualifications. One enthu- 
siastic youngster knew that he was slightly deficient 
in weight. When he took his physical examination, 

3i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

inquiry developed the fact that he had drunk four 
quarts of water to increase it. Another candidate — 
a college student — remained in bed three days "to 
stretch himself/' as he put it, and he is actually said 
to have overcome a three-eighths of an inch deficiency 
in height. 

For every man appointed, there were necessarily 
hundreds disappointed. The successful applicant, 
of course, withdrew from the uproar of solicitation, 
but the less fortunate aspirant and his many friends, 
political and otherwise, condemned the system of ap- 
pointments, and the Secretary of War, who was gen- 
erally supposed to have devised its limitations. 

There is no feature connected with the conduct of 
the War Department during the war with Spain so 
persistently misunderstood and misrepresented as the 
method of making appointments for the volunteer 
army. I doubt whether I was more vilified and slan- 
dered in any other connection. Yet there were not a 
dozen commissions issued during the entire Spanish- 
American War in which I had any personal interest. 
The appointments were made by the governors of 
the States and the President, and subsequent events 
have proved that in most instances the appointments 
of the latter were made wisely. 

The volunteer enlistments were confined to the regi- 
mental organizations of the several States. The act 
of Congress providing for raising volunteers espe- 
cially stipulated that all line appointments — that is, 
regimental officers from second lieutenants to colonels 
inclusive — as well as three regimental surgeons and 
one chaplain, were to be appointed by the governors 
of the several States, and the appointment of more 

32 



APPOINTMENTS 

than one regular officer in any one volunteer regiment 
was forbidden. In August, 1898, when the strength 
of the volunteer army reached its maximum limit, 
there were in the volunteer service 8,785 officers. The 
officers for the volunteer army appointed by the Pres- 
ident numbered, all told, 1,032. Of these, 441 were 
taken from the regular army, and but 591 from civil 
life.* Nearly one-fifth of the officers of the regular 
army were, therefore, given volunteer commissions. 
This was done at a time when the regular army had 
been more than doubled in size, and when many de- 
tails were required for the recruiting service. The 
scarcity of regimental officers in the regular service, 
owing to this cause, greatly embarrassed that army. 

The War Department requested of Congress au- 
thority to issue commissions for active service to re- 
tired army officers. This authority Congress denied. 
From the regular army was taken the maximum num- 
ber of officers consistent with its efficiency — an effi- 
ciency that is the rock upon which this country must 
build its hope for effective operations during the first 
few months of any war in which it may be engaged, 
so long as the militia is organized as it now is. 

For a little over a thousand appointments made by 
the President, as above stated, the number of applica- 
tions exceeded 25,000. Of the twenty-six major-gen- 
erals commissioned, nineteen were taken from the 
regular army, and seven from civil life. Of these 
seven, all but one were graduates of West Point, and 

* These figures are based upon a statement prepared by the Ad- 
jutant-General in July, 1899. In a publication from the Adjutant- 
General's office, bearing date of December 13, 1899, the statement is 
made that 453 officers of the regular army held commissions in the 
volunteers. 

33 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

all had distinguished themselves in a command of 
equal rank during the Civil War. One hundred and 
two brigadier-generals were appointed. Sixty-six were 
taken from the regular army, promotion in each case 
being based solely upon the efficiency record and mili- 
tary fitness. Of the thirty-six appointed from civil life, 
all were graduates of West Point or had seen service 
during the Civil War or on our Western frontier, and 
each had proven himself competent to command. 

In the general staff * the appointments from the reg- 
ular army were made with equal care. With scarce- 
ly an exception, the chief officer for every one of the 
departments of the general staff of every corps and 
division was an officer of the regular army. The 
list presented to the President for approval was com- 
piled from the efficiency records on file in the office of 
the Adjutant-General, and the President made his ap- 
pointments based upon these recommendations. 

The appointments from civil life were apportioned 
among the several States according to population. 
The War Department required that each applicant 
should give his age, education, and military expe- 
rience. An epitomized list by States, giving this in- 
formation, together with a reference to the persons 
vouching for the applicant, was prepared in the War 
Department and laid before the President. Experience 
proved that, taken as a whole, no better or more loyal 
body of men ever served their country. There were a 
few exceptions, but these were the inevitable failures. 

* The corps of the Adjutant- General, Inspector - General, Judp-e- 
Advocate - General, Quartermaster - General, Commissary - General, 
Surgeon-General, Paymaster-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of 
Ordnance, and Chief Signal Officer. 

34 



APPOINTMENTS 

The appointment of Major-General Shatter to com- 
mand in what proved to be the greatest expedition 
and land battles of the war was made upon the rec- 
ommendation of the major-general commanding the 
army, and at his request. The choice, as events 
proved, was an excellent one. 

The colonelcies of the three regiments of engineers 
were given to graduates of West Point and an eminent 
civil engineer, and in two regiments the lieutenant- 
colonels, and in the third the senior major, were taken 
from the regular army. The act authorizing the for- 
mation of this brigade forbade the assignment of more 
than three officers of the regulars to any one of these 
engineer regiments. The other commissions were is- 
sued only after examinations which tested the can- 
didates' fitness for engineering duties, and were ac- 
companied by the recommendations of the colonels of 
the several regiments. 

The officers of the ten "immune" regiments were 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Eight of these regiments 
were commanded by regular army officers. The other 
officers were commissioned under the rules for select- 
ing staff appointees from civil life. Four of the regi- 
ments were colored, and the first and second lieuten- 
ants thereof were obtained by promoting sergeants 
and corporals, then serving in the regular army, who 
merited such recognition. Many of the appointments 
in the six white regiments were likewise given to de- 
serving non-commissioned officers and men of the 
regular establishment. 

Every volunteer regiment, as a part of the quota of 
any State (that is, among the 200,000 volunteers of 

35 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the first and second calls), had one surgeon and two 
assistant surgeons, and, by law, these were appointed 
by the governors of the various States. Only ninety- 
five surgeons were appointed from civil life. These 
appointments, together with the 940 contract surgeons 
employed from June, 1898, to July, 1899, were made 
upon the recommendation of the Surgeon - General, 
who assured himself of the candidate's professional 
qualifications before recommendation. 

Not a volunteer officer commissioned by the Presi- 
dent was court-martialled during the war.* Of the 
eighty - seven paymasters commissioned, eighty - six 
were appointed from civil life. Not a dollar was de- 
faulted, and all accounts have been closed. These 
eighty-six paymasters were a part of the 591 volun- 
teers commissioned before mentioned. At great risk 
they took the money to the field with them, and 
there paid the army. In all the expenditures of every 
kind, aggregating upward of $200,000,000, no charge 
has been made of jobs or favoritism. This statement 
applies alike to all officers of the volunteer and reg- 
ular arnty. 

The War Investigation Commission, known as the 
Dodge Commission, after the examination of many 
camps and numerous witnesses, stated that "the 
young civilians who received staff and other appoint- 
ments in the main discharged their duties in a highly 
commendable manner." And further — 

* The act of March 2, 1899, authorized the organization of 35,000 
volunteers to he recruited at large for service in the Philippines. 
Twenty-five regiments were recruited under this authority. Of the 
1,210 officers, 983, or 81 per cent., were reappointments of volunteer 
officers or men who had served in the Spanish-American War. The 
remainder were officers and men of the regular army. 

36 



APPOINTMENTS 

" It is to be noted that the organization of the army indicated 
a desire on the part of the War Department to place in separate 
and responsible commands experienced officers of the regular 
army, and officers from civil life who had received a military 
education and had experience in the Civil War. The chiefs of the 
staff departments in the field were selected from a similar class 
of officers. They took charge of the depots of supplies at the 
camps and were assigned the most responsible positions. So 
many officers of the regular army commanded, supplied, and su- 
perintended the movement of troops that the service was mark- 
edly reduced in its field, line, and staff. 

" The rapidity with which commanding officers of corps, divi- 
sions, brigades, regiments, and officers of the staff departments 
have profited by the first six months' service is shown in the im- 
provements in the new camps, their location, water supply, and 
sanitary arrangements. The weak spots in the first arrange- 
ments for camping troops were soon discovered, and it was learn- 
ed that with proper system and little expense they could be camp- 
ed under favorable sanitary conditions. The present camps 
are models, the hospitals adapted to the comfort and care of the 
sick, the grounds clean, and the sanitary conditions greatly im- 
proved. The troops are now moved with promptness, without 
friction, and with more rapidity than in the beginning of the war. 
These improvements have come from experience, and the new 
army now is far advanced in facilities for feeding, equipping, 
camping, and transportation." 

The task of organization, however, was attended 
by still other difficulties. About the 13th of May, 
while the department was passing through the period 
of its greatest activity, it was reported in New York 
City that a Spanish fleet had been seen off Sandy 
Hook. 

The possible appearance of a Spanish fleet on the 
Atlantic coast was not entirely unexpected. On the 
29th of April the Secretary of the Navy had thus writ- 
ten Admiral Sampson : 

37 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

"It has of course been suspected that the destination of the 
four Spanish armored cruisers and torpedo destroyers might be 
on the Atlantic coast of the United States, probably at the north- 
ward, for the purpose of inflicting what injury they could upon 
our coastwise cities and towns." 

When the rumor of the appearance of the Span- 
ish fleet off New York was made known in Washing- 
ton, the major-general commanding immediately tele- 
graphed to the chief quartermaster in New York as 
follows : 

" Report at once any information about Spanish war-boats on 
our coast. Give full information. Hold transports until further 
orders. Acknowledge. ' ' 

A New York regiment was already embarking for 
Tampa, but the men were taken ashore in great haste 
and sent South by rail. The alarm quickly spread 
to every coast town on the Atlantic. It is even re- 
ported that in Boston and some of the other cities, 
towns, and fashionable watering-places on the New 
England coast, treasures and valuables were moved 
into the interior for safe-keeping. 

The calls made upon the department about this 
time for immediate rescue from the advancing Span- 
ish fleet were pathetic in their urgency. Telegrams, 
letters, and statesmen representing the imperilled 
localities poured into the War Department. They 
wanted guns everywhere; mines in all the rivers 
and harbors on the map; and their demands, joined 
with the tempestuous importunings of the appli- 
cants for appointments, lent to that period of the 
Secretary's life an affliction which it is difficult to find 
appropriate words to describe. It may be said, how- 

38 



APPOINTMENTS 

ever, that in a short time the Atlantic coast, owing to 
the energetic work of the Engineer and Ordnance 
departments, bristled with defensive artillery, from 
the relics of the Civil War to the latest products of mil- 
itary science, mounted on carriages of every variety 
and age. Mines were laid which would have destroyed 
the combined navies of the world, and for the removal 
of which a few weeks later the department was again 
importuned by those who had been only a little while 
before most insistent for their immediate installation. 

The increased army had hardly been organized be- 
fore the clamor for discharge from the service began. 
The report of every battle, or death from disease, nat- 
urally frightened the friends and relatives of the 
soldiers who had recently entered the service, and 
they requested their discharge. These requests were 
more often from their families or sweethearts than 
from the soldiers themselves; but they nevertheless 
came in large numbers, and did not cease with the 
end of the war. There were instances where rela- 
tives or friends of enlisted men came all the way from 
the Pacific coast to secure the discharge of volunteers 
on no other grounds than that they were " wanted at 
home by their mothers." With few exceptions, it was 
impossible to listen to these appeals, but every con- 
ceivable excuse was made to get into the Secretary's 
presence and urge them personally. 

The persistent clamor of the office-seeker, the ap- 
peal of those who wished to leave the service, the de- 
mands of the sea-coast cities and towns for immediate 
and impossible protection, and the savage criticism 
of the military administration, plans of campaign 
and battle, with the apparently endless lists of short- 

39 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

comings and grievances, have left an ineffaceable im- 
press of time and experience upon the weary shoulders 
of those in authority. One remembers Byron's couplet : 

" A man must serve his time to every trade 
Save censure — critics all are ready made." 



CHAPTER V 
PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

THE purely strategic aspects of the war, should 
war ensue, had received much consideration before 
the inauguration of hostilities. Even those who were 
opposed to conflict, and who resorted to every expedient 
to prevent it, finally realized that war was inevitable, 
and that it would be the part of wisdom to prepare for 
the crisis so far as might be done without committing an 
overt act, or incurring the reproach of deliberate prov- 
ocation. The government was well within its rights 
in making any change of station of the regulars, and 
also in hastening the work on coast and harbor de- 
fence — work authorized by Congress years before, and 
legitimately part of our national scheme of armament. 

The information in possession of the War Depart- 
ment showed that Spain had in Cuba more than 80,000 
effective regular troops — the remnant of the 214,000 
reputed to have been sent to suppress the insurrection. 
There were, moreover, 20,000 to 30,000 volunteers in 
Havana, and several thousands of the " Civil Guards " 
and guerillas, the latter being chiefly negroes. It was 
also reported that the Spaniards had 183 guns, for the 
most part concentrated at Havana. As the rainy, or 
"sickly," season was due within a month, and was 
likely to last until the middle of September, it was de- 
termined that the wisest course would be to devote the 

4i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the vol- 
unteers, and to make such harassing incursions into 
Cuba as might seem to be practicable. 

Before entering upon a consideration of the various 
plans proposed at different times — many of which 
were subsequently brushed away by the march of 
events — it should be mentioned that certain expe- 
ditions were made into the interior of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, having in view the procurement of military in- 
formation and the delivery to the Cuban insurgent 
leaders of arms, ammunition, and stores. 

During the first days of May, Lieutenant H. H. 
Whitney, 4th United States Artillery, undertook and 
carried out successfully a reconnoissance in Puerto 
Rico. Certain newspapers, with a criminal disregard 
for his personal safety, to say nothing of the govern- 
ment's plans, took pains, as soon as he had sailed, to 
publish, with the utmost attention to detail, not only 
the fact, but the purpose of his mission. The result 
was, of course, that when the foreign merchantman, 
with Whitney on board, touched Puerto Rico, she found 
the Spanish officials awaiting her. The ship was 
boarded and carefully searched, but the American 
officer was hard at work in the furnace-room, "stok- 
ing" like a professional, and thoroughly disguised 
in sweat and coal-dust. He landed at last, and, un- 
der a different disguise, made a thorough inspection 
of the southern part of the island. The information 
thus obtained was of great value to our army when 
it was disembarked in the latter part of July at 
Guanica. 

During May and June there were three separate 
expeditions to Cuba which had for their object the 

42 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

delivery to the insurgents of supplies and munitions 
of war. The enterprise known as the " Gussie ex- 
pedition/' commanded by Captain J. H. Dorst, of 
the 4th Cavalry, was the first detachment of United 
States troops landed on Cuban soil. It sailed from 
Tampa on the 12th of May, with Companies E and 
G of the 1st Infantry, under Captain John J. O'Connell, 
and was convoyed by the gunboats Wasp and Man- 
ning. A landing was effected at Point Abolitas, near 
Cabanas, some forty miles west of Havana. With- 
in fifteen minutes after disembarkation our force 
met and repulsed a Spanish regiment (1,200 strong) 
under Colonel Balboeis, who was killed, together with 
several of his men. We had no casualties. The 
second expedition, also under Captain Dorst, left 
Tampa in the latter part of May. Disembarkation 
was effected at Port Banes, on the northern coast, 
almost exactly opposite Santiago, on the southern. 
Through the agency of this enterprise the insurgents 
received 7,500 Springfield rifles, 1,300,000 rounds of 
.45 -caliber ammunition, and 20,000 rations. Still 
another undertaking of the same character sailed 
from Tampa, on the 21st of June, under command 
of Lieutenant C. P. Johnson, and consisted of a troop 
of the loth (colored) Cavalry and 375 armed Cubans. 
It took a large quantity of arms, ammunition, com- 
missary, and quartermaster supplies for the insur- 
gents. The expedition was attended by the Fanita 
and Florida. An unsuccessful attempt was made 
to land at Tunas, on the south coast, virtually midway 
between the eastern and western extremities of the 
island. The disembarkation was finally effected at 
Palo Alto, some forty miles distant, where, after a 

43 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

spirited engagement, in which we had one man killed 
and seven wounded, the supplies were put ashore and 
communication was established with General Gomez. 

These preliminary expeditions fulfilled their pur- 
pose. They were carried out thoroughly, gallantly, 
and with the loss of but one life. 

When war was declared, a very large proportion 
of the regular army was at Tampa, to which place 
General Shafter had been transferred from New Or- 
leans. Soon thereafter he went under orders to Wash- 
ington to receive instructions, and was at once placed 
in command of an expedition of about 5,000 men. 
It was intended at that time to make Tunas, a point 
on the southern Cuban coast, about seventy miles 
east of Cienfuegos, the destination. Here General 
Shafter was to open communication with Gomez, then 
reported to be operating in that district, ascertain his 
exact milita^ strength and resources, supply him 
with such munitions of war as might be necessary, 
and harass the Spanish forces as far as possible with- 
out bringing on a general engagement. The follow- 
ing are the instructions then given General Shafter : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, D. C, April 29, 1898. 
" Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, United States Army, 
Washington, D. C. 
" SIR, — The following letter of instructions is sent you for your 
guidance : 

" By authority of the Secretary of War, you are hereby directed 
to assume command of an expedition composed of Company 

E, Corps of Engineers ; the 9th Cavalry ; Light Batteries A and 

F, 2d Artillery, C and F, 3d Artillery, B and F, 4th Artillery, 
and D and F, 5th Artillery; the 1st, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 22d, 

44 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

and 24th Infantry, and all necessary quartermaster, commissary, 
and medical supplies; pontoon train, arms, and ammunition 
sufficient to engage the Spanish troops; with a very limited 
amount of transportation ; and proceed with your expedition from 
Tampa, Florida, to the south side of Cuba, under convoy of 
the ships of the United States navy, and land your force, or 
such portion of it as you may deem advisable, and penetrate 
far enough into the interior to form a junction, if practicable, with 
General Gomez's forces. Issue to them all the arms, ammuni- 
tion, and supplies that may be required, giving them all aid, 
support, and succor possible. Returning your command to 
your ships, proceed to the northwest coast of Cuba, communicate 
with the commanders of our naval ships of fleet, and endeavor 
to send arms and supplies to the insurgents on that coast, as cir- 
cumstances may warrant, unless you shall have received satis- 
factory information that the Spanish fleet has crossed the Atlan- 
tic and proceeded to Cuban waters. On receipt of such informa- 
tion, you will move your command to the nearest place of safety 
on our coast, and relieve your convoys, to enable them to join our 
fleet. In landing on Cuban soil, you will endeavor to select the 
most healthful location and avoid exposing your command to 
the yellow-fever or other epidemics of the island. It is not ex- 
pected that you will penetrate farther into the interior than to 
form a junction with General Gomez, to render him all assistance 
possible; and you are not expected to have your command on 
the island of Cuba but a few days. This expedition is in the 
nature of a reconnoissance in force, to give aid and succor to the 
insurgents, to render the Spanish forces as much injury as pos- 
sible, and avoiding serious injury to your own command. 

" In conducting this enterprise great confidence is placed in 
your zeal, judicious management, and good judgment. You will 
report all important information at every opportunity. 

" By command of Major-General Miles. 

"H. C. CORBIN, 

" Adjutant-General." 

As is well known, this expedition did not sail, for 
the reason that the Spanish fleet had been reported 

45 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

about that time at the Cape Verde Islands. Portu- 
gal's proclamation of neutrality compelled Cervera 
to leave those islands on the very day upon which 
General Shafter received his orders. Our next infor- 
mation concerning this fleet was that it had steamed 
westward, and this left but one logical theory, to wit : 
that Cervera had in mind the relief of Havana, in- 
volving, of course, an attack upon our blockading 
fleet. Naturally, under the circumstances, the ex- 
pedition to Tunas was abandoned. 

On the 2d of May a conference was held at the 
Executive Mansion for the purpose of discussing 
questions of military policy and plans of campaign. 
Those called in consultation by the President were the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Major- 
General Commanding, and Admiral Sicard. The 
result of the conference was a decision to send a force 
to Cuba with a view to formally investing the city 
of Havana. In pursuit of this plan, the first expedi- 
tion was to disembark at Mariel, a point about twenty- 
six miles west of Havana where there was a good 
harbor which would be well adapted to our purpose 
under reasonably favorable conditions. fThe objec- 
tions to the Tunas enterprise on the south coast did 
not apply in the case of Mariel, for the blockading 
fleet could conveniently protect our transports on 
the voyage from Tampa to that port. There was 
to be a vanguard sufficiently strong to seize and hold 
Mariel and occupy its immediate vicinity. For this 
purpose the whole of the regular army then at Tampa 
or otherwise available would be used. The plan pro- 
vided for the establishment at the point mentioned, 
or near it, of a fortified position to use as a base 

46 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

of military operation and a depot of supply. This 
accomplished, the force could be rapidly increased 
and Havana deliberately approached. Mariel offered 
many advantages in addition to its excellent harbor. 
It had high ground for camping purposes, and an 
abundance of good water. General Shaffer's new 
instructions were communicated to him thus : 

" Adjutant-General's Office, 

" Washington, May 9, 1898. 

" (Sent 6.07 A.M.) 
" General Wade, commanding troops at Tampa, Fla. 

" With the approval of the Secretary of War, the major-general 
commanding directs that General Shafter move his command, 
under protection of navy, and seize and hold Mariel or most im- 
portant point on north coast of Cuba and where territory is ample 
to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the 
forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as pos- 
sible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully 
equipped ; send abundance of ammunition, and ship with them 
food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four 
months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt. 

"H. C. CORBIN, 

" Adjutant-General." 

Congress was asked for a specific appropriation, 
and responded with a fund of $350,000 to be 
used in connection with "the expeditionary force 
to Cuba." 

While preparations for this new and most important 
move were under full headway, word came that Cer- 
vera's fleet had appeared off the island of Martinique, 
a few hundred miles southeast of Cuba. This sug- 
gested an attempt to relieve Havana, as before stated, 
and the thought of a possible descent upon our Atlan- 

47 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

tic coast. The Secretary of War therefore counter- 
manded, on the 13th of May, the orders previously 
issued looking to a landing at Mariel. Six days 
later, through the agency of an American telegraph 
company, the government was apprised of the entry 
into Santiago Harbor of Cervera's fleet. Ten days 
afterwards, on the 29th, the fact was confirmed by 
Admiral Schley, then cruising in search of the Span- 
iards. This definite information concerning the 
whereabouts of Cervera compelled the Government 
to lay aside all the plans that had been considered or 
formulated up to that time.* 

During this period numerous conferences were held 
at the Executive Mansion for the purpose of consider- 
ing plans of campaign. Besides the Secretary of 
War the President frequently called other members 
of the Cabinet and General Miles. The first consid- 
eration was, of course, the Santiago expedition ; the 
capture of Puerto Rico was likewise discussed, but 
this movement was regarded as of secondary im- 
portance. The Secretary of War directed General 
Miles to formulate a scheme of operation based 
upon the plans discussed at these conferences. In 
obedience to these instructions he submitted the 
following : 

* Says Count von Moltke, in his Franco-German War': 

" It is a delusion to believe that a plan of war may be laid for a pro- 
longed period and carried out in every point. The first collision with 
the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the result. 
Some things decided upon will be impracticable ; others, which origi- 
nally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an 
army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for 
the best for an unknown period, and carry out his purpose unflinch- 
ingly." 

48 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, D. C, May 26, 1898. 
" The honorable the Secretary 0/ War. 

" SIR, — I have the honor to submit the following : 

" As you are aware, the available force of the regular army, 
numbering some 17,000 men, has been ready for the field from 
the day that the government decided to take war measures against 
the Spanish government, and, as it will be remembered, my first 
purpose was to form a junction with Gomez's troops on the south 
coast of Cuba, in Santa Clara province. This movement was 
delayed, as the navy reported that it could not well furnish the 
convoys and desired all of their available ships to meet the 
Spanish fleet. When it was reported that the Spanish fleet had re- 
turned to Cadiz, transports were gathered in the Gulf to move a por- 
tion of the army to Cuba, and are now in readiness for that purpose. 

" In view of the fact that the volunteer army is neither equipped 
nor instructed, or even supplied with ammunition sufficient to 
fight a battle, I deem it advisable to suggest the use of the avail- 
able force now on the Gulf in the following manner : 

" According to all accounts, the Spanish fleet is divided, a small 
portion being in Cuban waters and the remainder at Cadiz, on 
the coast of Spain. If the ships and torpedo-boats under the 
command of Admiral Cervera have been enclosed in the harbor of 
Santiago de Cuba, I suggest that the military forces go at once to 
the assistance of the navy, and by landing fifteen miles east of 
Santiago de Cuba, at Daiquiri, move over the low mountains tow- 
ards Santiago de Cuba, where, by placing the artillery in posi- 
tion, they can command the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and 
with field and siege guns would be able to destroy the fleet by a 
plunging fire, or at least assist our navy in entering the harbor, 
thereby destroying or capturing the Spanish fleet as well as the 
garrison occupying that vicinity. We can also communicate 
with General Garcia, who has 8,000 men in Santiago de Cuba 
province, which would assist in the capture of the garrison. 
This might be considered the first movement. 

" Second, if it shall be found, before the above movements can 
be accomplished, that the Spanish fleet has escaped from San- 
tiago de Cuba or shall have been captured by our fleet, it would 
be well, in my judgment, to capture the island of Puerto Rico by 

49 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

a combined attack of the army and navy with the least possible 
delay. Twenty-five thousand men of the army, principally ar- 
tillery and infantry, with the assistance of the fleet, will, in my 
judgment, be sufficient to capture that island. 

" While either of these movements is being accomplished, addi- 
tional arms can be sent to Lieutenant-General Garcia, who can 
equip 15,000 additional troops, making his army 23,000 men. 
He now practically has possession of the provinces of Puerto 
Principe and Santiago de Cuba. 

" When either of the two movements above indicated has been 
accomplished, our troops can occupy the harbors of Bahia de Nipe 
and Bahia de Banes. (This last-named harbor is now controlled 
by Garcia's troops.) Also the harbors of Puerto de Bibara, Puerto 
Padre, Puerto Maniti, Sabana la Mar, but more especially Puerto 
de Nuevitas, can be occupied. The capture of these ports will 
have to depend upon circumstances. The occupation of the last 
named and the railroad to Puerto Principe, one of the principal 
cities of Cuba, will furnish a most excellent base for the move- 
ment of the cavalry and a small force of light artillery in con- 
junction with the Cuban forces, moving thence west in the prov- 
ince of Santa Clara, where a junction could be made with Gomez's 
forces. Our forces would then be in possession of at least two- 
thirds of the island of Cuba, supported by all of the available 
forces of Garcia and Gomez. By that time our volunteer troops 
will be equipped and prepared to assume active operations for 
the complete occupation of the remainder of the island, either 
landing in the vicinity of Matanzas, Mariel, or Havana, as is 
deemed most expedient at that time. This, in my judgment, would 
add to the greatest discomfort of the Spanish forces. It would 
unite all of the elements against the Spanish forces, with the least 
exposure to fever, and during the rainy season can best be ac- 
complished of any practicable military operations. 

" We will have a cavalry force much superior to the cavalry on the 
island, and it can be reinforced at any time it is deemed advisable. 

" Of course our ships, which are necessary to accomplish the 
objects specified, should at all times have the safe convoy of the 
ships of the navy. Very respectfully, 

" Nelson A. Miles, 
" Major-General Commanding." 
50 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

"Washington, D. C, May 27, 1898. 
" Tlte honorable the Secretary of War. 

" SIR, — Referring to my letter of yesterday and to our consul- 
tation since, I desire to submit the following : 

" As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations 
in conjunction with the navy, I think it would be advisable to load 
the transports at Tampa with a strong force of infantry and ar- 
tillery, move them to Key West, and thence along the northern 
coast of Cuba, where they would have the full protection of Ad- 
miral Sampson's fleet until they reach Admiral Schley's fleet 
at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the army 
and navy, capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish 
fleet at that point. 

" If, before reaching Admiral Schley's fleet, it shall be found 
that he has already accomplished the above object, or that the 
Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I then urge the importance of a 
combined attack of the army and navy upon Puerto Rico. We 
will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a com- 
bined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, 
provided it is done before it can be reinforced from Spain. The 
distance from Key West to Puerto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from 
Cadiz, Spain, to Puerto Rico it is 4,000 miles. The possession of 
Puerto Rico would be of very great advantage to the military, as 
it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand 
prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would 
be a most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily 
relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we 
could leave a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that 
might be sent against it. 

" Then we should commence, in my judgment, a movement tow- 
ards the west by capturing the ports along the northern coast of 
Cuba, at the eastern end, supplying the insurgents with abun- 
dance of arms and munitions of war, and as speedily as possible 
land our cavalry and sufficient light artillery to enable them to 
move from the harbor of Puerto de Nuevitas along the line of rail- 
road to Puerto Principe. From that base our cavalry and light 
artillery, in conjunction with the forces of Lieutenant-General 
Garcia and General Gomez, should move west to near Santa Clara. 

51 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished 
during the rainy season, through a country comparatively free 
from yellow - fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass 
sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished, our 
volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, 
Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture 
or destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. 
The advantage of this movement will be that the army and navy 
will act in concert and close unison; that it does not divide our 
navy, and that it will utilize our most available military force 
in the best way during the time of the year when military opera- 
tions are most difficult. 

" I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be ob- 
structed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage 
than to send the army there, where it would have to meet a 
strong garrison, which is already there, and all the forces that 
can be quickly sent there by rail directly from Havana and 
Matanzas. 

" If the above plan is approved, troops could be ordered to em- 
bark on the transports immediately, and the purpose would be 
the occupation of Spanish territory, first by moving our troops 
as speedily as possible to Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Rico, and 
later to the north coast of Cuba, especially our cavalry, this mili- 
tary occupation to continue until hostilities cease. 

" Very respectfully, NELSON A. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

The "movement towards the west" referred to in 
these letters was General Miles 's own conception. 
The plan embraced an attempted landing at Puerto de 
Nuevitas of a large cavalry force, to be moved along 
the railroad to its terminus at Puerto Principe, and 
thence over the Cuban roads to Havana, a distance 
of 345 miles, although the direct course to Havana by- 
sea from Tampa was shorter than to Nuevitas, whence 
over the route proposed the troops would have been 
400 miles distant. 

52 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

The plan required, moreover, the capture, as a base 
of supplies, of the city of Puerto Principe. The most 
reliable information in the possession of the War De- 
partment concerning Cuba indicated that the seizure 
of this place, so important to the plan, would not have 
been an easy matter. The collection of Military 
Notes on Cuba, published by the Military Information 
Division of the War Department, described the de- 
fences of Puerto Principe (a city of 25,102 inhabitants, 
according to the census of 1899) as consisting of fifty- 
four works, block-houses, and wire entanglements. 
This book, which the War Department placed at the 
disposal of every officer, also contains the information 
that Puerto Principe was the " headquarters of the 
Spanish troops in the province" of the same name, 
and that "the town is heavily garrisoned, and is re- 
garded by the Spaniards as a very important place." 
Moreover, " yellow- fever prevails sometimes." 

The general was so taken with this plan, however, 
that he referred to it again in a third letter, which read 
thus : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

"Washington, D. C, June 24, 1898. 
" The honorable the Secretary of War. 

" SIR,— I have the honor to submit the following : 
" With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it is expected we will 
have several thousand Spanish prisoners, and with the capture 
of the second objective position, now under consideration, it is 
expected we will add to the number, making, it is hoped, in the 
aggregate at least 30,000 prisoners. 

" After the capture of the position next after Santiago de Cuba 
it would be, in my judgment, advisable to take some deep-water 
harbors on the northern coast of Cuba, which would be available, 
not only for our army, but also for the navy, as safe ports for 
our transports, supply - ships, and naval vessels between Key 

53 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

West and Puerto Rico. It is also important that we should select 
some point at which to disembark our mounted troops and light 
artillery, with which our government is well supplied. We will 
have in a few weeks upward of 15,000 cavalry. This force, with 
the light artillery and a small body of infantry, will make a most 
formidable army corps with which to conduct a campaign in the 
interior of Cuba. 

" The most available point, it appears to me, would be the 
harbor of Nue vitas, which has 28^ feet of water. From there 
the command could move to Puerto Principe, one of the principal 
cities in the island of Cuba. Using that as a base, it could move 
through the rolling country, which is reported to be free from 
yellow - fever, to Moron and Taguayabon, and thence to Villa 
Clara ; or, by a more southern route, from Puerto Principe to Ciego 
de Avila, thence to Spiritus, and thence to Villa Clara. A road 
could be built at the rate of five miles per day as that army corps 
marches ; also, we could find two railroad bases between Puerto 
Principe and Villa Clara. 

" To move the mounted troops over from Florida to Cuba and 
make this march would undoubtedly consume the time up to 
nearly the 30th of September. 

" This army corps would also have the assistance of all the 
available forces of Garcia and Gomez, and would by that time 
be occupying practically two-thirds of the island of Cuba. 

" If no serious forces were encountered, this army corps could 
continue its march to the south side of Havana. If a large force 
of Spanish troops sufficient to check its march were moved to the 
vicinity of Villa Clara, then the entire army with which we pur- 
pose to invade Cuba could be moved between the forces at Villa 
Clara and Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and defeating 
them in detail. 

" I make this suggestion as having three advantages : First, 
we could employ at reasonable compensation such prisoners as 
desired occupation in road building ; second, we could move into 
the interior of Cuba our large cavalry command without serious 
molestation ; third, we would be operating during the rainy or 
sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba, practically 
free from yellow-fever, and at the same time be occupying a large 
portion of the enemy's territory. 

54 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

" If this proposition does not meet with favor, then, after the 
capture of Santiago de Cuba and other places to the east, we could 
move the entire force to the west of Havana and conduct the cam- 
paign from the deep harbors on that coast. My judgment, how- 
ever, is decidedly in favor of the first plan of campaign. 

" Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have up- 
ward of 50,000 prisoners, and if we could by judicious, humane 
treatment use them in a way that would be advantageous to them- 
selves as well as to our interests I think it would be advisable. 
There would be one great danger in moving them to our own ter- 
ritory and establishing a large camp of prisoners, and that is 
that they would bring the germs of disease with them and spread 
them among our own people, as many Americans would have 
to be employed on the ships and railroads together with the guards 
necessary to control them. Very respectfully, 

" Nelson A. Miles, 
" Major-General Commanding." 

This plan was so evidently impossible and imprac- 
ticable as to need little argument to so prove it. But 
it is, perhaps, well to say that, owing to the want of 
depth, tortuous character, and length (six miles) of 
the channel leading to the harbor of Nuevitas, it would 
have been impossible for vessels drawing more than 
fifteen feet to come nearer than fifteen miles of the 
town. This would have necessitated the lightering 
of the 15,000 or more horses, in addition to the men 
and supplies, over a distance of fifteen miles. The 
experience of Shafter's army at Siboney makes un- 
necessary any remarks on this feature of the plan. 
Moreover, to ration 15,000 cavalry and 30,000 prison- 
ers (the minimum number here proposed), assuming 
that it would be possible to force Spanish prisoners to 
work, would require ninety tons of food a day. Al- 
though the experience about Santiago demonstrated 
that a road could not be constructed in Cuba by our 

55 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

own men in the hot and rainy season at the rate 
of five miles, or even one mile, a day, assuming that 
roads could be built at the rate of five miles a day, 
the first day out and back would be a distance of ten 
miles for the supply- wagons, the next day twenty, 
the third day thirty, the fourth day forty miles, and 
so on. 

The landing and shipping of ninety tons a day over 
a road with little rolling stock, from Nuevitas to Puerto 
Principe, a distance of fifty miles, and thence loading 
upon wagons and hauling over a newly made road, 
where the first day out the wagons would have cut 
the roads hub-deep; the pitching of camps and hos- 
pitals every night; striking them each morning, and 
moving and pitching them again on wet land; taking 
the sick, or leaving them along the route ; the burying 
of the dead; the suffering of the men during the rainy 
season; the guarding of the whole line against gue- 
rillas or raiders; and, from a military point of view, 
putting the entire cavalry force of the United States 
where, if needed in an emergency, it would have been 
impossible to have shipped it — there being no seaport 
where transports could take them aboard, except on 
lighters — would have been an unnecessary risk and an 
inexcusable blunder. Besides, the general had known 
that there were not vessels enough in the Shatter expe- 
dition to have taken the cavalry and 15,000 horses and 
the artillery horses, had they been devoted entirely to 
their transportation ; and when one looks at the propo- 
sition, starting on a 350-mile march, through a sparsely 
settled country, to get to a point for operations three 
months hence, where we could land under the cover 
of our battle-ships in a day, coming direct from the 

56 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

United States, it is easily discovered how infeasi- 
ble it is. 

If history, as well as our own experience, has prov- 
en anything, it has certainly demonstrated what was 
already known to the War Department before the war 
with Spain: that operations in the tropics by unac- 
climated troops during the rainy season are invaria- 
bly accompanied by epidemics of sickness and great 
mortality the world over. The proposed employment 
of Spanish prisoners, exceeding in number our own 
army of invasion, was highly impracticable; the 
transportation of food and supplies to an army op- 
erating in the enemy's country and hampered by a 
large number of prisoners, each day more removed 
from its base of supplies, was both infeasible and 
impossible; and campaigning in Cuba during the 
summer months, under such conditions, would have 
resulted in a disaster which I shudder to contemplate. 

This proposition, however, was only one of numer- 
ous others which were not approved. Many of the 
general's proposals were obviously impracticable, 
and not infrequently absolutely impossible. He rec- 
ommended the shipment of 12,000 men to Key West, 
where all drinking-water would have to be brought in 
tank-ships; with our hands full at Santiago, and not 
enough troops there, he proposed to send " a battery of 
artillery and a regiment of infantry," as an expedition 
to the Isle of Pines, then of no military or strategic 
importance. He insisted on sending to Cuba, for use 
with infantry operating in a tropical jungle and over 
a country impassable to vehicles, his "portable" 
shields, each weighing 1,000 pounds and each occu- 
pying as much room on a transport as a hospital am- 

57 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

bulance; he recommended the abandonment of San- 
tiago, after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed, there- 
by lifting the siege of the city and large garrison, 
without reaping the fruits of victory then practically 
in our hands; he wanted 500 marines of the navy 
placed under his control; he expressed the opinion 
that a proposed force of 16,452 men, mostly volunteers, 
was "10,000 more than will be required" for General 
Merritt's Philippine expedition; and while in Puerto 
Rico he cabled to the War Department a recommenda- 
tion that " the manufacture of Springfield rifles, .45- 
caliber ammunition, all white canvas tentage, and 
black-leather equipments of every description be dis- 
continued, as they are obsolete and should not be a 
part of the army equipment." In answer to this last 
recommendation the following despatch was sent: 

" War Department, August 3, 1898. 
" General Miles, Puerto Rico. 

" As you ought to know, the last calibre .45 Springfield rifle 
was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless-powder cartridges 
are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I suggest 
that you get along with what the government has on hand. . . . 

"R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War." 

During the week in which war was declared he rec- 
ommended that the manufacture of Krag-Jorgensen 
rifles " be reduced to the minimum, if not entirely 
suspended," advising at the same time the substitu- 
tion of another small-arm twice previously rejected 
by the military experts who had selected the adopted 
type of gun then in the hands of our regular army. 
Of the general's numerous disapproved recommenda- 

58 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

tions, none demonstrated his lack of judgment more 
than this. To suddenly change the type of the mag- 
azine rifle meant also a change in the machinery and 
methods of the government armory, where these 
arms are made. Even if his recommendations in 
this respect enjoyed the advantage of some reason 
or excuse, a crisis like the outbreak of a war is not 
the time to change the type of arms or the machinery 
for their manufacture. 

Moreover, the law making appropriations for the 
manufacture of arms at the Springfield armory al- 
waj^s designates the model of the gun to be fabricated, 
a fact which the president of the Board of Ordnance 
and Fortification and the officer bearing the highest 
rank in the army certainly should have known. 

It was decided that General Shafter should com- 
mand the Santiago expedition, otherwise known as 
the 5th Corps, and after sailing orders had been is- 
sued to him, General Miles was directed to organ- 
ize an expedition to Puerto Rico. Upon the capture 
of Santiago, which it was then believed would re- 
quire but a short time, General Shafter and his force 
were to rendezvous at Nipe and there join the army 
for Puerto Rico, to be organized by General Miles, who 
was to command in person both forces when thus 
united. 

It soon developed, however, that General Miles re- 
garded the Puerto Rican movement of greater impor- 
tance than the expedition to Santiago. On the 6th 
of June, the day before the 5th Corps was ordered to 
sail from Tampa, General Miles recommended the 
abandonment of the movement to Santiago until 
after the taking of Puerto Rico. He submitted this 

59 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

proposition in answer to a despatch asking him how 
soon he could organize an independent command 
for the capture of Puerto Rico : 

"Tampa, Fla., June 6, 1898. 
"(Received 8.27 P.M.) 
" Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" Believe such a force can be ready as soon as sufficient trans- 
ports could be gathered for 30,000 volunteers. Will inform you 
definitely as soon as reports can be received as to exact condi- 
tion of regiments and batteries. This corps has been organized 
and equipped in part for that purpose, and I believe it sufficient. 
I offer the following merely as a suggestion: To leave No. I 
safely guarded. This corps, with the combined assistance of the 
navy, to take No. 2 first before it can be reinforced. In order 
to make sure of this, have it followed by 10,000 additional volun- 
teers as quickly as transportation can be secured, utilizing what 
transports are now engaged, and prize steamers now at Key West, 
and any Atlantic auxiliary cruisers that can be spared by the 
navy. Such a force ought to sail in ten days. Leaving suf- 
ficient force to hold No. 2, the capture of No. 1 can then be easily 
accomplished, and the troops then landed at any point that might 
be thought advisable. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding Army." 

Translated into plain English this plan proposed 
an invasion of Puerto Rico (No. 2), leaving Santiago 
(No. 1) "safely guarded" — whatever that might 
mean. The occupation of Puerto Rico having been 
accomplished, the army then to return to Santiago, 
leaving a guard behind to take care of No. 2, and 
promptly crush the Spanish power in Cuba, begin- 
ning with Santiago. The impracticability of this 
proposition is sufficiently apparent to account for the 
emphatic disapproval of General Miles's plans made 
known to him in the following despatch : 

60 



PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 

" War Department, June 6, 1898. 
" Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. 

" The President says no. He urges the utmost haste in depart- 
ure of No. 1, and also of No. 2, as indicated by you, but that No. 
1 must be taken first. R. A. ALGER, 

'• Secretary of War." 

However, on the evening of June 7th, and after 
General Shafter had been ordered to sail, General 
Miles was thus instructed : 

"Washington, June 7, 1898—10 p.m. 
" Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. 

" As you reported that an expedition to Puerto Rico (with 30,000 
troops) can be ready in ten days, you are directed to assemble 
such troops at once for the purpose. The transports will be ready 
for you in ten days or sooner, if you can be ready. Acknowledge 
receipt." 

On the 8th of July, more than thirty days after the 
orders were issued, General Miles sailed from Charles- 
ton with about 4,000 men, touching en route at San- 
tiago. Towards the end of the month, the 20th to 
28th, the other commands of the expedition which 
meanwhile had been organized by Generals Brooke, 
Wilson, and Schwan, embarked from Charleston, 
Newport News, and Tampa, to join General Miles's 
army on the Puerto Rican coast. 



CHAPTER VI 

EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

EVENTS crowded hard upon one another during the 
month of May. As a result of the uncertain move- 
ments of the Spanish fleet, the expedition to Tunas 
was indefinitely postponed, and when the enemy's 
squadron finally took refuge in the harbor of San- 
tiago, the proposed movement to Mariel was also 
necessarily abandoned. 

The capture or destruction of Cervera's ships be- 
came now of primal importance, taking precedence of 
any military operation. Within 1,000 miles of Tampa 
lay these ships — a menace to every plan of cam- 
paign involving the ocean transportation of troops, 
a consuming terror to our Atlantic coast. As al- 
ready described, the Spanish fleet had been located, 
May 19th, through the agency of an American 
telegraph company. There was no doubt as to its 
presence in the harbor, and with that knowledge 
came the unrest and anxiety which cancelled every 
thought and forbade every effort that did not point 
to Santiago. 

As a result of this changed situation, General 
Shafter received in rapid succession four notable 
despatches — three were from the Major - General 
Commanding and one came from the Secretary of 
War: 

62 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, D. C, May 26, 1898. 
" Major-General William R. Shaffer, Tampa, Fla. 

" Be prepared to load on transports 25,000 men, including in- 
fantry, four batteries light artillery, eight siege guns, includ- 
ing siege mortars, and one squadron cavalry. The movement 
of this expedition will depend upon information concerning the 
Spanish fleet. Should it not be advisable to send this force, then 
it is expected that all of the transports will be loaded at Tampa 
for another movement on Cuba. Definite instructions will be 
sent you later. Miles, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, D. C, May 29, 1898. 
" Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. 

" Place on your transports your most effective force of regulars 
and volunteers, 500 rounds ammunition per man, with a strong 
force of artillery, siege guns, howitzers, and mortars, with two 
months' supplies, small number of animals and transportation, 
and two squadrons of cavalry. Send 5,000 arms and supplies 
for Cubans. Telegraph when you will be ready to sail with naval 
convoy. Miles, 

"Major-General Commanding Army." 

"Washington, D. C, May 30, 1898. 
" Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla. 

" Referring to my telegram of last night, Admiral Schley re- 
ports that two cruisers and two torpedo-boats have been seen in 
the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison 
at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet. Load 
your transports with effective force of infantry and artillery, both 
regular, and mortars and two or four field batteries. You can 
take any dismounted cavalry you desire. Limit the animals to 
the least number required for artillery and transportation, as 
it is not expected that you will go but a short distance inland. 
Your troops should have 500 rounds of ammunition per man if 

63 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

possible, two months' supplies, and in addition you can load sup- 
plies to last six months. If practicable, take 5,000 rifles with 
ammunition for insurgents. You can organize your command 
under Generals Arnold, Burt, Hawkins, Kent, Henry, Lawton, 
and Chaffee. Have your command embark as rapidly as possible, 
and telegraph when your expedition will be ready to sail. I 
leave for Tampa to-night. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding." 



In the Secretary's despatch of the 31st of May were 
contained the instructions upon which General Shafter 
proceeded : 

"War Department, Washington, 

"May 31, 1898—2.30 A.M. 
"Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla. 

" With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to 
take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the 
navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such 
place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, 
under the protection of the navy, and move it on to the high ground 
and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall 
best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover 
the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, 
or, with the aid of the navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet 
now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the ut- 
most energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government 
relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of 
your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance 
of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You 
can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that 
vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisa- 
ble to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are 
cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons 
outside of your own troops. You will take every precaution 
against ambuscade or surprises or positions that may have been 
mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will co- 

64 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

operate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agree- 
ing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your 
instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On 
completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or 
deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, 
re-embark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Puerto de 
Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders 
and future important service — this with the understanding that 
your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above 
harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you 
sail? By command of Major-General Miles, 

"H. C. CORBIN, 

"Adjutant-General." 

Unquestionably, Tampa was not adapted to the con- 
centration and the effective handling of the vast quan- 
tities of supplies necessary for an army of 25,000 
men. Port Tampa has a fine roadstead, with a depth 
of twenty-one feet in the channel. It was accepted 
by the board of officers appointed to inquire into its 
suitability for the despatch of a small force, but it 
would hardly have been selected for the purposes of 
the Santiago expedition had so large a force been 
under consideration at the time. The city of Tampa 
was approached by only two lines of railroad, both 
single-track. To make the matter worse, one com- 
pany, the Plant Line, controlled communications be- 
tween Tampa and Port Tampa, where the ships lay, 
and from where the troops must be embarked. 
Tampa and Port Tampa are nine miles apart. The 
intervening country is, for the most part, very swampy 
and sand}?-. One single-track railroad connects the 
two places. At the terminus there was but one wharf, 
and that capable of accommodating not more than 
nine transports at a time. 

65 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

General Humphrey, the chief quartermaster of the 
5th Corps, in his testimony before the Dodge Com- 
mission, thus described the inadequate railroad and 
wharfage facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, and 
the many obstacles to be overcome in so hastily em- 
barking the Santiago expedition: 

" It was often difficult to get cars most needed to that place, or 
to get those that arrived there in position for unloading. This, 
in part, was owing to there being no card on cars, or other infor- 
mation showing their contents. Bills of lading in but few in- 
stances came to hand in time, and invoices not at all. But, all 
matters considered, I do not see how it was practicable to send 
them forward at the time shipments were made. 

" The loading of the transports was at best difficult, owing to 
the limited wharf facilities and not having in hand full cargoes, 
it being necessary to bring transports into the canal to be load- 
ed, and often before loading was completed send them into the 
harbor, to be brought back at a future time to complete cargo. 
Again, commissary stores in cars and trains were not in the form 
of complete rations, and this often necessitated going from car 
to car and from a car to some car that had come by another train 
— perhaps days after or before — to supply complete rations so 
far as possible for embarkation on any one vessel. To this dif- 
ficulty should be added the lack of sufficient facilities of the rail- 
road yards and the limited facilities for loading afforded by the 
pier at Port Tampa, and the additional inconvenience and hin- 
derance caused by trains running between Tampa and the head 
of the pier and the throngs of people they brought. Regularly 
cars had to be run back to the yards — one and a half or two miles 
distant — to be replaced by other cars, and a little later these were 
run back to the yard only partially unloaded and replaced by 
those first brought there, to again be returned to same point." * 

Major-General Miles, with his staff, reached Tampa, 

* The number of freight-cars handled at Tampa by the Quarter- 
master's Department amounted to 13,239. 

66 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

June 1st, in accordance with his despatch to General 
Shafter of the 30th of May, above quoted. On the 
same day he reported to the department : 

" Everything is being pushed as rapidly as possible to embark 
troops at Tampa and Mobile. Men are working night and day." 

On June 26. he telegraphed : 

" The working force at Tampa has been divided into three 
reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four. Nine 
ships being loaded at one time." 

On the 4th he again reported : 

"Tampa, Fla., June 4, 1898. 
" Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" Several of the volunteer regiments came here without uni- 
forms ; several came without arms, and some without blankets, 
tents, or camp equipage. The 32d Michigan, which is among 
the best, came without arms. General Guy V. Henry reports 
that five regiments under his command are not fit to go into the 
field. There are over 300 cars loaded with war material along 
the roads about Tampa. Stores are sent to the quartermaster 
at Tampa, but the invoices and bills of lading have not been re- 
ceived, so that the officers are obliged to break open seals and 
hunt from car to car to ascertain whether they contain clothing, 
grain, balloon material, horse equipments, ammunition, siege 
guns, commissary stores, etc. Every effort is being made to 
bring order out of confusion. I request that rigid orders be given 
requiring the shipping officers to forward in advance complete 
invoices and bills of lading, with descriptive marks of every pack- 
age, and the number and description of car in which shipped. 
To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, 
fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were side-tracked twenty-five 
miles from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops 
were suffering for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were 
discovered yesterday, were needed by several regiments. Also 

67 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for same, 
which will be required immediately on landing, are scattered 
through hundreds of cars on the side tracks of the railroads. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, this expedition will soon be 
ready to sail. NELSON A. MILES, 

"Major-General Commanding." 

In answer to this despatch was sent the following : 

" War Department, June 5, 1898. 
" Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. 

" Twenty thousand men ought to unload any number of cars 
and assort contents. There is much criticism about delay of 
expedition. Better leave a fast ship to bring balance of material 
needed than delay longer. R. A. ALGER, 

"Secretary of War." 

As shown, ample supplies and munitions had been 
shipped to Tampa, but in the congestion that followed 
the increased mobilization of the forces there the bills 
of lading were either missent or not delivered. This 
confusion was, in part, owing to the immense amount 
of mail sent to our troops at Tampa, which, because 
of the inadequate post-office facilities, it was impos- 
sible for the officials to assort and distribute until long 
after its receipt. Hence the bills of lading were much 
delayed in reaching their proper destination. 

Another report on the situation at Tampa was re- 
ceived from General Miles on the 5th of June, and thus 

read: 

"Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898—12.24 p.m. 

" The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" This expedition has been delayed through no fault of any one 
connected with it. It contains the principal part of the army, 
which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body 
of troops on earth. It contains fourteen of the best-conditioned 

68 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morn- 
ing. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 
per cent, are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men had 
never fired a gun. I request ample protection while on sea for 
this command from the navy. This enterprise is so important 
that I desire to go with this army corps, or to immediately or- 
ganize another and go with it to join this, and capture position 
No. 2.* Now that the military is about to be used, I believe it 
should be continued with every energy, making the most judicious 
disposition of it to accomplish the desired result. 

" Miles, 
" Major-General Commanding Army." 

No answer was sent to this telegram, as General 
Miles had been explicitly informed by the President, 
as well as by myself, before he went to Tampa, that 
he was at liberty to go in command of the Santiago 
expedition, or to organize the force for the invasion 
of Puerto Rico. Because of these instructions and the 
intention intimated in this despatch to accompany 
the 5th Corps, General Miles's instructions to organ- 
ize and command the Puerto Rican expedition were 
purposely withheld until Shafter or Miles should sail. 
General Miles did not command the Santiago expe- 
dition, and that he did not was his own mistake or 
misfortune. He lost the opportunity to command 
in the greatest land battle of the war. 

In preparing for the various expeditions already 
described, the government had gradually brought 
together at Tampa many thousands of troops. The 
original reconnoissance force of 5,000 for Tunas had 
been first augmented to 12,000 in preparing for the 
movement to Mariel, and then again increased to an 

* Santiago was designated by the department as No. I, Puerto Rico 
as No. 2. 

69 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

estimated force of 25,000 for Santiago. When, there- 
fore, an immediate movement to the front became im- 
perative, there seemed to be no alternative for the course 
pursued. The men were there, the material was there, 
and the transports were waiting for them. It was 
easier and safer to embark the expedition at Tampa 
than to move the army to any other point of departure. 
Indeed, it would have been disastrous to have attempt- 
ed any change at that time. Every day was of in- 
calculable importance. Not even an hour could be 
sacrificed. The work was one of serious difficulty, but 
this difficulty would have been multiplied tenfold had 
any other port for embarkation been selected at that late 
date. The army, or any great part of it, had not been 
mobilized since the Civil War. The problem was in 
all respects a new one, and it was presented in a form 
that aggravated its inherent obstacles We had at 
our service at Tampa the main part of the regular 
army. There were also the Major-General Command- 
ing, General Shafter, Major-Generals Kent, Wheeler, 
Lawton; Brigadier-Generals Chaffee, Hawkins, Sum- 
ner, Young ; Brigadier - General Wm. Ludlow, of the 
Engineer Corps; the Inspector-General of the army, 
and officers of high rank and demonstrated efficiency, 
in the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical bu- 
reaus, who had been selected with great care and with 
special reference to their fitness for this peculiar task. 
And yet, notwithstanding the natural and inherent 
embarrassments attending the organizing, equipping, 
and embarkation of that army, General Shafter was 
ready to sail within eight daj^s after he received his 
orders. This fact in itself is a high tribute to the en- 
ergy and ability of the officers in charge. 

70 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

As we have seen, General Shafter's orders, directing 
him to proceed to Santiago, bore date of May 31st. On 
the 7th of June the following despatch was received 
at the Navy Department from Admiral Sampson : 

" Bombarded forts at Santiago 7.30 to 10 A.M. to-day, June 6th. 
Have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though 
stationed 2,000 yards. If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet 
would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration 
demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be 
defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 

" Sampson." 

Thereupon General Shaf ter was directed to " sail at 
once, but with not less than 10,000 men." On the very 
evening of the receipt of this message — June 7th — 
the transports started down the bay of Tampa, with 
not 10,000, but nearly 17,000 men. Shafter was in- 
sufficiently supplied with wagons, tentage, even hos- 
pital equipment, but the distance to be covered was 
not great, the fighting force was ready, and the de- 
ficiencies could be made good, it was believed by the 
officers at Tampa, in a very few days. Haste was 
absolutely imperative. It was a question of striking 
a sudden blow, and so, perhaps, ending the war in 
short order, or, by taking time to equip the expedition 
more fully, possibly to prolong the struggle indefinite- 
ly. On the evening of the 7th of June General Shafter 
was ordered to immediately set sail with what force 
he had ready. This message was sent him from the 
Executive Mansion : 

" Information from Sampson says he has practically reduced 
fortifications, and only waits your arrival to occupy Santiago. 
Time is the essence of the situation. Early departure of first, 
importance." 

71 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

During all that night the transports moved down 
the bay towards the Gulf. But, just at that supreme 
moment, the phantom Spanish fleet, which, only a 
few weeks before, had appeared off Sandy Hook and 
thrown our whole Atlantic coast into a panic, revealed 
itself a second time with equally unfortunate results. 
Its presence was announced in these cipher despatches 
to the Navy Department : 

" Key West, June Sth. 
" Spanish armored cruiser second class and Spanish torpedo- 
boat destroyer seen by Eagle, Nicholas Channel, Cuba. De- 
stroy convoy. Details follow. REMEY." 

" Key West, June 8th. 
" Last cipher just come by Resolute, just arrived ; was pursued 
by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order 
Indiana and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More de- 
tails to follow. Remey." 

The Secretary of the Navy at once requested the 
recall of the transports. Just as the last ship was 
moving out from Port Tampa, General Shafter re- 
ceived the following message : 

" Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer 
quick. R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

Later he was furnished with a copy of Admiral 
Remey's despatches just quoted. He replied : 

" Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be 
able to stop them before reaching Gulf." 

In this connection General Miles forwarded to the 
department the following despatches : 

72 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898. 
" Secretary 0/ War, Washington, D. C. 

" Think it would be well to announce that the army got on board 
transports and started, as they did, yesterday. Say nothing 
about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the 
course that our transports would have gone over, with the hope 
of finding those Spanish ships. Does not the presence of Span- 
ish war vessels in Cuban waters render it extremely hazardous 
to send troops on transports until they are captured, destroyed, 
or driven away? And, under the circumstances, is it expected 
that I shall organize expedition No. 2? Arrangements had been 
partly made before the presence of the Spanish ships was an- 
nounced. Miles, 

" Major-General Commanding Army." 

" Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., 

"June 9, 1898 — 2.45 P.M. 
" Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might 
be advisable for the command now on board transports to have 
the protection of the entire navy to convoy it to No. I, No. 2, 
or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered too hazardous, then keep the 
troops in healthful camps, as they now are, and assist the navy 
to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here twenty-five good 
steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, 
guns, revolving cannon and mortars, etc., and they could be add- 
ed to the force of the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting 
that the army assist the navy in this way, but I am sure we 
would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe for 
crossing with the army. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding Army." 

He was informed in reply to these messages : 

" War Department, June 9, 1898. 
" Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. 

" The President directs me to say that no change of plan will 
be made ; that expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as 

73 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

possible. We are looking for transports, and am satisfied the 
navy will take care of that problem. Give nothing out. 

" R. A. Alger, 
" Secretary of War." 

It was subsequently ascertained that the "ghost 
fleet" reported to Admiral Reme}' and by him in turn 
to the Navy Department consisted of the United States 
vessels America, Scorpion, and Supply. Meanwhile 
the expedition which had returned to Port Tampa 
rocked idly in the bay, suffering from the extreme heat 
and the crowding, and losing a week of immeasurable 
opportunity at Santiago. If the expedition had been 
permitted to sail when it was ready, Shafter would 
have touched Siboney seven days earlier than he did, 
thus giving him one week more before the rains began. 

Reference has already been made to the fact that 
owing to the peculiar wording of the act of March 
9, 1898, appropriating $50,000,000 "for national de- 
fence," no portion of this fund could properly be used 
for the purchase or hire of transports until after war 
was declared. When events made it possible for the 
War Department to finally enter the market in search 
of transports, the vessels most available for the pur- 
pose had been secured by the navy, as the President 
held that scouting and other ships could be purchased 
for the Navy's use for "national defence" without 
any violation of the spirit of the act appropriating 
$50,000,000. The Quartermaster - General was there- 
fore reduced in his selection almost entirely to freight 
ships and those engaged in the coastwise trade of 
the United States. However, with the assistance of 
a marine expert, thirty -nine vessels were secured, 
at a cost of over $7,000,000. Mr. Cramp subsequently 

74 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 

informed me that the vessels of the Atlantic Trans- 
port Line, secured at a cost of $4,000,000 and after- 
wards converted into the finest troop-ships in the 
world, could have been sold, before any improvements 
had been made on them, at a large advance over the 
price paid by the United States. These vessels were 
secured and purchased under the direction of Mr. 
Frank J. Hecker, Colonel and Quartermaster of Vol- 
unteers, Chief of Transportation Division. His ap- 
pointment in the volunteer army was one of the few 
made by the President at my request. 

The British standard for estimating the carrying 
capacity of ships was adopted by the officers of the 
Quartermaster's Department, who were assisted by an 
officer of the navy detailed for the purpose through 
the courtesy of Secretary Long. The vessels char- 
tered and purchased, however, were not troop-ships 
in the proper acceptation of the term, and the English 
method of assigning one man to each ton and a half 
of carrying capacit}^ proved far too great. The ships 
assembled at Tampa were reported to the Quarter- 
master-General as having a capacity of 25,000 men. 
The estimate proved excessive, for, after increasing 
the original fleet to thirty-eight vessels, not including 
all the water-carriers, steam-barges, and lighters that 
could be obtained, we were able to transport less than 
17,000 men, most of whom were uncomfortably crowd- 
ed. The expedition sailed, however on the 14th of 
June, when the naval authorities thought it safe to 
furnish an escort. 

The following tabular statement gives the details 
of Shafter's army as finally organized and distributed 
on the several transports : 

75 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



Tabular 


Statement of Sh after' s Army 




Transport. 


.s 


Troops on Board. 


m 




•a 

.2 V 

sS 
W 


Alamo 


6 

17 

27 
9 

29 
4 

7 

14 

32 
16 
19 
25 

13 
21 


Headquarters band, and com- 
panies C, D, E, and G, 10th 
U. S. Infantry; companies 
C and E, Engineer Battalion, 
and headquarters 2d Infantry 
Brigade, 1st Division. 

Headquarters Cavalry Division. 
Enlisted men caring for 
horses. 

Loaded with the transportation, 
etc., of the 3d U. S. Infantry. 

Light Artillery Battalion and 
light batteries A and F, 2d 
U. S. Artillery. 

3d U. S. Infantry 

12th U. S. Infantry and head- 
quarters and 3 companies 
17th U. S. Infantry. 

Company I, 7th U. S. Infantry, 
and light batteries E and K, 
1st U. S. Artillery. 

Headquarters 2d Infantry 
Brigade, 2d Division, 4th 
U. S. Infantry, and 25th U. 
S. Infantry. 

Companies D and B, 2d U. S. 
Infantry. 

24th U. S. Infantry and 1 bat- 
talion 21st U. S. Infantry. 

Companies E, G, and H, 7th 
U. S. Infant^. 

Headquarters and companies 
A, B, C, D, and F, 7th U. S. 
Infantry ; companies C, G, H, 
and K, 17th U. S. Infantry ; 
headquarters 2d Infantry 
Division, and headquarters 
3d Infantry Brigade, 2d Divi- 
sion. 

Headquarters and 8 companies 
of 2d Massachusetts Infantry. 

8 troops 1st U. S. Cavalry, 8 
troops loth U. S. Cavalry, 
and headquarters 2d Cavalry 
Brigade, Cavalry Division. 


33 

14 

2 
14 

20 
35 

10 
53 

2 

33 

8 

38 

32 
5i 


574 


Allegheny 


80 


Aransas 


13 


Berkshire 


268 


Breakwater 

Cherokee 


467 
852 


Comal 


284 


Concho 


J.034 


Clinton 


169 


City of Washington . 

D.H.Miller 

Iroquois 


75i 
280 
722 


Knickerbocker 


588 
910 








345 


6,992 



76 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 



Tabular Statement of Sh after 's Army— Continued 



Transport. 



Manteo 
Matteawan. 

Miami 

Morgan . . . 

Olivette .... 
Orizaba .... 

Rio Grande 

San Marcos 
Santiago . . . 
Saratoga . . 



Troops on Board. 



Seguranca . 



Seneca 



36 



26 



30 

11 

^4 



22 



20 



12 



Brought forward 

2 companies 17th U. S. Infantry 
and 2 companies 2d Massa- 
chusetts Infantry. 

20th U. S. Infantry, Troops F 
and D, 2d U. S. Cavalry, and 
headquarters Independent In- 
fantry Brigade. 

6th U. S. Infantry and 8 troops 
9th U. S. Cavalry. 

Major Rafferty and Troop C, 
2d U. S. Cavalry. 

Hospital ship 

22d U. S. Infantry and bat- 
teries G and H, 4th Artillery 
(Siege Artillery Battalion). 

8 troops of 3d U. S. Cavalry and 
8 troops 6th U. S. Cavalry; 
Balloon Signal detachment, 
and headquarters 1st Cavalry 
Brigade, Cavalry Division. 

Companies A, E, F, and H, 2d 
U. S. Infantry ; 16th U. S. In- 
fantry, and headquarters 1st 
Infantry Brigade, 1st Division. 

9th U. S. Infantry; 1 battalion 
loth U.S. Infantry, and head- 
quarters 1st Infantry Divi- 
sion. 

13th U. S. Infantry, head- 
quarters' band, and com- 
panies C, D, E, and H, 21st 
U. S. Infantry, and head- 
quarters 3d Infantry Brigade, 
1st Division. 

1st U. S. Infantry, Balloon 
Signal detachment. 

Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 
staff. 

Officers accompanying the ex- 
pedition. 

8th U. S. Infantry, 2 companies 
2d Massachusetts Infantry, 
and headquarters 1st In- 
fantry Brigade, 2d Division. 



345 
10 



32 

55 
3 

3 

35 

49 

38 

51 

38 



"5! S 

■s a 



6,992 
265 



734 

919 

69 

35 
622 

882 

1,237 
739 
635 

477 
656 



729 14,262 



77 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Tabular Statement of Sh after' s Army— Concluded 



Transport. 


60 


Troops on Board. 


8 

£ 

O 


•0 

■as 
w 


Stillwater 


28 

23 

8 


Brought forward 

Troop A, 2d U. S. Cavalry... . . 

71st New York Infantry 

Headquarters, band and com- 
panies C, D, G, and B, 2d U. 
S. Infantry, and 8 troops 1st 
Volunteer Cavalry (Rough 
Riders). 


729 

3 

44 

43 


14,262 
69 




954 




773 








819 


16,058 




3i 

3 
34 
33 
35 
10 


Stevedores. 

Teamsters and packers. 

Water-tender. 

Steam-lighter. 

Water-tender. 

Teamsters. 





















) 



Also, 2,295 horses and mules. 

NOTE. — 1st, 3d, 6th, 9th, and loth United States Cavalry dis- 
mounted. First Volunteer Cavalry dismounted. Troops A, C, F, 
and D, 2d United States Cavalry, mounted. 

The question of the disembarkation of troops, ani- 
mals, and supplies was carefully considered by Gen- 
eral Shafter and his staff at Tampa. The entire prob- 
lem of transportation was of course a new one, and 
the conditions to be met by the Santiago expedition 
made the task especially formidable. Under the 
most propitious circumstances the landing of the 
army on the Cuban coast would have been difficult. 
The conditions were most unfavorable, and were ag- 
gravated by the inexperience of our army in such mat- 
ters. After much consultation with Cubans famil- 
iar with the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, General 
Shafter became satisfied, before the expedition left 
the United States, that the landing would have to 
be made, in all probability, east of Santiago Harbor, 

78 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 



and perhaps at either Daiquiri or Siboney. Neither 
of these places afforded any shelter from the strong 
trade-winds which blow from the southeast, and pro- 
duce during the summer a heavy surf on the coral 
reefs. The only harbor worthy of the name east of 
Santiago was at Guantanamo, fifty-five miles away 
— a prohibitory distance. Siboney and Daiquiri were 
simply open roadsteads with a rocky shore -line. 
Wharf building was impracticable under these con- 
ditions with the limited time that Shafter could spend 
in landing. The use of a pontoon bridge was ob- 
viously impossible, and although the Alamo accom- 
panied the expedition with a pontoon train, engineer- 
ing material, and two companies of engineers, only 
the detached boats could be used for any purpose. 

General Humphrey had an inventory taken of the 
carrying capacity of the 153 small boats accompany- 
ing the transports, as follows : 







. be >. 






M>» 


Name. 


No. of 
Boats. 


Men- 
arryin 

apacit 


Name. 


No. of 
Boats. 








°u 




5 


So 


Alanio .... 


4 


80 


Morgan . . 


75 


Allegheny . 






3 


75 


Olivette . 






8 


160 


Aransas . . 






5 


90 


Orizaba 






6 


120 


Berkshire 






3 


75 


Rio Grande 






5 


90 


Breakwater . 






5 


75 


San Marcos 






5 


132 


Cherokee . . 






6 


120 


Santiago . 






4 


80 


Comal . 






4 
5 


80 


Saratoga . 
Seguranca 






5 
6 


90 
108 


Concho . . 






100 






Clinton 






4 


60 


Seneca 






7 


140 


City of Washing 


ton 




4 


80 


Stillwater . 






4 


50 


D. H. Miller . 






5 


100 


Vigilancia 






6 


120 


Florida . . 






4 


90 


Whitney . 






5 


90 








3 


60 


Yucatan . 






6 


150 


Iroquois . . 
Knickerbocker 






8 
3 


160 
60 


Total . 






"i53 


3T034 








5 

2 


84 
35 


Steam - lighter 
Laura * . . 






Manteo . . 








4 00 


Matteawan . 






4 


I2 5 






Miami . . . 






4 


80 


Grand total . 








3A34 



* Steam-lighter Laura could carry 400 men standing on her deck. 

79 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

In addition to these the Quartermaster Department 
provided for two light - draught steamers, the Cum- 
berland and the Manteo (carrying ioo stevedores), 
two steam - lighters, the Laura and the Bessie, two 
decked barges, and a sea-going tug, the Captain Sam. 
With all these it was estimated that there would be 
a carrying capacity of between 3,000 and 3,400 men. 
The Quartermaster Department, moreover, made a 
strenuous effort to secure steam-launches to tow the 
small boats to and from the shore, but, as the San- 
tiago expedition was not finally decided upon until 
the 31st of May, it was found impossible to obtain 
launches, although telegraphic correspondence was 
held with the leading markets throughout the coun- 
try with that object in view. In this matter General 
Shafter expected the co-operation of the navy, and 
has stated, " I had been informed that the boats of the 
navy were there and would assist in the landing." 

On the 31st of May the Secretary of the Navy had 
written the following letter : 

" The Secretary of War. 

" SIR, — This department begs leave to inquire what means are 
to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, 
artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects 
when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast 
near Santiago. 

" While the navy will be prepared to furnish all the assistance 
that may be in its power, it is obvious that the crews of the armor- 
ed ships and of such others as will be called upon to remove the 
Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action cannot 
be spared for other purposes, and ought not to be fatigued by the 
work incident to landing of the troops, stores, etc. Very respect- 
fully, John D. Long, 

"Secretary." 
80 



EMBARKATION AT TAMPA 
To this the following reply was sent: 

"War Department, Washington, May 31, 1898. 
"SIR, — In answer to your inquiry of this date as to what means 
are to be employed by the War Department for landing troops, 
etc., I beg to reply that the major-general commanding the ex- 
pedition will land his own troops. All that is required of the 
navy is to convoy and protect with the guns of the convoy while 
the military forces are landed. Very respectfully, 

"R. A. Alger, 
" Secretary of War. 
"Hon, John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy." 

Secretary Long, however, cabled the next day to 
Captain H. C. Taylor, in command of the convoy : 
"The army will probably ask 3^011 to assist the land- 
ing with the boats of your convoy, and to cover the 
attempt with some of your small vessels, which may 
be done, exercising due caution/' * 

The Quartermaster - General knew that every pro- 
vision had been made that could be made with the 
limited time and facilities at his disposal. Upon 
this matter General Humphrey has since stated: 
"As a result of my experience, I would now recom- 
mend for an expedition of the same kind, and about 
the same size, three sea-going tugs, six steam-launch- 
es, four steam -lighters of the Bessie class, and four 
large decked-over lighters;" yet he adds : "Had it not 
been for the failure of the steam-lighter Bessie to join 
as expected, the desertion of the tug -boat Captain 
Sam, and the loss of a decked-over lighter, the ex- 
pedition would have been fairly well supplied in that 

* Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, p. 487. The assistance of 
the navy during the landing in Cuba, June 226. and 23d, was of the 
greatest benefit and most cheerfully given. 

8l 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

respect, and more satisfactory and expeditious results 
would have been accomplished." 

Reviewing now the events of that summer, I am 
convinced that, all things considered, the embarka- 
tion from Tampa was not a mistake. In the great 
stress of circumstances under which the expedition 
sailed, it was inevitable that there should be much 
confusion and congestion. The fact remains, how- 
ever, that, one week from the date of the receipt of 
orders to prepare to sail, Shafter had his men, animals, 
and supplies on board the transports, and, despite 
the crowding and the week's delay caused by the 
report of the " phantom fleet, " all arrived off Santiago 
little the worse for the voyage. 

Had the expedition sailed from any other port it 
is doubtful whether there would have been much less 
confusion; besides, the transports would have been 
obliged to cross an open sea hundreds of miles farther, 
and subject to dispersion by storms or attacks by the 
ships of the enemy. The expedition from Tampa 
was a success and unmarred by loss of life or treasure. 



CHAPTER VII 

SHAFTER DETERMINES TO "MARCH ON 
SANTIAGO " 

FAIR weather and a smooth sea made the voyage 
to the southern coast of Cuba a pleasant relief from 
the irksome inactivity aboard the stifling transports 
in the harbor at Port Tampa. The six days' cruise 
on the Gulf of Mexico, along the north coast of Cuba, 
through the Windward Passage, and over the purple 
waters of the Caribbean Sea, was uneventful. The 
expedition, however, suffered the loss of a decked- 
over barge, which broke its hawser at night and drift- 
ed away; it also lost the steam-lighter Bessie, which 
broke down as she left Tampa, and the sea -going 
tug Captain Sam, which deserted the first night out. 
These losses caused General Shafter great embarrass- 
ment in landing his supplies. 

From the poor maps of Cuba (the only ones ob- 
tainable) General Shafter studied, en route, the con- 
ditions which would confront his army in the cam- 
paign. Two Cubans accompanying him, residents 
of Santiago, who had been educated in the United 
States, gave much valuable information regarding 
the country, its coast-line, and the approaches to the 
city. In his testimony before the War Investigation 
Commission, General Shafter said that while en route 
to Cuba he devoted some time to reading an account 

83 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of the British expedition of 1741, which landed at Guan- 
tanamo with 5,000 men and attempted to take Santi- 
ago. The expedition was under Lord Vernon, a friend 
of Lawrence Washington, and after whom the Mount 
Vernon estate was named. The British committed 
the fatal mistake of exhausting the energies of their 
men in making and repairing roads while advancing 
from Guantanamo. The command met with but 
slight opposition from the Spaniards; yet 2,000 "died 
on their feet " during the march, and when the expe- 
dition was finally abandoned, a complete failure, the 
remnant of the army was still sixteen miles from 
Santiago and only forty miles from point of starting. 
Fatigue, exhaustion, and disease had caused greater 
loss of life to the British force than was sustained 
by the Americans at Santiago with an army three 
times its size, in killed, wounded, and from disease. 
General Shafter has since said that with this example 
before him he realized that the sole chance of success 
would lie in the very impetuosity of his attack. 

The day before the army reached the vicinity of 
Santiago, a fast-sailing scout was sent forward bear- 
ing a despatch to Admiral Sampson, informing him of 
the close approach of the army and adding that Gen- 
eral Shafter would call upon him and arrange for 
plans of operation as soon as the transports reached 
the Cuban coast. The fleet arrived off Guantanamo 
at eight o'clock on the morning of the 20th of June. 
No deaths occurred en route, or any accidents beyond 
the loss of the lighters already referred to. The troops 
were in excellent spirits and condition, and were eager 
for the conflict. 

Two or three hours after the arrival, Captain Chad- 

84 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

wick, Admiral Sampson's chief of staff, boarded the 
Seguranga, the headquarters ship, and briefly ex- 
plained the situation from the naval point of view. 
He suggested that the assault of the army be upon 
the Morro at the mouth of the harbor; and then gave 
directions that the Seguranga move along the coast 
south of Santiago Harbor, in order that General Shaff- 
er might see the coast -line for himself. The vessel 
would thus pass in review the several points suggest- 
ed for the landing to the east and west of the city. 
When off the harbor entrance, Admiral Sampson came 
aboard, and they proceeded at once to Aserradero, 
eighteen miles west of Santiago, for the purpose of 
conferring with General Garcia, whose command was 
about three miles inland at Palma. The day pre- 
vious General Garcia had met Admiral Sampson on 
board the New York, but owing to his susceptibility 
to sea-sickness he had requested that General Shafter 
and Admiral Sampson come ashore when the army 
should arrive and further conferences become neces- 
sary. 

From General Garcia, General Shafter hoped to se- 
cure definite information regarding the strength and 
position of the Spanish garrison in Santiago, the best 
landing-place for his army, and the most practicable 
means of approaching the city. The conference was 
held in General Rabi's tent, whose detachment (part 
of General Garcia's command) was located a short 
distance from Aserradero. Besides General Shafter 
and Admiral Sampson, Generals Garcia, Rabi, and 
Castillo were present, together with several staff offi- 
cers of the military and naval commanders. General 
Garcia confirmed the opinion already formed by Gen- 

§5 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

eral Shafter, that Daiquiri was the best place for the 
landing, though he gave little or no information re- 
garding the approaches to Santiago not already in 
the general's possession. He said there were 12,000 
Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity; about 
5,000 between Daiquiri and that city; and General 
Castillo stated that the Spanish force near the wharf 
at Daiquiri was 300 ; at Siboney, 600 ; at Aguadores, 
150; Justici, 150; and at Sardinero, 100. 

After his inspection of the coast from the transport, 
and the consultation with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and 
Castillo, General Shafter determined that the move- 
ment of his army should be against the city of Santiago, 
and so stated at the conference. He then suggested 
his plan for the co-operation of the navy and the as- 
sistance of the Cubans. General Garcia stated that he 
considered himself and his command subject to Gen- 
eral Shafter's orders, to which the general replied that 
while he would be glad to have his co-operation, he 
did not feel that he had authority to direct his move- 
ments. Before terminating the conference, a written 
memorandum of the plan of operations, embodying 
the subjects discussed, was dictated by General Shaft- 
er, and a copy handed to Admiral Sampson's flag- 
lieutenant, Staunton. 

It is surprising, therefore, after General Shafter had 
proclaimed his intention to march on Santiago, and 
with this plan of action, reduced to writing, in his 
possession, that Admiral Sampson should have in- 
cluded, in his official report to the Navy Department, 
such statements as these : 

" On July 4th I received the following despatch from General 
Shafter : 

86 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

" ' Headquarters sth Army Corps, July 4th. 
" ' Admiral Sampson, Commanding United States Navy Forces. 

" ' Through negligence of our Cuban allies, Pando, with 5,000 
men, entered the city of Santiago last night. This nearly doubles 
their forces. I have demanded their surrender, which they re- 
fuse, but I am giving them some wounded prisoners and delay- 
ing operations to let foreign citizens get out, and there will be 
no action before the 6th and perhaps the 7th. Now, if you will 
force your way into that harbor, the town will surrender with- 
out any further sacrifice of life. My present position has cost 
me 1,000 men, and I do not wish to lose any more. With my 
forces on one side and yours on the other — and they have a great 
terror of the navy, for they know they cannot hurt you — we shall 
have them. I ask for an early reply. Very respectfully, 

" ' William R. Shafter, 
" ' Major-General U. S. V.' 

" This despatch shows a complete misapprehension of the cir- 
cumstances which had to be met. 

" On the night of July 4th the Reina Mercedes was sunk by the 
Spaniards in a manner which would certainly obstruct the larger 
ships, and possibly the smaller ones. Extensive shore batteries 
were known to exist, and if our smaller vessels were sent in and 
were sunk, either by the mines or by the fire of the batteries, the 
harbor would be effectually closed to us. It was essential to the 
new scheme of attack on this mine field that the positions oc- 
cupied by the eastern and western batteries should be carried, 
and this was the scheme of action first proposed by General Shaft- 
er in his discussion with my chief of staff, who was sent by me to 
meet General Shafter the day of his arrival. The chief of staff 
carried with him a chart of the harbor and explained the situa- 
tion, stating that it was regarded by us as a movement of primal 
importance that these points should be carried before any at- 
tention was paid to the city. The possession of these points 
insured the destruction of the mines by us, the entrance of our 
heavy ships in the harbor, and the assault on Admiral Cervera's 
squadron inside. To this General Shafter gave most cordial 
assent, and stated that he had no intention of attacking the city 

87 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

proper, that here (pointing to the entrance) was the key to the 
situation, and that when we had this we had all. This was re- 
peated in his interview with General Garcia at Aserradero. 

" I do not know why a change of plan occurred, unless it was 
that the troops on being landed advanced themselves so far on 
the roads towards Santiago before any specific plan of opera- 
tions had been decided upon that it was found inconvenient to 
divert them to the other points. I believe that such adherence 
would have resulted in a much quicker surrender of the Spanish 
troops, and with much less loss of life excepting possibly to the 
navy, which would have borne the brunt of attack instead of 
the army. The urgency, of course, was lessened by the destruc- 
tion of the fleet on their sortie from the harbor, but the difficulty 
of entrance remained much the same." 

The facts did not warrant Admiral Sampson in 
casting this reflection upon General Shafter's suc- 
cessful campaign before Santiago ; and, in an official 
report to the War Department, General Shafter thus 
expresses his surprise and indignation thereat : 

"Headquarters Department of the East, 

" Governor's Island, New York City, December 24, 1898. 
" The Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C. 

" SIR, — I desire to invite your attention and the attention of the 
Secretary of War to the report of Admiral Sampson in reference 
to operations at Santiago, published in the Army and Navy Reg- 
ister of December 3d. 

" I cannot permit this to pass without notice, as it is incorrect 
in all that it states in reference to my assent to the plan which 
was proposed by the navy, to first attack the forts at the entrance 
of the harbor, permitting them to enter and take up the mines — 
a plan of operation that was never contemplated by me, and 
which, if it had been attempted, would, in my opinion, have re- 
sulted most disastrously to my army. 

" I also desire to protest emphatically against the statement made 
by Admiral Sampson that the men of my army advanced them- 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

selves on Santiago before any specific plan of operations had 
been decided upon. The incorrectness of this remark will be 
shown by the plan of campaign which I made immediately upon 
the conclusion of my interview with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and 
other Cuban officers who were present. I had decided, from what 
I could learn of the coast, that to the eastward of Santiago was 
the best place to make the landing, and only waited for the in- 
terview with General Garcia and his officers to get from them 
as accurate an idea of the country to be traversed as possible. 
At that interview I was convinced that Siboney and Daiquiri 
were the points at which to land, and that the city of Santiago it- 
self was the objective, as that embraced both the city and the fleet 
of Admiral Cervera. This memorandum was made by Colonel 
Miley, of my staff, upon my dictation, in the presence of Admiral 
Sampson and General Garcia, and was copied by Captain Staun- 
ton, of Admiral Sampson's staff ; was fully understood and agreed 
to, and was carried out to the letter, the navy carrying out the 
part assigned it of making a feint to the westward of the mouth 
of the harbor, where Kent's division was sent as though intend- 
ing to land at Cabanas, and shelling the places indicated to the 
eastward. With this memorandum in his possession, I cannot 
understand Admiral Sampson's making the statements that he 
has in his report. See his order of June 2ist, directing the op- 
erations of the navy in co-operating with the army in carrying 
out the plan of campaign I had decided upon the day before. 

" From the high rank of the officer making it, I desire that this 
my reply, and the memorandum submitted herewith, be placed 
on file at the War Department, and that a copy of the same, if 
it meets with the approval of the Secretary, be furnished the 
Secretary of the Navy. 

" It is true that the navy did, upon meeting me, urge an assault 
upon the enemy near the mouth of the harbor of Santiago; but 
in my opinion this was impracticable, and any general fitted 
to command troops in war would not have adopted the sugges- 
tions. 

" The true point of attack was the city of Santiago and the up- 
per end of the bay, and the success that attended this plan is suf- 
ficient proof of it. It would have been the height of folly and 
endangered the safety of the army to have attempted to carrj' 

8 9 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

out the plan desired by the navy, and it never for one minute 
met with my approval. Very respectfully, 

"WM. R. Shafter, 
"Major-General U. S. V." 

Accompanying this communication was the fol- 
lowing certified plan of action, adopted at the Garcia 
conference, a copy of which, as already stated, was 
given to Admiral Sampson's flag-lieutenant : 

" Notes on Conference between General Shafter 
and General Garcia, June 20, 1898. 

"About 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity; 
Spaniards can concentrate at any moment about 4,000 on the 
west. Proposal made of a feint of 3,000 or 4,000 men at some 
point west of Santiago de Cuba, and then land expedition at 
Daiquiri and march on Santiago. Plan proposed for General 
Castillo to have about 1,000 men at Daiquiri while navy bom- 
bards, and will capture escaping Spaniards. General Shafter 
then proposed a plan that on the morning of the 22d he would 
have the navy bombard Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and Ca- 
banas, as a feint, and land whole expedition at Daiquiri. About 
5,000 Spaniards between city and Daiquiri. General Garcia 
says Daiquiri is the best base, and General Shafter adopts it. 
The following numbers were then given by General Castillo: 
Force at Daiquiri, near wharf, 300 men ; at Siboney, 600 men ; 
Aguadores, 150 men; Justici, 150 men; Sardinero, 100 men. It 
was then decided that General Castillo will take on board the 
transports 500 men from Aserradero to be landed at Tajababo and 
joined to his command now there and 500 strong; with this 1,000 
men he will be at Daiquiri and assist at landing on the morning 
of the 22d. General Rabi will, on the 22d, make a demonstra- 
tion at Cabanas with 500 men, while navy shells. It was then 
decided by General Garcia to bring his men, about 3,000 or 4,000 
strong, from his camp near Palma to Aserradero and be ready 
to embark on the transports the morning of the 24th, and then 
be taken to Daiquiri, to join General Shafter. To-morrow (the 
2 1st) navy will make transfer of 500 men to Tajababo, under Gen- 

90 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

eral Castillo; 500 men under General Rabi will make demon- 
stration on Cabanas on the morning of the 22d. 

" December 9, 1898. 
"I certify that the above notes were taken by me during the 
conference between General Shatter and General Garcia in Gen- 
eral Rabi's tent at Aserradero, Admiral Sampson being present. 
The admiral's flag-secretary, Captain Staunton, took a copy of 
this plan at that time. J. D. MlLEY, 

" Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General, U. S. V." 



The intimation contained in the expression of Ad- 
miral Sampson that "the troops on being landed ad- 
vanced themselves" doubtless has reference to the 
engagement at Las Guasimas on the 24th of June, 
the incidents leading up to which will be discussed 
at a later period. This insinuation is as unwarranted 
as his other statement. Before the engagement of 
Las Guasimas, on the 22d of June, General Shafter 
thus wrote Admiral Sampson: 



"On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' at Sea, June 22A. 
" Admiral Sampson, Commanding U. S. Fleet off Santiago de 
Cuba. 
" SIR, — I shall commence landing this morning. It is my in- 
tention to proceed from Daiquiri to Santiago as rapidly as I can, 
and take some of my land transportation. The animals are in 
absolute need of some rest, and for that reason I may not get very 
far to-day. 

" I request you keep in touch during the advance, and be pre- 
pared to receive any message I may wish to transmit from along 
the bluffs or any of the small towns, and to render any assistance 
necessary. Very respectfully, 

"Wm. R. Shafter, 
"Major-General U. S. V. Commanding." 

91 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' at Sea, June 22, 1898. 
"Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief 
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 
" SIR, — I desire to express my regret at not having been able 
to call upon you in person aboard your ship before starting for 
Santiago de Cuba. Very respectfully, 

"Wm. R. SHAFTER, 
" Major-General U. S. V. Commanding." 

On the 23d, still before the affair of Las Guasimas, 
General Shafter directed General Kent to "Move up 
to the Santiago de Cuba road near the railroad cross- 
ing, where you should find a part of the 2d Divi- 
sion (Colonel Wood). Make a strong camp, looking 
towards Santiago de Cuba." And on the 24th, still 
before the fight had occurred, he directed General 
Lawton, then at Siboney, "to take up a strong de 
fensive position a short distance on the road to Santi- 
ago and hold it until transportation is ready/' After 
once deciding upon his method of attack, on the after- 
noon of June 20th, every order issued and every move- 
ment made by the army proves that Shafter kept that 
plan steadily in view, and had no thought of modify- 
ing it. Every act was deliberate, was in accordance 
with his design, and followed his specific, written, 
and verbal instructions. On that same 20th of June 
Shafter had issued the following order regarding the 
landing to take place on the 22d, a copy of which was 
furnished Admiral Sampson : 

" Headquarters sth Army Corps, 
" On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' at Sea, June 20, 1898. 
" General Orders No. 18. 

"1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper com- 
manders, troops will disembark in the following order : 

92 



! 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

" First. The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton's). The Gatling- 
gun detachment will accompany this division. 

" Second. General Bates's brigade. This brigade will form as 
a reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps. 

" Third. The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). 

" Fourth. The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent's). 

" Fifth. The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty's). 

" Sixth. If the enemy, in force, vigorously resist the landing, 
the light artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the bat- 
talion commander and brought to the assistance of the troops 
engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will 
be unloaded after the mounted squadron. 

" 2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with 
shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee 
ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. 
Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, 
baggage, and company cooking utensils will be left under charge 
of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned offi- 
cer and two privates from each company. 

" 3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constitut- 
ing a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing para- 
graphs, will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplish- 
ed and until notified they can land. 

"4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all 
small boats, and will distribute them to the best advantage to 
disembark the troops in order indicated in par. I. 

" 5. The ordnance officer — Second Lieutenant Brooke, 4th In- 
fantry — will put on shore, at once, 100 rounds of ammunition 
per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing-line. 

" 6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men 
with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have upon the Span- 
ish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, 
and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy. 

" 7. Major John W. Dillenback, 2d Artillery, will, in addition 
to his duties as commander of the light-artillery battalion, act 
as chief of artillery of the expedition. 
"By command of Major-General Shafter, 

" E. J. McClernand, 
"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

93 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The following day, June 2 1st, was spent in consum- 
mating arrangements for the disembarkation of the 
troops. The sea was rough and the weather squally, 
hence the transports were somewhat scattered. In 
accordance with the plan agreed upon at the Garcia 
conference, and based upon the memorandum fur- 
nished him at the time, Admiral Sampson issued the 
following order: 

" The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force 
landing at Daiquiri. The landing will begin at daylight. Ships 
stationed to the eastward of Daiquiri will assist in clearing the 
way for an unopposed landing by flanking out the Spanish 
forces at that point. Simultaneously with the shelling of the 
beach and block-house at Daiquiri, the Ensenada los Altares* 
and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the 
small bay of Cabanas, about two and one-half miles to the 
westward of Santiago, will be shelled by the ships stationed 
there for that purpose. 

" A feint in force of landing at Cabanas will be made, about ten 
of the transports — the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri 
— remaining during the day or a greater part of the day about 
two miles to the southward of Cabanas, lowering boats and mak- 
ing apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of 
troops. 

" At the same time, General Rabi, with 500 Cuban troops, will 
make a demonstration on the west side of Cabanas. The fol- 
lowing vessels are assigned to bombard the four points men- 
tioned above. At Cabanas, the Scorpion, Vixen, and Texas ; at 
Aguadores, the Eagle and Gloucester; at Ensenada los Alta- 
res, the Hornet, Helena, and Bancroft ; at Daiquiri, the Detroit, 
Castine, Wasp, and New Orleans, the Detroit and Castine on the 
western flank, and the Wasp and New Orleans on the eastern 
flank. 

" All the vessels named will be in their positions at daylight. 
Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of 

* Siboney. 

94 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

ammunition. The firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from 
the New Orleans. 

" At Cabanas, it is probable that after a few minutes, unless 
the firing is returned, the occasional dropping of shots from the 
smaller vessels will be sufficient; but the semblance of cover- 
ing a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in 
at Aguadores and Ensenada los Altares. 

" The same rule should prevail at Daiquiri, the point of actual 
landing. The vessels will, of course, use their artillery until 
they have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will 
take care to make the firing deliberate and effective. 

" The Texas and Brooklyn will exchange blockading stations, 
the Texas going inside, to be near Cabanas. The Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts, Iowa, and Oregon will keep a vigilant watch on 
the harbor mouth. The Indiana will take the New Orleans's 
position in the blockading line east of Santiago de Cuba, and 
between the flag-ship New York and the shore. This is only a 
temporary assignment for the Indiana to strengthen the blockad- 
ing line during the landing, and to avoid any possibility of the 
enemy's breaking through should he attempt to get out of the 
port. 

" The Suwanee, Osceola, and Wompatuck will be prepared to 
tow boats. Each will be provided with two five or six inch lines, 
one on each quarter, and each long enough to take in tow a dozen 
or more boats. These vessels will report at the New York at 3 
A.M. on June 22d, prepared to take in tow the ships' boats which 
are to assist in the landing of troops and to convey them to Dai- 
quiri. 

" The Texas, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa, Oregon, New York, 
and Indiana will send all their steam-cutters and all their pull- 
ing boats, with the exception of one retained on board each ship, 
to assist in the landing. The boats will report at the Neiv York 
at 3 A.M. Each boat, whale-boat, and cutter will have three 
men ; each launch, five men ; and each steam-cutter its full crew, 
and an officer for their own management. In addition to these 
men each boat will carry five men, including one capable of acting 
as coxswain, to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each 
steam-launch will be in charge of an officer, who will report to 
Captain Goodrich. 

95 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" Care will be taken in the selection of boat-keepers and cox- 
swains to take no men who are gun-pointers or who occupy posi- 
tions of special importance at the batteries. Unnecessary oars 
and impediments should be removed from the pulling boats for 
the greater convenience of transportation of troops, but each 
boat should retain its anchor and chain. 

" Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the St. Louis, will have, 
on the part of the navy, general charge of the landing. The 
New Orleans will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich 
upon her arrival at Daiquiri. 

" The attention of the commanding officers of all vessels en- 
gaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the 
necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both 
as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to 
keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish 
admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be 
made soon." 

By Admiral Sampson's direction, in further exe- 
cution of the plan agreed upon, 500 Cubans of Gen- 
eral Rabi's command were transferred from Aserra- 
dero to Tajababo (about three miles east of Daiquiri), 
to reinforce the 500 men already there under General 
Castillo. A conference of general officers was held 
on board Shafter's headquarters ship on the afternoon 
and evening of the same day, and final arrangements 
for the landing were discussed and adopted. At day- 
break the transports containing General Lawton's 
division assembled at the point agreed upon, and the 
small boats and launches from the navy and from 
the transports gathered near the headquarters ship. 
At about half past nine, after all had been loaded, the 
navy began firing on Daiquiri and making, simul- 
taneously, feints upon Aguadores, Siboney, and Ca- 
banas. Off Cabanas part of General Kent's division 
assembled and went through the process of loading 

96 



"MARCH ON SANTIAGO" 

small boats, as if preparing to land, while the navy 
shelled the shore, and a small force, under General 
Rabi, made a demonstration against the settlement. 
The bombardment of Daiquiri lasted from fifteen to 
twenty minutes, and then the boats, with Lawton's 
division, moved towards the shore in tow of the naval 
launches. For the assistance rendered by the navy 
in landing his troops, General Shafter at the time re- 
peatedly expressed his appreciation to Admiral Samp- 
son and to the Navy Department. Our troops, as 
they landed, were met by part of General Castillo's 
force, which had failed to intercept the Spaniards, 
who left the vicinity of Daiquiri early in the morning. 
The dawn of that eventful day disclosed the heaviest 
sea that had been experienced since the arrival of the 
blockading squadron. The entire absence of any save 
one small wharf made the landing from the boats both 
difficult and hazardous. The soldiers, laden as the}?- 
were with haversacks containing three days' rations, 
belts filled with ammunition, guns, and camp accou- 
trements, found it difficult to descend from the ships 
into the small boats and make the landing in the rough 
surf. One boat capsized, and two soldiers were drowned. 
These were the only fatalities that attended the landing 
of the entire army. No provision had been made for 
getting ashore the horses and mules, because General 
Shafter knew, before he left Tampa, that on account 
of the rocky coast, where he expected to disembark, 
there would be no alternative other than simply put- 
ting the animals overboard and swimming them ashore. 
I He knew that in thus landing his animals and sup- 
plies he could not re-embark them unless he captured 
Santiago city and harbor. It was a risk of war which 

97 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

circumstances forced upon him, but he took it con- 
scious of the responsibilities involved. The total loss 
of horses and mules from this crude method amounted 
to but fifty, including those that died on the trans- 
ports en route to Cuba. 

No opposition was met from the Spaniards during 
the day, and by evening most of General Lawton's di- 
vision, General Bates's brigade, and one brigade of 
General Wheeler's cavalry division, a total of about 
6,000 men, had landed on Cuban soil. 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

SOON after landing General Lawton was informed 
by General Shafter that there were only about 200 
Spanish troops reported at Siboney, and these had 
retreated on the first firing from the fleet. He was 
therefore directed to push forward a strong force of 
about two regiments and occupy the crossing of the 
railroad at Siboney with the main road to Santiago. 
General Castillo was suggested for the advance, his 
men knowing the country thoroughly. If no oppo- 
sition was encountered, they were to go into camp, 
intrench, and remain there. 

Siboney is about seven miles from Daiquiri and 
twelve miles from Santiago. At that time a very 
narrow jungle path was the only connection between 
the two places. Upon receipt of his instructions, Gen- 
eral Lawton immediately proceeded along this trail 
towards Siboney, with the 1st and 2d brigades of his 
division, until night closed upon them. He moved 
out at daylight next morning. At eight o'clock his 
advance was fired upon from the hills on the right. 
At the same time it was reported that a column of 
Spanish troops was crossing the trail in his front. 
Reinforcements were pushed rapidly forward, and the 
Spanish column retreated hastily from the trail lead- 
ing a little to the right of Siboney, in the direction 

tLofC. 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of Las Guasimas and Sevilla. General Lawton oc- 
cupied Siboney (sometimes called Juraguacito) on the 
morning of the 23d, and at once reported to General 
Shafter that, as he entered, the town had been aban- 
doned by the Spanish troops, with no attempt at re- 
sistance, except a few scattering shots at long range, 
and that an ambuscade prepared for his advance guard 
had been discovered. The Spanish force, variously 
estimated at between 600 and 1,200, was said to have 
been under General Linares, the senior officer in com- 
mand of the troops in the province of Santiago. 

With the capture of Siboney a good defensive po- 
sition was occupied, and another available place for 
landing troops and supplies secured, seven miles near- 
er Santiago. Several locomotives, with 100 small 
cars, loaded with steam coal, were also captured. Gen- 
eral Lawton reported that the retreat of the Spaniards 
was so rapid it was impossible to follow with infantry, 
and that a squadron of cavalry would have enabled 
him to capture the command. However, some mount- 
ed Cubans pursued the rear guard of the Spaniards, 
and succeeded in capturing several carts. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Aguirre, of General Castillo's command, ac- 
companied by 120 Cubans, had a skirmish with the 
Spaniards about two miles west of Siboney. The 
Cubans were repulsed, losing two killed and nine 
wounded. Later in the day, reinforced by one of 
their own regiments, the Cubans renewed the attack, 
but were again driven back, having seven wounded. 
One Spaniard was left dead on the field. General 
Shafter reported the result of these two days' opera- 
tions in the following despatch to the War Depart- 
ment: 

100 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

"Daiquiri, Cuba, June 23, 1898. 
"Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C. 

" Had very fine voyage. Lost less than fifty animals, six or 
eight to-day. Lost more putting them through the surf to land 
than on transports. Command as healthy as when we left. 
Eighty men sick. Only deaths two men drowned in landing. 
Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of 
San Francisco and covered with dense growth of bushes. Land- 
ing at Daiquiri unopposed. All points occupied by Spanish 
troops heavily bombarded by navy to clear them out. Sent troops 
towards Santiago and occupied Juraguacito, a naturally strong 
place, this morning, Spanish troops retreating as soon as our 
advance was known. Had no mounted troops, or could have 
captured them, about 600 all told. Railroads from there in. Have 
cars and engine in possession. 

" With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and 
as many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, includ- 
ing light artillery and greater portion of pack train, probably 
all of it, with some of the wagons; animals have to be jumped 
into the water and towed ashore. 

"Had consultation with Generals Garcia, Rabi, and Castillo on 
P.M. of 20th, twenty miles west of Santiago. These officers 
were unanimously of the opinion that landing should be made 
east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion. Gen- 
eral Garcia promises to join me at Juraguacito to-morrow with 
between 3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of 
Santiago by ships of the navy to Juraguacito, and there disem- 
barked. This will give me between 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, and 
leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santiago from the west. 

" General Kent's division is being disembarked this afternoon 
at Juraguacito and will be continued during the night. The 
assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and en- 
thusiastically given. Without them I could not have landed 
in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost 
so many boats in the surf. At present want nothing. Weather 
has been good, no rain on land, and prospects for fair weather. 

" SH AFTER, 
"Major-General U. S. V., Commanding." 
101 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

General Wheeler and his staff established head- 
quarters in Siboney on the evening of the 23d. As 
General Wheeler had the rank of major-general, he 
was the senior officer on land, and to him, therefore, 
were sent, by General Shafter, the following instruc- 
tions : 

" On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' 

"Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 3, 1898. 
" The Commanding General, Dismounted Cavalry Division. 

" SIR, — In connection with instructions of yesterday to Gen- 
eral Lawton, a copy of which is sent you herewith, the command- 
ing general directs you to send Colonel Wood's regiment to be 
added to the force near Juraguacito, with orders to have two or 
three companies patrol the road to that place from the junction 
of the main road from Daiquiri to Santiago de Cuba with the 
railroad. Very respectfully, 

"E. J. McClernand, 
" Assistant Adjutant-General." 

The instructions to General Lawton, already re- 
ferred to, accompanying this letter, were as follows: 

" On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' at Sea, June 22, 1898. 
" Brigadier-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.,or Senior Officer 
at the Front. 
" SIR, — The commanding general directs me to say there were 
only about 200 troops at Juraguacito this morning, and they 
left at the first discharge. He wishes you to push down a strong 
force, about two regiments, to occupy the crossing of the railroad 
at that place with the main road to Santiago de Cuba. I suggest 
General Castillo as an advance, as his men know the country 
thoroughly, and a good regiment to back him. If they meet with 
no opposition, they should go into camp, intrench, and remain 
there. Very respectfully, 

"E. J. McClernand, 
" Assistant Adjutant-General." 
102 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

It will be noticed that these last instructions are 
addressed to " Brigadier - General H. W. Lawton, U. 
S. V., or Senior Officer at the Front/' and provided 
that, "if they met with no opposition, they should 
go into camp, intrench, and remain there." Fol- 
lowing out these orders, General Wheeler, as "sen- 
ior officer at the front/' placed Colonel Wood's regi- 
ment on the Santiago road as a patrol, and during the 
evening of the 23d, ordered up parts of two other dis- 
mounted cavalry regiments of General Young's bri- 
gade. That night General Wheeler learned from Gen- 
eral Castillo the position and approximate strength 
of the Spaniards, who were intrenched about three 
and a half miles west of Siboney, on the main road to 
Santiago. He had made during the day a personal 
reconnoissance along the Siboney road, in the direc- 
tion of Sevilla. General Castillo prepared a map for 
General Wheeler, giving a full description of the to- 
pography of the county, and furnished much infor- 
mation regarding the Spanish troops and their method 
of fighting. He expressed the belief that, although 
the Spanish had successfully resisted his attack, they 
would fall back to Santiago during the night. Gen- 
eral Young was present at this conference, and asked 
permission from General Wheeler to make a recon- 
noissance in force the next morning. Although 
General Shatter had given instructions to intrench at 
Siboney, this was conditional upon meeting no op- 
position. General Wheeler felt that his orders gave 
him sufficient latitude, in view of the proximity of the 
enemy, to determine the position and movements of 
the Spanish force threatening our advance, and per- 
mission was, therefore, given General Young as re- 

103 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

quested. General Castillo promised to assist with a 
force of 800 effective Cubans. 

Two approaches led from Siboney towards Santiago, 
and the position of the enemy, who were intrenched 
near the place where these two roads converge, about 
four miles northwest of Siboney. The left or westerly 
trail was scarce^ more than a path over a rough and 
mountainous country, and was known as the " ridge 
trail." The other approach, known as the "valley 
road/' was the main trail to Santiago. When the 
reconnoissance in force was determined upon, during 
the night of the 23d, General Young directed that 
Colonel Wood's dismounted volunteer cavalry regi- 
ment, consisting of troops A, B, D. E, F, G, K, and 
L, about 500 strong, should take the ridge trail, 
while the regular troops A, B, G, and K. of the 1st 
Cavalry, 244 men, with troops A, B, E, and I, 220 
men, of the loth (colored) Cavalry, should go with 
him (Young) along the valley road, together with a 
battery of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. These 
two trails were at no place over one and a half 
miles apart. It was agreed that at about half a mile 
in advance of the enemy's outposts the two simulta- 
neously approaching cavalry detachments should de- 
ploy, Colonel Wood's regiment to be thrown out in the 
jungle on the right, and join on the left of the line 
formed by the 1st and 10th Cavalry. The regulars, 
under General Young, were to make a feint on the 
enemy's front, and hold on hard, while Wood's regi- 
ment was to make a detour, under a couple of Cuban 
guides, and attack the Spaniards in flank. 

The right column, under General Young, moved 
out at 5.45. After marching a little over an hour the 

104 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUAS1MAS 

"point," consisting of Captain Mills and two men, 
discovered the enemy's presence at the place where 
they had been informed by General Castillo the night 
before the Spaniards would be found. The enemy 
had chosen his position well. Where Young halted, 
a small creek crossed the road, and an open glade of 
tall guinea-grass extended for several acres in his front. 
Immediately in his vicinity a strong Spanish outpost 
had been stationed. About 900 yards to the front 
and right were the principal works of the enemy, on a 
steep mountain height, where he was intrenched be- 
hind rock forts and barricades. On the right ran a 
high ridge, with a succession of block-houses. The 
Spanish trenches were 800 or 900 yards in length, 
and in form of an obtuse angle, the eastern slope facing 
the regulars, and the southern slope commanding the 
approach of both the ridge and valley roads. 

Realizing that Colonel Wood could not make as 
good progress as his own column, General Young 
purposely delayed his attack, in order that the volun- 
teer cavalry might come up abreast of him before he 
opened fire. However, he at once began operations 
to develop the enemy's strength. The preparations 
were cautiously and deliberately made. A Cuban 
guide was sent by General Young to warn Wood of 
the nearness of the enemy; canteens were ordered 
filled from the small creek, the Hotchkiss guns placed in 
battery about sixty yards beyond the point where the 
road crosses the creek, and the position of the Spaniards 
carefully examined. In the mean time, General Wheel- 
er came up, and approved the plan of attack and the 
proposed disposition of the troops. 
The attack was to be made by the 1st Cavalry, the 

105 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

loth to be held in reserve. The 1st Cavalry was de- 
ployed in skirmish order in front and to the right of 
the battery of Hotchkiss guns, B and K on the left, A 
and G forming the right wing. After a delay of a 
half-hour the troops began to deploy through the open 
glade and brush. They had hardly advanced 200 
yards when a strong outpost of the enemy, concealed 
in an old cemetery between the creek and the road, 
which here ran parallel, fired a volley almost point- 
blank into troops B and K. In this discharge, and in 
several volleys which quickly followed, while these 
two troops were seeking shelter, the squadron com- 
mander, Major Bell, with K troop at the time, was 
wounded, as well as Captain Knox, Lieutenant Byram, 
and Sergeant-Major Ryan. Four privates were killed. 
The firing from the outposts and intrenchments of the 
enemy now became very severe, and General Young 
ordered Captain Beck's troop (A) to the left, and troops 
I and B, all of the 10th, to the right of the 1st, the 
fourth and remaining troop of the 10th being held in 
support of the Hotchkiss battery. 

At only very rare intervals could the enemy be seen, 
but his firing was both severe and accurate. Never- 
theless, the seven troops pushed steadily forward tow- 
ards the enemy's works, always driving the Spaniards 
before them. The advance was exceedingly difficult, 
and made under most trying circumstances. The 
air was filled with the sharp humming of the Mauser 
bullets, and the underbrush was so thick that at times 
the troopers had to cut their way with knives and sa- 
bres, occasional wire entanglements adding to the 
harassing obstacles in the forward movement. The 
thickness of the jungle made it impossible to keep any 

106 



-r r * 



.4/ 













FAC-SIMILE OF MAP, DRAWN BY GENERAL WOOD, OF I III- FIGHT AT 
[.AS GUASIMAS 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

regular line, and the advance and support were soon 
intermingled. It was practically a troop-command- 
er's fight, and even an individual trooper's fight, su- 
pervision of the single isolated soldiers being almost 
impossible on account of the dense undergrowth. 
Throughout this affair, General Young occupied a 
most exposed position, in plain view of the enemy's 
intrenchments. Not a soldier went to the rear to 
assist the wounded; there were no stragglers; and 
every man, both white and black conducted himself 
with bravery and great self-control. All advanced 
towards the common objective, and with much difficulty 
finally forced their way through the dense thicket and 
over the rocks covering the steep heights on which the 
Spaniards were, and from which they precipitately 
fled upon our approach. Troops A, of the loth, and 
B, of the 1st, reached the summit somewhat ahead of 
the others, but were joined by A, of the 1st, and I and 
B, of the ioth. 

In the mean time, the left column, under Colonel 
Wood, was moving rapidly over the ridge trail, which, 
as already stated, was hardly more than a bridle-path, 
with a dense and almost impenetrable jungle pressing 
closely on its sides. The difficulties of the advance 
were much increased by the precipitous and rugged 
character of the ridges over which the trail ran. Know- 
ing that his march would be long and difficult, Wood 
led his men swiftly over the trail, at such a smart pace, 
in fact, that fifty or more of them are reported to have 
fallen out of the column from heat exhaustion. Colo- 
nel Wood had been notified that a few hundred yards 
on the Siboney side of the trail, in advance of the Span- 
ish outposts, he would find a dead guerilla, killed in 

107 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the action with the Cubans on the previous afternoon. 
Here Captain Capron's advance, under Sergeant Ham- 
ilton Fish, discovered the presence of the enemy, and 
word was sent back to Wood, who personally moved 
forward to reconnoitre the Spanish outposts. Satis- 
fying himself of their nearness, he silently deployed 
five of his eight troops before a shot was fired. Some 
of these were sent in the jungle of the bushes on the 
right, under Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, and part in 
the clearing on the left, under Major Brodie. Before 
this deployment had been entirely completed, the 
action opened. Wood soon found that the Spanish 
line was overlapping his own, and he was compelled 
to place seven of his eight troops on the firing-line. 

The enemy kept up his firing, mostly by volleys, 
delivered with the precision of a militia company in a 
prize drill. The singing and shrieking of the Mauser 
bullets filled the air, and it was a long time before the 
regiment could find a target upon which to direct its 
return fire. Notwithstanding the very trying con- 
ditions under which these volunteers received their 
baptism of fire, they pushed fearlessly and steadity 
forward. The thickness of the jungle and the use of 
smokeless powder made it impossible to discover the 
enemy. The regiment was untried; it had had less 
than three weeks' drill before being shipped to Tampa. 
It is true these dismounted troops had an advantage 
over other volunteers in that they were armed with 
Krag - Jorgensen carbines and smokeless powder, 
and, in fact, with all the best accoutrements fur- 
nished the regulars. But Colonel Wood had done 
wonders with his raw recruits, in organization, equip- 
ment, and discipline. It was Wood's spirit and genius 

108 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

that made the regiment what it was.* Colonel Wood's 
high qualities served him in good stead that hot 24th 
of June in the Cuban jungle. He was at all times at 
the front, in the most exposed places, with as little ap- 
parent concern as if he were on the streets of Wash- 
ington. His coolness inspired the admiration of his 
men, who dubbed him "The Ice-Box. " 

Wood's two squadrons advanced slowly, forcing 
the enemy back, and capturing, by a charge across 
an open glade, an old distillery, from the cover of which 
the Spanish had been doing much damage to his men, 
and finally driving the enemy out of his position be- 
hind the rocks to his second line of defence on the ridge, 
but three hundred yards from our line. Soon after, 
Wood's right extended to the left of the regulars, 
and both joined in an assault, driving the Span- 
iards out of their main position behind the rock 
forts, where they were in large force, and supported 
by two machine-guns. 

The Spaniards were completely routed. They left 
a large number of their dead upon the field. Our troops 
occupied the enemy's position, and, had it not been 
for exhaustion, doubtless would have captured much 
of the Spanish command. So hasty was the flight of 
the Spaniards that the road over which they retreated 
was strewn with abandoned equipment, and ammuni- 
tion and articles of clothing were found in profusion 
scattered in and about the trenches. 

As soon as General Lawton, at Siboney, heard the 

* Wood had won a medal of honor (that prize coveted by every 
American soldier) for an act of gallantry, fortitude, and heroic phys- 
ical endurance, during an Indian campaign in the pursuit and capt- 
ure of Geronimo, which General Lawton at the time pronounced was 
without an equal in his varied and lengthy military experience. 

IO9 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

firing, he ordered General Chaffee's brigade, which 
had in the mean time come up that morning from Dai- 
quiri, to proceed at once to General Young's support, 
if occasion should make this necessary. Finding that 
he was more heavily engaged than he had anticipated, 
General Wheeler, before Chaffee arrived, sent the fol- 
lowing note to Lawton : 

" GENERAL LAWTON,— General Wheeler directs me to say 
that he is engaged with a bigger force of the enemy than was 
anticipated, and directs that any forces you may have be sent 
forward on the Sevilla road as soon as possible. 

"W. D. Beach, 

"Captain 3d Cavalry. 
"June 24, 8.30 A.M." 

General Chaffee's brigade, however, did not reach 
Las Guasimas until after the engagement was over. 
A half-hour after the fight had terminated, three troops 
of the 9th Cavalry arrived and were deployed to the 
front as outposts. When Chaffee's brigade and part 
of the other two brigades of Lawton's division arrived, 
they were sent forward half-way to Sevilla (one and a 
half miles), and this division remained in advance of 
the army thereafter. 

Our losses were one officer and fifteen men killed; 
six officers and forty-six men wounded, out of a total 
attacking force of 964. This small number of dis- 
mounted cavalry drove from his position an enemy 
which has been variously estimated at from 2,000 to 
3,000, supported by machine-guns. The Civil Gov- 
ernor of Santiago de Cuba informed General Wheeler 
and Colonel Wood, after the surrender, that the Span- 
ish force that day amounted to 4,000. General Toral 

no 



THE AFFAIR OF LAS GUASIMAS 

told General Wheeler that the Spanish numbered 2,000. 
Their strength was undoubtedly not less than 2,000. 
General Wheeler, General Young, and Colonel Wood 
reported thirty-nine Spanish dead found, the bodies 
having being thrown into the jungle for concealment. 
Spies and Cuban refugees afterwards stated that the 
Spanish dead and wounded were brought into San- 
tiago for six hours that day, while General Toral 
admitted that the loss of General Rubin's column at 
Las Guasimas (or Sevilla, as the engagement is known 
to the Spaniards) was 250. General Young states, in 
his official report, that the Spanish press in Santiago 
the next da}?- conceded the loss as seventy-seven killed 
alone. General Linares, the senior Spanish officer 
commanding the 4th Corps and the military division 
of Santiago de Cuba, is reported to have been in com- 
mand at the engagement, accompanied by Generals 
Toral, Vara del Rey, and Rubin. 



CHAPTER IX 

RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS— PREPARING FOR 

CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

THE affair of Las Guasimas served a useful pur- 
pose. It drove the enemy off the ground which lay 
between our army and the Spanish defences in front 
of Santiago; it gave us a limited but most welcome 
area of open and well- watered country in which to rest 
and prepare for the final assault on the city ; it proved 
to the Spaniards, who were greatly dispirited and de- 
pressed thereby, that American and Cuban methods 
of fighting were two distinct and separate propositions ; 
and, in proportion to the discouragement and dismay 
of the Spaniards, caused by their defeat at Las Guasi- 
mas, the American forces were encouraged and in- 
spired. Two squadrons of regular cavalry and two 
squadrons of volunteer cavalry, all dismounted, had 
proved their valor equally under most difficult and 
trying circumstances. An unseen enemy, with a 
much superior force, in his own country, and intrenched 
in the position of his choice, had been driven from his 
rocky fastnesses, completely routed, and forced back 
to his principal works of defence before Santiago. 

The Spanish reported next day, as General Shafter 
reported it in a despatch to Washington, that "we 
[the Americans] were beaten, but persisted in fighting, 
and they were obliged to fall back." In other words, 

112 



RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS 

the defeated Americans had driven the victorious Span- 
iards from their position — one of those Castilian con- 
tradictions to which the Spanish language lends itself 
so readily. In an official communication to the War 
Department, written immediately after the fight, an 
officer reported: "It is understood that the Spanish 
object to the American style of fighting, as being a 
kind to which they were unaccustomed; their criti- 
cism being that the ioth (colored) United States Cav- 
alry neither returned the Spanish fire nor retreated 
when fired upon from heights, but just kept straight 
on up the hill, then, but not until then, shooting back, 
so compelling the Spanish to retire." 

It is interesting to note the Spanish version of the 
affair, as given by Lieutenant M tiller,* second in com- 
mand of the naval forces of the province of Santiago 
de Cuba. He states that on the 226. of June General 
Rubin, with three companies of the provisional bat- 
talion of Puerto Rico, three of San Fernando, and two 
pieces of artillery, was directed to retreat from Dai- 
quiri, "as the force guarding it could not cope with 
the ships;" and to take up a position on the heights 
of Sevilla before daybreak of the 23d. " On the 23d," 
Lieutenant Mtiller says, "General Rubin, reinforced 
with one company from San Fernando, half engi- 
neers, and two guns, was attacked in the morning and 
again in the evening, checking the enemy's advance." 
(This, of course, was the attack of the Cubans, under 
General Castillo, already referred to, and not partici- 
pated in by any American force.) "At daybreak on 

* Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, by Lieutenant 
Jose Miiller y Tejeiro, translated and published by Office of Naval 
Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department. 

113 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the 24th," continues Lieutenant Miiller, "the echelon 
was reinforced by two companies from Talavero, and 
not only resisted a strong attack of the enemy, but 
also forced the latter to retreat." 

Two days after the engagement General Linares 
issued the following manifesto : 

" General Order of the 4th Army Corps, dated June 26th, at 
Santiago de Cuba. 

" SOLDIERS, — We left the mineral region because I did not wish 
to sacrifice your lives in vain in unequal battle, with musket fire, 
against the pompous superiority of the enemy, who was fighting 
us under cover of his armored ships, armed with the most modern 
and powerful guns. 

" The enemy, rid of our presence at the points referred to, has 
already landed his troops and proposes to take the city of San- 
tiago. 

" The encounter is at hand and it will take place under equal 
conditions. 

" Your military virtues and your valor are the best guarantee 
of success. 

" Let us defend the right, ignored and trampled upon by the 
Americans, who have united themselves with the Cuban rebels. 

" The nation and the army look to us. 

"More than 1,000 sailors, disembarked from the fleet, will 
assist us. Volunteers and firemen will take part in the task of 
repulsing and defeating the enemies of Spain. 

" The other division of this army corps is hastening towards 
us to reinforce us. 

" I make no recommendations, because I feel sure that all will 
vie in the defence of their posts with firmness and resolve ; but I 
will say that those assigned to any position, be it in the precincts 
of the city or at the foremost points, must stand firm at any cost, 
without vacillating, without thinking of retreating, but only 
of saving the honor of our arms. 

" I shall comply with my duties, and, in conclusion, I say with 
all, Long live Spain ! LINARES. " 

114 



RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS 

Some timid newspaper men, accompanying General 
Young and Colonel Wood, became alarmed at the first 
shot fired at Las Guasimas, and, rushing frantically- 
back to Siboney, before the engagement was over, 
wrote from the decks of the transports, where they took 
refuge, imaginary accounts of the fight, which was 
described as an "ambush" brought on by General 
Wheeler, in direct violation of General Shafter's in- 
structions. The 71st New York Volunteers was pict- 
uresquely described as taking an active part in the 
fight and conducting itself with great valor. This 
regiment was not engaged. 

As we have already seen, the engagement at Las 
Guasimas was in no sense an ambuscade. General 
Young deliberately waited twenty minutes before at- 
tacking with his column, and Colonel Wood, after 
learning of the presence of the enemy in the position 
where he had been informed the Spaniards would be 
found, deployed five of his troops before a shot was 
fired. Neither was the engagement brought on in 
violation of General Shafter's orders. It occurred 
unexpectedly, to be sure, but under conditions which, 
when made known to him, commended the affair to 
his hearty approval and acquiescence. As a matter 
of fact, he had already issued instructions which Gen- 
eral Wheeler very properly regarded as authorizing 
him to act in the premises. These instructions are 
quoted in the preceding chapter. Intelligent com- 
pliance therewith demanded a reconnoissance in force, 
and General Wheeler proceeded accordingly. 

On the morning of the 24th — the morning of the Las 
Guasimas affair— General Shafter issued the follow- 
ing order: 

115 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

"Headquarters sth Army Corps, 
"On Board S. S. 'Seguranca,' 

" Off Daiquiri, June 24th. 
" To Division Commanders : 

" The Commanding General directs me to say it is impossible 
to advance on Santiago until means to supply troops can be ar- 
ranged. Take up strong positions, where you can get water, 
and make yourselves secure from surprise or attack. 

" General Lawton's division will be in front ; Kent's near Jura- 
guacito, where he disembarked ; Wheeler's near Daiquiri ; Bates's 
command where it will be in support of Lawton. 

" Very respectfully, E. J. McCLERNAND, 

"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

He also directed General Lawton to "take up a 
strong defensive position a short distance on tlw road 
to Santiago, and hold it until transportation is ready. 
Be sure to be convenient to water, and see that your 
flanks are protected. A battery of artillery will be 
sent to you as soon as it can be disembarked." Of 
course, neither of these orders was received before Gen- 
eral Young's brigade, under General Wheeler's in- 
structions, moved out to develop the enemy's position 
near Sevilla. 

As soon as General Shafter heard of the affair of 
Las Guasimas, he expressed his approval of General 
Wheeler's action in the following note : 

"On Board S. S. 'Seguranca,' 

"Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 24th. 
" Major-General Wheeler, Commanding Cavalry Division. 

" SIR, — The Commanding General directs me to say he is glad 
to hear such good news, that you are occupying the enemy's 
ground. A battery will be sent to you as soon as it can be un- 
loaded ; horses are all off. Will also send you some saddle-horses 
from artillery. The mounted cavalry will be despatched as fast 

Il6 



RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS 

as possible. Kent's division now disembarked at Siboney and 
ordered to hold themselves in readiness to support you if need- 
ed. Navy are firing at the point probably where the railroad 
crosses the river San Juan. It is likely the enemy are sending 
reinforcements by rail. Rations will be in Juraguacito to-night, 
and we will have pack-trains out for you during night — one for 
each division. Very respectfully, 

"E. J. McClernand, 
"Assistant Adjutant-General." 

He also sent General Wheeler this letter the next 
morning : 

"Headquarters sth Army Corps, 
" On Board S. S. ' Seguranca,' 

"Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 25, 1898. 
"Major-General J. Wheeler, U. S. V., Commanding Cavalry 
Division, near Sevilla, Cuba. 
" SIR, — Despatch* of 5 P.M. just received. Your news is ex- 
cellent. Have ordered Bates to repair road to Sevilla at once. 
One battery of artillery is on the way to you, and will have an- 
other battery before to-night. Four troops 2d Cavalry will be 
gotten to you just as early to-day as possible. Will send them 
in detachments as ready ; also three pack - trains, one for each 
division, to carry rations to you. The Ordnance Officer with 



* " Half-mile beyond Sevilla, June 24, 1898. 
"Adjutant-General sth Corps. 

" SIR, — I have the honor to report we can see Santiago very plainly 
from this point, about seven or eight miles distant. The country 
appears level for six miles this side the citj' except for heights on the 
south which extend to within three miles of Santiago, and from which 
the city can be shelled. These hills now appear deserted. The coun- 
try is fairly open, a good tract for campaigning over ; and it is said 
to be well watered. The road from this point to Santiago is said to 
be very good. An engineer force ought to be put to work immediately 
to repair the road between Juraguacito and Sevilla, as considerable 
work must be done to make it passable for guns and wagons. Sevilla 
is abandoned, and General Chaffee will occupy it to-morrow. 
"Very respectfully, Jos. WHEELER, 

" Major-General Volunteers." 

117 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

another train will get ammunition to you. General Kent with 
two transports could not be found up to last night. The most 
of his division is at Juraguacito under General Hawkins. Or- 
der it to join you, if you can place it in good position ; they are 
and should be with you. Expect General Garcia's command 
up to-day, and it will disembark at Juraguacito. Keep your 
front thoroughly picketed and also your right flank, and well in 
advance, but do not try any forward movement until further 
orders. From where you are now, or approximately there, I wish 
to advance in force, and will not move until all the troops are well 
in hand. 

" I will see you to-day there. Very respectfully, 

"W. R. SHAFTER, 
" Major-General U. S. V., Commanding." 

On the 24th of June, after the engagement, less than 
a third of General Shatter's army was at Las Guasi- 
mas — a fragment of the cavalry division and part of 
Lawton's division. Bates's independent brigade was 
at Siboney; all of Sumner's first cavalry brigade 
was at Daiquiri; all of Kent's division at Siboney, 
or still on transports off Cabanas; the artillery had 
not passed beyond Siboney; and Rafferty's squadron 
of the 2d Cavalry, the only mounted troops in Cuba, 
had not yet been sent to the front. None of these 
forces moved forward until specifically directed to do so 
by General Shatter. I dwell upon these details to show 
how deliberate was the general's advance on Santiago. 

After all the troops had been landed, a greater part 
of the navy's boats and launches were withdrawn. 
General Shatter then realized that, with the losses he 
had sustained through the accidents to the barges 
and lighters already mentioned, the question of get- 
ting sufficient supplies ashore was, indeed, a serious 
one. On the 24th of June he sent to Washington an 

118 



RESULTS OF LAS GUASIMAS 

urgent message for additional barges and lighters. 
Two days later a large tug, with three barges in tow, 
left Mobile ; a sea-going tug with two additional barges 
left New Orleans; and two decked barges were de- 
spatched from Key West. The lighter Bessie was again 
started from Tampa. All save one of these broke 
down en route, or were wrecked the day after their 
arrival. 

But the loss of the lighters was not the only embar- 
rassment. The continuously heavy surf beating hard 
upon the sharp coral coast caused the masters of trans- 
ports, the marine insurance of which the United States 
did not assume in chartering them, to keep well out at 
sea, and thereby greatly increased the distance over 
which the small number of lighters and barges had to 
pass. It was with the greatest difficulty that General 
Shaf ter could get his supplies ashore for the army and 
the 4,000 Cubans under General Garcia. He had hoped 
to land ten days' rations and supplies before ordering 
any forward movement from Sevilla. As it was the 
season of the year when the West Indian hurricanes 
prevailed, General Shaf ter knew that at the first storm 
the transports would have to go to Guantanamo Bay 
for anchor, or put to sea — in either event, the vessels 
would be gone several days until the storm had abated. 
In the mean time the unloading of ammunition and 
rations w r ould cease. Moreover, he was compelled to 
rely entirely on his own supplies, as the country 
was absolutely devastated, and without any resources 
whatsoever. It was for these reasons that General 
Shaffer remained aboard his headquarters ship, giv- 
ing his pergonal effort and attention to the problem 
which caused him the greatest anxiety. 

119 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

On the 25th of June, by his direction, General Wheel- 
er was given supervisory charge of the army on land, 
with detailed instructions for placing the several bri- 
gades in good camps preparatory to the completion of 
arrangements for the advance. Advantage was taken 
of this enforced delay in the forward movement to im- 
prove the roads, reconnoitre, and secure as much in- 
formation as possible regarding the enemy's strength 
and position. General Wheeler was repeatedly en- 
joined under no circumstances to make any forward 
movement until General Shafter could get sufficient 
supplies ashore. 

The da}^ after Las Guasimas, General Chaffee's 
brigade was pushed one and a half miles beyond Se- 
villa, with 600 Cubans stationed as outposts, and Bates 
was ordered to send a detachment from his brigade to 
work upon the road from Siboney to Sevilla, to make 
it passable for wagons and artillery. This trail was 
so narrow that wagons could not pass each other; in 
some places they could not even pass a mounted man. 
There was not sufficient time to widen the entire trail, 
five miles in length, and General Shafter did not wish 
to fatigue a large number of his men by such work. It 
became necessary, therefore, to direct that no trains 
should leave the front after nine in the morning, and 
that those going out with supplies from Siboney 
should not start until eleven o'clock. 

Some criticism has been made of General Shafter 
for not pushing the army forward after June 24th, and 
preventing the enemy from intrenching more strongly 
on San Juan Ridge. This has been coupled with the 
charge that no reconnoitring was done during the 
period following the landing and before the final as- 

120 



CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

sault July 1st. Those who make these criticisms are 
ignorant of the motives which compelled the general 
to delay his forward movement, and of the difficul- 
ties he had in landing supplies sufficient to render it 
safe for his army to advance. 

During the six days following the engagement at 
Las Guasimas, which was itself a reconnoissance, 
and before the attack on Santiago, reconnoitring was 
constantly in progress, by General Shafter's direction, 
under Colonel Derby, chief engineer officer, by six staff 
officers especially selected for the purpose, and by nu- 
merous line and field officers. A company of the 9th 
Infantry made a reconnoissance within a mile of the 
San Juan River, and patrols were kept constantly 
moving from the extreme left on the sea with Bates's 
brigade to the extreme right of the cavalry. The whole 
area between Sevilla and the Spanish outposts in front 
of San Juan and El Caney was repeatedly reconnoi- 
tred by the officers of General Lawton's division, in- 
cluding General Lawton himself, as well as by General 
Chaffee, with a company of infantry and some Cubans. 
These movements extended to Marianage, and even to 
the Ducrot House. General Bates's officers made a 
careful reconnoissance from the shore line to the San 
Juan River, and as far to the right as General Kent's 
division. The country thus surveyed was carefully 
plotted by the engineer corps, and daily reports of prog- 
ress were made to General Shafter. 

It must not be forgotten that these operations were 
conducted under the most difficult circumstances. The 
denseness of a Cuban jungle can be appreciated only by 
one who attempts to penetrate it. Every bush that 
grows in it bears a thorn. Hot and suffocatingly close, 

121 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

progress at the best was slow and tedious. A recon- 
noissance in force was both impossible and unneces- 
sary. The position of the enemy was well known; 
and while it is doubtless true, as General Shatter knew 
at the time, that the Spaniards strengthened their po- 
sition somewhat on San Juan Ridge, he made no ef- 
fort to prevent their intrenching for fear that, before 
he was ready, such an attempt would bring on a gen- 
eral engagement, as it undoubtedly would have done. 
Ample means were placed at the control of Gen- 
eral Wheeler for the employment of spies, to be 
sent into Santiago. From them, scouting parties, 
Cuban refugees, and pacificos, much information was 
obtained regarding the strength and condition of the 
Spanish forces in Santiago and the fortifications sur- 
rounding the place. The inhabitants were reported 
to be in a state of panic, and daily expecting an attack 
from our forces, which were said to number 16,000. 
The Spanish officers circulated the report that their 
force was 20,000, although General Shatter's informants 
stated that the garrison did not exceed 12,000, an esti- 
mate which agreed with the information obtained 
from several different sources. The Spanish soldiers 
and lower classes of citizens were reported as speaking 
enthusiasticalfy of their coming victories over the 
Americans. Soldiers and citizens were short of sup- 
plies, and Spanish officers had seized all food in the 
stores of the city. But little meat was to be had, and 
this was sold at a dollar a pound. It had become neces- 
sary to kill young horses for food. The principal and 
only staple article available was rice, while in the hos- 
pitals the supplies consisted of sardines and a bread 
made from rice flour and starch. Many Spanish sol- 

122 



CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

diers were described as sick with malarial and other 
fevers, and the Reina Mercedes, which had been dis- 
abled, had been converted into a hospital-ship. 

The fortifications surrounding Santiago were de- 
scribed as consisting of almost continuous intrench- 
ments, especially designed to oppose the advance of 
cavalry, and located on rising ground for rifle fire. 
Two lines of barbed-wire running parallel, about three 
yards apart, completely surrounded the town. Each 
fence, consisting of seven or eight strands, with wire 
running diagonally across, formed a meshwork of en- 
tanglements. Only six entrances to the city had been 
left open, and the one road in front of General Shaff- 
er's army cut through San Juan Ridge. The two 
hills on either side of this road commanded it perfectly. 
On the east and southeast of the town ten block-houses, 
containing four or five muzzle-loading cannon and a 
breech-loading gun of large caliber, had been erected 
on the line of defence. On the northern part of the 
town no artillery had been placed by the enemy, as 
it was believed that the Spanish fleet could cover that 
territory with its guns. A large force had been re- 
cently sent to the Morro, and Shaffer's informant 
added that 1,000 marines, with artillery, had been land- 
ed from the ships. At Aguadores a stone fort, with 
numerous cannon in it, was described as splendidly 
situated, and commanding all the country as far as 
Santiago. General Shaffer also learned that Hobson 
and his men were in the Mercedes Hospital, and being 
well cared for. Much valuable information from these 
sources was likewise secured regarding the defence 
and strength of the garrison at Caney. 

General Shaffer had intended to begin his forward 

123 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

movement on the 28th of June, and, two days before, 
ordered Lawton's entire division to move forward about 
two miles in advance of Sevilla ; Kent was brought up 
from Siboney to that place; and Sumner's brigade of 
cavalry, as well as the four batteries of light artillery, 
was ordered to the front. The siege battery troops, 
acting as infantry, with a small detachment from 
Sumner's cavalry, were left to guard Daiquiri, while 
Bates's independent brigade guarded and patrolled 
Siboney and vicinity. In the mean time Garcia' s 3,000 
Cubans had been transported from Aserradero to 
Siboney. 

On the 26th of June General Shafter thus wrote 
Admiral Sampson : 

"On Board S. S. 'Seguranca/ 

" Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 26th. 
"Admiral Win. T. Sampson, U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief 
U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station. 

" SIR, — The last of my men will be on shore to-night, but it will 
take until Tuesday to get them up to where the advance guard 
is at this time. In addition to my own force of about 15,000 men, 
I will have a little over 4,000 Cubans. I mean to advance on the 
road from Sevilla Wednesday, without fail, towards Santiago. 

" I hear the main force is outside of the city and is intrenching 
itself so as to prevent my reaching the bay south of the city. I 
shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps still 
farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city, the 
ground in that vicinity being less bushy than that between the bay 
and the San Juan River ; making my main attack from the north- 
east and east. If I can get the enemy in my front and the city 
at my back, I can very soon make them surrender, or drive 
them towards the Morro. You will hear my guns, of course, and 
can tell about where the action is taking place. I will be obliged 
if you can prevent any reinforcements crossing the railroad at 
Aguadores, but without destroying the bridge, as I may need it. 

I24 



CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

" I wish to express to you again the many obligations the army 
is under for your assistance. 

" I have not, as yet, as much forage or rations ashore as I would 
like to have, but cannot delay for them any longer. Staff of- 
ficers will continue putting off stores ; and if you will let Captain 
Goodrich continue to help you will greatly assist in the cam- 
paign. I think I should have ten days' full rations and forage 
on shore, so as to cover accidents by storm or rough weather. 
To-day I have not more than half that amount ; but now that the 
men and animals are out of the way, I think these stores can be 
discharged faster. Very respectfully yours, 

"Wm. R. Shafter, 
" Major-General U. S. V., Comding." 

On the 27th the Secretary of War telegraphed Gen- 
eral Shafter : 

" We are anxiously waiting, but hope you will take sufficient 
time to get a good ready. The second half of Duffield's brigade 
left Fort Monroe yesterday. The general, with about 1,400 men, 
should arrive to-day. Tugs and lighters are on the way. What 
are your needs?" 

Fearing that he might misconstrue this message as 
an order to delay his advance, the Secretary again 
cabled him on the same day : 

" My despatch of this morning was not intended to direct or re- 
tard your movements, or restrain you in the free exercise of your 
discretion, but to express the hope that you would not be urged 
to precipitate action before you were ready." 

With the information he had obtained regarding 
the condition of the Spanish garrison and people in 
Santiago, General Shafter determined to postpone his 
attack several days to await the arrival of the rein- 

125 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

forcements referred to, confident in the belief that his 
own force and position were daily growing stronger, 
while those of the Spanish were weakening. Up to 
this time there had been no rains of any consequence, 
and the health of his command was remarkably good. 
On the 27th he thus wrote General Wheeler at the front : 

" My Dear General Wheeler,— I had intended to make 
an advance to-morrow, with the troops that I have, but, in view 
of telegrams received yesterday, that a large number of rein- 
forcements (about 4,000) are on the way, and the further fact that 
one of the ships has arrived this morning, I will not feel justified 
in advancing until I get them on shore. The government seems 
to be very solicitous about us, and it is possible they have infor- 
mation of which we know nothing. I hope your scheme of send- 
ing spies in Santiago has worked. I also understand that a 
large number of poor people came out yesterday and are within 
the lines. Of course they will be received, as we can't drive starv- 
ing people back, at least not at the present time. Question them 
carefully and get as good an idea as you can of the condition of 
affairs there and of the location of the forces that are said to be on 
the road to oppose us. I am shipping out stores as fast as pos- 
sible, ammunition, forage, and rations, and will direct it all sent 
to you, to avoid confusion. Will you have your Q. M. take charge 
of it and pile it where we can get at it conveniently? The forage 
please issue to the artillery horses and cavalry, as well as horses 
of officers; and issue subsistence stores to any troops that re- 
quire it, but not more than three days' at a time for any command. 

" I hope you will look up the subject of finding if there is any 
means of moving a division off to your right, bringing it out at 
El Caney, a good point from which I do not believe we will be ex- 
pected, which is only about four and a half miles from the city. 
My engineer officer tells me there is a wide road leading off to 
the left on the high ground, generally in the direction of the mouth 
of the San Juan River, and which will be on Kent's left. From 
the fact that I hear that Spanish troops are evidently working 
down towards the Morro, it is possible that they may try or be 

126 



CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

thinking of attempting to flank us on our left flank ; so send at 
least a regiment of Kent's out that road, a couple of miles I should 
say, to pretty near opposite the left of where Lawton is to be placed 
this morning, and establish a picket-line connection with him, 
if practicable. I am going to have Garcia keep men well to the 
front on our left. I am coming out to see you this afternoon. 
" I hope the mounted cavalry are doing well. I had them bring 
four days' forage on their horses, instead of riding them. 
" Very truly yours, Wm. R. SHAFTER, 

"Major-General U. S. V., Commanding." 

June 27th the Yale arrived at Siboney, with Gen- 
eral Duffield and part of his brigade, consisting of 
the 33d Michigan and one battalion of the 34th, about 
1,200 officers and men. General Duffield was at once 
directed to place a large force at work upon the road 
leading from Siboney to the camp of the army in the 
vicinity of Sevilla. Late in the afternoon of the next 
day, General Shafter was informed that General Pan- 
do,* with 8,000 Spanish regulars, was advancing from 
Manzanillo to relieve the garrison in Santiago. Pando 
was reported to be within fifty-four miles of the city, 
and moving at the rate of twelve miles a day, with an 
abundance of supplies in the way of pack-trains and 
beef on the hoof. If the Spanish general met with no 
opposition, this would bring a strong force, with a 
large quantity of food, for the relief of General Linares, 
by the 2d or 3d of July. General Shafter determined, 
if possible, to prevent General Pando's entering San- 
tiago, and to make the attack without waiting for the 
additional reinforcements, consisting of the remainder 
of Duffield's brigade, then en route. 

* It subsequently proved to be General Escario with a much smaller 
force. 

127 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

General Garcia, with 3,000 Cubans, was requested, 
on the 29th, to proceed from Siboney to the west and 
northwest of Santiago and guard the approaches over 
which the advancing Spanish reinforcements, under 
Pando, would come. The American outposts were 
pushed forward to within one and a half miles of San- 
tiago, and General Shafter established his headquar- 
ters in advance of the whole army on the Santiago 
road at the point where it branches with the trail lead- 
ing to Caney. The next day he determined upon his 
plan of attack, and gave directions for the disposition 
of the several divisions, preparator}^ to the assault, 
July 1st. He proposed to throw his army against the 
intrenched position of the enemy on the heights of 
San Juan : Lawton's division on the right, Wheeler's 
division in the centre, and Kent's division on the left. 
Bates's brigade was ordered up from Siboney to the 
front, to be held in reserve, with two batteries of light 
artillery, and three troops of Rafferty's mounted cav- 
alry. The remaining troop of the 2d Cavalry was 
sent with Lawton, as well as a battery of artillery — 
Capron's (the father of Captain Capron, who was 
killed on the 24th at Las Guasimas) — while General 
Shafter directed General Duffield, with one regiment, 
to make a demonstration against the extreme right of 
the Spaniards at Aguadores Bridge. 

Only 1,200 men of General Duffield's brigade had 
landed in Cuba, as the navy had directed the Harvard, 
transporting the remainder of his brigade, to convoy 
a repair-ship which could make but eight or ten knots 
an hour. This delayed the arrival of his command 
nearly two days— too late to take part in the engage- 
ment of July 1st. General Duffield's command on the 

128 






CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

1st of July consisted only of the 33d Michigan and one 
battalion of the 34th Michigan. The latter acted as a 
guard at Siboney. It was not intended that General 
Duffield, with his small force of 900 men, should at- 
tack, across the San Juan, the fortified heights which 
rose abruptly from that river 300 or 400 feet; but, as 
General Shafter stated in an official report, General 
Duffield " was expected to make such a demonstration 
at Aguadores as would hold at the place all Spanish 
troops occupying it, and prevent their reinforcing the 
main body at Santiago. This he accomplished per- 
fectly and with very slight loss. There was no in- 
tention of attempting to capture the works, as they 
would naturally fall with Santiago, and, besides, 
were very strong. I had the position carefully ex- 
amined by my engineer officers and General Bates, 
and personal observation afterwards satisfied me 
that it was not on the true line of advance for 
Santiago." 

A deep and wide ravine separated the Spanish posi- 
tion from General Duffield's advance. At this season 
of the year the river, which flows between the high 
and precipitous banks of this gorge, was broad, swift, 
and deep — 600 to 700 feet in width, and spanned 
by an iron girder bridge sixty feet above. About 
100 feet of the trestle on the Spanish side of the San 
Juan had been blown up. Moreover, as was sub- 
sequently learned and at the time suspected, all that 
was left of the bridge had been mined. Then, too, 
the river was not fordable, and had General Duffield's 
instructions contemplated an assault, which they 
did not, it would have been impossible for him to cross 
the San Juan River, since he had no boats or means 
1 129 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of throwing any part of his small force across the 
swollen river. 

The enemy, protected by stone forts, block-houses, 
and rifle-pits along the cliffs, was subsequently learned 
to have been 500 strong, supported by artillery — a force 
almost equal to that which kept General Lawton's 
division of over 4,000 a whole day at Caney. In addi- 
tion to these troops, two companies of marines (about 
400 men) from Cervera's fleet were at Las Cruces 
and vicinity, where they were held in reserve at a dis- 
tance of about five miles on the railroad leading to 
Aguadores and from where they could be brought 
to this place in a very short time. The local condi- 
tions were such that our war-ships could not see nor 
reach many of the trenches across the river confront- 
ing General Duffield, and at the very instant the ves- 
sels firing upon the heights signalled "there are no 
Spaniards in the rifle-pits," a volley from the enemy 
wounded several of our men. 

General Duffield's demonstration, coupled with the 
movement of Garcia on the northwest of Santiago, 
brought about what General Shafter had hoped — i. e., 
the Spaniards were kept in doubt as to his real move- 
ments and deterred from concentrating their forces 
at San Juan Ridge. 

While General Duffield was making the before- 
mentioned feint at Aguadores Bridge, Admiral Samp- 
son was requested to bombard that place, as a part 
of the manoeuvre, and to direct such firing against 
the Spanish works at the mouth of the harbor of San- 
tiago as in his judgment might seem best to further 
divert the enemy's attention from the main advance. 
This he did. 

130 



CANEY AND SAN JUAN 

Before moving out to take up the positions assigned 
them, preparatory to the attack the next morning, 
General Shafter called the general officers to his head- 
quarters and explained to them fully the plan of battle 
and the part each was to take in it. This meeting 
was attended by the division commanders Lawton 
and Kent, acting division commander General Sum- 
ner," and the brigade commanders Chaffee, Hawkins, 
Ludlow, and Duffield, as well as the Cuban General 
Castillo. The battle of July 1st was conducted in 
direct accord with these plans, with the exception 
that it took Lawton's division a day instead of two 
hours, as estimated, to reduce Caney. 

* General Sumner had succeeded to the command of the cavalry 
division as a result of General Wheeler's sickness. 



CHAPTER X 
CANEY 

THE road leading from Siboney to Santiago, via 
Sevilla and El Poso, was the only one available for 
General Shafter and his army. The road was ex- 
ceedingly narrow, and the jungles on either side so 
dense as to forbid any general deployment. General 
Shafter deemed it necessary to capture El Caney, 
to the right of El Poso about two and a half miles, and 
on the direct road from Guantanamo to Santiago. 
This would block the advance of the 7,000 Spanish 
troops reported to be at Guantanamo, and give our 
army another approach to Santiago over the El Caney 
road. 

On the 26th of June, General Wheeler began to 
reconnoitre El Caney. On the 27th Lieutenant Men- 
doza, of General Wheeler's staff, assisted by fifteen 
Cubans, made a preliminary reconnoissance. Cap- 
tain Chanler, also of General Wheeler's staff, the next 
day advanced within three-quarters of a mile of Caney. 
From two Cuban residents he learned that the Span- 
ish garrison consisted of from 500 to 600 regulars, 
which afterwards proved to be the "Battalion Con- 
stitution," and seventy local guerillas, under the 
command of General Vara del Rey, the officer who 
had been with Linares and Toral in the engagement 
at Las Guasimas. The terrain in the vicinity of Fort 

132 



CANEY 

Marianage (a block-house on the road leading north 
from El Poso in the direction of Caney) and the coun- 
try as far northwest of Marianage as the Ducrot House 
were thoroughly reconnoitred. The last-named place 
was a large estate, plainly visible from corps head- 
quarters, about two miles southwest of Caney in the 
direction of Santiago. The plantation was said to 
be the propert}^ of a Frenchman, and had been mutu- 
ally regarded as neutral territory during the insurrec- 
tion. Generals Lawton and Chaffee likewise recon- 
noitred El Caney with two companies of infantry and 
fifty Cubans, who had widened the trail from the 
Siboney-Santiago road for three miles, in order that 
the artillery might be brought up and placed in a 
position overlooking the town. 

To General Lawton, with his division of infantry, 
was assigned this "turning movement." He was 
directed to capture or drive out the garrison at Caney, 
and, swinging around to the right, confront, and if 
possible flank, the Spanish left in the defences of San- 
tiago. This manoeuvre would enable him to join in 
the forward movement against the enemy's position 
on the right of the cavalry division. 

June 30th was a busy day for the 5th Corps. Early 
that morning Lawton, accompanied by his brigade 
commanders, Generals Ludlow and Chaffee and Colo- 
nel Evan Miles, personally reconnoitred the vicinity, 
approaches, and defences of El Caney. The posi- 
tions they were to occupy that night and the next 
morning were carefully explained to the brigade com- 
manders, as well as the plan of battle and the part 
each one was to take therein. While this reconnois- 
sance of Caney was in progress, Shaffer, with Gen- 

133 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

erals Kent, Sumner, and Hawkins, reconnoitred the 
enemy's position on San Juan Ridge. In the early 
afternoon, as already stated, a conference was held 
at Shaffer's headquarters, in which the plans for the 
general attack were deliberately canvassed and form- 
ulated. So far as circumstances would permit, the 
preparations were complete. 

The various reconnoissances of El Caney showed 
that the enemy occupied a position of great natural 
strength, and that he had fortified and secured it with 
all the resources of military science. Cuban refugees 
had confirmed previous information to the effect that 
the garrison consisted of some 500 Spanish regulars 
and seventy guerillas, commanded by General Vara 
del Rey, and that the defences were five block-houses, 
a stone fort, well-located rifle-pits, and barbed-wire 
barriers. A stone church in the town had been loop- 
holed for riflemen, and a large number of buildings 
and tall trees in the vicinity were occupied by sharp- 
shooters. Three of the block-houses were on the south- 
west, each banked with earth four feet high; one was 
on the northeast limit, and the fifth was located about 
a mile northeast of the town. These block-houses, 
with the stone fort, covered all available approaches to 
Caney, over which our troops would necessarily have 
to advance. The stone fort, however, was the key to 
the situation. It occupied a commanding position on 
a round and prominent knoll about sevent3 T -five feet 
high, and 800 yards southeast of the town. It was a 
solidly built, thick-walled structure, thirty-five by forty- 
five feet in outside dimensions. On the east, south, 
and west, cut in the rock, were rifle-pits. From the 
roof of this imposing fortress floated the Spanish flag. 

134 



CANEY 

About three miles along the ridge trail to Caney 
from the Siboney-Santiago road, a path leads to the 
left and west, and finally connects with the Caney- 
Santiago road, in the vicinity of the Ducrot House. 
Here the artillery, Capron's light battery, four pieces, 
was installed on the night of the 30th of June, at a dis- 
tance of about 2,000 yards from Caney. A mile far- 
ther along the trail to Caney a jungle-path leads to the 
left and south of a short ridge facing the stone fort, 
700 yards away. The Caney trail itself continues 
to the north and east, following around the base of a 
sugar-loaf mountain, and joining the Caney-Guan- 
tanamo road some two miles northeast of the town. 

At the conference with General Shatter, during the 
afternoon of the 30th, Lawton explained the proposed 
plan of attack, which had been suggested by General 
Chaffee. This plan received General Shatter's ap- 
proval, and, by his order, the several brigades of Law- 
ton's division began to move out for position between 
three and four o'clock that afternoon. General Chaf- 
fee, with his brigade, camped on the Caney trail be- 
yond the position of the artillery, where the road di- 
verges to the left towards the Caney-Santiago road, 
and near the foot of the sugar-loaf mountain referred 
to. He personally placed a company of the 12th In- 
fantry that night on the ridge overlooking the stone 
fort, and a company of the 7th Infantry was well ad- 
vanced on the Caney trail, in the rear of the sugar-loaf 
mountain, near the Guantanamo road. General Lud- 
low's brigade encamped on the Caney trail, in the rear 
of Capron's battery. Colonel Miles's brigade occu- 
pied a position on the El Poso-Marianage trail south 
of El Caney. One of his regiments, however, the 1st 

135 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Infantry, was detailed as a support to the light battery. 
The several brigades and the artillery secured their 
positions that night under cover of darkness. The 
entire division bivouacked without lights or calls, 
and slept on their arms within a short distance of the 
battle-field. 

The proposed assault on Caney was looked upon as 
a mere incident of the attack on Santiago, to be made 
the day following. Generals Lawton and Chaffee had 
expressed the opinion that the town could be taken in 
a couple of hours. The movement against the town 
and garrison was to begin as soon as the light of day 
would permit; then the division was to swing to the 
right, and, advancing along the Santiago road, join 
with the two divisions which would be waiting for 
Lawton in the movement against San Juan Ridge. 
The hour for this combined assault was fixed at ten 
o'clock. The small garrison known to be defending 
Caney; the readiness with which the Spaniards had 
given way before our landing at Daiquiri, and upon 
our advance to Siboney and Juraguacito; the ease 
with which a small force of 964 dismounted cavalry, 
under General Young, had driven 2,000 of the Span- 
iards from their intrenched position on the heights of 
Las Guasimas, seemed to justify the opinion so con- 
fidently expressed that the town could be taken in two 
hours. General Wheeler had also stated to General 
Shafter that the place could be easily captured, and 
twice requested authority, on the 28th and 29th of June, 
to make the attempt. 

In the plan of battle General Chaffee's brigade was re- 
quired to approach the town from the northeast, on the 
Guantanamo-Caney road, and drive the enemy from 

136 



CANEY 

the stone fort, block-houses, and intrenchments on that 
side. General Ludlow's brigade was to take a position 
on the southwest of the town, across the Caney-Santi- 
ago road, and cut off the retreat of the garrison, should 
it attempt escape. Two regiments of Colonel Miles's 
brigade were to assemble near the Ducrot House, the 
general rendezvous for the entire division after the en- 
gagement, and to act as a reserve if necessary. It 
was not expected, however, that the 2d Brigade would 
be called into action. 

Between four and five o'clock on the morning of 
July 1st, the several brigades left their bivouacs and 
" marched to the field of battle without breakfast, ex- 
cept a cracker and a drink of cold water."" 

General Lawton's division was constituted as 
follows : 

1st Brigade. — General Ludlow — 8th Infantry, 226. 
Infantry, 2d Massachusetts Volunteers. 

2d Brigade. — Colonel Evan Miles — 4th Infantry, 1st 
Infantry, 25th (colored) Infantry. 

3d Brigade. — General Chaffee — 7th Infantry, 12th 
Infantry, 17th Infantry. 

Capron's battery of light artillery, four pieces ; and 
fifty Cubans. 

The 12th Infantry began to deploy on the ridge 
opposite the knoll upon which the stone fort was 
planted, while the 7th and 17th Infantry, with Gen- 
eral Chaffee in command, moved to the eastward 
of the sugar-loaf mountain, and, entering the Caney- 
Guantanamo road, advanced towards Caney to form a 
junction on the right of the 12th. The last-named 
regiment was to be practically on the le|t of that road, 

♦General Chaffee's official report. 
137 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the 17th and 7th Infantry to be on the right, the latter 
regiment forming the centre of the line. 

The action opened at 6.30 with the firing from 
Capron's battery. His guns were directed upon what 
appeared to be a column of Spanish cavahy moving 
from Caney in the direction of Santiago at about two 
miles' range. The firing was accurate and effective, 
sixteen of that column being killed, as was afterwards 
learned. Almost at the same time the 7th and 17th 
Infantry deployed in front of the intrenchments east 
of the town. A company of the 7th Infantry, with 
fift}- Cubans attached to General Chaffee's brigade, 
and who remained with that brigade during the en- 
tire day, were directed to drive out the garrison in the 
block-house already referred to as located on a com- 
manding position about a mile northeast of Caney. 
The approach had to be made in the open through 
the tall grass, and under a fire from the houses in the 
town, the block-houses, intrenchments, and the sharp- 
shooters in the trees. The movement was abandoned. 

General Chaffee's brigade, having deployed in a 
rather irregular line due to the inequalities of the 
ground and the jungle which covered it, began the ad- 
vance on Caney under a severe fire. The enemy was 
apparently fully prepared to receive them, as indicated 
by the accuracy of his volleys, which fell most heavily 
upon the 7th Infantry. Indeed, this regiment bore 
the brunt of the fight. In repeated efforts to advance 
against the Spanish works it was subjected to the 
direct fire from the rifle-pits in front as well as an en- 
filading fire on both flanks from the stone fort on the 
left and the two block-houses on the right. " They 
took a position so close to the town," says General 

138 



CANEY 

Chaffee, " that a man could not raise his finger with- 
out being shot." This, however, did not prevent their 
persistent advance They crawled on their hands 
and knees through the grass, brush, and thickets with- 
in arrow -shot of the intrenchments and protected 
Spaniards, and, says General Carpenter, who was 
then in command of the regiment, "although no in- 
fantry fire in my opinion could have been more severe- 
ly or certainly delivered from this position, it seem- 
ingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire 
delivered in our front." 

In the mean time the 12th Infantry was attempting 
to take the stone fort on the left. Again and again 
a company of that regiment advanced to a bald hill 
but 350 j^ards from the fort, and was as often forced to 
fall back. The Spanish resistance was so formidable 
that it finally became necessary for most of the brigade 
to take position in a sunken road parallel to the hos- 
tile intrenchments and within 300 yards of them. Up 
this sunken road Colonel Haskell, of the 17th, and his 
aide, Lieutenant Dickinson, led their men, and step- 
ping fearlessly into the open, to direct the cutting of 
wire entanglements, they received a full volley from 
the enemy concealed behind a stone wall immediately 
in their front. Colonel Haskell fell mortally and 
Lieutenant Dickinson seriously wounded. 

Between necessary halts to rest exhausted men, 
the 7th Infantry advanced close to the enemy's works 
and crawled forward fifty yards through the tall grass, 
where some daring spirits among the sharp-shooters 
long remained to pick off the enemy. But the Span- 
iards were not yet to be driven from their strong posi- 
tion. The 12th Infantry, moving along the sunken 

139 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

road and screened by trees, took a position within 150 
yards of the stone fort. It was discovered that the 
line of assault was impeded by a mesfrwork of barbed 
wire. Volunteers were called for. With a coolness 
and intrepidity that caused the entire regiment to 
cease firing and hold its breath, two privates crept 
through the hedge, and within a stone's-throw of the 
enemy's fort performed the hazardous duty of cutting 
five lines of wire in a dozen places. They returned 
unscathed to their comrades. The names of these 
soldiers are: Private James W. Smith and Private 
James L. McMillen, both of Company H, 12th Infantry. 
The time had now arrived for the general attack. 
One by one the members of Company F crawled 
through the grass unseen by the enemy. When as- 
sembled they burst forth from their cover, and with 
a triumphant cheer rushed upon the fort. As they 
swept up the hill, they were quickly followed by com- 
panies A, D, and E, and all swarmed together over 
the ditches and into the fort through the breaches made 
in the walls by the artillery. So impulsive was the 
charge that our infantry captured with their hands 
armed Spaniards in the trenches outside, and with- 
in the fort one lieutenant and nine men were taken 
prisoners. The interior was a charnel-house. The 
remains of eighteen dead were lying about. The 
walls and floors were bespattered with blood. How- 
ever, there was more fighting yet to be done. The key 
to the situation had been captured, but the enemy had 
not been dislodged from his fastnesses in the city 
and in the block-houses. To hasten forward reinforce- 
ments two privates leaped upon the walls and roof of 
the fort and fearlessly and exultantly waved the na- 

140 



CANEY 

tional and regimental colors amid a hail of shot. 
Their names are Corporal Edward Meyers and Pri- 
vate Joseph E. Abel, both of Company E, 12th In- 
fantry. 

To this inspiring signal cheer upon cheer answered 
back from the chaparral and open field, across which 
parts of Ludlow's and Miles's brigades were then rush- 
ing on the stone fort and town. The excitement was 
intense; hunger and fatigue were forgotten; bullets 
and death were disregarded; and, inspired by the 
"red god of battle/' they pushed on. Some of the 
more daring sharp-shooters forced their way into 
the town. Sergeant Feldcamp, with a detachment 
of one corporal and a few men of the 12th, intercepted 
in their efforts to escape General Vara del Rey and 
three of his staff, all mounted. The surrender of the 
Spaniards was demanded. Their answer was a re- 
newed attempt at escape. The Spanish general and 
his staff were immediately shot. 

This assault on the stone fort by Chaffee's brigade 
occurred at about three o'clock in the afternoon. At 
noon the two regiments of Colonel Miles's brigade were 
brought into action on the south of the town proper, 
between Ludlow and Chaffee; General Bates's indepen- 
dent brigade, which had arrived at ten o'clock that 
morning from Siboney at General Shafter's head- 
quarters, was ordered to report to Lawton for the pur- 
pose of relieving the 2d Brigade, then acting as a 
reserve. Bates's force, however, was not used as a 
reserve as intended, but was immediately placed in 
position by General Lawton between Miles and Chaffee, 
where it joined the assault on the stone fort in the 
afternoon. The fighting of this brigade was so severe 

141 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

that, when the garrison of the fort was ready to sur- 
render at two o'clock, the Spanish dared not come out, 
and the men and officers of the 12th Infantry (Chaffee's 
brigade) dared not attempt to go in the fort on account 
of Bates's fire. 

Meanwhile the left wing under Ludlow on the 
southwest of the town had been having a hot time. 
Ludlow soon found his position an exceedingly dif- 
ficult one. He was confronted by three block-houses 
and numerous rifle-pits, from which a galling fire was 
continually poured during the nine hours his brigade 
was in action. His troops, however, moved steadily 
forward in the face of a searching fire from the unseen 
foe, advantage being taken of every opportunity to 
secure cover by trees, hedges, bushes, and rocks. 

The critical period in the combined attack on the 
town, stone fort, and block-houses by Chaffee, Ludlow, 
Miles, and Bates occurred at half-past two, when the 
artillery moved to a new position within a few yards 
of the town and shelled the three block-houses. By 
a well-directed and effective fire these were soon 
silenced. By four o'clock parts of all the brigades had 
swarmed into the town, and the entire garrison was 
either captured or destroyed. Most of the enemy who 
attempted to escape to Santiago were swept down 
by the fire of Ludlow's men. It has been estimated 
that of the garrison of 520 men not over forty escaped. 
Those not killed were captured to the number of 140. 

At 2 P.M., just at the time when the cavalry divi- 
sion under Wheeler and the other infantry division 
under Kent had assaulted and captured the heights 
of San Juan, and just before the critical moment had 
been reached by Lawton's division at Caney, General 

142 



CANEY 

Shafter, overlooking, from the elevated position of 
his headquarters, the operations on both fields of 
battle, felt that he had made (to use his words) "a 
terrible mistake in engaging my whole army at six 
miles intervals." It must not be forgotten, however, 
that he had been led to believe by those most com- 
petent to judge that the engagement at Caney would 
be over and Lawton's division well on its way to San 
Juan before the action at that place would begin. 
General Shafter therefore sent the following note to 

Lawton : 

" July ist. 

" LAWTON, — I would not bother with little block-houses ; they 

cannot harm us. Bates's brigade and your division and Garcia 

should move on the city and form the right of line going on 

Sevilla road. Line is now hotly engaged. SHAFTER." 

This was not received until it was really too late to 
stop the action against Caney, although Lawton sent 
word to his brigade commanders to move forward on 
Santiago. They were then too deeply involved, how- 
ever, to withdraw, and Lawton so informed General 
Shafter in the following note: 

"El Caney, 4.45 p.m., July 1st. 
" Adjutant-General §th Army Corps. 

" SIR, — The enemy were driven from the town about half an 
hour since. It is impossible now to tell to what extent we have 
suffered. We have accomplished little except to drive them out 
of their strongholds. Our losses are considerable, but cannot 
tell how great. I have everybody at work getting straightened 
out, the dead buried, and property gathered together. 

" I made the effort to communicate with my brigade command- 
ers during the fight to effect a withdrawal. It was impossible 
to do so. The only alternative was to take the place, which was 
accomplished very soon after receiving your order. Captain 

143 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Gilmore was present at the time and can explain to you the dif- 
ficulties to be encountered. My headquarters will be near the 
Ducrot House. My men are completely worn out, and I doubt 
if I can get out from there to-night. Very respectfully, 

"H. W. LAWTON, 
" Brigadier-General Volunteers." 

To which General Shafter replied : 

"July 1st. 

" DEAR GENERAL, — Very glad to hear of your success. Gather 
in your wounded and leave sufficient force to take care of them 
— I should say a regiment and troop of cavalry, which I shall 
send over in a few moments. Rest and feed your men, but some 
time during the night, or before daylight, you should be down 
at Santiago on the extreme right joining Sumner, who is in 
front of the big barracks on this side of the town. Keep the four 
men I send you, and Captain Brett, with his troop, will soon join 
you to remain with the force you have at Caney, from which 
point messages can be sent to me if anything should turn up. 

" If you have any more ammunition than you need to-night 
and to-morrow, send it back here immediately. Get your battery 
in a good position within easy range, and we will knock the town 
to pieces. WM. R. SHAFTER. 

" I have just found that Troop D is with you, so keep that and 
I will not send the additional troops. Send back the messengers. 

"W. R. S. 
" To Brigadier-General H. W . Latvton." 

After burying our dead and those of the Spanish, 
and providing for the care of the wounded and the 
prisoners, the exhausted army, leaving a battalion to 
guard Caney, marched to the Ducrot House, where it 
arrived at about 9 P.M. With the loss of sleep the 
night before, lack of food, the exhaustion incident to 
battle for nine hours, under a tropical sun, and the fa- 
tigue of marching through a dense jungle in which 
scarce a breath of air stirred, the army reached the 

144 



CANEY 

rendezvous so utterly worn out that the men could 
go no farther, and threw themselves down in the road 
to rest. The movement towards the position origi- 
nally assigned his division on the right of Wheeler's 
cavalry was begun by Lawton a little after 10 P.M., 
which, because of the protracted struggle at El Caney, 
was twelve hours late. Two staff officers were sent 
forward in advance of the division, with General Law- 
ton closely following. They were soon fired upon 
from out of the dark by the Spanish pickets. General 
Lawton immediately wrote General Shafter: 

"Opposite Ducrot House, 

"July I, 1898, 10.30 P.M. 
" Adjutant-General §ih Corps. 

" SIR,— I have been ordered to move forward by the El Caney 
road to Santiago and take position on the right of Wheeler there, 
where I would find Colonel Derby who would show me my posi- 
tion. I sent two staff officers to find Colonel Derby, and follow- 
ed them closely myself a short distance ahead of the advance 
column. We were fired upon apparently by Spanish pickets. 
I have no guides, and it is night and I cannot tell what is in my 
advance. I should have some one to direct me from this point 
to my place in line. I have sent some Cubans forward to recon- 
noitre the road. Hurry some one to me if possible who can guide 
me to my place." 

General Shafter had no means of determining the 
strength of the enemy in front of Lawton, and there- 
fore ordered him to turn back and come in on the right 
of the cavalry from the rear by the El Poso road. Law- 
ton rested his troops until 3 A.M., when his patient 
soldiers began their long fifteen-mile march. Very 
few of these men had ever been in battle, but during 
the fight and the long night march they conducted 

145 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

themselves with the indomitable and unconquerable 
spirit that characterizes the American soldier. 

At noon on the 2d of July, Lawton, with his division, 
reached the station to which he had been assigned in 
the original plan. 

In the Caney engagement General Lawton had lost 
4 officers and 77 men killed ; 25 officers and 332 men 
wounded — a total casualty of 438, of which 132 were 
of the 7th Infant^. The enemy lost, as near as 
can be ascertained, from Spanish reports, something 
over 500; the exact number is not known. This 
loss included General Vara del Rey and his two 
sons killed; a third son prisoner, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Rey, brother of the general, wounded and a 
prisoner, together with other Spanish officers. The 
resistance offered by the Spaniards at Caney was a 
great surprise to General Lawton and General Chaf- 
fee, and much more stubborn than they had expect- 
ed. This was doubtless attributable to the fact that 
the Spanish soldiery had been led to believe by 
their officers that the Americans would give no quar- 
ter, and would massacre red-handed every prisoner 
taken. Indeed, the nervous anxiety and restlessness 
of the prisoners the next day, after they had been 
brought to General Shafter's headquarters, betrayed 
the fears they had been so carefully taught to enter- 
tain. When the armed guard, in the regular course 
of events, came to relieve those in charge of these Span- 
iards, they thought that their hour had come, and fell 
upon their knees, trembling and crossing themselves. 
It was with great difficulty that General Shafter's in- 
terpreter assured them of our honorable intentions 
and kind treatment, and when finally making them 

146 



CANEY 

realize that they were not to be butchered, but would 
receive a generous allowance of food, their joy scarce 
knew any bounds. The Spanish wounded showed 
great reluctance to leave our lines when General Shatt- 
er afterwards directed that they be turned over to 
General Toral. In this, General Shafter showed no 
little circumspection. The return of the Spanish 
wounded to their comrades was the best method of 
disproving the mischievous statement of Spanish of- 
ficers that American soldiers massacred their prison- 
ers. Doubtless this incident had much influence in 
determining the subsequent course of events. 

The artillery at Caney, four field-pieces, was insuf- 
ficient, and located at too great a distance in the early 
part of the engagement to be of much assistance to 
the infantry in destroying the fortifications or dis- 
lodging the enemy from his trenches. It did better 
service, later in the day, when moved near. Nine 
hours were consumed in accomplishing what it was 
thought could be done in two. The engagement, in 
fact, amounted to an assault by infantry against a 
strongly fortified and intrenched enemy, armed with 
Mauser rifles. Such an operation is always extremely 
difficult, and usually meets with failure. General 
Lawton's effective force was 226 officers and 4,913 
men, after two o'clock in the afternoon, when Miles's 
and Bates's brigades had been placed in action, 
and the 2d Massachusetts had been practically with- 
drawn. 

The Spanish version of the Caney fight is thus given 
by Lieutenant Miiller : 

" The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with 
truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, 

147 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many 
fortresses, threw forth a hail of projectiles upon the enemy, while 
one company after another, without any protection, rushed with 
veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been 
decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and 
those soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted 
that expression for want of a better) rather than men ; but they 
met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bul- 
lets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were 
obstructed with dead and wounded, El Caney had been convert- 
ed into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it 
impossible to go near it. 

" Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost with- 
out having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased 
for some time, and General Vara del Rey took advantage of this 
circumstance to have his soldiers reform the lines and again get 
ready for the battle. 

" The fight commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again 
and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, 
and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle 
was no longer possible under these circumstances. The gen- 
eral was wounded almost simultaneously in both legs by two 
musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, 
the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third 
one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying 
him. The greater part of the commanders and officers (among 
them two relatives of the general) were dead or wounded, as also 
the majority of the soldiers. Finally, at 7 P.M., the commander 
being dead and those 520* men having been reduced to less than 
100, and most of these slightly wounded and bruised, that handful 
of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from 
the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without 
being able to get any reinforcements, for there were none to be had, 
and the enemy occupied the position on which he, in his turn, 
had made such a bold attack." 

* He apparently does not include the " Civil Guard" at Caney 
which took part in the fight, and a remnant (16) of which, as prisoners 
of war, subsequently gave their parole to General Shatter. 

148 



CANEY 

Unfortunately Lieutenant Muller's statements can- 
not be accepted at all times as correct. He says that 
the total Spanish losses in killed, wounded, and capt- 
ured, July 1st, at Caney and Santiago, were 593. He 
also says that of the force of " 520 " at Caney only eighty 
escaped to Santiago, "most of them crippled and 
bruised." According to these figures the Spanish 
casualties at Caney alone must have been 440. This 
would leave his total losses at San Juan only 153, * 
which is known to be incorrect. 

The fight at Caney was less picturesque than the 
attack on San Juan Ridge, but it was an extreme- 
ly important affair. It is perhaps fortunate that 
the town was not captured in two hours, as had 
been predicted by General Lawton, and as was also 
believed by his brigade commanders. If Caney had 
been taken by eight o'clock on the morning of July 1st, 
and Lawton's division had reached San Juan Ridge 
at ten o'clock, in time to join in the assault, as planned, 
it is not unlikely that the three divisions of Kent, Law- 
ton, and Wheeler, when thus united, would have pushed 
on to the city of Santiago. Had this occurred, the loss 
of life would have been, in all probability, much great- 
er than it was, as doubtless the enemy, when thus 
cornered in Santiago, would have fought as they proved 
that they could at Caney. The resistance of the 
Spanish soldiery, under such circumstances, is neither 

♦Although Lieutenant Muller pretends to give an "official state- 
ment of all the casualties" at Caney and San Juan as 593, and makes 
use of these figures in several parts of his book, he also says that 
during the 1st of July there were received in the hospital in Santi- 
ago " in a short time over 300 wounded "—" and they were still 
coming." All of the wounded must have come from the defences of 
Santiago alone, as none were removed from Caney July 1st. 

149 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to be despised nor underestimated. I shall always 
regard the unexpected delay experienced in taking 
Caney as one of the many incidents connected with the 
Santiago campaign in which the guiding hand of 
Providence seems to have interposed for America. 



CHAPTER XI 

SAN JUAN 

FROM General Shafter's headquarters to El Poso 
the distance was about one mile. The position select- 
ed for the artillery was on a height to the left of the 
road at El Poso. From here to San Juan Ridge it 
is approximately one and one-half miles, and the nar- 
row road leading thereto crosses the ridge near the 
centre. About half-way between El Poso and San 
Juan Heights, 600 yards to the left and south of the 
road, the Aguadores joins the San Juan River. Both 
streams are crossed by the Santiago road, the Agua- 
dores or eastern branch three-quarters of a mile from 
El Poso, and the San Juan one-quarter of a mile far- 
ther on, and but 600 yards from the San Juan block- 
house, the central point of attack. To the edge 
of this latter river extends an almost impenetrable 
thicket. The river runs parallel with San Juan 
Heights, and is separated from it by an open valley 
covered with grass, waist high. To the right of the 
road between San Juan River and Las Guames Creek, 
a branch of the Aguadores, is an open, grass-covered 
glade 600 yards in width, terminating on the San- 
tiago side in a thick chaparral about 400 yards wide 
and through the middle of which flows the San Juan 
River. The edge of this thicket is almost at the foot 
of a steep and isolated knoll. The grass-covered 

151 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

valley already referred to is interposed between this 
height and the main position on San Juan Ridge, one- 
third of a mile west. The knoll was topped with a 
red-roofed house, and subsequently received the name 
of " Kettle Hill," several large caldrons having been 
found on its crest when captured by our cavalry. 

The Spanish position on San Juan Heights was 
well adapted to defence and observation. Its steepest 
side was in the direction of our assault. From his 
fortified and intrenched position on these heights 
the enemy could direct a plunging fire into the valley 
below and sweep the jungle and trails where our troops 
were compelled to deploy. General Kent was to place 
his infantry division with the right on the Santiago 
road and the left on a " green knoll " which was pointed 
out to him by an officer of General Shaffer's staff. 
The San Juan block-house was on that part of the 
ridge facing the position assigned to General Kent. 
The cavalry was to rest its left on the Santiago road, 
thus joining Kent and, by extending to the right, 
form a junction with Lawton. Kettle Hill was there- 
fore between the dismounted cavalry and that part of 
San Juan Ridge on the right of the Santiago road, 
thus necessitating the taking of the former place be- 
fore the assault on the main works. 

Daylight, July 1st, found our army in readiness 
for action, the dismounted cavalry, preceded by a 
small number of Cubans, in the vicinity of El Poso; 
Kent's division in the rear; and Grimes's light artil- 
lery (four guns) in battery on El Poso heights with 
gun-pits dug, ready for the signal. The day opened 
clear and hot. Not a breath of air was stirring as the 
cavalry moved slowly by El Poso along the narrow 

152 



SAN JUAN 

road, so narrow in fact that the men could only march 
by file or columns of two. This congestion greatly 
delayed the forward movement. As General Young 
was ill, Colonel Carroll had been placed in command 
of the 1st cavalry brigade, consisting of the 3d, 6th, 
and 9th (colored) regulars, and Colonel Wood was 
assigned the second and remaining brigade — the 1st 
and loth (colored) regulars and the 1st Volunteer 
Cavalry. 

Grimes's battery was to open upon the block-houses 
and trenches on San Juan Hill when the musketry 
and artillery fire of Lawton's division indicated that he 
was well engaged at Caney, which, as already stated, 
it was expected would be captured by 8 A.M. ; while 
the cavalry (all dismounted) and Kent's division were 
to advance slowly along the road withholding their 
main attack until ten o'clock. This would give Law- 
ton sufficient time, it was expected, to come up and 
join on the right in the assault. 

By eight o'clock the firing in the direction of Caney 
indicated that the battle was on, and Grimes was direct- 
ed to open upon the Spanish position on San Juan 
Heights. The range was 2,600 yards. Each dis- 
charge of his guns left a volume of smoke, which 
clearly discovered the position of the battery to the 
enemy. The cavalry began to wind its way slowly 
down the road, the 1st Brigade, headed by the 9th, 
in the advance, while the 2d Brigade, headed by the 
1st Volunteer Cavalry, brought up the rear. There 
was but one troop of mounted cavalry in Cuba, the 
horses for the others having been left at Tampa. 

At ten o'clock Lieutenant Miley, General Shafter's 
aide, sent back the following report : 

153 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" General Shafter and Colonel McClernand. 

" Since writing last note have gone forward about one-quarter 
of a mile, and overtaken General Sumner. Colonel Carroll's 
brigade is ahead, and Colonel Wood's brigade has its head with 
General Sumner. General Sumner has halted Colonel Wood, and 
ordered Colonel Carroll to move to the front and attempt to turn 
to the right at the river. Where I am writing the earthworks 
are visible at 1,000 yards, and it is feared that the fire of rapid- 
fire guns will be directed down this road. It is suggested that 
the light batteries at El Poso at once open fire upon these works 
with shell, and keep up the fire until the troops come into danger 
from our fire. Captain Howze has just returned and says he 
has been about 500 yards beyond the San Juan River. Colonel 
Carroll's whole brigade is across the river, he reports, and ready 
to turn to the right. General Kent is waiting with the head of 
his column one-half mile to the rear. Everybody is cool and 
determined. The two light batteries should be kept back to 
avoid confusion in the road if a reverse is suffered." 

In the mean time a captive balloon, which had as- 
cended in the vicinity of El Poso, was moving down 
the narrow, crowded road. In it were Colonel Derby, 
Chief Engineer Officer 5th Corps, and Lieutenant-Col- 
onel Maxfield, of the Signal Corps. At half-past nine 
Colonel Derby had sent this despatch as a result of 
his observations in the balloon : 

" Major-General Commanding. 

" Balloon over river bed to right of road 500 yards from El Poso. 

" Capron's battery in position to right of Caney, firing single 
shots at intervals of several minutes. Active skirmish fire south 
side of Caney. Cannot distinguish troops. Large force of Cubans 
at Marianage and along road to west and south. 

" Troops moving to front from south of El Poso — also on main 
road from headquarters towards Santiago. Latter road is block- 
ed with troops at its junction with road from El Poso. Grimes's 
battery has not fired since 9 o'clock ; nor has the Spanish battery 

154 



SAN JUAN 

in its front, which opened fire with shrapnel at 8.30. Cannot 
make out location of the battery, which had ceased firing before 
balloon went up. 

" Only few Spaniards visible at block-house beyond San Juan 
River. This block-house is south of main road to Santiago. 
There are also trenches north of road and a short piece between 
block-house and the road. Country beyond San Juan is open ; 
also field half-mile wide a quarter of mile north of road and west 
of Marianage. 

" No troops marching on main road from Santiago to San Juan. 

" Head of our column halted in main road within 400 yards of 
San Juan River. Woods on both sides of road, not very dense 
to right, where there is a skirmish line deployed." 

Colonel Derby determined to push the balloon to 
the skirmish line and, ascending to a height of 1,000 
feet, report to General Shafter the movements of the 
army as it advanced on San Juan. But the flight 
of the balloon down the road a short distance above 
the tree-tops had disclosed to the enemy our line of 
march, and his musketry and shrapnel fire soon open- 
ed on the balloon and road, raking the latter, crowded 
with troops. When the Aguadores ford was reached, 
the balloon moved to the right, but its anchor - ropes 
becoming entangled in the trees and brush prevented 
the ascension as planned. It now furnished a large, 
stationary target for the Spanish marksmen, who 
by well-directed shots soon brought it to earth. 

Although it was possibly a mistake to have pushed 
the balloon to the front, the reconnoissance served 
a good purpose. It developed the fact that the enemy 
was in force in the trenches on San Juan Ridge, and 
discovered a road in the rear leading to the left, there- 
by enabling Kent's division to be deployed much 
more expeditiously than would otherwise have been 

155 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

possible." Much has been written in criticism of the 
use of the balloon on that road. Of course the Span- 
iards were perfectly familiar with the road, knowing 
it to be the only one leading from El Poso across the 
San Juan River, and therefore that our troops would 
be obliged to use it. 

Before the balloon reached the Aguadores, the en- 
tire 1st cavalry brigade and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry 
regiment had crossed the ford and marched to the 
right. 

By this time the enemy's fire had become very hot 
from the heights in front as well as on the flanks. 
The cavalry was ordered to move to the right up the 
open glade, taking advantage of such cover as an 
occasional rise in the ground or the bank of the creek 
afforded. After proceeding about a half-mile, the 
column was halted and faced to the left, Kettle Hill 
being then in its front. Sheltered there only by a 
sunken road leading to the hill, it waited for Kent's 
division to form on the left. 

Lawton was still held at Cane}', while Kent and 
Sumner being so exposed to the enemy's fire had now 
no recourse but to make the assault. Miley reported 
from the front: "The heights must be taken at all 
hazards. A retreat now would mean a disastrous 
defeat." This was communicated to Shafter, and 

* In his testimony before the War Investigation Commission, Lieu- 
tenant Miley said (p. 3238) : 

" This enabled General Kent to hasten his troops to the front and 
to move simultaneously with Sumner's cavalry division on San Juan. 
Otherwise it would have been almost impossible to have held Sum- 
ner's division in check until General Kent's division had been deploy- 
ed to the left, if they both had been required to move to the front on 
the same road." 

156 



SAN JUAN 

McClernand,* at El Poso, thus forwarded his answer to 
Miley : " I have told General Shatter we are comply- 
ing with his order for Kent and Sumner to fight all 
their men if they can do so to advantage. From pres- 
ent firing I think Lawton is at it hard. Don't let 
him fight it out alone." These orders were at once 
communicated to General Wheeler, who, ill as he was, 
on hearing the firing had gone to the front. Wheeler 
promptly notified General Sumner, whom he had 
left in immediate command of the cavalry. Kent had 
in the intervening time received General Shaffer's 
orders to make the assault at once. 

Sumner directed Carroll, commanding the first 
cavalry brigade, to advance on Kettle Hill, supported 
by Wood. The red-roofed house on the top of the hill 
was pointed out as the objective, and the forward move- 
ment began, first slow and haltingly, as the Spanish 
volleys were hot and continuous. Crawling through 
the grass and taking advantage of every shelter, our 
troops advanced, firing and receiving fire. As they 
moved forward and into the thick brush at the foot of 
Kettle Hill, the main line and support became mixed, 
and no formation could be kept. As at Las Guasimas, 
it was a troop - commander's fight. At last, how- 
ever, they forced their way through the undergrowth, 
crossed the San Juan River, then swollen and deep, 
and emerging from the jungle and wire entanglements, 
charged with a cheer. The Spaniards holding Kettle 
Hill fled to the rear in the direction of their main works 
on San Juan Ridge. The assault was made simul- 
taneously by one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, the 
9th Cavalry, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, all 

* Shafter's adjutant. 
157 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

charging together over the crest. Two troops of 
the 9th Cavalry reached the top of the hill first. 
Part of the 10th Cavalry, most of the 3d and 6th 
Cavalry and a squadron of the 1st regulars were 
deflected to the left and joined the infantry in its 
assault on the main works. 

The fearless manner in which the officers had ex- 
posed themselves in moving forward their commands 
resulted in a disproportionately great loss among 
them. Colonel Hamilton, of the 9th Cavalry, was 
killed while leading his command to the right of the 
farm-house on Kettle Hill ; Colonel Carroll command- 
ing the first brigade was wounded ; and besides man}^ 
other losses, all five of Colonel Wood's staff were 
killed, wounded, or prostrated by the heat in this 
charge and in the subsequent dash across the valley 
in front. Officers and men of both regulars and 
volunteers conducted themselves with conspicuous 
gallantry, and are entitled to great credit for their 
unshaken discipline under fire, as well as for the 
fearlessness and impetuosity of their assault. 

During this time General Kent directed General 
Hawkins, who was in advance, to move forward on 
the main road, with the 6th and 16th Infantry, cross 
the Aguadores River, deflect to the left, and prepare to 
make his attack on the ridge as soon as the other two 
infantry brigades (Pearson and Wikoff) had formed 
on his left. These latter were to take the trail dis- 
covered by the officers in the balloon. 

To hasten the movement of Hawkins's brigade, the 
71st New York, the remaining regiment of his brigade, 
was directed to take the lead along the "trail/' 
"This," says General Kent in his official report, 

158 



SAN JUAN 

"would have speedily delivered them in their proper 
place on the left of their brigade." By this time "the 
enemy's fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now 
came from all directions, not only from the front and 
the dense tropical thicket on our flanks, but from 
sharp-shooters thickly posted in our rear, and from 
shrapnel." When thrown forward into this narrow 
trail, with the hail of shot and shell from an unseen 
enemy falling among them, the first battalion re- 
coiled in confusion upon the rest of the regiment. It 
was a mistake to have placed them in the lead in the 
jungle through which the enemy's bullets were then 
driving in sheets. The strain of the long wait in the 
road, the galling fire from the invisible foe, and the 
lack of opportunity to return the fire was too great 
for them. It would have been a serious trial to ex- 
perienced veterans under highly trained officers, there- 
fore it is not to be wondered that for the moment it 
demoralized these inexperienced soldiers whose offi- 
cers were little better qualified than they for such an 
emergency. WikofFs brigade was, therefore, ordered 
to take the lead and the movement was resumed. 
Two regiments, the 2d and loth Infantry, of the sec- 
ond brigade of this division (Pearson's brigade) were 
directed to follow closely in Wikoff's rear and make 
their assault from the green knoll, already referred 
to as the point against which the left of the divi- 
sion was to rest. The third regiment of Pearson's 
brigade, the 21st Infantry, was sent down the main 
road as a support to Hawkins. 

The gallant WikofT was ordered to "hurry forward 
the brigade, move across the creek by the trail, put the 
brigade in line on the left of the trail, and begin the 

159 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

attack at once." As the brigade entered the narrow, 
winding path, the sight of the numerous dead and 
wounded was enough to make the stoutest heart re- 
coil. But that sight did not restrain the onward rush 
of these fearless soldiers. The time that tried men's 
courage had arrived, but these were not the kind that 
blenched. Reaching the precipitous banks of the 
San Juan, they leaped in, wading the stream waist 
deep, and clambered up the west bank in sight of the 
enemy. Totally oblivious of his own danger, Colo- 
nel Wikoff personally directed the deployment and 
formation of the battle-line of the 13th Infantry, then 
in the lead, until a shot, passing through his body, 
felled him to the earth to rise no more. His men ten- 
derly carried him to a sheltered spot in the river-bed, 
where he died with the roar of battle in his ears. Colo- 
nel Wikoff had been the spirit of the heroic rush through 
the jungle, and his personal bravery inspired his men 
with hope and courage. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, of 
the 13th Infantry, immediately assumed command of 
the brigade, and continued the hazardous duty of form- 
ing the line of battle under the terrific fusillade of the 
enemy, who now concentrated the fire of his trenches, 
block-houses, and artillery upon this place. Five min- 
utes later, Colonel Worth was shot, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Liscum, of the 24th, had hardly taken com- 
mand when he, too, was wounded. 

In the mean time the 6th and 16th Infantry, under 
Hawkins, had moved down the main road to take up 
their position on the left of that road, and to the right 
of the remainder of the division. After crossing the 
first ford, the Aguadores, they deflected to the left into 
a small triangular meadow which was bounded by the 

160 



SAN JUAN 

Santiago road and the two converging streams. Be- 
tween them and the open valley in their front were a 
fringe of trees and thick underbrush and the steep 
banks and swift current of the San Juan River. Across 
the river a sunken road on the edge of the jungle 
bordered the field for its entire length. Between our 
forces and the Spanish position, in their full view and 
covered by their guns, the way was obstructed by six 
lines of barbed-wire, stoutly fastened to the trees and 
brush. 

General Hawkins had hoped that when he debouched 
from this thicket he would be in a position to enfilade 
the Spanish rifle-pits. He found, however, that his 
line was parallel to the trenches on San Juan Hill. 
A Cuban who had accompanied the 6th Infantry brave- 
ly hewed down, with his machete, a portion of these 
wires in the face of a savage fire.* When he had made 
several breaches, the regiment moved out into the 
grassy field and opened fire upon the enemy's trenches. 
Their attack was answered by every rifle-pit, block- 
house, and battery in sight. With no shelter, and un- 
der such a galling fire, in ten minutes one-fourth of the 
regiment was killed or wounded. To attempt to hold 
this exposed position, with no support, because the 
remainder of the division had not yet gone into position 
on the left, would have resulted in annihilation. Or- 
ders for its withdrawal to the protection of the sunken 
road were given and quickly executed. Without panic 
or confusion they fell back, carrying their dead and 
wounded. 

* He is the only Cuban recorded as having taken part in the assault 
on San Juan Hill, upon the crest of which he was killed while fear- 
lessly exposing himself and firing upon the Spanish trenches in front. 
l t6t 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

At this moment, about one o'clock, three batteries 
of our Gatlings opened fire on San Juan Ridge. They 
were under Lieutenant Parker, who had advanced his 
guns to an exposed position beyond the Aguadores ford. 
The little clouds of dust along the line of trenches 
showed how well-directed was the fire. The effect 
was magical. In five minutes the Spaniards were 
seen climbing out of the trenches and running to the 
rear, only to be mowed down as they fled. Simul- 
taneously with the opening of the Gatlings, Lieutenant 
Ord,* of General Hawkins's staff, who, with his com- 
mander, was with the 16th, and somewhat to the left 
of the 6th Infantry, called for volunteers to support 
the latter regiment, which he had seen advance in the 
grass and withdraw to the road. As he rushed out 
into the field with a handful of men, the whole line, 
including Wikoff 's brigade, arose in the road, beat down 
the fence, and swarmed out into the open. At prac- 
tically the same time a portion of the cavalry joined 
in the assault on the right and left of the road. The 
charge on San Juan Hill had begun. 

Multitudes of skirmishers poured out into the grass- 
covered valley, one cheering, shouting, rushing mass. 
Well in the lead was that grizzled veteran, General 
Hawkins. With bared head he led the charge, his 
white locks, erect figure, and inspiring presence form- 
ing one of the most gallant and picturesque features 
of the fight. Waving his hat, he called to his men to 
charge. "Come on, come on!" was his slogan, and 
the crowd of yelling, running soldiers swiftly swept 

* This gallant and fearless officer was the first officer on San Juan 
Hill, where he was killed by a wounded Spaniard to whom he was 
offering assistance. 

162 



SAN JUAN 

across the meadow which had now become their Acel- 
dama. Above the staccato of the Gatlings and the 
roar of shot and shell, above the cheering and din of 
battle, was heard the thrilling note of the bugle at Haw- 
kins's side, sounding the "Advance." Several com- 
panies of the 6th and 1 6th Infantry reached the slope 
first. When two-thirds up the hill, well in advance 
of the main force, cries were heard of "Come back; 
our artillery is going to fire!" and a bugle in the rear 
sounded "Cease Firing," "Recall," and "Assembly." 
The line wavered and faltered, as the fire from our own 
artillery and Gatlings, directed against the crest of 
San Juan, became dangerously close overhead. Cap- 
tain Allen, of the 16th Infant^, well up on the slope of 
the heights, shouted to his men, " Who will go with me 
to the top of that hill, in spite of hell and the batteries?" 
Again the movement up the slope was started, and 
again checked, but only for a moment, as just then 
our artillery fire ceased. A moment of silence, like 
the awful instant that succeeds a vivid flash of light- 
ning before the crash of thunder comes, and then 
— that triumphant outcry of delight which victory 
in battle alone inspires. Up sprang the infantry 
— up the slope and over the crest crowded the men 
in one long and continuous line. The valor of our 
troops had broken the enemy so firmly intrenched. 
The Spaniards had fled, leaving their flag and their 
dead on the heights which our army had taken. San 
Juan Hill was ours! 



CHAPTER XII 

AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN 

A PART of the cavalry division which first attacked 
Kettle Hill did not advance on San Juan Ridge at 
the time of the assault by the infantry division under 
Kent. Colonel Roosevelt, in his book The Rough 
Riders, shows that the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, then 
under his command, as well as parts of the regular 
regiments which captured Kettle Hill, did not join the 
infantry in its charge on San Juan block-house and 
that portion of San Juan Ridge to the left of Santiago 
road commonly known as San Juan Hill, but made 
their assault on that part of San Juan Ridge to the 
right of the road after San Juan block-house and the 
trenches to the left of the road had been taken by the 
infantry and part of the cavalry brigade. He thus 
writes of the matter (pp. 134 and 136) : 

" No sooner were we on the crest [of Kettle Hill] than the Span- 
iards from the line in our front, where they were strongly in- 
trenched, opened a very heavy fire upon us with their rifles. 
They also opened upon us with one or two pieces of artillery, 
using time fuses which burned very accurately, the shells ex- 
ploding right over our heads. 

" On the top of the hill was a huge iron kettle, or something 
of the kind, probably used for sugar refining. Several of our 
men took shelter behind this. We had a splendid view of the 
charge on San Juan block-house to our left [and a third of a mile 
to the front], where the infantry of Kent, led by Hawkins, were 

164 



AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN 

climbing the hill. Obviously the proper tiling to do was to help 
them, and I got the men together and started them volley-firing 
against the Spaniards in the San Juan block-house and in the 
trenches around it. 

" The infantry got nearer and nearer the crest of the hill. At 
last we could see the Spaniards running from the rifle-pits as 
the Americans came on in their final rush. Then I stopped my 
men for fear they should injure their comrades." 

By these quotations it is not intended in any manner 
to discredit the part the cavalry took in that battle, but 
to place them in their true position upon the field. 
Though a portion of the cavalry brigade did not par- 
ticipate in the attack on San Juan Hill, as it is gen- 
erally termed, their attack upon Kettle Hill and sub- 
sequently upon the enemy's position on San Juan 
Ridge to the right of the line was gallantly carried 
out. The percentage loss of the cavalry division 
was practically equal to that of Kent's division (13.64 
per cent.) and considerably more than Lawton's (8.6 
per cent.). 

Pearson's brigade, also, did not assault that portion 
of San Juan Hill on which was located San Juan block- 
house, but, after following Wikoff through the jungle, 
moved south, passed over "the green knoll," and as- 
saulted the ridge to the left of San Juan Hill. Driv- 
ing the enemy before him, Pearson finally secured a 
position on the extreme left of the army, nearest San- 
tiago and the second line of the Spanish intrench- 
ments, therefore receiving, perhaps, the most severe 
fire of all after the capture of the heights. 

The Spaniards had retreated to a new and formi- 
dable position, only about 800 yards distant, in the 
outskirts of Santiago. From this position, which con- 

165 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

stituted his second line of defence, the enemy now 
directed his fire on the works we had just taken. 
Meanwhile the remainder of Dumeld's brigade (the 
9th Massachusetts and two battalions of the 34th 
Michigan), which landed at Siboney that morning, 
were hastening to the front. But they and Lawton 
were not yet available, nor was Bates, and so the 
situation stood. 
At 2 P.M. Miley thus reported to General Shafter: 

" Undoubtedly we have the heights. The artillery must be 
pushed forward at once and strongly intrenched by night. I 
believe the road is clear unless Bates is in the road. The Gat- 
ling guns and the Hotchkiss guns have gone forward, likewise 
dynamite gun. I believe they are on the hill now. Ammuni- 
tion must be brought forward by the men. We will strongly 
intrench on the hill to-night. Everybody in good spirits, de- 
termined, and cool. General Wheeler is with me and I have read 
him this." 

A little later Miley again reported : 

" Our men are probably one mile from the river and pushing 
the enemy, and we certainly have everything on the hill. Cap- 
tain Best's battery is now on the hill, and second battery must be 
pushed forward with all possible despatch.* A train of 45-cali- 
ber ammunition has just passed and caliber .30 ammunition must 
be pushed forward with energy. Also get food forward, and 
fresh troops if any can be spared from Bates's brigade. Our men 
are going to be too tired to-night to dig much. So far as I can 
learn, our losses are not great." 

* Best's battery found the position on the hill untenable, and soon 
withdrew to Kettle Hill, a point of relative safety, where, later in the 
afternoon, Parkhurst's battery also reported. Parker with his Gat- 
lings, however, remained with the most advanced line, rendering in- 
valuable service from that time on until the raising of the siege. 

166 



AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN 

The exhaustion of the men made a further advance 
that day unadvisable. More than 1,000 had been 
killed or wounded in the advance through the jungle 
and in the assault. In General Kent's division it was 
feared that the supply of ammunition would not last 
the day. Naturally this feeling of insecurity deep- 
ened as the hours wore on, and in time ran the whole 
length of the line. The men were utterly worn out; 
the army sadly decimated; renewed calls for am- 
munition and reinforcements were heard on every 
side. Where was Lawton? Where was Bates? 

About this time Miley thus wrote General Shafter 
from San Juan Hill : 

" Bates's brigade must be put in here at once. We need fresh 
men and caliber .30 ammunition to enable us to hold the hill. 
Urge everything forward." 

To this Adjutant- General McClernand replied for 
General Shafter : 

" Headquarters sth Army Corps, 

El Poso, Cuba, July 1, 1898. 
" Lieutenant Miley. 

" The general was just here. By his order I sent directions to 
Kent and Wheeler to intrench at night-time and hold position. 
The general has ordered Lawton to press the enemy. I hear him 
driving them, I think, near the Ducrot House. He says he will 
send on ammunition and rations. I will send by the general's 
directions another battery." 

Later in the afternoon General Wheeler, who had 
taken up his headquarters at the foot of San Juan 
Ridge, informed General Shafter that, owing to the 
wounding and drifting away of so many men, the 

167 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

right was weak, and fears were entertained that the 
Spaniards would renew their attack at night. He also 
expressed the wish that Lawton would make con- 
nection on his right. Later in the evening he wrote 
as follows : 

" General Shafter. 

" SIR, — I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade, and gave 
the men shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to 
work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get intrench- 
ing tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the 
same thing. They all promised to do their best, but say the 
earth is rocky. The positions our men carried were very strong 
and the intrenchments were very strong. A number of officers 
have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a 
strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. 
I have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much 
prestige. 

" The lines are now very thin, as so many men have gone to the 
rear with wounded and so many are exhausted ; but I hope these 
men can be got up to-night, and with our line intrenched and 
Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will 
be a severe day. If we can get through to-morrow all right we 
can make our breastworks very strong the next night. You 
can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The 
3d and 6th Cavalry and other troops were up marching or halt- 
ed on the road all last night, and have fought for twelve hours 
to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches 
to-night. 

" I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down, 
and reported the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"Jos. Wheeler, 
" Major-General Volunteers." 

General Shafter, however, ordered that the men 
should intrench at once while waiting for the arri- 

168 



AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN 

val of reinforcements — to wit : Lawton's division and 
Bates's brigade. 

Such was the situation of our army at sundown 
on the 1st of July. All day long they had been fight- 
ing, undergoing many hardships, and attacking al- 
most insurmountable obstacles. More, they had been 
harassed, from morning to evening, by the Spanish 
sharp-shooters posted in the trees and everywhere, 
who made victims not only of our armed soldiers but 
of the sick, the hospital attendants, and even the 
wounded. Going into battle our men had stripped 
themselves of all encumbrances. Blanket-rolls, pon- 
chos, shelter-tents, even their haversacks containing 
three days' rations, had been thrown away. Thus 
at nightfall, when both sides ceased firing, when our 
men lay on the damp ground, without protection and 
short of rations, it seemed too much to ask of them 
to give up such poor rest as they could thus obtain, 
even to erect fortifications against the storm of bullets 
to come next day. Nevertheless, during the night 
much fortifying was done. Under cover of darkness 
twelve field-guns were put in position on San Juan 
Hill, near the block-house. This was the site Best 
had been compelled to abandon the afternoon before, 
and which, soon after sunrise, was reported to be 
untenable by Major Dillenback, commanding the ar- 
tillery. Accordingly, these guns were removed to El 
Poso; but, owing to the condition of the roads and 
the rising of the San Juan River, were not in place 
until after three o'clock on the afternoon of that day, 
July 2d. 

At least one cheering incident came when, at 1.30 
on the morning of the 2d, General Bates's brigade, 

169 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the 3d and 20th Infantry, reached the front and took 
position on the extreme left, next to Pearson. This 
brigade had left Siboney at 8.30 P. M., June 30th; had 
marched to General Shafter's headquarters that night; 
had gone thence to support Lawton; had been in the 
thick of the fight for two hours, and, after seeing the 
finish, had hurried back by the El Poso trail to the 
fighting -line on San Juan, where it arrived a little 
after midnight. With the exception of a brief rest of 
six hours during the night of June 30th- July 1st, this 
brigade had been continuously marching and fighting 
for twenty-nine and a half hours. 

The night of July 1st was passed in constant vigil 
and in strenuous toil. Digging trenches and throw- 
ing up fortifications made sorry work for men who 
had been afoot all day, scaling heights under the fer- 
vid heat of a tropical sun, pushing through dense un- 
dergrowth, and facing death at every step. Day came 
and brought but slight relief. Light had scarce broken 
when the Spaniards opened fire all along the line. On 
the left an assault was made upon Pearson and Bates, 
when the enemy advanced in two lines within 600 
yards of our position. He was repulsed and driven 
to cover. 

As General Wheeler had predicted in his note to 
General Shafter, the 2d of July was a day of trial. 
The flooding rains had now set in, and the twelve 
miles of road between the firing-line and the base of 
supply at Siboney had been converted into sloughs. 
Transportation, except by means of pack-trains, had 
become virtually impossible, and even the mules were 
occasionally swept away and lost while attempting 
to ford the swollen streams. Lawton's division, after 

170 



AFTER THE CAPTURE OF SAN JUAN 

a long, hard march, arrived at noon and was assigned a 
position on the extreme right, and so, at last, the whole 
of Shafter's effective army was on San Juan Ridge. 
The men lay in the close and stifling pits, alternate^ 
scorched by the tropical sun and drenched by the heavy 
rain. During the entire day of July 26. the Spaniards 
kept up a severe fire. But neither our own troops nor 
those of the enemy changed the positions they occupied 
on the night of July 1st. The Spaniards made no at- 
tempt to recapture San Juan Ridge, and our own men 
were too exhausted to make any farther advance. 



CHAPTER XIII 
" I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION " 

SUNDAY, the 3d of July, was the darkest day of the 
war. Since his despatch, received in the early morn- 
ing of July 1st, announcing that the " action is now go- 
ing on," only two messages had come from General 
Shafter regarding the situation, and these were not 
encouraging. In one, received late on the night of 
July 1st, he stated that he had had a very heavy en- 
gagement, lasting the entire daj T . It read : 

" We have carried their outer works, and are now in possession 
of them. There is about three-fourths of a mile of open country 
between my lines and the city. By morning, troops will be in- 
trenched, and considerable augmentation of forces will be there. 
General Lawton's division and General Bates's brigade, which 
have been engaged all day in carrying El Caney (which was ac- 
complished at 4 P.M.), will be in line and in front of Santiago 
during the night. I regret to say our casualties will be above 
400. Of these not many are killed." 

The other message from the general reached the de- 
partment between one and two o'clock on the morn- 
ing of July 2d. It announced that he had underesti- 
mated his losses of the previous day. No word of 
any character was received from the army in Cuba 
during the day of July 2d. But the air was filled 
with foreboding rumors. Although the department 
had no information to such effect, the press de- 

172 



"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION" 

spatches announced General Shafter's serious illness; 
that General Wheeler, next in command, was also sick, 
and unable to perform his duties; and that yellow- 
fever had appeared among the troops at Siboney. 

The following message was sent to General Shafter 
from the White House at one o'clock on the morning 
of July 3d : 

" We are awaiting with intense anxiety tidings of yesterday." 

During the whole of that night (July 2d~3d) I had 
awaited, with the President and Secretary of Agricult- 
ure, news from the front. Hardly a day, from the 
beginning of the war until its close, had I crossed the 
threshold of my residence before midnight, and fre- 
quently it was in the gray of dawn. The nightly vigils 
had become a part of our routine life. In fact, these 
conferences afforded the only opportunity for uninter- 
rupted council. 

When Sunday opened with no bulletins from the 
seat of war, the anxiety for the army at the front was 
felt by the whole nation. The War Office was thronged 
continually during the day by people prominent in 
political and private life, all anxiously inquiring for 
news. 

No despatches coming from General Shafter by 
eleven o'clock in the morning, I telegraphed him as 
follows : 

" I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for 
news from you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was 
received, nor has there been up to this hour, 11 A.M., except an 
account of the battle of Friday, upon which I congratulate you 
most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt all 
messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others, 

173 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

and make report at the close of each clay, or during the day if 
there is anything of special importance, at once. The Relief 
left New York yesterday. She has seventeen surgeons aboard, 
and will come to you as quickly as possible." 

Three-quarters of an hour later, however, General 
Shafter sent a despatch which, owing to a cable- 
operator's mistake, opened with the ominous words: 
" Well invested on the north and east, but with a very 
thin line." The message implied that the Spanish 
had succeeded in flanking Shafter on the right and in 
the rear. 

The missing words of the message were not supplied 
by the cable company until a much later hour in the 
day, when the despatch, corrected, read as follows: 

" Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. 
" Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" Camp, near Seville, Cuba, July 3d. — We have the town well 
invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon 
approaching it we find it of such a character, and the defences 
so strong, it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my pres- 
ent force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 
five miles, and taking up a new position on the high ground be- 
tween the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, 
so as to get our supplies, to a large extent, by means of the rail- 
road, which we could use, having engines and cars at Siboney. 

" Our losses up to date will aggregate a thousand, but list has 
not j'et been made ; but little sickness outside of exhaustion from 
intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yester- 
day, and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. 
Wagon-road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account 
of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General 
Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear 
to-day. General Young also very ill ; confined to his bed. Gen- 
eral Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made 
last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of 

174 



"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION" 

the troops (regulars) was magnificent. I am urging Admiral 
Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will 
have a consultation with him this morning. He is coming to 
the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat 
of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. Gen- 
eral Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San 
Luis and has burned a bridge and removed some rails ; also that 
General Pando has arrived at Palma and that the French con- 
sul, with about 400 French citizens, came into his line yesterday 
from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every 
courtesy possible. SHAFTER, 

" Major -General. 
" 11.44 A.M." 

General Shafter had no fear of a successful assault 
by the Spaniards from the front. He did not believe 
the enemy were either strong or audacious enough to 
drive him from even the hastily constructed trenches 
on the San Juan Heights. " Pando, with 8,000 men," 
and the strong garrison reported to be at Holguin, 
were the forces that he apprehended might attack his 
unprotected flanks and rear. 

As there still was the same pressure to abandon the 
position that General Wheeler mentioned in his letter 
to General Shafter of July 1st, already quoted, and as 
the reports of Spanish reinforcements were so numer- 
ous and, apparently, authentic, the general deemed it 
wise to call a conference of the division commanders. 
The meeting was held at El Poso. Those present were 
Generals Wheeler, Kent, Lawton, and Bates. "Pan- 
do," said General Shafter, "is reported to have been 
sixteen miles out yesterday with 8,000 men. A large 
force of troops is at San Luis, twenty-five miles in our 
rear; 10,000 men are at Holguin ; and 7,000 more are in 
my rear at Guantanamo. If they come down we shall 

175 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

have to get back, and I want an expression of opinion 
against anything that might come. If those forces 
take us in flank, which would not be difficult in our 
present exposed position, I will be held responsible." 

As is customary in such military conferences, the 
junior officer is required to express his opinion first. 
General Bates, whose Independent brigade formed 
the extreme left of the army, stated that he did not 
think he could hold his present position. Lawton 
came next. In his characteristic manner, he said, 
"Hang on." Kent and Wheeler gave the same ad- 
vice. The conference lasted two hours. General 
Shaf ter did not make known his decision other than to 
say : "We shall hold our present position for the next 
twenty-four hours, and if our condition is not improved 
I shall call upon you again for an expression of your 
views." 

The next morning (July 3d) General Shafter felt it 
his duty to acquaint the War Department with the 
situation, and it was for this purpose he sent the 
despatch. It was not his intention to withdraw, un- 
less the conditions of insecurity should become more 
aggravated. 

At the same time that he sent the discouraging 
despatch to Washington, on the morning of the 3d of 
July, with characteristic American spirit he sent a de- 
mand to the Spanish general to surrender. * It should be 
noted that this demand for surrender was prior to any 
knowledge of Cervera's intention to attempt to escape, 
and, as already stated, was sent simultaneously with 
the cablegram to the Secretary of War, intimating the 

* The demand on Toral is dated 8.30 A.M., July 3d. See chap, xiv., 
p. 182. 

I76 



"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION" 

possibility of a withdrawal. In Washington, how- 
ever, the situation could only be judged by the light 
of the information contained in the message just quoted. 
It was not there known that the surrender of the Span- 
iards had been demanded until the evening of July 
3d, and all realized that it would be exceedingly unfort- 
unate if Shafter were compelled to abandon his po- 
sition, for, besides loss of prestige abroad, in the United 
States the effect would be most keenly felt, and the 
Spanish government would, without doubt, be great- 
ly encouraged to further resistance. The conditions 
were regarded as too delicate to warrant any inter- 
ference with General Shafter in the exercise of his au- 
thority in the field. Thence, upon the receipt of his 
message with reference to the retrograde movement, 
General Shafter was given full discretionary power, 
as seen by the following reply: 

"War Department, July 3, 1898— 12.10 p.m. 
" Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba. 

" Your first despatch received. Of course you can judge the 
situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, 
you can hold your present position, especially San Juan Heights, 
the effect upon the country would be much better than falling 
back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only 
a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once. 

" R. A. Alger, 
"Secretary of War." 

In the mean time every effort of the department was 
being made towards hastening forward reinforcements. 
General Brooke, at Chickamauga, was ordered to get 
Wilson's division ready to move at an hour's notice; 
General Guy V. Henry was directed to send two of his 

177 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

strongest regiments to Newport News to embark on 
the fast-sailing ships St. Paul and Duchess, while the 
rest of his command was to go by way of Charles- 
ton, making, with those on the way from Tampa, an 
increase in the 5th Corps of 10,000 men.* General 
Shafter was notified of these preparations, and in- 
formed that he could have whatever reinforcements 
he needed. 

At seven in the evening another despatch came 
from Shafter — the second received from him that day 
— which did not tend to brighten the situation. It 
announced that Cervera's fleet had come out and es- 
caped ! In full, the message read as follows : 

" Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. 
" Secretary of War, Washington. 

" Camp near Santiago, July 3d. — Lieutenant Allen, 2d Cavalry, 
is just in from my extreme right, which is on the railroad running 
north from Santiago, and which overlooks the entire bay. Lieu- 
tenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet was in full view until near- 
ly ten o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, 
and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Dufneld, at Si- 
boney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the Har- 
vard, just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signalled 
Cervera had come out and had escaped and that he was in pur- 
suit. The Harvard immediately left. The French consul in- 
formed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, that 
Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at ten o'clock 
this morning, and that was the hour Allen witnessed his depart- 
ure. Cervera told such consul it was better to die fighting than 
to blow up ships in harbor. SHAFTER, 

" Commanding. 

" 7 P.M." 

* If not needed in Cuba these troops were to form part of the Puerto 
Rican expedition. 

178 



"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION" 

Three-quarters of an hour later, however, there 
came from the military censor at Playa del Este, where 
the end of the Cuban cable under our control had been 
established, a brief message, which stated : 

" All Spanish fleet, except one war-ship, destroyed and burned 
on the beach. It was witnessed by Captain Smith, who told op- 
erator. No doubt of its correctness." 

This was the first intimation received of the suc- 
cessful operations of the navy, July 3d. After the 
experience of the day, and the report received from 
General Shafter, saying that the fleet had come out 
"and escaped," this unofficial information could hardly 
be credited. A half-hour later a message from Shaft- 
er announced as follows: 

" Early this morning I sent in a demand for immediate surren- 
der of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. Perfect 
quiet on lines for an hour. From news just received of escape of 
fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered." 

A few minutes later another message from the cen- 
sor confirmed his previous despatch. The curtain of 
gloom was rising. Whatever doubt was still lurking 
in our minds as to the correctness of these reports was 
removed by a message from Shafter, which reached 
Washington the first hour of the Fourth of July, in 
answer to a cablegram informing him that we had 
received no news: 

"Did not telegraph, as I was too busy looking after things that 
had to be attended to at once and did not wish to send any news 
that was not fully confirmed ; besides, I was too much excited my- 
self. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is re- 
ported practically destroyed. I demanded the surrender of the 

179 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

city at ten o'clock. At this hour, 4.30 P.M., no reply has been 
received. Perfect quiet along the line. Situation has been pre- 
carious, on account of difficulties of supplying command with 
food and tremendous fighting capabilities by the enemy from 
his almost impregnable position." 

Outside of the refreshing naval information that 
this message confirmed, the very spirit of it showed a 
more hopeful condition on the part of the army. 

At two o'clock on the morning of July 4th I walked 
home, with the newsboys crying in my ears the joy- 
ful tidings of " Full account of the destruction of Span- 
ish fleet!" I also had with me the last message from 
General Shafter, received at a quarter past one. It 
contained but a single sentence — 

"I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION." 



CHAPTER XIV 

SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

AT eleven o'clock on the morning of the 3d of July 
active hostilities ceased, and were not again renewed 
until late on the afternoon of July 10th. The firing then 
continued through the forenoon of July 1 ith, when the 
last shot of the Santiago campaign was fired. Fight- 
ing practically ended July 3d, the interregnum until 
the date of formal surrender, July 17th, being devoted, 
with the exception of the skirmishing on the two days 
noted, to negotiations for the capitulation. During 
this entire period, however, both armies, remained in 
their trenches. 

When the news of the destruction of Cervera's fleet 
reached our troops in the rifle-pits, on the afternoon 
of July 3d, their enthusiasm knew no bounds. The 
men cheered along the entire line of our works, and 
gave vent to their delight as only soldiers can — 
dancing on the earthworks, throwing up their hats, 
and embracing one another. General Shafter thus 
cabled : 

" The good news has inspired everybody. When the news 
of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was 
during the period of truce, a regimental band that had managed 
to keep its instruments on the line played the ' Star-Spangled 
Banner ' and ' There will be a hot time in the old town to-night/ 
men cheering from one end of the line to the other. Officers and 

181 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

men, without even shelter-tents, have been soaking for five days 
in the afternoon rains, but all are happy." 

Later in the evening he reported that his lines then 
completely surrounded the town from the bay on the 
north to a point on the San Juan River to the south. 
The enemy, however, still held the ground from the 
west bend of the San Juan River, at its mouth, up the 
railroad to the city. Shafter also cabled that Pando 
was some miles away, and that it was not believed 
that he would get into Santiago. This last statement 
was based on a report from Garcia. 

The first demand for surrender, forwarded on the 
morning of July 3d, and already referred to, read : 

"Headquarters U. S. Forces, 

Near San Juan River, Cuba, 

July 3, 1898—8.30 A.M. 
" To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago 
de Cuba. 
" SIR, — I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell San- 
tiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries 
and all women and children that they should leave the city before 
ten o'clock to-morrow morning. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"Wm. R. Shafter, 

"Major-General U. S. V." 

General Linares, in command of all the Spanish 
forces in the province of Santiago, had been wounded 
during our assault on San Juan, July 1st, and had been 
succeeded by General Toral. The latter thus replied 
to General Shaffer's communication: 

" Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898—3 p.m. 
"His Excellency the General Commanding the Forces of the United 
States, near San Juan River. 
" SIR,— I have the honor to reply to your communication of to- 

182 




THEATRE OF 
MILITARY OPERATIONS 



CUBA 



Soleclad 




, 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

day, written at 8.30 A.M. and received at I P.M., demanding 
the surrender of the city, or, in the contrary case, announcing 
to me that you will bombard this city, and that I advise the for- 
eigners, women, and children that they must leave the city before 
ten to-morrow morning. 

"It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, 
and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the 
contents of your message. Very respectful^, 

"Jose Toral, 
" Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army Corps." 

When the threat of bombardment was made known 
in Santiago, the British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Nor- 
wegian consuls came into our lines and asked that the 
non-combatants might occupy the town of Caney, 
and urged that the bombardment be delayed until ten 
o'clock of the 5th, as there were about 20,000 people 
who wished to leave the city. These requests were 
granted, and General Shafter informed the Spanish 
commander that, out of deference to the expressed 
wish of the consuls, he would not begin his operations 
against Santiago until noon of the 5th. He also sub- 
mitted the matter to Washington, reporting what he 
had done, and stated that such a large number 
of refugees to the town of Caney would cause 
much hardship, as the place could not shelter over 
1,000 people, and it had no supplies. He added, "I 
can hold my present line and starve them out, 
letting the non-combatants come out leisurely, as 
they come out for food, and will probably be able to 
give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep 
them alive." 

This correspondence occurred before positive news 
of the destruction of Cervera's fleet reached our lines. 
When that fact was confirmed, General Shafter re- 

183 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

newed his demand for the surrender of the city and 
garrison of Santiago, as follows : 

" Headquarters sth Army Corps, 
Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July 4, 1898. 
" The Commanding General Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba, 
Cuba. 

" SIR, — I was informed officially last night that Admiral Cer- 
vera is now a captive on U. S. S. Gloucester and is unharmed. 
He was then in the harbor of Siboney. I regret also to have to 
announce to you the death of General Rey, at Caney, who with 
two of his sons was killed in the battle of July 1st. His body 
will be buried this morning with military honors. His brother, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rey, is wounded and a prisoner in my hands, 
together with the following officers : 

" Captain Don Antonio Vara del Rey, aide to the general ; Cap- 
tain Isidore Arias Martinez ; Antonio Mansas, post commander ; 
Captain Manuel Romero, volunteer force; who, though severe- 
ly wounded, will all probably survive. I also have to announce 
to you that the entire Spanish fleet, with the exception of one 
vessel, was destroyed, and that is so vigorously followed that it 
will be impossible to escape. 

"General Pando is opposed by forces sufficient to hold him in 
check. In view of the above, I suggest that, to save needless ef- 
fusion of blood and the distress of many people, you may recon- 
sider your determination of yesterday. Your men have certain- 
ly shown the gallantry which was expected of them. 

" I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

"WM. R. Shafter, 
" Major-General Commanding U. S. V." 

He also offered to return to the Spanish lines a num- 
ber of seriously wounded officers and men, and, by 
direction of the Secretary of War, asked for the ex- 
change of Hobson for any unwounded officer held by 
our troops as a prisoner of war. To these demands 
and suggestions, General Toral replied : 

184 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

"Army of the Island of Cuba, 
4TH Corps, General Staff. 
"To His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the American 
Forces. 

" EXCELLENCY,— I have the honor to reply to the three com- 
munications of your excellency, dated to-day, and I am very 
grateful of the news that you give me in regard to the generals, 
chiefs, officers, and troops that are your prisoners, and of the 
good care that you give to the wounded in your possession. With 
respect to the wounded, I have no objection to receive them in this 
place, those that your excellency may willingly deliver me, but 
I am not authorized by the general-in-chief to make any exchange, 
because he has reserved to himself that authority. Yet I have 
given him notice of the proposition of your excellency. It is 
useless for me to tell you how grateful I am for the interest that 
your excellency has shown for the prisoners, and corpse of General 
Vara del Rey. Giving you many thanks for chivalrous treatment. 

" The same reason that I explained to you yesterday I have to 
give again to-day : that this place will not be surrendered. 

" I am yours with great respect and consideration, 

"Jose Toral. 
"In Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898." 

The next day the Spanish general stated that au- 
thority had been granted him to exchange Lieutenant 
Hobson and his men, and this was effected on the 6th 
of July. 

General Shafter's ill-health caused much anxiety 
in Washington. He was informed on the 4th of July : 

" Your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case 
you are disabled, General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to 
command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so 
serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must deter- 
mine whether your condition is such as to require you to relin- 
quish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will 
order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and 
to take up the work in hand." 

185 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

He was also notified that he would not be expected 
to make an assault until he was ready. 

" Being on the ground and knowing all the conditions, . . . you 
will use your own judgment as to how and when you will take the 
city of Santiago, but for manifest reasons it should be accom- 
plished as .speedily as possible." 

On the night of July 3d, in spite of the assurances 
of Garcia that "General Pando would scarcely dare 
to go into the town of Santiago," and of General 
Shatter's especial injunction to the Cuban general to 
prevent such an occurrence, reinforcements to the num- 
ber of 3,654* entered the besieged city from the south- 
west, over what is known as the Cobre road. This 
was the force that had been described by Garcia's 
scouts as "Pando, with 8,000 men." 

The Spaniards have just cause for referring with 
pride to the movements of General Escario's army of 
relief. He left Manzanillo on the 23d of June, marched 
one hundred and fifty miles over trails so narrow that 
his column could only move in single file, and for a 
good part of the distance the men had to cut their way 
through the jungles with machetes. During the ad- 
vance they were continually harassed by the Cubans. 

The arrival of this large body of reinforcements 
made the problem of capturing Santiago more difficult. 
It also decreased the likelihood of an early surrender, 
of which General Shatter had been so hopeful since 
the destruction of the fleet. The general thus reported 
the situation to Washington: 

* Lieutenant Muller says General Escario's forces consisted of 3,752 
men (p. 117), and that his losses, inflicted by the Cubans en route, 
were 98 killed and wounded. 

186 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" Camp near Santiago, Cuba, July 4. 
" When am I to expect troops from Tampa? Report just re- 
ceived, Pando entered city last night by Cobre road with 5000 
from Holguin. Garcia was especially charged with blockad- 
ing that road." 

And later the same day he cabled : 

" There appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando 
succeeded in entering Santiago last night with his force, said to 
be about 5000 men. This puts a different aspect upon affairs, 
and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it would be at the 
cost of very considerable fighting* and loss. General Lawton 
reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando, 
informed him at ten o'clock last night that Pando had passed 
in on Cobre road. Lawton says cannot compel General Garcia 
to obey my instructions, and doubts if they intend to place them- 
selves in any position where they will have to fight, and that if 
we intend to reduce Santiago, we will have to depend alone upon 
our own troops, and that we will require twice the number we now 
have. ... If we have got to try and reduce the town, now that 
the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the 
expedition, there must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops 
here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and people 
are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the 
troops can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other 
supplies. There will be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, 
and I suppose I can put them off a little longer to enable people 
to get out. Country here is destitute of food or growing crops, ex- 
cept mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good health, 
though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. I am 
sorry to say I am no better, and in addition to my weakness can- 
not be out on account of a slight attack of gout, but hope to be 
better soon. ..." » 

Firing was not resumed at noon on the 5th of July, 
as intended, as many of the old men, women, and chil- 
dren fleeing to Caney still blocked the roads from San- 
tiago. General Toral was sent the following notice: 

187 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" In response to the earnest request of the foreign consuls, and 
because of the large number of persons who wish to leave to-day 
(July 5)> n o firing will be made while the women, children, and 
foreign consuls are coming out of the city, and all such persons 
will be granted a safe conduct beyond and through our lines." 

General Shafter did not wish to hasten matters, 
having determined to take no aggressive action until 
his reinforcements, then on the way, should reach 
him. He cabled to the War Department : 

" I do not believe I will bombard the city until I get more troops, 
but will keep up fire on their trenches. If it were simply a going 
out of the women and children to outside places where they could 
be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their 
going out to starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and 
the latter is not possible now." 

He also stated in another despatch, of the same 
date, that he expected to see Admiral Sampson the 
following morning and arrange for the naval co- 
operation, but added that nothing could be done by 
the army until Hobson and his men were free, and not 
even then, if taking the place would require an assault. 
"Starving them out is better/' he said.* 

In the mean time Shafter was endeavoring to per- 
suade Admiral Sampson to force his way into the har- 
bor, and so relieve the army from its perilous position. 
As Sampson seemed reluctant to make the effort, it 
was proposed by the War Department that the army 
should attempt to run one of its light-draught trans- 
ports into the harbor, clearing the way for the navy, 
in accordance with the following despatch : 



Hobson and his men were exchanged the following day. 
188 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" Washington, July 5, 1898. 
"Major-General W. R. Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: 

" Your telegram concerning the navy entering Santiago Har- 
bor is received and your action thoroughly approved. The Secre- 
tary of War suggests that if the navy will not undertake to break 
through, take a transport, cover the pilot house in most exposed 
points with baled hay,* attach an anchor to a tow line, and if pos- 
sible grapple the torpedo cables, and call for volunteers from the 
army — not a large number — to run into the harbor, thus mak- 
ing way for the navj^. Before acting, telegraph what you think 
of it. One thing is certain : the navy must get into the harbor and 
must save the lives of our brave men that will be sacrificed if we 
assault the enemy in his intrenchments without aid. This is 
strictly confidential to you. 

" (Signed) H. C. CORBIN, 

" Adjutant-General." 

The above project was abandoned when Sampson 
promised to make an effort at countermining and en- 
tering the harbor; a feat which, however, he did not 
accomplish during the entire period of the siege. 

In compliance with General Shaffer's request for a 
conference at field headquarters on the morning of the 
6th, Admiral Sampson, because of his own illness, 
sent as representative his chief of staff, Captain Chad- 
wick, of the New York. 

Captain Chadwick suggested that if more detailed 
information be conveyed to General Toral regard- 
ing the completeness of the naval victory of the 3d, 
the Spanish general would become convinced of the 
futility of further resistance, and would surrender. 
He proposed that he draft a letter for General Shafter's 
signature, embodying the details of the destruction 

* This method was used to protect the pilot houses of Admiral Por- 
ter's fleet when he ran past Vicksburg. (Grant's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 
462.) 

189 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of Cervera's fleet, in another demand for surrender. 
If this failed, Captain Chad wick promised, in Admiral 
Sampson's name, to attempt to force the harbor after 
twenty-four hours' bombardment by the navy. As 
Shafter's reinforcements had not yet arrived, and as he 
desired to take advantage of every opportunity for de- 
lay, pending their coming, the letter describing the 
naval victory was drafted by Captain Chadwick. As 
a play for time, General Shatter directed that there be 
included in this note an offer to give Toral until noon 
of the 9th for an answer, on the grounds that the Span- 
ish general might desire to consult his government 
relative to the situation. This letter, the third de- 
mand for surrender, was as follows : 

"Headquarters 5TH Army Corps, 
"Camp near San Juan River, Cuba, July 6, 1898. 
" To the Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago 
de Cuba. 

" SIR, — In view of the events of the 3d instant, I have the honor 
to lay before your excellency certain propositions to which I 
trust your excellency will give the consideration which, in my 
judgment, they deserve. 

" I enclose a bulletin of the engagement of Sunday morning . 
which resulted in the complete destruction of Admiral Cervera's 
fleet, the loss of 600 of his officers and men and the capture of the 
remainder. The admiral, General Paredes, and all others who 
escaped alive, are now prisoners on board the Harvard and St. 
Louis, and the latter ship, in which are the admiral, General 
Paredes, and the surviving captains (all except the captain of 
the Almirante Oquendo, who was slain), has already sailed for 
the United States. If desired by you this may be confirmed by 
your excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Ad- 
miral Sampson, and he can arrange to visit the Harvard, which 
will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish 
officers and men aboard that ship. 

190 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to 
.state that unless a surrender be arranged by noon of the 9th in- 
stant, a bombardment of the city will be begun and continued 
by the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range 
of the guns, the 8 -inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards, 
the 13-inch of course much farther. The ships can so lie that 
with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the centre of the city. 

" I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian 
spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men 
either of your excellency's forces or my own; the final result 
under circumstances so disadvantageous to your excellency 
being a foregone conclusion. 

" As your excellency may wish to make reference of so mo- 
mentous a question to your excellency's home government, it 
is for this purpose that I have placed the time of the resumption 
of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow a reply being 
received. 

" I beg an early answer from your excellency. 

" I have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servant, 

"Wm. R. Shafter, 
" Major-General Commanding." 

General Shafter had little faith in the efficacy of this 
demand, or in the effect of the twenty-four hours' bom- 
bardment promised by Captain Chadwick, and so ex- 
pressed himself in a despatch to Washington at the 
time, saying, " I do not expect much from long-range 
firing, but do from course promised by navy for second 
day," that is, the attempt to force the harbor. 

General Toral thus replied to General Shafter : 

" Army of the Island of Cuba, 4TH Corps, 

"Santiago de Cuba, July 6, 1898. 

" To the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the United States. 

" SIR, — I have the honor to answer your communication of this 

date, requesting that you permit the return to this garrison of 

1 the employees of the Cuban Submarine Co. in conformity with 

the accompanying letter to H. B. M. consul. On the announce- 

191 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ment of the bombardment of the city they (the employees) aban- 
doned it, and I have no one available who can communicate with 
my government, to submit the propositions made by your ex- 
cellency in said letter. 

" Otherwise it will be impossible for me to consult with my 
superiors, my military honor will require me to defend to the 
utmost extreme my position as far as forces and position can go. 

"... Awaiting your reply, I remain your excellency's most 
obedient servant, " JOSE TORAL, 

" Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Corps of the 
Army of the Island of Cuba." 

Permission for the return of the English cable op- 
erators was given. Hostilities in the meanwhile were 
suspended, and Shafter reported that he was making 
his "lines stronger and hanging on." He was in- 
structed to communicate freely w T ith Washington, set- 
ting forth any assistance that could be given him. 

Late on the night of July 8th he reported : 

" Have been visiting the lines all day. I regard them as im- 
pregnable against any force the enemy can send. The truce ex- 
pires at twelve to-morrow, and I expect soon after the firing will 
begin. No assault will be made or advance from our present 
lines until the navy comes into the bay. I hope to be able by 
fire from the intrenchments to drive the enemy into the city." 

The following morning Toral submitted a prop- 
osition, dated July 8th, to evacuate Santiago de Cuba 
and march to Holguin with his men. 

" Army of the Island of Cuba, 4TH Corps, 

'•Santiago de Cuba, July 8, 1898—10 p.m. 
" To His Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the 
United States, in Camp at the San Juan. 
" SIR, — In answer to your letter of the 6th instant, I propose to | 
you, to avoid further damage to the city, useless shedding of blood, 
and other horrors of war, the evacuation of the division of San- 

192 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

tiago de Cuba, to retreat to Holguin with my troops with all their 
baggage, arms, and munitions, without their being attacked 
during the march, and should this proposition be accepted, the 
necessary negotiations to effect it should be made under the usual 
manner and form. 

" The loss of the Spanish squadron, as related in the American 
bulletin, if it is exact, in no way influences the defence of this 
city, we having been reinforced on the 3d by a column which you 
doubted could arrive. 

" Therefore, I have at my disposal sufficient men to resist any 
attack, well provided with ammunition, water in abundance, not- 
withstanding the supply pipes were cut, and rations for a reason- 
ably long time. Now, more than ever, besides my own supplies, 
I count on those provided for the inhabitants who have emigrated. 

" As the troops are placed, with a convenient reserve of rations 
and plenty of munitions of war, and the city almost entirely 
deserted, the bombardment will only be felt by the house-owners 
—foreigners many of them — and many other natives whom the 
American army came to protect. 

" The Spanish soldier is fully acclimated as your troops are not, 
and the losses attendant on the different attacks on Santiago 
will be greatly added to by the rigors of a bad climate and the 
sickness of the present season. 

" I consider that my proposition to evacuate extensive territory 
will save most lamentable loss of life on both sides and of the 
honor of the Spanish arms saved. 

" In view of the above expressions the suspension of hostilities 
will cease at noon to-morrow unless ruptured meanwhile, and 
you do not determine anything, or pending any consultation 
you may wish to make with your superior government referring 
to those proposals. 

" I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant, 

"Jose Toral, 
" Commander-in-Chief, 4th Army Corps of the 
Army of the Island of Cuba." 

General Shafter answered that he would refer the 
proposal to Washington, but hardly thought that it 

193 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

would be accepted; in the intervening time the truce 
was to continue. 

In referring this offer to Washington, General Shaft- 
er stated that it would give another day to bring up 
troops from Siboney, as the first transports, with re- 
inforcements, had just arrived there. General Shafter 
was at once informed: 

" You will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and 
should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape." 

A few hours afterwards, on the same day (July 9th), 
a second despatch was received from Shafter : 

" Secretary of War, Washington. 

"I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacuate the town 
this morning without consulting any one. Since then I have 
seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with 
me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the har- 
bor ; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children, 
and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment and 
who are now suffering where they are, though I am doing my 
best to supply them with food ; third, it saves the great destruc- 
tion of property which a bombardment would entail, most of 
which belongs to Cuban and foreign residents ; fourth, it at once 
relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations 
elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow-fever at Siboney, 
in Michigan regiment, and if it gets started no one knows where 
it will stop. We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not 
want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert 
and return to our lines. I was told by sentinel, who deserted 
last night, that 200 men want to come but were afraid our men 
would fire upon them. W. R. SHAFTER, 

"General." 

General Shafter was thereupon informed, in no jl 
equivocal language, that such a proposition would 
not be considered : 

194 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" You have repeatedly been advised that you would not be 
expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santiago until 
you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are 
ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said 
your position was impregnable, and that you believed the enemy 
would yet surrender unconditionally. You have also assured us 
that you could force their surrender by cutting off their supplies. 
Under these circumstances, your message recommending that 
Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without 
molestation to Holguin is a great surprise and is not approved. 
The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants 
rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secretary of 
War orders, when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy 
and take Santiago, that you do it. If you have not force enough, 
it will be despatched to you at the earliest moment practicable. 
Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been 
advised. In the mean time nothing is lost by holding the position 
you now have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowl- 
edge receipt." 

General Shaf ter answered : 

" The instructions of the War Department will be carried out 
to the letter." 

General Toral was notified that his proposition to 
evacuate Santiago with his forces was not favorably- 
considered, and the demand for unconditional sur- 
render repeated. The Spanish general was assured 
that the utmost courtesy and consideration would be 
extended to all persons of whatsoever grade under his 
command, as well as to the inhabitants of the city of 
Santiago. It was suggested that the gallant defence 
made by the Spanish troops at Caney and in front of 
Santiago "would cover every point involved." If a 
favorable reply was not received to this call for sur- 
render, the fourth that had been made, it was to be 

195 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

understood that all obligations as to active operations 
would cease at 4 P.M. that day, July 10th. Toral 
declined to accept the proposition of unconditional 
surrender, and firing from both sides began that after- 
noon a little after four. General Shafter informed 
his division commanders that the effort should be to 
drive the enemy out of his works and into the town by 
means of artillery and rifle-fire, and that to do this the 
volume of fire was of small importance, but accuracy 
of the greatest. The men were cautioned to fire de- 
liberately and to keep well covered. The several com- 
mands were informed that no advance upon the city 
was expected until after the bombardment. Shafter 
acquainted the War Department with his plans; add- 
ing that he did not intend to assault, and that no lives 
would be sacrificed. 

The enemy opened with light guns, which were 
soon silenced by our artillery. The firing was not 
heavy, and neither side advanced from its trenches. 
The losses of both armies were small. In accordance 
with the promise of Admiral Sampson, made by 
Captain Chadwick on the 6th, the navy, as General 
Shafter expressed it, "fired a few shots from the sea 
near Aguadores. Effect was not perceptible." Our ar- 
tillery had been augmented by the arrival at the front 
of the field-mortars, four of which fired a total of thirty- 
six rounds. All effort to bring forward the heavy 
five-inch siege-guns, which had been taken on the 
expedition at the request of General Miles, proved to 
be futile. The roads were utterly impassable for such 
artillery." 

* After much labor the heavy siege-guns were placed on shore at 
Daiquiri, then returned to the ships, sent to Puerto Rico, and finally 

I96 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

The action continued, in a desultory manner, dur- 
ing the afternoon of the loth and until mid-day of the 
nth, when the last shot of the Santiago campaign 
was fired. We had sustained, in the few hours of 
fighting on both days, a loss of one officer and one man 
killed, one officer and one man wounded. The Span- 
ish casualties are reported to have been seven men 
killed, and four officers and sixty-one men wounded. 

On the 9th, ioth, and nth of July a large number 
of reinforcements reached Cuba, including two bat- 
teries of artillery, the 4th and 5th. Part of these ad- 
ditional troops were never disembarked in Cuba, nor 
were the field batteries, but were sent to Puerto Rico. 
Two volunteer regiments, the 1st District of Columbia 
and the 1st Illinois, were landed, and reached the 
trenches on the nth of July. With these General 
Shatter was enabled that night to complete his cir- 
cumvallation of the town and close up the gap of three 
miles which had caused him no little anxiety, leaving, 
as it did, a possible means of escape to the Spanish 
forces. Our lines now extended all the way down 
to the bay on the west of Santiago. 

When it became evident in Washington that a large 
number of prisoners would fall into our hands, the 
question arose as to the best method of disposing of 
them. Galveston, Texas, was suggested as a con- 
venient and suitable locality for landing, guarding, 
and camping them. The place seemed to answer 
every requirement, and its selection met with the Presi- 
dent's approval. 

Subsequently the Secretary of War conceived the 

brought back to the United States without a shot having been fired 
from them. 

197 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

idea of transporting the prisoners to their own country 
as the happiest solution of the problem. In addition 
to avoiding the danger of introducing yellow -fever 
into the United States, this plan, it was thought, would 
have a good effect upon the people of Spain ; the world 
generally would regard it as a gracious act on the part 
of a victorious nation, and it would tend to demoralize 
those Spanish soldiers remaining in Cuba, some of 
whom had been campaigning there three years, and 
were anxious to return to their homes. Moreover, 
it would cost but little more to send them to Spain 
than to Galveston. 

The proposition having received the approval of the 
President, this cable was sent to General Shatter on 
the ioth of July : 

"War Department, July 10, 1898. 
" General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba. 

" Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally, and wish 
to return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense of 
the United States government. R. A. ALGER, 

"Secretary of War." 

On the afternoon of July nth, with these instruc- 
tions as a basis, General Shafter sent to Toral his fifth 
demand for surrender : 

" To his Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Forces, 
Santiago de Cuba. 
" SIR, — With the largely increased forces which have come to 
me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my 
hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your 
excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency's 
army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so 
desire the government of the United States will transport the 

198 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

entire command of your excellency to Spain. I have the honor to 
be, etc., etc., WM. R. SHAFTER, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

General Toral's answer, though dated the nth, was 
not received until the morning of the 12th : 

" To his Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the 
United States, in the Camp of the San Juan. 
" ESTEEMED SIR, — I have the honor to advise your eminence 
that your communication of this date is received, and in reply 
desire to confirm that which I said in my former communication ; 
also to advise you that I have communicated your proposition 
to the general-in-chief. Reiterating my sentiments, etc., etc., 

"Jose Toral, 
" Commander-in-Chief, etc." 

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this mes- 
sage came another from the Spanish general : 

" Army of the Island of Cuba, 4TH Corps, 

" Santiago de Cuba, July 12, 1898. 
" To his Excellency the General of the American Forces. 

" ESTEEMED Sir, — I have the honor to insist upon my prop- 
osition to evacuate the Plaza and the territory of the division 
of Cuba, under conditions honorable for the Spanish arms, trust- 
ing that your chivalry and sentiments as a soldier will make 
you appreciate exactly the situation, and therefore must a solu- 
tion be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact. Other- 
wise you will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to make 
a defence as far as my strength will permit. . . . 

" Very respectfully, etc., JOSE TORAL, 

" Commander-in-Chief, etc." 

On the day before the receipt of this note (July nth), 
Garcia had informed General Shafter that he had re- 
ceived from General Feria, commanding the Cuban 
forces in the vicinity of Holguin, trustworthy informa- 

199 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

tion to the effect that a Spanish force of 6,000 men was 
preparing to leave Holguin for Santiago. It was re- 
ported that to this column would be added another 
from Manzanillo, whence General Escario had come, 
the two detachments to form a junction at Jiguani. 
Although our troops completely surrounded Santiago, 
the line was very thin, and the ten days' confinement 
in the trenches was beginning to have a marked effect 
upon the men. Moreover, there was much suffering 
among the 20,000 refugees who had gone out to Caney, 
and, in spite of the fact that everything possible was 
being done to relieve the destitute, the limited trans- 
portation and the almost impassable condition of the 
roads admitted of only partial success. They were 
suffering for food. Shafter therefore asked (July 13) : 

" Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I 
have been perfectly satisfied that he [the enemy] can be taken, 
but if he fights, as we have reason to believe he may, it will be at 
fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease threatening 
may be at great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people 
who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to 
keep them from starvation, and if the rains continue I do not 
know how long I can do that." 

General Miles, who had reached Cuba on the Yale, 
Juty nth, arrived at General Shaffer's headquarters 
on the afternoon of the next day. Although he was 
fresh from the United States, and had not been sub- 
jected to the trying experience of three weeks' cam- 
paigning in the tropics, he seconded the only recom- 
mendations made by General Shafter which met with 
the disapproval of the government. 

The despatch of General Miles thus read: 

200 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" Camp near Santiago, July 12th. 
" Secretary of War, Washington. 

" The Spanish general to-day asked that some conclusion be 
reached that shall save his honor. Offers to surrender Santiago 
province, force, batteries, munitions of war, etc., all except the 
men and small-arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not 
advise acceptance, but this is a great concession, and would avoid 
assaulting intrenching lines with every device for protecting 
his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines. The siege 
may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two 
months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city 
and were not allowed to take any food. The fortitude and hero- 
ism of the army has been unsurpassed, and, under the circum- 
stances, I concur with General Shafter and the major-generals, 
and would request that discretion be granted as to terms, in view 
of the importance of other immediate operations in which both 
this part of the army and navy will participate. The very serious 
part of this situation is that there are 100 cases of yellow-fever 
in this command, and the opinion of the surgeon is that it will 
spread rapidly. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

In reply to these despatches General Shafter was 
sent the following : 

"Washington, D. C, July 13, 1898— 2.14 a.m. 
" Major-General Shafter, before Santiago, Cuba, Playa del 
Este. 
" Telegram just received. No modification of former order 
permitting the Spanish army evacuating Santiago under such 
conditions as proposed by Toral will be made. The Secretary 
of the Navy will be consulted at once concerning the ordering of 
Sampson in to assist you. R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

According to the Spanish law, the commanding 
general could not surrender without authority from 
his government. To this end General Linares thus 

201 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

cabled the Minister of War at Madrid on the 12th of 
July: 

" To the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of War. 

" Though confined to my bed with great weakness and sharp 
pains, I am so much worried over the situation of these long- 
suffering troops that I deem it my duty to address your excel- 
lency and the minister of war for the purpose of setting forth the 
true state of affairs. 

" Hostile positions very close to precinct of city, favored by 
nature of ground ; ours spread out over fourteen kilometers ; troops 
attenuated ; large number sick ; not sent to hospitals because 
necessary to retain them in trenches. Horses and mules with- 
out food and shelter ; rain has been pouring into the trenches in- 
cessantly for twenty-four hours. Soldiers without permanent 
shelter ; rice the only food ; cannot change or wash clothes. 
Many casualties, chiefs and officers killed ; forces without proper 
command in critical moments. Under these circumstances, 
impossible to open passage, because one-third of the men of our 
contingent would be unable to go out ; enemy would reduce forces 
still further ; result would be great disaster without accomplish- 
ing the salvation of eleven much-thinned battalions, as desired 
by your excellency. In order to go out under protection of Hol- 
guin division, it would be necessary for the latter to break through 
the hostile line, and then with combined forces to break through 
another part of the same line. This would mean an eight days' 
journey for Holguin division, bringing with them a number of 
rations which they are unable to transport. The situation is 
fatal ; surrender inevitable ; we are only prolonging the agony ; 
the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our 
situation. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust 
our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bom- 
barding on land by elevation without our being able to see their 
batteries, and from the sea by the fleet which has full advices, 
and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical ac- 
curacy. 

" Santiago de Cuba is not Gerona, a city enclosed by walls, 
on the soil of the mother country, defended inch by inch by her 

202 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

own sons, by old men, women, and children without distinction, 
who encouraged and assisted the combatants and exposed their 
lives, impelled by the sacred idea of independence while await- 
ing aid which they received. Here solitude, the total emigra- 
tion of the population, insular as well as peninsular, including 
public officials, with a few exceptions. Only the clergy remains, 
and they intend to leave to-day, headed by their prelate. 

" These defenders are not just beginning a campaign, full of 
enthusiasm and energy ; they have been fighting for three years 
with the climate, privations and fatigue ; and now that the most 
critical time has arrived their courage and physical strength are 
exhausted, and there are no means for building them up again. 
The ideal is lacking; they are defending the property of people 
who have abandoned it in their very presence, and of their own 
foes, the allies of the American forces. 

" There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judg- 
ment of the government and the whole nation; for these long- 
suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the 18th 
day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment. 

" If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for rea- 
sons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the 
responsibility of the denouement anticipated and announced by 
me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of 
my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon 
myself to perform the act of signing the surrender, for my hum- 
ble reputation is worth very little when it comes to a question of 
national interests. LINARES. 

The tenor of this letter indicates a devotion and 
patriotic spirit highly commendable. The conduct 
of General Linares, as well as his successor, General 
Toral, was all that any country could reasonably 
have expected of them. The troops under their com- 
mand fought bravely and stubbornly, as General 
Shafter testified in his despatches to Washington, 
when he spoke of the "tremendous fighting capabil- 
ities shown by the enemy." It is a pleasure to pay 

203 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

a tribute to the courage and honor of both these com- 
manding officers of the enemy. 

Several hours after the receipt of Toral's communi- 
cation insisting upon the evacuation of his troops to 
Holguin, he again wrote General Shafter, and asked 
that hostilities be suspended until he received an an- 
swer from his government, to which he had communi- 
cated the proposition of our army to transport his 
forces to Spain, free, in event of surrender. An ar- 
mistice was therefore declared until July 13th, at noon. 
Later in the day Shafter requested a personal inter- 
view with the Spanish commander for nine o'clock on 
the morning of the 13th, and added that he would be 
" accompanied by the general-in-chief of the American 
army." To this General Toral gave his consent. 

General Shafter, accompanied by General Miles,* 

* On the 6th or 7th of July, when General Miles decided to go to 
Cuba, he voluntarily stated to the President and myself at the White 
House, that he was not going to supersede General Shafter who had 
fought his troops so well, and that he would not assume command 
if General Shafter was physically able to perform his duties. The 
attitude of General Miles, as expressed in this conference, was con- 
siderate and explicit. In accordance with this conversation, and 
with a full understanding as to his proposed action in the matter, and 
for the purpose of assuring General Shafter that the administration 
was not dissatisfied with his conduct up to that time, the following 
cablegram was sent him : 

"Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, 

"July 8, 1898. 
" Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba. 

" Secretary of War directs me inform you that General Miles left 
here at 10 40 last night for Santiago with instructions not to in any 
manner supersede you as commander of the forces in the field near 
Santiago so long as you are able for duty. H. C. CORBIN, 

" Adjutant-General." 

This is the so-called " secret" despatch to which General Miles has 

204 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

General Wheeler, and Lieutenant Miley, met General 
Toral on the morning of the 13th of July, between the 
lines, in a small valley a short distance to the south of 
the Santiago road. Their conference took place under 
a large ceiba, which has since received the name of 
"Surrender Tree," from the fact that beneath it were 
signed the articles of capitulation. Mr. R. G. Men- 
doza, volunteer aide to General Lawton, and sub- 
sequently made a captain and assistant- adjutant - 
general of volunteers for his services in the Cuban 
campaign, acted as interpreter. He took a verbatim 
statement of the conference, from which I quote 
the following extracts : 

" Shortly after 9 A.M. the Spanish flag of truce appeared on 
the road, with a small escort. The officers coming to the meet- 
ing were the Spanish General Jose Toral, commanding, and his 
chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Ventura Fontan. The Span- 
ish officers brought along with them, as interpreter, Mr. Robert 
Mason, connected with the firm of Brooks Brothers, in Santiago, 
Cuba. 

" After the usual courtesies, Generals Shaffer and Toral sat 
upon the roots of the ceiba tree facing each other. General Miles 
remained back of General Shaffer. 

" General Toral spoke first. In mild and moderate tones, very 
polite in form, he said that he considered it an honor to meet so 
prominent officers of the American army, the bravery of which 
had impressed him most highly in the battles fought during the 
previous week, though he only regretted that the meeting should 
take place under circumstances so trying to him. He then pro- 
ceeded to say that he had received from the commander-in-chief 
of the American army in the island of Cuba, Major-General 

so frequently referred adversely in his numerous newspaper inter- 
views. 

The statement, often made in this connection, that there was a 
" conspiracy " against him, is too absurd to need contradiction. 

205 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

William R. Shatter, an intimation of surrender, and had accepted 
General Shafter's invitation to meet and discuss the matter ; that, 
had it not been for this invitation, he would never have come to 
speak about the matter; that he only did so now, having been 
duly authorized by his superior officer, Captain-General Ramon 
Blanco, at Havana, to open negotiations ; that he wished to state 
that he was only a subordinate officer ; that he had no executive 
power for the surrender of troops or territory under his command, 
and that, accordingly, nothing that he said in this meeting was 
to be considered final, because in all matters of importance he 
had to consult with General Blanco and the government at Madrid. 
' I cannot decide by myself ; I can only suggest, consult with my 
chiefs, and obey their orders ; therefore I cannot surrender, capit- 
ulate, or evacuate the territory without my intended action re- 
ceiving first the approval of my government. 

" ' 1 have already informed it of the events, and I am authorized 
to open negotiations only for the evacuation of the city and the 
capitulation of the forces under my command. My division 
covers the district known as the Eastern District of Santiago de 
Cuba, situated to the east of the line, which, starting from Sagua 
de Tanamo on the northern coast of Cuba, in a southwesterly 
direction, would pass through Cauto, Palma Soriano and along the 
river Cauto down to Aserradero on the southern coast. Of course 
this is to be taken only approximatively, for there is no such line. 
' ' I happen to be temporarily in command of the division of 
the Western District of Santiago de Cuba, of which General Li- 
nares is the commander-in-chief; but whatever I might say will 
only cover my own division, because over Linares's forces and 
territory I have absolutely no control or jurisdiction beyond main- 
taining it as an organization. It must be understood that what- 
ever might be the result of these negotiations, I do not look upon 
them as a surrender. There is going to be a capitulation, and 
even then my action is not final. If my government approves it, 
I am ready to evacuate the city, taking all my forces to Holguin. 
I would march out, taking with me whatever my men could carry 
— the arms, ammunition, and guns, which usually form an 
army corps. I would leave behind the heavy guns and other war 
material which neither follows an army in the field, nor constitutes 
an entity or a military organization, acting independently. 

206 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" ' This is all I can undertake to do. If you should oppose this 
plan, then I would have to defend myself, but I would not sur- 
render. 

' I am thousands of miles away from my government. Com- 
munications with Havana are slow, difficult, and at times ab- 
solutely interrupted. We have to use the cable to Jamaica and 
Bermuda, and, when hard pressed with work, the cable officers at 
these places disconnect their wire with Cuba. Under the cir- 
cumstances, I can do nothing else but obey the regulations of the 
Spanish army. These compel me to defend myself whenever 
I have men, arms, ammunition, provisions of war and a duty 
to fulfil. I cannot surrender; but I am perfectly willing to in- 
form my government of your intimation of surrender and await 
their answer. This I hardly could expect before two or three 
days. All I want is this brief delay.' (General Toral said the 
above in answer to questions put to him by General Shaffer, who 
led the negotiations. I have left out the said questions, and put 
it in this form because discussion at times dragged a little over 
the same point, and it is easier for me to remember in whole the 
substance of General Toral's point of view. The majority of the 
sentences or phrases quoted I fully remember to be Toral's own 
expressions, translated, in many cases, even to the words, be- 
cause he insisted often on these points. ) 

" General Shaffer said to General Toral : ' Now, general, 
that is all very well, but you have had already time enough to 
consult with your government, and the granting of the delay 
you ask for is absolutely impossible. I have given you until 
to-morrow at five o'clock in the morning. If by that time you 
have not received an answer, or decided, as to what you are going 
to do, well — I will open fire upon your works with every gun 
I have.' 

" General Toral shrugged his shoulders, and said : ' Very 
well, I cannot help it: I will do my duty. If you force me to de- 
fend myself, I will do it. But this I beg to say, that I will de- 
fend myself to the bitter end, and the city, when fallen, would be 
found in ruins. I will turn my own guns upon it. I will set it 
afire, and I will block the entrance to the harbor in such a way 
as to make it entirely useless to you. Your ships would never 
get in, and the Cuban families, which you say you come to pro- 

207 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

tect, would be left without a home, for I would destroy everything. 
You would gain practically nothing, and we both would suffer 
a terrible loss, for my men can fight.' 

" ' I am satisfied that they can,' said General Shaffer, smiling. 
' Two thousand losses I had during the last two weeks bear evi- 
dence to your statement. Your men fought bravely.' 

" General Toral then thanked General Shaffer for the com- 
pliment, and went on, saying : ' This would be the result. On 
the other hand, if you allow me to evacuate the city and the dis- 
trict of Santiago de Cuba, as I suggest, and my government ap- 
proves it, well. . . . Think of the great advantages you 
would gain. Withdrawing my forces I would leave in possession 
of the United States forces, which you command, an extensive 
territory, very rich in mines, once thickly populated, and which 
has some of the best ports in Cuba. I would leave to you a har- 
bor for your ships in good condition. I would leave the city and 
its buildings, wherein your army could better escape the ravages 
of this climate, which has cost me so many losses during the past 
three years. Camp life in Cuba is awfully hard. Besides^ it 
would end the fight. The occupation of the Island of Cuba by 
the United States forces would thus begin, and think of the glory 
that would come to you for having successfully commenced to 
solve the Cuban problem. All these advantages, all these bene- 
fits you could gain by simply granting me the brief delay which 
I ask from you and which I expect will allow me the time necessary 
to receive an answer from my government. It can do you no 
harm; it will not weaken your position; it will not strengthen 
mine. I appeal to your soldierly feelings. You see, I am in a 
very bad plight, and my strong desire, my only wish, is to save 
the honor of the Spanish army, and not to submit the forces 
under my command, and myself, to the insult and humiliation 
of a surrender, or to the disaster of a stubborn defence, for they 
deserve better treatment. This is all I ask ; this is all I can do.' 

" General Shaffer again spoke and refused to grant the delay 
asked for. Then General Miles said to General Toral that with 
General Shaffer's permission he would like to say a few words to 
'confirm what the commanding general had just said. General 
Shaffer said, ' Certainly, certainly,' and General Miles spoke 
thus: 

208 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

" ' General Toral, General Shafter and myself appreciate the 
way you feel about your men, and we highly respect your ideas 
about your duty as a soldier, but at the same time I feel inclined 
to believe that the situation has changed to such an extent that 
your duty to defend the city at any cost does no longer exist. Be- 
fore the battles at Guasimas [Sevilla] , Caney, and San Juan were 
fought, you had a fleet in the harbor to protect, and a city and its 
inhabitants to defend. You were expecting reinforcements, and 
your way for a retreat was open, but now the circumstances are 
entirely different. Your fleet has been destroyed; the majority 
of the inhabitants have left the city. You are surrounded by 
overwhelming forces. Your retreat is cut. You expect and 
perhaps could get no reinforcements. Yours is a very difficult 
position. I only left Washington a few days ago, and I saw the 
President on the 7th. He told me that I could have all the men 
I wanted — 5,000 or 50,000. You are 3,000 miles away from your 
government, and you lack proper communications. There are 
occasions in which it is more than a duty — a necessity — for a 
commanding general to act for himself, independent of his gov- 
ernment. And if you have no authority, you ought to have it/ 
said General Miles, smiling. 

That is a fact, indeed,' said Toral, ' I ought to have such 
authority, but I have not, and under the circumstances I can do 
nothing else than obey the army regulations and do my duty. 

" ' You have just said that I expect no reinforcement. I admit 
it for the sake of the argument. Then, what harm could come 
to you from granting the delay I ask for? My only wish is to 
avoid the loss of blood and to save the honor of the Spanish army.' 

" General Shafter then stated again that he had had time to con- 
sult with his government during the past days; that the truce 
would expire at five o'clock A.M. on the 14th day of July, 1898. 
General Toral insisted upon the ground that he could not get, 
within so short a time, an answer from his government in regard 
to the cable informing Madrid of the intimation of surrender re- 
ceived from the commanding general of the United States forces. 
Generals Miles and Shafter stood up, walked around the tree, and 
had a short conversation. General Miles, on returning to his 
seat, looked worried. It appears that both had been discussing 
the point of extending or not the time of the flag of truce. After 
° 209 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

short parleying, General Shafter said he would allow General 
Toral until noon of the 14th, and that General Toral would en- 
deavor to reach a decision or to have an answer from his gov- 
ernment."* 

This morning conference of July 13th lasted an 
hour and a half, and concluded with an agreement to 
meet the following day at noon. On the morning of 
the 14th, General Shafter received a note from Toral, 
saying that he was authorized to " agree upon capitu- 
lation on the basis of repatriation." 

The letter was thus worded : 

" Santiago, Cuba, 14. 

" General-in-Chief of the American Forces. 

" HONORED SIR, — His excellency, the general-in-chief of the 
army of the island of Cuba, telegraphs from Havana yesterday 
at 7 P.M. the following : ' Believing that business of such impor- 
tance as the capitulation of that place should be known and de- 
cided upon by the government of his Majesty, I give notice that 
I have sent the condition of your telegram asking immediate 
answer and enabling you also to show this to the general of the 
American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the 
government which cannot be as soon as the time which he has 
decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than 
Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the general of 
the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of 
returning to Spain.' I have the honor to transmit this to you 
that in case you may find the foregoing satisfactorj^ that he may 
designate persons representative of himself who, with those in 
my name, may agree to the clauses of capitulation upon the basis 
of return to Spain accepted already in the beginning by the gen- 

* General Miles wanted to break off the truce at sundown that day 
(July 13th). General Shafter wisely decided not to do this. On the 
other hand, he extended the truce from 5 A.M., July 14th, to noon 
of that day. His good judgment on this occasion undoubtedly saved 
much bloodshed. 

210 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

eral-in-chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am, very respect- 
fully, your servant, Jose Toral, 

"Commanding Chief of the 4th Army." 



Another communication accompanied this letter. 
It appointed, as the Spanish commissioners, Brigadier- 
General Don Federico Escario; lieutenant-colonel of 
staff, Don Ventura Fontan; and, as interpreter, Mr. 
Robert Mason, a British subject. 

General Shatter, with the same officers as on the 
previous day, met General Toral, as agreed, at noon 
on the 14th. The meeting lasted but a few minutes, 
and, from the conversation that then took place, all 
present understood that the surrender had been ac- 
complished, and only required the drawing up and 
signing of the articles of capitulation to make it an 
accomplished fact. General Shatter at once reported 
to Washington that Toral had agreed to surrender on 
the basis of being returned to Spain ; that the territory 
embraced all of eastern Cuba from Aserraderos, on 
the south to Sagua on the north, via Palma; and 
that commissioners would be appointed that after- 
noon to definitely arrange terms. And General Miles 
forwarded this despatch : 

" Playa, July 14, 1898—3.24 P.M. 
" Secretary of War, Washington. 

"Before Santiago, July 14th.— General Toral formally sur- 
rendered the troops of his army and division of Santiago on 
the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned 
to Spain. General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw 
up the conditions of arrangements for carrying out the terms of 
surrender. This is very gratifying, as General Shafter and the 
officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for 

211 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable 
obstacles which they encountered. A portion of the army has 
been infected with yellow-fever, and efforts will be made to separate 
those who are infected and those free from it and to keep those 
which are still on board ship separated from those on shore. Ar- 
rangements will be immediately made for carrying out further 
instructions of the President and yourself. 

" Nelson A. Miles, 
" Major-General of the Army." 

The commissioners appointed on the part of the 
United States were Generals Wheeler and Lawton, 
and Lieutenant Miley. They met under the giant 
cotton-tree, already referred to, at 2.30 on the after- 
noon of July 14th. The Spanish commissioners asked 
that the water connections to Santiago, destroyed by 
the American forces, be repaired at once; that, in 
whatever articles of surrender might be signed, pro- 
vision be made for the return to Spain of the archives 
in Santiago province; and that those volunteers who 
might wish to do so be permitted to remain in Cuba 
upon giving their parole. Then they inquired if it 
was proposed to include in the cartel a stipulation de- 
manding the surrender of their arms. Upon being 
informed that this would be required, they requested 
an adjournment to refer the matter to General Toral. 

The commissioners again met at six o'clock. The 
representatives of General Shafter suggested the imme- 
diate withdrawal of the Spaniards from their trenches, 
and that the City of Texas be permitted to enter the 
harbor at once with supplies from the Red Cross for 
the suffering people of Santiago. It soon developed 
at this second conference that the Spanish commission- 
ers were really without any powers whatsoever, and| 

212 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

could only discuss terms of a " preliminary agreement 
for the capitulation of the Spanish forces." When 
this fact became known, the American commissioners 
expressed some surprise, in view of Toral's letter of 
that morning, in which he stated that he had been 
authorized to " agree upon capitulation on the basis of 
repatriation." The Spanish commissioners again 
raised the point about surrendering their arms, and 
when informed that the way to surrender was to sur- 
render, stated that they could proceed no further with- 
out consulting Generals Toral and Linares, and again 
requested an adjournment until the next day. Gen- 
eral Lawton suggested that the matter be concluded 
at once, even if the entire night had to be devoted to 
that purpose, and, after some parleying, they ad- 
journed for the second time that day until 9.30 in the 
evening, when it was expected that General Toral 
would be present with his commissioners. 

The commissioners met as agreed, accompanied by 
General Toral. The latter stated emphatically that 
he could not, contrary to the understanding of General 
Shafter, arrange " terms " for the surrender, but only 
a "basis." He also asked that the word "capitula- 
tion" be substituted for "surrender" in the tentative 
articles which had been drawn up; he objected to the 
entrance into the harbor at this time of the Red Cross 
ship, or to withdraw from his trenches until he had au- 
thority from Madrid to capitulate, on the ground that 
it would weaken his defences. The American com- 
missioners, on their part, declined to have repaired 
the water connections to Santiago, for the reason that 
if General Toral doubted the successful termination 
of the negotiations, though he assured them he did 

213 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

not, an element in the strength of our position would 
have been weakened. Again the point of the surren- 
der of the arms was raised, and in an impassioned 
appeal to the American commissioners, addressed 
particularly to General Wheeler, on "account of his 
age," as General Toral put it, he asked that his sol- 
diers be permitted to take their arms with them, to save 
their honor as Spaniards. General Shafter's repre- 
sentatives promised to recommend to the government 
of the United States, if the time came for finally sign- 
ing the articles, that the Spanish soldiery be permitted 
to return with their rifles. As an indication of sym- 
pathy for this sentiment, our commissioners agreed 
to recommend that the Spanish troops be permitted to 
march out of Santiago " with the honors of war." 

General Wheeler has expressed the opinion that To- 
ral did not care so much about the fact of the return of 
the arms as he did that a record of some recommenda- 
tion to that effect be made, as he was punctiliously in- 
sistent upon some reference to the "Spanish honor" 
and gallantry. Even under the conditions then con- 
fronting him, the Spanish general feared the conse- 
quences, unless his terms of surrender were sanc- 
tioned in advance by the government at Madrid. Toral 
plainly indicated this on more than one occasion in the 
course of his conversation with our commissioners. 

After the receipt of General Shafter's report of July 
14th, announcing that the Spaniards had agreed to 
surrender, the delay in consummating the negotia- 
tions was not understood in Washington. General 
Shafter was telegraphed that information was de- 
sired if the surrender was an accomplished fact. After 
waiting until the evening of the 15th, without news 

214 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

from the front, it was suggested to the general that, as 
the way of the Spanish diplomat is peculiar and pro- 
crastinating, possibly Toral was playing for time in 
order that reinforcements, then reported to be on the 
way from Holguin and Manzanillo, might reach him, 
and finally this cable was sent to General Shafter: 

" Washington, July 15, 1898—12 Midnight. 
" Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago. 

" It is not possible that you are entertaining the proposition 
of permitting the Spanish to carry away their arms. Such a 
suggestion should be rejected instantly. You have been in- 
structed the terms of surrender acceptable to the President, and 
they must be concluded on those lines. R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War." 

To this he replied : 

" I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain 
their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely, immediately 
after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of 
consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government 
that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small 
matter that in no way binds the government, but is one that I 
would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of 
Cuba or leaving them there to be captured later, and probably with 
much loss to ourselves." 

Later that night (July 15th) he cabled : 

" Surrender was made by Toral yesterday afternoon abso- 
lutely on conditions of returning troops to Spain. Delay was 
caused by commissioners on his part insisting on approval of 
Madrid. I think they fear death when they get home. We may 
have to fight them yet." 

In the mean time, after making such minor changes 
in the "preliminary basis for capitulation" as Toral 

215 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

asked, the Spanish commissioners signed the draft 
of that basis, and submitted it, as a proposition to the 
American representatives, a few minutes after twelve 
on the night of July I4th-I5th. 

The commissioners again met the next morning. 
After a little parleying, our representatives added 
their signatures, and, at the same time, to satisfy the 
Spanish sense of honor, which seemed to be the only 
obstacle in the way, they also signed the following 
statement : 

" Recognizing the chivalry, courage, and gallantry of Generals 
Linares and Toral, and of the soldiers of Spain who were en- 
gaged in the battles recently fought in the vicinity of Santiago de 
Cuba, as displayed in said battles, we, the undersigned officers 
of the United States of America, who had the honor to be engaged 
in said battles, and now are a duly authorized commission, treat- 
ing with a like commission of officers of the Spanish army for the 
capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in earnestly 
soliciting the proper authority to accord these brave and chival- 
rous soldiers the privilege of returning to their country bearing 
the arms they have so bravely defended." 

Finally, on the evening of July 15th, General Toral 
reported that he had been authorized to surrender : 

" Santiago de Cuba, July 15, 1898. 
" To Excellency Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces. 

" EXCELLENT SIR, — I am now authorized by my government 
to capitulate ; I have the honor to so advise you, requesting you 
to designate hour and place where my representatives should 
appear to compare with those of your excellency to effect the 
articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed 
upon to this date. In due time I wish to manifest to your ex- 
cellency my desire to know the resolutions of the United States 
government respecting the return of arms, so as to note on the 
capitulation ; also the great courtesy and gentlemanly deportment 

2l6 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

of your great grace's representative, and return for their generous 
and noble impulse for the Spanish soldiers will allow them to re- 
turn to the Peninsula with the arms that the American army do 
them the honor to acknowledge as dutifully defended. 

" Jose Toral, 
" Commander-in-Chief, 4th Army Corps." 

The letter was received on the morning of the 16th, 
and at noon on that day the surrender became an ac- 
complished fact. The conditions of the capitulation 
are thus set forth : 

" Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the 
Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the 
division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows: All 
that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through 
Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and 
Aguilera, said troops being in command of General Jose Toral, 
agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners : Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Don Federico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff Don Ven- 
tura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city 
of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding 
the Spanish forces, on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Major- 
General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major - General H. W. Law- 
ton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2d Artillery, 
aide - de - camp, appointed by General Shatter, commanding the 
American forces, on behalf of the United States. 

"1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces 
in this district absolutely and unequivocally cease. 

" 2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war 
material in said territory. 

" 3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as pos- 
sible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the 
kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, 
at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy. 

" 4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to re- 
tain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their 
personal property. 

217 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" 5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the 
American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to 
navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth. 

" 6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver with- 
out delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war 
of the Spanish forces in above-described district to the commander 
of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said 
district. 

" 7. That the commander of the Spanish forces in leaving said 
district is authorized to carry with him all military archives and 
records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district. 

" 8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volun- 
teers, movilizadoes, and guerillas who wish to remain in the 
island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of deliver- 
ing up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against 
the United States during the continuance of the present war be- 
tween Spain and the United States. 

" 9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de 
Cuba with honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a 
point mutually agreed upon to await their disposition by the 
United States Government, it being understood that the United 
States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier re- 
turn to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended. 

" 10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become 
operative immediately upon its being signed. 

" Entered into this 16th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned 
commissioners acting under instructions from their respective 
generals, and with the approbation of their respective govern- 
ments. 

" Joseph Wheeler, 

" Major-General U. S. V. 
" H. W. Lawton, 

" Major-General U. S. V. 
"J. D. MlLEY, 

" First Lieutenant, 2d Artillery, 
Aide-de-camp to General Shafter. 
" FEDERICO Escario. 
" Ventura Fontan. 
" Robert Mason." 
?t8 



SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO 

At the request of General Toral, the following letter 
was signed by General Shafter, embracing certain de- 
tails of the surrender not included in the formal articles 
of capitulation : 

" Headquarters, sth Army Corps, 

" Camp before Santiago, July 17, 1898. 
" To his Excellency General Jose Toral, Santiago de Cuba. 

" SIR, — In order to carry out the terms of the capitulation which 
were signed yesterday, I have the honor to communicate to your 
excellency the following details, which will be carefully ob- 
served : 

" I. The wounded, sick, and helpless, with their attendants, will 
remain under the care and protection of the Red Cross Society, 
under the Medical Corps of the United States army, aided as far 
as possible by the Spanish attendants. The wounded and sick 
will receive all the care that their misfortune and ailments entitle 
them to, and will be sent back to Spain in the same form and 
manner as the division of the army. 

" 2. The materials of war, to which reference is made in the 
second article of the capitulation, includes the men and materials 
of the navy. 

" 3. The commander-in-chief of the American army will 
afford all facilities for assembling by the Spanish officers all 
such parts of the division as occupy the towns and parts included 
in the capitulation, with all the necessary guarantees so that 
the third article can be safely and promptly carried out. The 
embarkation of the families of the Spanish chiefs and officers, 
and also their baggage and private property, will be made in the 
same steamers in which they embark. 

" 4. The shipment of archives and records referred to in the 
seventh article of the capitulation will, if possible, be made in 
the same steamers as the troops to which said records belong ; 
and if for any reason this is not possible, commissioners of the 
Spanish army are to remain behind, to duly forward them at the 
earliest possible date. 

" In confirming, in writing, the above details verbally agreed 
to between us yesterday, I beg to assure your excellency of the 

219 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

high appreciation I entertain of your excellency's soldierly qual- 
ities and honor. I am, very respectfully, etc., 

" Wm. R. Shafter, 
" Major-General Commanding." 

It now remained to take possession of the city, and 
to hasten increased supplies to the refugees at Caney, 
as well as to our own army in the trenches, who had 
endured, with Spartan fortitude, the trying days of 
the siege. General Toral was then requested to as- 
sist in opening the harbor; the refugees at Caney 
were permitted to return to Santiago; and arrange- 
ments were completed for the formal surrender of the 
Spanish army. 

On the morning of the 17th, General Shafter, with 
his several division commanders and their full staffs, 
together with 100 men of the 2d Cavalry, all mounted, 
advanced between the lines and received the formal 
surrender, on the part of the Spanish army, of 1 00 
armed men. To General Toral, General Shafter 
courteously gave the sword of General Vara del Rey, 
killed at Caney July 1st. The Spaniards, as prisoners, 
then marched out, depositing their arms, and at noon 
our entire army lined up along the trenches, and greet- 
ed with cheers the raising of the Stars and Stripes on 
the Governor's Palace. When the old flag finally 
floated there, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired, 
and our bands played the "Star Spangled Banner." 
The campaign in Cuba was at an end. 



CHAPTER XV 

ADMIRAL SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

UNFORTUNATELY the relations between General 
Shafter and Admiral Sampson during the Santiago 
campaign were not at all times of the most cordial 
nature. I approach with some reluctance a discus- 
sion of the causes which brought about this condition. 
What I have to say of Admiral Sampson, however, 
should not be understood as applying to the navy as 
a whole. The record of our navy during the war with 
Spain is of such a character that every American cit- 
izen can refer to it with unqualified pride and satis- 
faction. Its victories were complete, and, consider- 
ing the insignificant loss of life and treasure and 
the far-reaching results, they may be called incom- 
parable. The history of naval warfare does not fur- 
nish an analogue. What nation can point to the com- 
plete destruction of two entire fleets of the enemy, ag- 
gregating twenty-one ships of all kinds, with a loss 
on its part of but an even score of men, only one of 
whom was killed, and without the loss or disablement 
of a ship? 

Admiral Cervera's fleet entered the harbor of San- 
tiago on the 19th of May. On that very day, by means 
of confidential agents in Havana, the Western Union 
Telegraph Company, through the chief signal officer 
of the army, apprised the War Department of the fact. 

221 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The information was also communicated, through 
the same agency, to the Secretary of the Navy, and 
by him to Admiral Sampson at Key West. On the 
morning of the 19th, before this knowledge reached 
Key West, Commodore Schley, in command of the 
flying squadron, sailed with the Brooklyn, Massa- 
chusetts, Iowa, Texas, and Marblehead, accompanied 
by the Vixen, Eagle, and the collier Merrimac. 
His destination was Cienfuegos, where it was believed 
Cervera would be. His squadron arrived off that port 
during the forenoon of May 22d. As soon as Admiral 
Sampson learned that the fleet was at Santiago he di- 
rected the flying squadron to leave Cienfuegos, if 
Commodore Schley was satisfied that the enemy was 
not in that port. These orders reached Schley on the 
23d of May, by the Hawk. His fleet remained off 
Cienfuegos until the evening of May 24th, when he 
proceeded in the direction of Santiago. Although 
he had been advised of the necessity of haste, he per- 
mitted his entire squadron to be delayed on account 
of the Eagle, a vessel of no importance, so far as the 
Spanish fleet was concerned. The Eagle was in a 
disabled condition, and could only make between four 
and five knots. 

It is but a day's sail from Cienfuegos to Santiago. 
Schley's squadron did not reach the vicinity of Santi- 
ago until 5 o'clock on the evening of the 26th, and then 
he took up a position at no time nearer than eighteen 
miles south of that place. Here he remained three 
hours without making any effort to determine whether 
the Spanish fleet was in the harbor or not. He then 
signalled to his squadron, "Destination Key West, 
via south side Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon 

222 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

as collier is ready. Speed, nine knots," and started 
back at 9.20, this time again delayed on account of 
the Merrimac, which had met with an accident to her 
engines. After proceeding a short distance away 
from the enemy, the squadron lay to, with engines 
stopped. They were under way again by morning, 
leaving Santiago to the rear. As the high sea which 
had been running for the few days previous had some- 
what subsided, the commodore endeavored to coal the 
Texas and the MarbleJtead from the colliers with him. 
He sailed west until the afternoon of the 28th, when 
he reversed his course, and for the second time made 
for Santiago, off which place the squadron arrived 
on the evening of the same day. Four days had been 
consumed in this journey to Santiago, and that night 
(May 28th), he thus cabled to the Secretary of the 
Navy: 

" The receipt of the telegram of May 26th is acknowledged. De- 
livered by Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac engines 
disabled ; is heavy ; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have 
been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, 
Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather 
since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than 
sufficient coal to proceed to Key West ; cannot remain off San- 
tiago present state of squadron coal account. Impossible to coal 
leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly 
winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to- 
day for Kingston ; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives 
or Mole. Minneapolis only coaled for Key West ; also Yale, which 
tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of 
department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal 
to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot ascertain 
anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send Eagle 
— admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica ; had twenty- 
five tons of coal. Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will 

223 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow 
collier to get cable to hold." 



However, the light of the next day (May 29th) 
brought with it the discovery of Cervera's presence in 
Santiago Harbor, and Schley reported to the Sec- 
retary of the Navy that he had recognized the 
Colon, Teresa, and two torpedo-boats. 

On the 30th Admiral Sampson left Key West for 
Santiago, with the New York, Oregon, Mayflower, and 
Porter. Three days before, when reports were re- 
ceived from Commodore Schley that he could not re- 
main off the harbor of Santiago on account of his in- 
ability to coal at sea, Admiral Sampson directed him 
to use the collier Sterling to block the exit from Santi- 
ago. It was proposed to do this so that there might 
be no chance for the enemy to succeed should a sortie 
be attempted. I have never yet been able to see any 
good reason for sinking the Merrimac in the entrance 
to the harbor on the morning of the 3d of June, after 
Sampson had arrived off Santiago, when his fleet so 
greatly outnumbered the Spanish squadron. He had 
with him the New York, Brooklyn, Oregon, Massa- 
chusetts, Iowa, Texas, New Orleans, and Marblehead, 
besides the auxiliary vessels, Harvard, Vixen, May- 
flower, Porter, and the colliers Merrimac and Sterling. 
Was it to keep Cervera in, or Sampson out? Was 
it his purpose to bottle up Cervera and throw upon 
the army the entire burden of solving this naval prob- 
lem? With the escape of the Spanish squadron, sup- 
posed impossible on account of the obstruction, and 
the navy shut out, so that it could not co-operate, or 
even effectively reach the Spanish fleet with its guns, 

224 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

was it his intention to have the army capture the city 
and garrison of Santiago, and also to capture the 
Spanish fleet? 

Admiral Sampson's original proposition seems to 
have been to prevent a sortie pending the arrival of 
the army by blocking the channel ; and that the army 
should then attempt the impracticable task of assault- 
ing the precipitous heights of the Morro, with the 
Spanish army in its rear, and, after capturing the 
forts at the entrance of the harbor, protect the navy 
while removing the mines in the channel. But this 
plan would also have required that our forces should 
remove the Merrimac, if it had successfully obstructed 
the channel, as was supposed and intended. 

There can be no doubt that this was his plan, for he 
thus states, in a letter to General Shafter, on the 2d of 
July : " It was my hope that an attack on your part 
of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us 
at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes." This 
would imply that, if the entrance were clear of mines 
and obstructions, the admiral proposed to engage the 
enemy's fleet within the harbor. And yet he made no 
effort to enter the harbor after the Spanish fleet had 
gone out and had been destroyed, even though re- 
peatedly urged to do so by General Shafter. 

It is fortunate that the plan for blocking the chan- 
nel by sinking the Merrimac did not succeed.* It 

* Lieutenant Hobson, in his interesting account of the Merrimac, 
published in the Century Magazine, thus expresses himself regard- 
ing the fortunate outcome of that hazardous venture : 

" I had heard Admiral Sampson and Captain Chadwick refer to 
the selection of a point for landing troops, and wondered if it were 
intended to try to take the city and attack the ships from the land. 
The more I thought on the subject the more futile such an attempt 

225 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

is the consensus of opinion of the military officers at 
Santiago that it would have cost us many thousand 
additional lives to take the city by assault, even after 
the capture of San Juan Heights. Had Cervera found 
egress impossible, he would doubtless have destroyed 
his ships and placed ashore his 2,000 marines and sail- 
ors, with their machine and rapid-fire guns, to aid the 
Spanish army. As a matter of fact, he requested per- 
mission of Captain-General Blanco to do this. 

At the close of the 2d of July, General Shafter keen- 
ly felt that, since his command had suffered a loss of 
over 1,650 in killed and wounded, in an expedition 
which was purely naval in its object, that it was about 
time the fleet took some serious part in the campaign. 
He therefore requested a conference with Admiral 

seemed. How could the city be occupied under the guns of the enemy's 
ships? How could land artillery of sufficient caliber to outclass the 
armor of the Spanish vessels ever be placed in position under fire 
of their guns? How could such artillery even be landed and trans- 
ported under existing conditions? The conclusion grew stronger 
and stronger that land operations against the ships and the army 
of occupation would probably cost thousands of lives and still be 
futile. It then became clear to me that the ships should be captured 
or destroyed and the city taken by our vessels, the army's function 
being simply to cut off escape inland and to occupy the place after 
surrender. Steadily this conclusion engendered a profound con- 
viction that if the enemy should not come out we should go in. I 
determined to make every possible endeavor to get back to the fleet 
with my knowledge of all the defences. Escape from the cell was 
impossible. My mind turned upon the Merrimac. How fortunate 
it seemed to me now that she did not go down athwart the channel ! 
Our entrance for the rest of the war would have been impossible. She 
could not be better situated. The enemy would hesitate a long time 
before trying to pass, thus allowing time for our whole fleet to arrive. 
Their ships could not form in the enlargement of the channel or even 
across it, but would have to pass single file and would be at great 
risk if they tried to pass at night. Heaven had not frowned upon 
our efforts after all. The series of coincidents that had kept us from 
going down athwart were only the steady guidance of a kindly fate. 
I went to sleep with a thankful mind." 

226 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

Sampson, with a view to urging upon him the neces- 
sity of forcing the harbor. 

As has been already stated, General Shafter re- 
quested the admiral to come to his headquarters for a 
conference, which the admiral consented to do. Horses 
were sent to Siboney to bring the admiral to the front. 
He left his squadron on the morning of the 3d of July, 
on his flag-ship the New York, with instructions to 
"disregard the movements of the commander-in- 
chief/' and when he had reached Siboney, ten miles 
from the harbor entrance, the sortie of the Spanish 
fleet began. He immediately hastened in the direc- 
tion of the engagement, then being so gallantly con- 
ducted by the captains of the Oregon, Indiana, Iowa, 
Texas, Brooklyn, and Gloucester, but "she [the New 
York] was not, at any time, within the range of the 
heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing 
was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in 
passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots 
at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to 
be attempting to escape from the Gloucester."* 

On the 2d of July, prior to the destruction of the 
fleet, the following notes were exchanged by General 
Shafter and Admiral Sampson : 

General Shafter to Admiral Sampson 

" July 2d. 
" Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly in- 
trenched about three-fourths mile from town. I urge that you 
make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future 
losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can 
now operate with less loss of life than I can." 

* Admiral Sampson's official report (p. 507, Report of Secretary 
of Navy for 1898). 

227 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Admiral Sampson to General Shafter, by his Flag - Secretary 

Staunton 

" July 2d. 
" Admiral Sampson had this morning heavily bombarded 
forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta Gorda battery in- 
side, silencing their fire. Do you wish further firing on his part? 
He began at 5.30 and finished at 7.30. Your message to him 
here; impossible to force entrance until we can clear channel of 
mines, a work of some time after forts are taken possession of 
by your troops. Nothing was accomplished yesterday by the 
advance on Aguadores." 

General Shafter to Admiral Sampson 

" July 2d. 
" It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at en- 
trance to harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those we have 
been pitted against it will be some time and at a great loss of life. 
I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destruc- 
tive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 
men.* By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you 
until demolished. I expect, however, with time and sufficient 
men, to capture the forts along the bay." 

Admiral Sampson to General Shafter 

" July 2d. 

" I have your note of this morning — just received at 11.20. 

" An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing 
which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he 
told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which 
would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they 
cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our 
entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first 
has been that the channel to the harbor is well strewn with obser- 
vation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one 
or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by 
the sinking of a ship the object of the attempt to enter the harbor 
would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part. 

* His losses up to that time were really something over 1,650 in killed 
and wounded. 

228 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

" I was in hope that an attack, on your part, of these shore bat- 
teries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel 
for torpedoes. 

"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I 
will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our 
position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, 
we fail in our attempt. 

" We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining 
mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and 
if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use 
I will enter the harbor. 

" This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable 
time. 

" It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which 
has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the 
ships within the port." 

This letter was considered a distinct promise on the 
part of the admiral to undertake to force the harbor, 
which he never did, although he claims that he had 
taken steps to utilize the countermining outfit which 
was on the Resolute at Guantanamo, and, with this 
object in view, that orders were given as early as the 
28th of June. Santiago did not surrender until the 
16th of July. It is well enough to give the admiral 
credit for this intention, especially since he says " such 
an attack as that which the general proposed in his 
third telegram, herewith mentioned, was in accord 
with the views which had been held by myself and 
discussed by my staff," but he does not give in his 
reports, nor have I ever seen, any sufficient reason for 
not putting this plan into execution during the period 
of nearly three weeks which elapsed from its inception 
to the final surrender. The third telegram from Shaff- 
er, just referred to, has been mentioned in another 

229 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

chapter of this book (p. 174, as well as the discus- 
sion of it by Admiral Sampson. In that discussion, 
as we have already seen, Admiral Sampson offers 
these reasons for not entering the harbor : 

" I. The Reina Mercedes was sunk by the Spanish in a man- 
ner which would certainly obstruct the larger ships and possibly 
the smaller ones. 

" 2. Extensive shore batteries were known to exist. 

"3. If our smaller vessels were sent in and were sunk there 
by the mines or by the fire of the batteries the harbor would be 
effectively closed to us. 

"4. It was essential to the new scheme of attack of this mined 
field that the positions occupied by the eastern and western bat- 
teries should be carried." 

Let us discuss these reasons seriatim: 
I. Of the Reina Mercedes, I quote Admiral Samp- 
son's own words, given in his despatch to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, of July 5th :* 

" About midnight last night the Reina Mercedes was seen 
by the Massachusetts, which vessel had her searchlight on the 
channel, coming out of harbor of Santiago. The Massachusetts 
and Texas opened fire, and the Spanish vessel was sunk opposite 
Estrella Cove. I am inclined to think it was the intention to 
sink her in the channel, thus blocking the harbor entrance. If 
so, this plan was defeated by the fire of the ships, as she lies on the 
edge of the channel and does not block it." 

On this point Lieutenant Miiller also says : 

" Unfortunately the ship did not come to lie across the channel, 
because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable ; the sacri- 
fice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed." 

* The despatch is dated July 6th, but should undoubtedly have 
been July 5th, as the Reina Mercedes was sunk on the night of July 
4th. (See report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898, p. 557.) 

230 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 
And again he writes : 

" She (the Reina Mercedes) lies in the line of the channel, and 
therefore does not interfere with the entering or going out of ships." 

The official report of Admiral Sampson of July 5th 
and the statements of Lieutenant Miiller are both borne 
out by the fact that the army transports had no dif- 
ficulty in entering the harbor after July 17th, when 
the mines were removed. The Reina Mercedes did 
not obstruct the entrance. 

2. With reference to the "extensive shore batteries," 
the admiral again contradicts his statements previ- 
ously made. On the 15th of June, in giving his "or- 
der of battle," he thus writes: "It is not considered 
that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do 
any material injury to battle-ships," and in his letter 
to General Shatter of July 2d, just quoted, we have 
seen that he says of these batteries: "They cannot 
even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago." 

Admiral Sampson's own statements, therefore, dis- 
prove the claim that the Reina Mercedes could have 
prevented his entrance, or that he had any fear of the 
shore batteries. Both of these facts he must have 
known at the time he wrote the report from which we 
have just quoted extracts. 

3. Of the mines, however, we must credit Admiral 
Sampson with entire lack of information regarding 
their destroying power. As a matter of fact, these 
mines proved to be almost as insignificant as the bat- 
teries. Moreover, it was not necessary to risk any 
vessels in the attempt to enter the harbor, but to coun- 
termine first, which Admiral Sampson himself seems 
to have thought possible. The very fact that the 

231 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Spaniards endeavored to sink the Reina Mercedes in 
the channel was an admission that they did not regard 
it as protected by their mines. And then he must 
have known that before Cervera's fleet could leave the 
harbor all contact mines would have to be removed. 
Lieutenant Miiller states : 

" As the interior of the harbor did not longer have the safe- 
guard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had 
been taken up so that the fleet could go out and had not yet been 
placed, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, 
it was decided to sink the Mercedes in the channel." 

General Toral also reported to General Blanco on 
the 3d of July : 

" According to torpedo officer, the electric torpedoes of the first 
line do not work, and only four of the second line, and as two of 
the seven Bustamente torpedoes have become unserviceable and 
two others are defective, he thinks it will be easy for enemy to 
force the harbor entrance." 

I visited Santiago Harbor in the early spring of 1899, 
when the position and character of the mines were ex- 
plained to me by officers who were present at the time 
of their removal. About twenty-eight mines of the 
Bustamente type were found, but they were so over- 
grown by barnacles and sea-growth that it was im- 
possible to explode them, with the exception of four, 
and of those four but one broke the water. 

Four torpedoes and three of the observation mines 
are said to have been fired at the Merrimac from the 
Pluton and the Mercedes, none of which is thought to 
have done any damage. 

4. Admiral Sampson alone seems to have had any 

232 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

knowledge of a "new scheme of attack." There was 
no new scheme of attack. On the other hand, the sit- 
uation of the army had grown more serious, owing to 
the reinforcements which had entered the city under 
General Escario, and the augmented difficulties of 
supplying our army over the twelve miles of sloughs 
and muddy trails which bore the name of roads in 
Cuba. The necessity for relieving our forces was in- 
tensified; the reasons against the navy entering the 
harbor were lessened. There was now no hostile fleet 
inside, and our squadron had not been in the least 
damaged. If Admiral Sampson had been willing, on 
the 2d of July, to force the harbor, as he intimated in 
his letter to General Shaf ter, there would seem to be no 
reasonable excuse for his failure to attempt it after 
the destruction of Cervera's fleet. 

When General Shafter learned of Admiral Samp- 
son's unwillingness to attempt to clear the harbor and 
enter, he sent the following despatches to the War De- 
partment on the 4th and 5th of July : 

" July 4, 1898. 

" If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the up- 

! per bay of Santiago, we can take the place within a few hours. 

Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the 

j army is to take the place, I want 15,000 troops speedily, and it is 

not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure 

and speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do 

my part." 

" July 4, 1898. 
" I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into 
the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant and assist 
in the capture of the place. If they do, I believe the place will 
surrender without further sacrifice of life." 

233 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" July 5, 1898. 
" Navy should go into Santiago Harbor at any cost. If they 
do I believe we will take the city and all the troops that are there. 
If they do not the country should be prepared for heavy losses 
among our troops. . . ." 

On the 5th of July the Secretary of War carried the 
second and third of these messages to the President, 
and asked that, because of the great emergency then 
confronting the army, the navy should either force 
the harbor entrance at once, or permit the army to do 
so with one of the small ships of the navy, which en- 
terprise the army was ready to undertake. 

As a result of this conference, Shafter was sent this 
despatch : 

" Adjutant-General's Office, 
" Washington, July 5, 1898— 11.20 a.m. 
" Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba. 

" Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs 
that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for co-operation 
in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views you 
will agree upon the time and manner of attack. 
" By command Major-General Miles. H. C. Corbin, 

' ' Adjutant-General. ' ' 

A similar message was sent to Admiral Sampson 
by the Secretary of the Navy. 

Following up this order of the President, Captain 
Chadwick, representing Admiral Sampson, who was 
sick, appeared at General Shaffer's headquarters on 
the 6th of July, as has already been mentioned. As 
a result of that conference, the following plan of action 
was agreed upon: 

" That a long and continued bombardment be made of San- 
tiago from the sea with the heavier guns of the fleet, the fleet to 

234 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

fire slowly and continuously during, say, twenty-four hours, at 
the rate of one shell every five minutes, excepting one hour at 
the rate of one every two minutes. This refers to the 8-inch to 
13-inch shells. If this is not sufficient to bring the enemy to 
terms, then an assault be arranged on the Socapa battery, using 
marines and the Cuban forces under General Cabreco, and 
an effort made to enter the harbor with some of the smaller ships 
of the squadron. This attack to be made upon knowing the 
result of a second demand* made to-day upon the commanding 
officer of the Spanish forces for the surrender of the place, stating 
to him the conditions that surround him ; destruction of the Span- 
ish fleet, etc., and the number of forces opposed to him. To give 
him time to consider the matter, the date of the bombardment 
is fixed at noon of the 9th, unless he positively refuses to consider 
it at all, when it will be begun at such time as is convenient to 
ourselves. General Shafter will furnish Admiral Sampson with 
correct map, showing where his lines will be surrounding the city, 
and also open telegraphic communication by way of Siboney down 
to near Aguadores to give information as to falling of shots." 

Reference has already been made to the events which 
occurred between the 6th and nth of July. On the 
afternoon of the 10th, and for a few hours on the morn- 
ing of the nth, the navy threw some shells into San- 
tiago. Of the naval firing on these two days, General 
Shafter reported that "the bombardment has abso- 
lutely had no effect on the town," and General Wheeler 
says that many of the shots had too great a range, 
and went over the city. 

Shafter was naturally disinclined to again request 
Admiral Sampson to force the harbor, after he had 
received two promises, as he understood them, that 
such an attempt would be made, "after twenty-four 
hours' bombardment/ ' Admiral Sampson was in- 

* The Chadwick letter, given on p. 190. 
235 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

formed of the existence of the truce of July nth; later 
he was notified of the possibilities of further opera- 
tions against the Spaniards. He then sent this mes- 
sage to General Shafter, July 12th : 

" Admiral Sampson proposes to begin bombarding to-morrow 
morning with 13 -inch shells, unless there are reasons for not 
doing so. Will General Shafter please inform him of the dis- 
tance of the fall of the shot from the cathedral, using the cathe- 
dral as a point of reference? And he would like particularly to 
know immediately if any shell fall in the water." 

Again, on the 13th: 

" I am now prepared to shell the city of Santiago with three of 
my largest iron-clads, with 13-inch projectiles. Can commence 
at short notice. Will await your signal." 

It will be observed that these two despatches make 
absolutely no mention of the proposed attempt to force 
the harbor. The situation of the army had become 
even more precarious — repeated downpours of rain had 
made the question of transportation alarming, and 
this difficulty had been greatly augmented by the ob- 
ligation, engendered by humanity, to feed 20,000 refu- 
gees at Caney; but, most serious of all, yellow-fever 
had appeared among our troops. General Shafter 
thus wrote General Miles, then at Siboney : 

" July 12, 1898. 
"... Admiral Sampson proposed to land 1,000 marines at 
the little bay two miles west of Santiago Harbor, and from there 
carry the work just west of the harbor. If the rains continue, it 
is going to be a physical impossibility to supply my men with 
rations, and something has got to be done by the navy. ..." 

236 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

He also reported to Washington that nothing had 
been done by the navy ; that the refugees were suffer- 
ing for food, and that if the rains continued it would 
be impossible to transport rations over the roads, in 
which event he would simply have to take the town 
by assault, without regard to loss of life. He also 
added that "the navy should be required to make a 
determined effort at once." 

With these reports of the situation, the following 
note was addressed to the Secretary of the Navy : 

" July 13, 1898. 

" SIR, — I have the honor to request that you order the fleet off 
Santiago to force at once its way into the bay, if possible, to aid 
the army in the capture of Santiago and the Spanish army de- 
fending it. 

' ' The special reasons for immediate action are : First, the 
very heavy rains that are falling almost continually have made 
the roads nearly impassable and threaten to cut off our supply 
of provisions for the army in the trenches altogether. Second, 
the rains are making the holding of our lines almost impossible, as 
the trenches are filled with water. Third, the lives of our men 
are in great danger from yellow-fever, which has broken out among 
our troops and is spreading rapidly; and, fourth, the character 
of the works of the enemy is such that to take them by assault 
would be a terrible sacrifice of life. 

" These conditions, it is believed by the major-general com- 
manding, would be changed were the navy in the bay to co-operate 
with the army, and the capture of the city and Spanish army thus 
made a comparatively easy matter. Very respectfully, 

"R. A. Alger, 
" Secretary of War. 
" The honorable the Secretary of the Navy." 

The answer of the Navy Department came : 

" Navy Department, Washington, July 14, 1898. 
" Sir, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 

237 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

communication of the 13th instant, requesting orders be issued 
by this department for the fleet off Santiago to force its way into 
the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture of Santiago 
and the Spanish army defending it. JOHN D. LONG, 

" Secretary. 
" The honorable the Secretary of War." 

Secretary Long, however, thus cabled to Admiral 
Sampson : 

" The commanding general of the army urges, and Secretary 
of War urgently requests, that navy force harbor. Confer with 
commander of army, wishing to do all that is reasonably pos- 
sible to insure the surrender of the enemy. I leave the matter 
to your discretion, except that the United States armored vessels 
must not be risked." 

I do not wish to do Admiral Sampson an injustice. 
It may be that his failure to force the harbor, "after 
twenty-four hours' bombardment," was due to an im- 
pression on his part that the necessity no longer ex- 
isted. I refer to General Shafter's telegram of the 
nth of July, sent after the navy had bombarded for 
twenty-four hours, which reads in part : 

" I think it advisable to put some heavy shots, say ten to thir- 
teen inches, to-morrow and see if we can start a fire." 

And again, on the 13th : 

" Message about being ready to open with 13-inch guns re- 
ceived. Thanks. I believe they will surrender before noon to- 
morrow. If not I will want you to open fire. I will notify you." 

Perhaps these two messages, and the fact that a 
truce then existed, deterred him from making the prom- 
ised attempt to countermine and enter the harbor. If 

238 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

this be so, then he should have the credit for it. But 
it is exceedingly difficult to reconcile his promises to 
his actions, or to harmonize the statements contained 
in his several official reports. On the 14th of July he 
thus cabled the Secretary of the Navy : 

" Published telegrams of General Shafter, Herald of July 6th, 
reflect on the navy. I wish the department and the President to 
understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago 
de Cuba is the occupation of forts and intrenchments at its en- 
trance guarding mine fields, and that the general has never made 
a move to do this, although before his army landed he stated that 
such was the primary object of his operations. If the general 
chooses to ignore the sea approaches and to attack Santiago to 
the east and north that is his affair, but it should be clearly un- 
derstood that this attack does not influence the situation at the 
harbor entrance, from which his left flank is distant not more 
than four miles. I have been ready at any time during the last 
three weeks to silence works, to clear entrance of mines, and to 
enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper 
conduct of war assigns to it. To throw my ships to certain de- 
truction upon mine fields would be suicidal folly, and I have not 
the force to form landing party strong enough to insure the capture 
of the forts. No disagreements mentioned by the paper have been 
brought to my notice by General Shafter." 

I cannot see how the admiral reconciles the state- 
ments contained in this remarkable despatch with 
those made in his letters to General Shafter of July 2d, 
and the promise made by Captain Chadwick in his 
name, July 6th, to the effect that if a day's shelling of 
the town " be not sufficient to bring the enemy to terms, 
that an assault be arranged on the Socapa battery,* 
using marines and the Cuban forces under General 

* This battery was located on the west side of the entrance to San- 
tiago Harbor. 

239 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Cebreco, and an effort made to enter the harbor with 
some of the smaller ships of the squadron." 

His statement regarding the "silencing" of the 
works at the entrance of Santiago Harbor, deserves 
some consideration. On the 6th of June he re- 
ported : 

"Bombarded forts at Santiago to-day, 7.30 A.M. to 10 A.M., 
and have silenced works quickly, without injury of any kind, 
though stationed within 2,000 yards." 

On the 15th of June, in the orders issued to the 
captains of his fleet for the proposed action on the 
next day, he wrote : 

" It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient 
power to do any material injury to battle-ships." 

And then reported to the Secretary of the Navy, 
after the firing had taken place : 

"Bombarded forts on June 16th for forty-two minutes; firing 
very accurate. The batteries were silenced completely. Fleet 
not injured," 

And for the third time, on the 2d of July, he stated 
that he had 

" Bombarded forts at entrance of Santiago, and also Punta 
Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire." 

It is to be noted that these reports were made prior 
to his despatch of July 14th, just quoted, in which he 
remarks that he has been ready for three weeks to 
"silence works." 

As a matter of fact, these several costly bombard- 
ments accomplished little or nothing. On the 17th of 

240 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

July a careful examination was made of the different 
batteries at the entrance to Santiago Harbor. The 
total result of Admiral Sampson's shelling consisted 
in the dismounting of one muzzle-loading brass can- 
non, described as a "very ancient pattern," on the 
battery east of Morro, and in "damaging" of one of 
the two modern breech-loading rifles on a naval mount 
at Punta Gorda battery Not another gun was found 
to be injured or dismounted. 

It seems incredible that such repeated heavy bom- 
bardments could have accomplished so little. The 
only real damage was to a non-military edifice, a small 
light-house, and, in several places, the picturesque 
and historic old Morro Castle, nearly four centuries old, 
was somewhat marred, but not materially injured, by 
the shots. 

When General Shafter made known to Admiral 
Sampson that he was to have a conference with the 
Spanish commander on the morning of July 13th, rel- 
ative to surrendering, the admiral at once telegraphed : 

" As commander-in-chief of the naval forces engaged in joint 
operations, I expect to be represented in any conference held to 
arrange the terms of the surrender of Santiago, including the 
surrender of the shipping and the harbor. Questions are in- 
volved of importance to both branches of the service." 

General Shafter answered that he would be glad to 
have the navy represented, and suggested that an 
officer be sent for that purpose to remain at his head- 
quarters, as it might be difficult to state when arrange- 
ments for surrender would be made. If this were not 
possible, General Shafter agreed to inform the admiral 
when to send his representative. On the morning of 
q 241 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the 1 6th the letter from General Toral was received, 
saying that he was authorized to surrender. Admiral 
Sampson was at once notified, but Captain Chadwick 
did not arrive at the front until the articles of capitu- 
lation had been signed by the American and Spanish 
commissioners. 

It does not appear that General Shafter intended 
that Admiral Sampson, or his representative, should 
be a signatory party to the capitulation, but that his 
invitation was with the view of having some officer of 
the navy take part in the ceremonious function of the 
formal surrender of the Spanish forces. When the 
matter was brought to my attention I telegraphed 
General Shafter: 

" As you have won a great victory, and our relations with the 
navy have been so cordial, ask Admiral Sampson to sign jointly 
with you the articles of capitulation." 

This despatch, however, was not received by General 
Shafter until after the articles of capitulation had 
been signed, and were then on their way to the United 
States by a special messenger. I quote General Shaff- 
er's report in the matter, dated July 19th : 

"It is now too late for Admiral Sampson to sign the articles 
of capitulation. They were completed three days ago, and de- 
livered : one to the Spanish commander, the other was forwarded 
by the hands of Colonel Astor to you. I did not sign them my- 
self, they were signed only by the commissioners appointed to 
prescribe the details of the surrender. Surrender was made to 
me in person, verbally, and later by General Toral declaring, in 
the presence of myself and the general officers commanding here, 
that he then and there surrendered the Spanish army and city of 

242 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

Santiago represented by a detail of ioo men from the different 
regiments of his command. This surrender included the officers 
and men of the navy who were a part of his command." 

Admiral Sampson subsequently appealed the mat- 
ter, through the Secretary of the Navy, to the Presi- 
dent, but the latter did not see fit to direct that any 
officer of the navy should sign the articles of capitu- 
lation, which are now in the War Department. 

Referring to this matter, Admiral Sampson has 
stated, in his official report: 

" I do not think the commanding general quite appreciates 
how necessary a part our forces were to the reduction of Santiago 
and the surrender of its garrison, independently of the effect of 
our shell, which latter was undoubtedly one of the principal causes 
of the surrender at this time." 

In another portion of his report, in referring to the 
fact that the articles of capitulation were not signed 
by a representative of the navy, he says : 

" Captain Chad wick arrived at the front at the earliest hour 
it was possible for him to do so, and informed General Shafter 
of my expectancy in the matter, but General Shafter peremp- 
torily refused. The convention had already been signed, and he 
stated as one reason that nothing had been said of the army in 
my report of the fleet action of July 3d * There would have been 

♦"Washington, July 3, 1898. 
" Secretary of the Navy. 

" The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July 
present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9.30 
this morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 
seventy-five miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The 
Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, 
burned, and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The Furor 
and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of port. 

" Sampson." 
243 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

as much reason for mentioning the navy in the report of the land 
action of July 1st, when assault was made by our army on the 
Spanish lines." 

It may not be out of place here to consider just what 
part the army did take in forcing Admiral Cervera to 
leave the harbor. The only acceptable evidence on 
this point would be the statement of the Spaniards 
themselves, although Admiral Sampson does say, 
and it is the only reference to that fact in all lus official 
reports and messages, that "after the arrival of the 
army . . . the situation forced upon the Spanish 
admiral a decision. ..." 

Based on historical facts, which need no demonstra- 
tion, and the evidence of the official despatches which 
passed between Captain-General Blanco at Havana 
(under whose orders the naval squadron was), and 
General Toral and the Spanish admiral at Santiago, 
these statements cannot be controverted : 

1. That Cervera went out of Santiago Harbor. 

2. That Cervera left the harbor because ordered to 
do so, July 26. and 3d, by General Blanco. 

3. That General Blanco ordered Cervera to make 
his sortie because General Toral reported to him the 
"serious condition of Santiago/' resulting from the 
"hostile progress" of the American forces. Upon 
receipt of this information Blanco telegraphed Toral : 

" Main tiling is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans 
take possession of it Spain will be morally defeated, and must 
ask for peace at mercy of enemy." 

Again, after General Toral's report of our military 
successes July 1st, General Blanco thus telegraphed 
him: 

244 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

"It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong 
defence as much as possible, by every means preventing enemy 
from taking possession of harbor entrance before sortie of squad- 
ron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not to have to 
surrender nor destroy ships." 

These and many other despatches from the same 
source prove conclusively, if any evidence were want- 
ing, that the movements of General Shafter's army 
drove the Spanish squadron out of Santiago Harbor. 
The complete investment on the land side by the mil- 
itary forces pinned the Spanish admiral to one or the 
other horn of the dilemma : he was compelled to either 
destroy his ships himself, or attempt a sortie, under 
conditions which he conceived would not only result 
in the destruction of his squadron, but in the useless 
sacrifice of many lives. Admiral Cervera was in 
favor of destroying his ships in the harbor. In a de- 
spatch to Havana he reported : 

" I shall never be the one to decree the horrible hecatomb which 
will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force." 

General Blanco thought differently, when the suc- 
cess of General Shafter's army was made known to 
him, and ordered the fleet out. 

As we have already seen, when the formal articles 

of capitulation were signed on the 16th of July, at 

General Toral's request, supplementary conditions 

were provided for in a letter over General Shafter's 

| signature. This letter refers to the surrender of the 

! shipping in the harbor, and was based upon a note 

'from the Spanish general, which thus reads in 

part: 

245 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" July 17, 1898. 
" To his Excellency General Shafter. 

" ESTEEMED Sir, — The terms of the capitulation which has 
been signed, and which is being carried out, set down the bases 
of the same, but these bases should be made definite and precise 
in writing as agreed between us both. 

" As the evidences of these points are to serve me for my de- 
fence before my superiors when I am arraigned for the events that 
have occurred, and should prove how well founded all my acts 
have been, I should be much obliged to your excellency if you 
would authorize with your signature the details in the carrying 
out of the bases we had agreed upon, in the following manner, 
in case you find them in conformity. 

" 2. The elements of war to which reference is made in the second 
article of the bases of capitulation, include the men and materials 
of the navy. 

" I appeal to the sentiments of justice and soldierly honor which 
I recognize in your excellency, begging you to give me proof of 
your good will by authorizing in writing what I have set down 
above which was verbally agreed to yesterday. 

" With great respect, etc., etc., JOSE ToRAL, 

" Commander-in-Chief, etc." 

After General Toral had verbally surrendered to 
Shafter the vessels in the harbor of Santiago, July 
1 6th, Captain Chad wick informed Shafter that Ad- 
miral Sampson would expect these "prize vessels" to 
be turned over to the navy. As the city, its garrison, 
the harbor, and the shipping in it had been surrendered 
to Shafter, I could not see the justice, in view of what 
had transpired, of permitting Admiral Sampson to se- 
cure these vessels as prizes of war. I therefore directed 
Shafter to hold the vessels; whereupon he placed a 
guard upon them, under General McKibben. On the 

246 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

17th of July, the very day upon which the formal sur- 
render took place, Admiral Sampson, without con- 
sulting General Shafter, sent into the harbor of San- 
tiago prize crews for the captured vessels. General 
McKibbin informed Lieutenant Doyle, sent by the 
admiral to take possession of the ships, that they were 
the property of the army, having been surrendered to 
General Shafter by the Spanish general, and were to 
be kept by the military forces, by order of the Secre- 
tary of War. Admiral Sampson thus wrote to Gen- 
eral Shafter: 

" U. S. Flag-ship ' New York,' ist Rate, 

"July 18, 1898— 1.40 A.M. 
" SIR, — The following has just been sent me by Lieutenant 
Doyle in charge of Spanish prizes in the harbor of Santiago : 

'"Santiago, July 17, 1898. 
" ' Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, 
and in the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer 
him with his officers and men to their respective ships. 

"'C. McKibbin, 
" ' Brigadier-General Commanding.' 

" 2. I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the re- 
ception of such a paper. 

" 3. No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of 
capitulation, though I specially requested that it be included by 
my message to you of July 13th. 

"4. Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, 
so directed by the President, and so confirmed by their character. 
All propriety and usage surrenders the floating material in such 
case to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it. 

" 5. I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary 
of War over my actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary 
of the Navy and await his instructions. 

"6. In the event of a difference of opinion between the depart- 
ments, the question will of course be decided by the President 

247 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of the United States ; until then my prize crews must remain in 
charge, and I have so directed them. Very respectfully, 

" W. T. Sampson, 
" Commander-in-Chief, etc. 
" Major-General Shafter, Commanding $th Army Corps." 

In the mean time Lieutenant Marble, of the navy, 
had presented himself to General McKibbin, and rep- 
resented that, by an understanding between General 
Shafter and Admiral Sampson, the Alvardo, one of the 
surrendered boats, was to be turned over to the navy. 
No such agreement had been made or implied. Upon 
his representations, however, the Alvardo was turned 
over to the navy, with which he proceeded at once to 
Guantanamo. Admiral Sampson's letter, just quoted, 
was in answer to a note from General Shafter, request- 
ing the return of the vessel, and protesting against his 
action. 

General McKibbin reported the facts to General 
Shafter in the following note: 

" July 18, 1898. 

" Sm, — The letters sent herewith were turned over to me by 
a naval officer, with the request that I read and forward. The note 
quoted was given by me to Lieutenant Doyle, as he had no means 
of getting back to his ship, and would be compelled to stay on the 
wharf if I sent him ashore. Lieutenant Doyle said nothing about 
taking possession. On the contrary, he stated that he was sent 
to assist in the care and management of the vessels. Admiral 
Sampson expresses no surprise at the dishonorable trick on the 
part of Lieutenant Marble to get possession of the Alvardo, nor 
does he express surprise at the equivocal language of Lieutenant 
Doyle. Again, there is no mention of the fact that in every case 
except the San Juan armed guards were aboard the vessels. 
Joint occupation continues, and I await your orders. 

" Very respectfully, C. McKlBBIN, 

" Brigadier-General U. S. V." 
248 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

It is to the credit of General Shafter that he did not 
reply to Admiral Sampson's letter in the same spirit 
in which that communication was written. On the 
contrary, he informed the admiral that there was no 
necessity for a collision or clash of authority between 
the naval and military authorities, or even hard feel- 
ing. He was generous enough to say that he believed 
that the admiral wished to do what he regarded as 
right, and assured him that he was actuated by the 
same motive. His orders, however, from the Secretary 
of War, required that all the ships and shipping surren- 
dered to him in the harbor be retained by the army, 
as they belonged to it. He added that it was very 
easy to submit the matter to the President, through 
the Secretaries of War and Navy. 

In the mean time, the Attorney-General, to whom the 
question had been referred, rendered the opinion that 
vessels captured by the army, or by the army and navy 
jointly, were not subject to the laws regarding prizes. 
As the military authorities had no means of caring 
for the ships, General Shafter was ordered to turn 
them over to the navy. This he did. Subsequently, 
however, the President directed that the five merchant 
vessels be returned by Admiral Sampson, in order 
that they might be used for transporting troops. 

Admiral Sampson's inexplicable attitude was not 
confined to General Shafter. On the nth of July the 
Yale and Columbia reached Cuba with reinforcements 
for the 5th Corps. If not needed in Cuba, it was or- 
dered that they were to form a part of the Puerto Rican 
expedition. The Yale, formerly the Paris, had been 
used by the navy during the early part of the war as a 
scouting vessel, but, after the destruction of Cervera's 

249 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

fleet, was turned over to the army, together with the 
Harvard (New York), as fast transports. They were, 
of course, entirely unarmored, and with an insignif- 
icant armament. Aware of the unfortunate results 
experienced during the Santiago campaign from a 
lack of that cordial co-operation which ought to exist 
between the two branches of our service, General Miles 
thus telegraphed from Guantanamo, where he was 
with the Yale and Columbia, on the 18th of July : 

" . . .1 notified Admiral Sampson that I was authorized to 
organize and take an expedition to Puerto Rico and desired the 
co-operation of the navy. Last night I sent a telegram saying 
that I was ready to go with 3,000 men, and desired an escort to 
cover debarkation. No replies have been received to either of 
these communications. As the enterprise is so important, and 
time valuable, I think it advisable that some naval officer, with 
whatever vessels may be spared, be ordered to report at once to 
act under the general direction of the commanding general of 
the army. The experience of the last few weeks should not be 
repeated." 

In another despatch he also asked that the convoy 
be placed under Commodore Schley. 

The President ordered that Admiral Sampson should 
give such assistance to General Miles as they might 
jointly regard as necessary for convoying troops and 
covering their landing. 

The expedition to Puerto Rico was of such a charac- 
ter as to demand an immediate movement. A delay 
would give the enemy opportunity to increase his 
forces by raising Puerto Rican volunteers, then report- 
ed by the American consul at St. Thomas as organiz- 
ing ; it was known that the Spanish were strengthen- 
ing their fortifications, and daily adding to the mines 

250 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

in the several harbors ; the spread of yellow-fever in 
General Shafter's army made it desirable to remove 
these 3,000 or 4,000 troops from the infected neighbor- 
hood; and it was believed that by seizing Puerto 
Rico we would be in a better position to enforce our 
demands upon the Spanish government. 

The President's order, above referred to, was dated 
July 1 8th. Two days passed and nothing was done 
in the way of furnishing a convoy, whereupon Sec- 
retary Long again cabled Sampson, on the 20th, to 
give immediate assistance in the way of a suitable 
convoy. On the afternoon of that day the admiral 
informed General Miles that the Yale and Columbia 
would act as a convoy for themselves, but that he 
would furnish the Cincinnati, although he did not 
know where she was, and the New Orleans, if she was 
at San Juan. With this information, General Miles 
cabled the War Department : 

" Playa del Este, July 20, 1898. 

"(Received 11.07 P.M.) 
" Admiral Sampson came on board the Yale this morning. 
He had not at that time seen the order of Secretary Long. He was 
furnished a copy of it, and after sending to his flag-ship found 
the order there. I asked him to give us as strong a force of the 
navy as possible in the movement against Puerto Rico. He said 
he would inform me later. At five o'clock he came on board, and 
stated that he would furnish, to assist our landing, the Yale and 
Columbia. These are the two ships with which we left Charles- 
ton, S. C. He said that the Columbia would take three or four 
days to coal. He also stated that he would give us the Cincinnati, 
but does not know where she is. Also ' the New Orleans, if she 
is now at San Juan.' If the New Orleans is not at San Juan there 
is nothing to prevent the small Spanish gunboats coming out of 
that harbor and attacking the transports en route, and it is highly 

251 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

important that she should remain, blockading that harbor while 
we land at Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. This assures but 
two vessels to cover our landing, and these are loaded with troops. 
The Columbia and Yale could not silence a piece of artillery on 
shore without risking the lives of from 300 to 1,500 of Garretson's 
brigade on board. This, in my judgment, is not in accordance 
with the orders of Secretary Long, to give such assistance as is 
necessary for landing, or in accordance with your telegram of 
the 18th. I think you and the President should be apprised of 
the fact that, while these ten transports, loaded with troops and 
munitions of war, are waiting here, a great portion of the American 
navy are within cannon-shot of this place, and some of them 
actively engaged in bringing into this harbor vessels which were 
captured by and surrendered to the army. There are battle-ships 
enough here to enable us to land within cannon-shot of the city of 
San Juan. I request that positive orders be given to the navy 
to cover the landing of at least 10,000 troops on the island of Puerto 
Rico without delay, as that number will be there within a week." 

I quote the President's letter in this matter, written 
at midnight July 20th-2ist: 

" Executive Mansion. 
" Hon. John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy. 

" gjR^ — I hand you a despatch just received from General 
Miles. It is evident from this despatch that Admiral Sampson 
is not proposing to furnish such assistance as I have heretofore 
directed. He should send enough ships, and strong enough, 
as will enable General Miles to land his troops in safety at Point 
Fajardo, Cape San Juan, and to remain so long as their assist- 
ance is needed. 

" General Wilson has already sailed from Charleston, with 
orders to proceed to Point Fajardo. If your convoy is delayed 
he will reach Point Fajardo without any protection whatever, 
which must not be permitted. Wilson cannot be reached by wire. 
He has no guns on his ships. The Secretary of War says that 
General Wilson is due to arrive at Point Fajardo in three or four 
days. Prompt action should be taken to give General Wilson 

252 



SAMPSON AND THE ARMY AT SANTIAGO 

protection on his arrival there. It seems to me a cruiser or battle- 
ship, or both, should be detailed for this duty. 

" Please see that the necessary orders are issued at once. 

" William McKinley." 

At two o'clock on the morning of July 2 1st, the Sec- 
retary of the Navy forwarded such a message to Samp- 
son that he yielded to the instructions of the President, 
and furnished a convoy consisting of the Massachusetts, 
Dixie, Gloucester, Cincinnati, Annapolis, Leyden, and 
Wasp. 

Admiral Sampson's explanation is that he consid- 
ered the expedition he was then preparing against the 
Spanish coast as of first importance; that the Yale 
and Columbia would answer every purpose, and that 
his instructions from the Navy Department did not 
permit of sending any heavy ships. His instructions 
from the President, transmitted through the Secretary 
of the Navy, were to furnish such convoy as he and 
General Miles might regard as necessary, and the 
latter insisted from the outset that at least one battle- 
ship would be required. 

I give here, in full, his explanations to the Navy 
Department : 

" Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 21, 1898. 
" Secretary of Navy, Washington. 

" Off Playa del Este, Cuba, July 21st.— Replying to your No. 
56, I was ordered, July 12th, to prepare all armored ships and 
certain cruisers for special service [Watson's movement to coast 
of Spain], and I have been led to believe that the department re- 
garded this of prime importance. This work is in progress. I 
was ordered to send a specified force to Nipe to remove mines and 
hold it as a rendezvous. This was done. I was informed yes- 
terday that the army has decided not to rendezvous there, but 
the expedition had sailed. I placed yesterday at General Miles's 

253 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

disposal the Cincinnati, which had been ordered from Key West, 
and the New Orleans, blockading at San Juan. The Columbia 
and the Yale carrying troops are both powerfully armed.* This 
is an ample convoy for his expedition and to effect his landing. 
At his urgent request for further force, however, I sent to Nipe 
to order the Annapolis, Wasp, and Leyden to San Juan. They 
will await the troops at Cape San Juan. I also added the Glouces- 
ter here, and have ordered three monitors from Key West. Gen- 
eral Miles has from the first insisted upon a convoy of heavy ships. 
This, I have told him, my instructions did not permit. The depart- 
ment will observe that General Miles's failure to obtain the naval 
force which he considers necessary is due to the department's 
instructions. Following the instructions in department's No. 
56, I have ordered the Massachusetts and the Dixie. The Indi- 
ana and Newark are under repair to steam machinery. The Ioiva 
is not in condition to go. I cannot find any telegram here un- 
answered. Sampson. ' ' 

It is difficult to account for Admiral Sampson's 
seeming attitude towards the army during the opera- 
tions before Santiago, as well as to excuse him for his 
contradictory statements, subsequently made in his 
official report. After the 3d of July the admiral's 
conduct may be due to the keen disappointment re- 
sulting from his non-participation in the engagement 
with Cervera's squadron. Possibly he felt that Shaft- 
er's request for a conference on the morning of July 
3d, innocent though it was, was responsible for his 
being deprived of the honor of actively participating 
as commander-in-chief in one of the most remarkable 
victories in the annals of naval warfare. 

* The Yale had already been turned over to the War Department 
for transporting troops, and was not subject to the admiral's orders. 
Her armament consisted of eight 5-inch rapid-fire guns ; four 3-pound- 
ers ; and four 6-pounders. The vessel was totally unarmored. 

254 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

THE first alarm of an epidemic of sickness in the 
army in front of Santiago reached the department on 
July 13th. It came in the form of a telegram, which 
thus read in part: 

"... The serious part of the situation is that there are 100 
cases of yellow -fever in this command, and the opinion of the 
surgeons is that it will spread rapidly."* 

This announcement injected a new and most alarm- 
ing factor into a problem already difficult. In the 
first place, negotiations for the surrender were still in 
progress, and in the next place the existence of yellow- 
fever forbade the sending of any portion of Shafter's 
army to Puerto Rico to reinforce General Miles, who 
was then at Guantanamo, on the transports carrying 
part of his expedition. It was fair to assume, if Toral 
became aware of an outbreak of yellow-fever among 
our troops, especially if it was attended by the least 
sign of panic and demoralization, he would at once 
interrupt negotiations. With disease fighting his 
battles for him, the Spanish general would soon be 

* As we have already seen, General Shafter announced on the 9th 
of July that three cases of yellow-fever had appeared in a Michigan 
regiment. This extract is from General Miles's despatch, quoted in 
full on p. 201. 

255 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

master of the situation. It was indispensable, there- 
fore, that the military status should be preserved at 
any cost. Our army was threatened by other perils 
than yellow - fever, and, pending the successful con- 
clusion of our efforts to secure Toral's capitulation, 
the smallest blunder might have involved us in dis- 
aster. 

It was known to General Shafter that, in addition 
to the Spanish forces inside the Santiago defences, 
there were about 4,000 of the enemy twenty-five miles 
to the north, about 7,500 at Guantanamo, and 10,000 
at Holguin — making an army outside of Santiago 
larger than his own. Under the circumstances we had 
no alternative than to maintain the military situation 
as it then stood. Even the measures for checking 
the spread of the fever had to be made with caution, 
and under many embarrassments. The Secretary 
of War had, on July 13th, advised General Shafter by 
telegraph : 

" As soon as the military situation admits of such action, 
troops should be withdrawn from proximity to the infected towns 
and encamped on high ground near the coast and within easy 
reach of their base of supplies. The camps should be well sepa- 
rated, and any regiment which remains in such fresh camp 
for five days without having any cases of yellow-fever among the 
troops could be put on a transport, if desired, to return home or 
go to some other point of active operations. If cases of yellow- 
fever occur in any regiment by itself, they should at once be sent 
to the hospital established for the reception of such cases and 
the regiment should not be put upon a transport until at least 
five days have elapsed since the last case of yellow-fever. In 
general, no cases of yellow-fever and no suspicious cases of yellow 
fever should go upon the transports, as it is extremely important 
that these should not become infected." 

256 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

It was again explained to General Shafter, on July 
14th, that as soon as the surrender was accomplished 
the 5th Army Corps was to be put into camp near 
Santiago, but above the fever belt. 

" Experts here say this can be done. This is the first step to 
fight the fever. If, later, it is found advisable to bring your 
troops away, it will be done. After careful consideration of the 
question, your views and recommendations are desired. Every 
possible aid in the power of the government will be given you." 

For the moment, however, there was no option save 
that of preserving an unbroken front. 

Fortunately the tension was soon relieved. The 
Spaniards capitulated four days after the first an- 
nouncement of a yellow-fever epidemic, and General 
Shafter was free to deal with the problem — not wholly 
free, though, for the disarmed Spanish prisoners had 
to be guarded, not only to prevent them from escaping, 
but to protect them against the Cubans, who were now 
extremely warlike; and this double duty called for 
vigilance and no little show of force on General Shaft- 
er's part. Indeed, the chief duty of our troops at that 
time consisted in guarding the disarmed Spaniards. 

On the day of the formal surrender, General Shafter 
was notified that 

" The Secretary of War expects that you will take the fever 
question into active consideration. How far will it be possible to 
place the command above the fever belt, and how soon? An early 
report on the situation is requested." 

Shafter replied (July 18th) : 

" Troops will be put in good camps as soon as possible. I put 
1 the cavalry division out this A.M., but until prisoners are sent 

257 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

away it will not be safe to send other troops to higher camp. Feel- 
ing between Spaniards and Cubans is very bitter, and care will 
have to be taken to avoid collision." 

And on the 226. of July he again reported : 

" The minute the prisoners can be disposed of will put troops 
twenty miles inland on railroad, and hope for improvement." 

The quarantine authorities in the United States 
were reluctant to advise that an army infected with 
yellow-fever be brought to any part of the country. 
In fact, when it was made known that the department 
proposed to bring this army to some point on the New 
England coast, several prominent Senators called at 
the War Department to personally protest against 
such a course. Moreover, experts in such matters 
had expressed the opinion, as already stated, that 
General Shafter's corps could be moved to the moun- 
tainous regions about Santiago, above the supposed 
fever belt, where the troops could be kept until the 
yellow-fever was eradicated, in which General Miles, 
then in Cuba, expressed concurrence. Then, too, the 
government was not unmindful of the danger of in- 
fecting every transport in its already too limited fleet, 
that might be used to return the troops in Cuba. 

Military necessity demanded the presence of the 
troops at Santiago to guard the Spanish prisoners; 
prudence and protection of the country against an 
epidemic of yellow-fever prevented their return until 
that supposed danger had passed, or its real condition 
was determined — every consideration, in fact, of strat- 
egy and prudence made it imperative that the 5th 
Corps remain in Cuba. Such was the position held 

258 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

by the administration in the light of the information 
then before it. 

The intention of the War Department to bring the 
troops back to the United States as soon as the mili- 
tary situation would permit, and as soon as it was re- 
garded by the medical and quarantine authorities as 
safe, was made known to General Shafter, as already 
stated, as early as July 13th, and repeated to him, July 
23d, in the following despatch : 

" The Secretary of War asks for report on fever conditions 
to-day, and what progress is being made in getting troops to high 
grounds, and how effective this is going to be. Would you advise 
sending more than two immune regiments now on the way to 
you? The desire is to help you in every way possible. As soon 
as it can be done with safety, it is the intention to bring the entire 
5th Corps North for rest and recuperation." 

On the same day, July 23d, General Shafter replied, 
however, that "the situation is not alarming/' but 
that " it is out of the question to move any more troops 
until the prisoners are started for Spain, and the rail- 
road is repaired." 

On the 26th of July the Surgeon-General was directed 
to proceed to Montauk Point, and report on the suita- 
bility of that place as a camp of recuperation. The 
favorable decision of the department, based upon his 
report, was communicated to Shafter on the 28th of 
July, as follows: 

" War Department, July 28, 1898. 
" General Shafter, Cuba. 

" Would it not be well to encourage your command by telling 
them they will be moved North as soon as the fever cases subside? 
It would stimulate them, it seems to me, and that frequently is 9 

259 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

tonic. We have selected Montauk Point, Long Island, for your 
command when it can be moved. How many troops should be sent 
to take the place of your command? How many Spaniards have 
surrendered to date? R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the 27th of July General Shafter reported that, 
from a pathological point of view, it would be safe to 
order the cavalry division back to the United States. 
On the 1st of August he regarded the military situa- 
tion so much relieved that the cavalry division " could 
be spared." Instructions were therefore given him 
on that day (August 1st) 

" to send some of Wheeler's dismounted cavalry on the Louisiana 
to New York, where they will be put in camp at Montauk Point. 
Great care should be had that no man infected with fever be sent. 
On the result of this shipment will depend further action in mov- 
ing your command. Have a careful medical officer come with 
them." 

Orders for the necessary contracts to prepare Mon- 
tauk Point were given on the 1st of August and ap- 
proved on the 2d. These provisions, however, were for 
a detention camp of but 5,000, and a general hospital 
of 500, then regarded as more than sufficient to meet 
the demands of the 5th Corps, which it was proposed 
to return in instalments. There was, however, at 
Montauk Point ample camping - ground for a whole 
army.* 

* An army in the field is supposed to be a complete unit in itself, 
and to carry with it every necessity for properly feeding and shelter- 
ing the troops. All, and a great deal more, that an army usually does 
for itself had to be done hy the War Department for Shafter's men. 
Not only were tents erected for them in two separate camps (the de- 
tention camp and the general camp), but these tents and the hospitals 
were floored. See, however, chapter on " Camps and Disease." 

260 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

So far as the information in the possession of the 
War Department showed, the situation on the 1st of 
August was as follows: Military considerations had 
made it impossible for Shafter to detach any part of 
his command, other than the cavalry, with a view of 
checking the spread of yellow - fever. In the mean 
time, the War Department had selected Montauk Point 
(July 26th) as a place in every way suitable for the 
return of the troops, of which fact General Shafter 
was informed July 28th. Contracts for a camp suita- 
ble for a small part of the army were ordered on the 1st 
of August and let on the 2d. July 26th General 
Shafter recommended the embarkation of the cavalry 
division ; July 28th he reported it safe for that division 
to return, and August 1st said that that part of his 
army could be spared. On the date last named, Gen- 
eral Wheeler's command was ordered back to the 
United States, while preparations at Montauk Point 
were rapidly made for its reception.* 

* As a detachment of the regular cavalry at Santiago had been 
left at Tampa, Port Tampa, and Fernandina, as well as one battalion 
of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Wood's regiment), and all the horses 
for both the regular and volunteer cavalry organizations, it was de- 
cided, August 1st, when the cavalry division was ordered to the United 
States, to have these detachments join their commands at Montauk 
with their mounts ; but the order for this purpose was not given until 
August 3d. General Shafter and General Miles had recommended 
that the cavalry division be mounted upon its return to the United 
States. Then, too, the health of the cavalry detachments in Florida, 
as well as the condition of the mounts for the entire cavalry division, 
made the change advisable. Since Montauk Point afforded ex- 
cellent facilities for cavalry drill, it was proposed to establish there 
a camp of preparation as well as of recuperation, for the expedition 
against Havana then still thought to be necessary. While I have 
no knowledge or even belief that the ordering of these 3,459 of- 
ficers and men to Montauk Point was a detriment or that the send- 
ing of 5,505 horses and mules there caused additional sickness, yet 
their presence in a measure increased the confusion caused by the 

26l 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

As already stated, upon the success of this move- 
ment was to depend the return of the remainder of 
the 5th Corps. Up to this time the yellow-fever situ- 
ation was reported constantly "improving/' and "not 
alarming," and even as late as July 29th "daily re- 
ports show rapid increase of cases, but at the same 
time they are not severe." 

On the morning of the 26. of August the following 
despatch was received from General Shafter : 

" I am told that at any time an epidemic of yellow-fever is liable 
to occur. I advise that the troops be moved as rapidly as possible 
while the sickness is of a mild type. With the departure of the 
first lot of prisoners, all but a brigade can go, and now cavalry 
division can be spared." 

Later that day a conference was held at the White 
House, the President, the Secretary of War, and the 
Surgeon-General being present. As a result of that 
conference, General Shafter was notified that 

" after full consultation with Surgeon-General, it is deemed best 
to have you move your command up to end of railroad, where 
yellow-fever is impossible. Then we will move them north as 
rapidly as possible. What do you advise?" 

When General Shafter was informed that it was 
proposed to move his army " up to the end of the rail- 
road," he sent the following cablegram, dated August 
3d, and received the same day : 

necessity suddenly thrust tipon the department of expanding a re- 
cuperative camp originally intended for but 3,000 or 4,000 into a camp 
for 30,000. We were still preparing for war, as it was known that 
at least 180,000 Spanish troops, well armed, were in Cuba. 

262 






THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

"Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C. 

" In reply to telegram this date, stating that it is deemed best 
that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow-fever is 
impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is 
practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although 
it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men 
a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make 
this move, even if the sick list should not increase. An officer of 
my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, 
says that it is not a good camping-ground. The country is cover- 
ed with grass as high as a man's head when riding a horse, and 
up in the hills there is no water, and it will be required to pump 
water two miles. He also states that rainfall is twice as great 
as it is here and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for 
camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been 
housed in barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, 
and that is to immediately transport the 5th Corps and the de- 
tached regiments that came with it to the United States. If it 
is not done, I believe the death-rate will be appalling. I am sus- 
tained in this view by every medical officer present. I called to- 
gether to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers 
and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow- 
fever in almost every regiment throughout the command. As soon 
as it develops they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise, not 
very many, it is true, and it is of a mild type, but nevertheless 
it is here. All men taken with it will, of course, have to be left 
and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken 
sick on the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than if 
an attempt is made to move this army to the interior, which is 
now really an army of convalescents ; at least seventy-five per cent, 
of the men having had malarial fever, and all so much weakened 
by the exposure and hardships which they have undergone that 
they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be 
put at once on all the transports in the harbor and not crowded 
at all, and this movement should begin to-morrow and be com- 
pleted before the fifteenth. All here believe the loss of life by 
doing this will be much less than if more time is taken. If the 
plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out, there 
will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is past, 

263 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

and I believe there will be then very few to move. There are 
other diseases which are prevailing — typhoid-fever, dysentery, etc. , 
and severe types of malarial-fever, which are quite as fatal as yel- 
low-fever. The matter of moving this army has been placed be- 
fore you, and you have the opinions of all commanding officers 
and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course 
left open for the preservation of this army. There can be no 
danger to the people at home, and it seems to me that infected 
ships is a matter of small moment. SHAFTER, 

" Major-General. " 

The information this message contained was a great 
surprise. General Miles had reported, on the 1 6th 
of July : " It is hoped that by moving them (the troops) 
on high ground the fever may be stamped out." Gen- 
eral Shafter had cabled, July 22d, as we have seen, 
that "the minute the prisoners can be disposed of 
will put troops twenty miles inland on railroad, and 
hope for improvement," and as late as the 2d of August 
the Surgeon-General had expressed the opinion that the 
fever could be stamped out by the removal to the high 
ground above the supposed fever belt. Moreover, up to 
the 2d of August, when General Shafter announced the 
army was threatened with a yellow-fever epidemic, 
the health reports from Cuba indicated a constantly 
improving condition, and the daily bulletins of sick- 
ness were beginning to show that more men were re- 
turning to duty than were going on the sick-list. 

General Shafter's report of August 1st (received 
August 2d) stated: "Total sick, 4,255; total fever 
cases, 3,164; new cases of fever, 653; cases of fever 
returned to duty, 722." 

Nevertheless, immediately upon the receipt of Gen- 
eral Shafter's message describing in detail the alarm- 
ing condition of the army, he was directed (August 3d) : 

264 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

" To move to the United States such of the troops under your 
command as are not required for duty at Santiago. You can 
use for that purpose the transports now at Santiago, and such 
others will be furnished you as rapidly as possible as you may 
wire may be necessary. How many troops in your judgment 
will be required to remain pending the removal of the Spanish 
prisoners, and when removed how many troops will be required 
to properly garrison the district which was surrendered to you? 
Whom do you intend to leave in command? Cannot the colored 
troops in your command be safely kept at Santiago for the time 
being? How many of them have you? Will send immunes. 
We have to-night ordered General Miles to send the St. Louis and 
St. Paul, which are now at Ponce, to Santiago to report to you. 
By order of the President. R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

The letter to General Shafter, signed by his general 
officers, referred to in his alarming despatch of August 
3d, and commonly known as the "Round Robin," 
was not received until August 4th. It was accom- 
panied by a letter from the chief surgeons of his com- 
mand. Both of these papers were received after Gen- 
eral Shafter had been directed to repatriate his arnry, 
and the War Department had given instructions for 
additional transports to report to Santiago, and has- 
tened orders for the increased accommodations at Mon- 
tauk Point. 

The " Round Robin " is as follows : 

" Santiago de Cuba, via Haiti, 

" August 3, 1898. 
"(Received August 4, 1898.) 
" Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington. 

" Following letter giving the views of the general officers of 
this command is sent for the consideration of the War Depart- 
ment: 

265 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

'"To Major-General W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States 
forces in Cuba : 

" ' We, the undersigned general officers, commanding various 
brigades, divisions, etc., of the United States army of occupa- 
tion in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army must 
at once be taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some point 
on the northern sea-coast of United States ; that this can be done 
without danger to the people of the United States; that there is 
no epidemic of yellow-fever in the army at present — only a few 
sporadic cases; that the army is disabled by malarial-fever to 
such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and it is in a con- 
dition to be practically entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yel- 
low-fever sure to come in the near future. We know from reports 
from competent officers and from personal observations that the 
army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facili- 
ties for such move, if attempted, and will not be until too late. 
Moreover, the best medical authorities in the island say that with 
our present equipment we could not live in the interior during 
the rainy season without losses from malarial-fever almost as 
badly as from yellow-fever. This army must be moved at once 
or it will perish. As an army it can be safely moved now. Per- 
sons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible 
for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opin- 
ions are the result of careful and personal observations, and are 
also based upon the unanimous opinion of our medical officers, 
who are with the army and understand the situation absolutely. 
(Signed) Jos. Wheeler, Major-General Volunteers ; Samuel S. 
Sumner, commanding Cavalry Brigade ; William Ludlow, Brig- 
adier-General, U. S. V., commanding 1st Brigade, 2d Division; 
Adelbert Ames, Brigadier - General, U. S. V., commanding 3d 
Brigade, 1st Division ; Leonard Wood, Brigadier-General, U. S. V., 
commanding city Santiago ; Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel, com- 
manding 2d Cavalry Brigade ; J. Ford Kent, Major - General 
Volunteers, commanding 1st Division, 5th Corps ; J. C. Bates, 
Major-General Volunteers, commanding Provisional Division, 5th 
Corps; H. W. Lawton, Major-General Volunteers, commanding 
2d Division, 5th Corps ; C. McKibbin, Brigadier - General, 
U. S. V., commanding 2d Brigade, 2d Division.' 

" SHAFTER, Major-General." 
266 






THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

In further explanation, and to somewhat moderate 
the expressions describing the situation, General Shaf t- 
er sent the following : 

" Santiago, August 8, 1898. 
" Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington. 

" In connection with ray telegram of the 3d instant and the 
letter of the general officers to me of the same date, I have the 
honor to say that since then I have talked with the division com- 
manders and they join me in saying that the first report was made 
so strong because of the weakened and exhausted condition of 
the command, more than seventy-five per cent, of which have 
been ill with a very weakening malarial-fever lasting from four to 
six days and which leaves every man too much broken down 
to be of any service, and in no condition to withstand an epidemic 
of yellow-fever which all regard as imminent, as there are more 
or less cases in every regiment here. For strong and healthy 
regiments coming here now and a little later, with plenty of tent- 
age to cover them and not subject to any hardships and with 
plenty of nourishing food, the danger, in my opinion and that of 
the division commanders, will be reduced to a minimum. For 
days this command lay in trenches without shelter, exposed to 
sun and rain, and with only hard bread, bacon, and coffee, and 
these hardships account for its present condition, to none of which 
will troops coming now be subjected." 

In adding his signature to the "Round Robin," 
General Lawton, with thorough military spirit, and 
an insight into the true situation which subsequent 
events proved to have been most remarkable, wrote 
the following endorsement : 

" In signing the above letter, I do so with the understanding 
it has been seen and approved by the commanding general. I 
desire to express it as my strong opinion that ' the best medical 
authorities of the island ' and ' all the surgeons of the command ' 
be also required to sign the paper. At least the chief surgeon 

267 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of the army and each division. I desire also to express the opinion 
that the mandatory language used in the letter is impolitic and 
unnecessary. Milder expressions to those high in authority gen- 
erally accomplish just as much. It is also my opinion that much 
of the fatal illness is due to homesickness and other depressing 
influences." 

Apparently, as a result of this recommendation, 
the chief surgeons sent the following to General 
Shaf ter : 

" Santiago de Cuba, via Haiti, August 3, 1898. 
" Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington. 

" Following letter giving the opinion of the medical officers 
of this command is sent for the consideration of the War Depart- 
ment : 

" ' The Adjutant-General §th Army Corps. 

" 'SIR, — The chief surgeon of the 5th Army Corps and the 
surgeons of divisions consider it to be their imperative duty, after 
mature deliberation, to express their unanimous opinion that 
this army is now in a very critical condition. They believe that 
the prevalent malarial-fever will doubtless continue its ravages, 
and that its mortality will soon increase ; that there is imminent 
danger that the yellow-fever, now sporadic and of a mild type, 
may any day assume a virulent type and become epidemic. They 
unanimously recommend that the only course to pursue to save 
the lives of thousands of our soldiers is to transport the whole 
army to the United States as quickly as possible. Such transport 
they consider practicable and reasonably free from danger. The 
proposed move to the plateau of San Luis they believe danger- 
ous and impracticable. Very respectfully, V. Havard, Major and 
Surgeon, U. S. A. , Chief Surgeon ; H. S. Kilbourne, Major and 
Surgeon, Chief Surgeon 2d Division, 5th Corps; M. Wood, 
Major and Chief Surgeon 1st Division, 5th Corps ; Frank J. 
Ives, Major and Surgeon U. S. V., Chief Surgeon Provisional 
Division; H. S. T. Harris, Major and Surgeon, U. S. V., Chief 
Surgeon Cavalry Division.' SHAFTER, 

" Major-General." 
268 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

For reasons of public policy the alarming informa- 
tion contained in General Shafter's messages received 
August 2d, 3d, and 4th, as well as the fact that the 
cavalry division had been ordered back August 1st 
and the entire army August 3d, were not made public. 

It was therefore generally believed that the " Round 
Robin " was responsible for the orders issued from the 
War Department for the return of the 5th Corps, and 
for the selection of Montauk Point. As a matter of 
fact, it had nothing whatever to do with either. 

The "Round Robin," exclusive of General Law- 
ton's endorsement, and the paper signed by the 
surgeons just quoted were given to the Associated 
Press correspondent at Santiago, and were published 
throughout the United States and the world at large 
on the morning of August 4th. 

Of the "Round Robin" itself, I have no criticism 
to offer. General Shafter invited his officers to a 
conference, and himself telegraphed to the War De- 
partment their conclusions and recommendations, 
which was entirely proper for him to do. But I do 
criticise the agencies through which these alarming 
utterances were given to the world. The publication 
of the " Round Robin " at that time was one of the most 
unfortunate and regrettable incidents of the war. 
This communication did not, as commonly reported, 
result in a selection of Montauk Point; neither did 
it hasten the return of the Santiago army, as every 
possible effort had already been made, and was then 
making, for the speedy repatriation of our troops. 
On the other hand, the information this startling 
paper made known not only brought terror and an- 
guish to half the communities and neighborhoods in 

269 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the land, but it returned to Cuba in due time to spread 
demoralization among our troops. It did more than 
this — it threatened, and might have accomplished 
even, an interruption of the peace negotiations then 
in progress between the United States and Spain. 
Those negotiations had been inaugurated by Spain 
on the 26th of July, through M. Cambon, the am- 
bassador of France, and had reached their most delicate 
stage at the time when the "Round Robin/' with all 
its suggestions of panic and disaster, was made public 
in the four corners of the earth. That a satisfactory 
agreement between the two governments was at last 
reached cannot be credited to those who precipitately 
gave out information which might have prevented 
it. Moreover, the publication of this official letter 
was a gross breach of army regulations and military 
discipline; and through the agency of it the enemy 
secured information regarding our situation when 
the government was most anxious to conceal the facts 
until the acceptance of the demands of the United 
States could be assured. 

The matter was regarded so seriously that, after a 
conference at the White House, the following message 
was sent: 

" White House, Washington, August 4, 1898. 

" General Shaffer, Santiago. 

" At this time, when peace is talked of, it seems strange that 

you should give out your cable signed by j'our general officers, 

concerning the condition of your army, to the Associated Press 

without permission 

from the War Department. You did not even await a reply to 

your communication. 

"R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War." 
270 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

To which General Shafter replied: 

" Santiago de Cuba, August 4, 1898. 
" Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" The report * was given out, as I have since learned, before 
it reached me. I called the general officers together, to tell them 
what I proposed to do and to express to them my views and ask 
them to give me theirs. I found we all felt alike. Some one 
then proposed they write me a letter, setting forth their views, and 
I told them to do so. Meanwhile I wrote my telegram, and later 
it was handed in and forwarded, with the letter of the surgeons 
and the letter of these officers. It was not until some time after 
that I learned their letter had been given to the press. It was 
a foolish, improper thing to do, and I regret very much that it 

occurred 

. . . I have been very careful about giving to the press 
any information, and I will continue to be so. 

" W. R. Shafter, 

" Major-General." 

It appears from General Shafter 's official declara- 
tion, therefore, that the text of the "Round Robin" 
was made known to the press agents before the docu- 
ment itself reached him. When the President read 
the "Round Robin" for the first time in the news- 
papers he became very much excited and indignant. 
Every possible effort was made to ascertain the name of 
the person responsible for its publication that he might 
be called to a proper account for the act, but in vain. 

To counteract the effect of the "Round Robin," 
the following statement was given to the press: 

" War Department, 
" Adjutant-General's Office, August 4, 1898. 

" The Secretary of War has ordered General Shaffer's troops 

* That is, the " Round Robin." 
271 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

relieved from further duty in Santiago as fast as transportation 
can be provided, and the transfer of Spanish prisoners will admit 
of reduction of the garrison. . . . These will sail for New 
York as fast as they can be comfortably embarked. 

" The rest at Montauk Point will prepare these seasoned troops 
for the campaign against Havana, in which they will probably 
take part. The first transport left Santiago yesterday. The 
movement is expected to be completed by the 20th of the month. 
Five United States volunteer regiments, immunes, have been 
ordered to Santiago for garrison duty. The first has already 
arrived, the others are being pushed forward as rapidly as trans- 
portation can be furnished." 

As soon as the announcement was made that the 
"immune" regiments were to be sent to Santiago 
many protests were received against such action. No 
attention, however, could be paid to these communi- 
cations. The following indicates their general char- 
acter : 

" Macon, Georgia, August 5, 1898. 
" General H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washing- 
ton, D. C. 
" It is distinctly understood throughout the whole country 
that the 3d Regiment United States Volunteers, although called 
immune, are no more immune from yellow-fever than any oth- 
er volunteer regiment. It is composed almost exclusively of 
Georgians, nearly all of whom are very young men, and many 
of them minors. When enlisted, the government subjected them 
to a rigid physical examination, but no proof was demanded or 
desired as to their immunity from yellow-fever. To send these 
young men and boys to Santiago at this time, with no enemy 
to fight, is to expose them to the same deadly peril from yellow- 
fever as is now said to confront those who, having reaped the hon- 
ors, are now demanding to be sent to a Northern seaside. If more 
troops were now needed at Santiago, or if fighting were to be done^ 
then the order for this regiment would be approved by all, but 

272 



THE "ROUND ROBIN" INCIDENT 

it is a wholly different matter to send them into a pestilence that 
other soldiers, who are probably more nearly immune than they, 
may be removed from the danger. A solemn sense of my duty 
to these young men impels me, therefore, to request most earnest- 
ly and urgently that the order for their removal to Santiago be 
revoked. I send this without the knowledge of any officer or man 
in the regiment. A. 0. BACON, 

" United States Senator." 

It would be impossible to exaggerate the mischiev- 
ous and wicked effects of the "Round Robin." It 
| afflicted the country with a plague of anguish and 
apprehension. There are martyrs in all wars, but 
the most piteous of these are the silent, helpless, 
heartbroken ones who stay at home to weep and pray 
and wait — the mother, the sister, wife, and sweet- 
heart. To their natural suspense and suffering 
these publications added the pangs of imaginary 
terrors. They had endured, through sympathy, the 
battle-field, the wasting hardships of the camp, the 
campaign in the tropics, the fever-stricken trench. 
They might at least have been spared this wanton 
torture, this impalpable and formless yet overwhelm- 
ing blow. 



CHAPTER XVII 

RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

THE assault on San Juan Ridge, July 1st, of 
Kent's division of infantry and Wheeler's dismounted 
cavalry was made by about 7,000 men. According 
to General Wheeler's estimate the number was much 
less, resulting from the drifting away of numerous 
stragglers, from the prostration by heat of many more, 
and from details to care for the wounded. 

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the strength of the 
force opposed to us. A Spanish prisoner stated that 
there were between 250 and 300 men in the trenches of 
San Juan early on the morning of July 1st, and that 
at about eleven o'clock, before our assault, these were 
reinforced by 500 more. But these figures do not in- 
clude the 400 marines who were also at least in the 
vicinity of San Juan Ridge, if not in the trenches, and 
took an active part in the fight. At least one naval 
officer, Lieutenant Bustamente, Admiral Cervera's 
chief-of-staff, died from the wounds received at San 
Juan Hill. This would bring the Spanish forces de- 
fending that immediate position to 1,150 men known 
to have formed part of troops there. At the time of 
our assault, July 1st, there were in Santiago not less 
than 12,000 Spanish regulars and 1,000 marines. If 
the Spanish did not have more than 1,150 men on San 
Juan Ridge, when it became evident that our attack 

274 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

was to be centred upon that point, then their commander 
was guilty of a tactical blunder utterly at variance with 
the skilful manner in which he conducted every other 
feature of his campaign. I do not give any credit to 
the report. A prisoner captured after the fight of July 
1st stated that the Spanish casualties were 1,500. This 
was outside of the losses at Caney. It hardly seems 
probable that their killed and wounded could have 
been so great, fighting as they did behind strong en- 
trenchments; but the Spanish loss was certainly 
large. On the 15th of July the officers of General To- 
ral's staff, meeting in a council of war, stated that the 
force in Santiago then numbered 11,500,* and that 
there were 1,700 in hospital. Of the latter, however, 
a large number must have been sick, not wounded. 

On the 2d of July, after the divisions of Lawton and 
Bates had reached San Juan Ridge and the hills flank- 
ing it on both sides, General Shafter could not have 
had on the firing line over 15,000 men at the most, 
including the 33d Michigan, at Aguadores, the 34th 
Michigan, and 9th Massachusetts, which came to the 
front from Siboney early July 2d. It is more probable 
that his force did not exceed 13,000. No other rein- 
forcements reached him until July 1 1, when the 1st 
District of Columbia and the 1st Illinois Volunteers ar- 
rived. However, firing had then practically ceased. 

On the 26th of May, General Linares reported to 
the Minister of War that he should need rations for 
12,000 men in Santiago, and "cotton suits" for the 
same number. If we put the Spanish losses in battle 
and wounded and sick in hospital at 2,000, this would 

* It is not believed that this included the volunteers. 
275 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

leave him an available force for the defence of the city, 
July 2d, of 10,000. On the night of the 3d of July 
Escario's column reinforced him to the extent of 3,654 
— bringing the total Spanish force in Santiago up to 
13,500 in round numbers. The accuracy of these 
figures is confirmed by the number of prisoners that 
surrendered on the 17th of July. The statement is 
fully warranted, therefore, that the Spanish army in 
Santiago at least equalled in numbers the force under 
General Shatter besieging the city. The concurrent 
testimony of all American officers who took part in 
that campaign is that our available force* in the 
trenches was much less than General Toral had in 
Santiago. 

No matter from what point, therefore, the campaign 
is viewed, the conclusion is inevitable that it was a 
most creditable victory for the American army as a 
whole, and for the individual soldiers composing it. 

The offer to transport the Spanish prisoners to Spain 
contributed greatly to the surrender. It was not until 
this suggestion was made to the Spanish general that 
he consented to consider the question of complete sur- 
render. Had he persisted in his proposal to evacuate 
Santiago with his forces, it would have necessitated 
either an assault or a protraction of the siege. In any 
event, the loss of life among our forces would doubtless 
have been great. 

Outside of the advantage which this scheme pos- 



* No reference is here made to General Garcia's force of Cubans, for 
the reason that their presence added no appreciable strength to our 
operations. The only duty assigned them — stopping Escario — 
they failed to perform, and General Shafter finally found it necessary 
to place our men in front of the Cubans. 

276 



RESUME' OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

sessed of relieving the government from the annoy- 
ance and expense of guarding such a large number 
of prisoners; of avoiding any danger of yellow-fever 
infection from that source; and of enabling the de- 
partment to retain the services of all vessels for our 
own immediate purposes, it exerted a most salutary 
influence upon General Toral's troops, who were al- 
ready without interest in the war, and anxious, above 
all things, to return to their homes. The proposal 
had a most demoralizing effect, too, upon the Spanish 
troops in Cuba generally, and this was fully appre- 
ciated by General Blanco. To no other cause can be 
ascribed the alacrity with which 12,000 Spanish reg- 
ulars, in the province of Santiago, outside of the city, 
surrendered without having fired a shot. When Lieu- 
tenant Milej^, with a Spanish officer representing Gen- 
eral Toral, appeared at San Luis and the other posts 
where parts of Toral's command were stationed, to 
make known the fact of their surrender, these several 
garrisons declined to accept his statement without 
verification, and sent commissions to Santiago for 
that purpose. Upon learning that they were to be 
immediately transported to their own country they 
accepted the conditions of surrender with unmistaka- 
ble delight. 

General Shafter wrote, on the 18th of July, after he 
had entered the city of Santiago, that the Spanish 
troops "are perfectly delighted at the thought of going 
home. I believe this knowledge of the disposition 
made of them, as soon as it reaches other troops in 
Cuba, will utterly demoralize the whole island." This 
prediction was confirmed by subsequent events and 
by the testimony of many Spanish officers. Imme- 

277 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

diately upon the fall of Santiago, the War Department 
set to work to arrange for the speedy return of Toral's 
army, and bids for transporting the prisoners were in- 
vited. Ten transatlantic steamship companies com- 
peted, nine of which submitted practically the same 
bids ! The nine bids were all from British and German 
companies, as the ships of the American lines had 
been taken by the War and Navy Departments. The 
terms of each of these liners were: $110 for commis- 
sioned officers, and $55 for enlisted men, the steamers 
to be despatched from Santiago de Cuba within forty- 
eight hours of their arrival, or demurrage to be paid at 
the rate of sixty cents per capita a day passenger ca- 
pacity; if passengers were on board during any day 
of delay, forty cents additional charge per capita per 
day was to be made. The same conditions were stip- 
ulated if the transports were detained at the place of 
destination by quarantine or other cause. The bid of 
the Spanish Transatlantic Company was $55 for com- 
missioned officers, and $20 for enlisted men, with no 
demurrage. The bid of the Spanish company was 
accepted. These figures are given in detail, because 
at the time there was much criticism based upon a 
misapprehension of the facts. The bid of the Spanish 
company, in addition to being less than fifty per cent, 
of that of the other lines, had the advantage of 
placing the prisoners entirely under the control of 
citizens of their own country, and did not contemplate 
the use of vessels available to the government of the 
United States, since they sailed under the Spanish 
flag. Moreover, the Spanish line agreed to ship pris- 
oners much earlier than the other lines. On the part 
of the United States, it was required that the ships 

278 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

should not be overcrowded ; that commissioned officers 
should be furnished first-class accommodations, and 
that subsistence en route should be equal to the gar- 
rison ration of the United States army. To insure 
fulfilment of this contract, army officers were detailed 
to superintend loading and rations furnished. 

The wisdom of giving the contract to this Spanish 
company was fully demonstrated by the successful 
manner in which the work was performed. No com- 
plaint ever reached the War Department of ill-treat- 
ment of the Spanish prisoners, or failure of the com- 
pany to completely meet the requirements of its 
contract. The total number of prisoners thus shipped 
was 22,864, at a cos t °f $513,860. The actual saving 
to the government, over the bids of the British and 
German lines, was practically $800,000, not including 
possible demurrage charges. 

After the surrender of Santiago, the relations be- 
tween our troops and the Spaniards were of the most 
cordial character. General Shafter reported that the 
friendship between his men and General Toral's troops 
was something remarkable, and that it was with dif- 
ficulty he could keep them apart. And of the Spanish 
prisoners themselves he said they were "the most or- 
derly, tractable, and generally best-behaved men that 
I have ever known." 

When they left Santiago these soldiers expressed 
their appreciation of the courteous treatment received 
from the general and his men in the following letters : 

" Santiago, Cuba, August 2, 1898. 

" To Major-General Shafter, Commanding the American Army 
in Cuba. 
" SIR, — The Spanish soldiers who capitulated in this place 

279 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

on the 16th of July last, recognizing your high and just position, 
pray that through you all the courageous and noble soldiers 
under your command may receive our good wishes and farewell, 
which we send them on embarking for our beloved Spain. For 
this favor, which we have no doubt you will grant, you will gain 
the everlasting gratitude and consideration of 11,000 Spanish 
soldiers, who are, 

" Your most humble servants, 

" Pedro Lopez Castillo, 

" Private of Infantry." 

" Soldiers of the American Army,— We would not be 
fulfilling our duty as well-born men, in whose breasts there lives 
gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain 
without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes 
and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our strength 
endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor 
or hate towards the American nation. We have been vanquished 
by you (so our generals and chiefs judged in signing the capitula- 
tion), but our surrender and the bloody battles preceding it have 
left in our souls no place for resentment against the men who 
fought us nobly and valiantly. You fought and acted in com- 
pliance with the same call of duty as we, for we all but represent 
the power of our respective states; you fought us as men, face 
to face, and with great courage, as before stated, a quality which 
we had not met with during the three years we have carried on 
this war against a people without religion, without morals, with- 
out conscience, and of doubtful origin, who could not confront 
the enemy, but, hidden, shot their noble victims from ambush 
and then immediately fled. This was the kind of warfare we 
had to sustain in this unfortunate land. You have complied 
exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the 
armies of the most civilized nations of the world ; have given an 
honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their 
wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your 
prisoners and their comfort ; and, lastly, to us whose condition was 
terrible you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, 
and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy ; for after 
the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony. 

280 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all there remains 
but to express our farewell, and with the greatest sincerity we 
wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no 
longer belong to our dear Spain, but will be yours who have 
conquered it by force and watered it with your blood as your con- 
science called for under the demand of civilization and humanity ; I 
but the descendants of the Congo and of Guinea, mingled with 
the blood of unscrupulous Spaniards and of traitors and advent- 
urers—these people are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, 
for they will find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern 
civilized communities. 

" From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers. 

" Pedro Lopez de Castillo, 
" Soldier of Infantry. 

"Santiago de Cuba, 21st of August, 1898." 

Although the greater part of the Santiago garrison 
had been in Cuba from two to three years, and were sup- 
posed to have become acclimated, and, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Spanish soldiers had had comfortable 
quarters, there was much sickness among them. 
When the American forces took possession of the 
city, no less than 2,000 Spanish soldiers were found in 
the hospitals. The deaths among them at the time of 
capitulation were said to number from thirty-five to fifty 
a day. In spite of their well-appointed hospitals and an 
abundance of medical supplies, the same Cuban fevers 
which later attacked practically our whole army had 
seized the Spanish troops." Experience proved that, 
no matter what precautions were taken, or how favor- 
able were the circumstances for preventing sickness, 
all American troops that came to the province of San- 
tiago de Cuba, after the capitulation, sooner or later 

* I personally visited these hospitals in April, 1899, and found them 
to be models of their kind. 

28l 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

fell victims to the same diseases. The 5th United 
States Infantry, which reached Santiago after the 
campaign, were provided with floored tents, boiled 
water, fresh meat, vegetables, etc., and did not ex- 
perience the exposure and hardships of Shafter's army, 
yet that regiment had the same kind and proportion of 
sickness, in spite of these precautions. Scarcely a 
man in it, or in any of the other regiments arriving 
after the fall of Santiago, escaped sickness. The 
statement has been made, and yet remains unchal- 
lenged, that not one per cent, of the troops which went 
to Santiago after the surrender escaped the Cuban 
malarial fevers which had previously seized the 5th 
Corps. 

On this subject General Wood thus testified before 
the War Investigation Commission : 



" We had never served in that climate, so peculiarly deadly 
from the effects of malaria, and in this respect my opinions have 
changed very much since the close of the war. If I had been 
called before you in the first week of August I might have been 
disposed to have answered a little differently in some respects. 
I have been there ever since, and have seen regiments come to Cuba 
in perfect health and go into tents with floors and with flies, camp- 
ed up on high hills, given boiled water, and have seen them have 
practically the identical troubles we had during the campaign. 
The losses may not have been as heavy, as we are organized to 
take them into hospitals protected from the sun, which seemed 
to be a depressing cause. All the immune regiments serving 
in my department since the war have been at one time or another 
unfit for service. I have had all the officers of my staff repeated- 
ly too sick for duty. I don't think that any amount of precau- 
tion or preparation, in addition to what we had, would have made 
any practical difference in the sickness of the troops of the army 
of invasion. This is a candid opinion, and an absolutely frank 

282 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

one. If I had answered this question in August, without the 
experience I have had since August, I might have been disposed 
to attribute more to the lack of tentage than I do now ; but I think 
the food, while lacking necessarily in variety, was ample." 



The experience of fresh troops arriving in Cuba 
after Shatter's army left warrants the assertion that 
the sickness of the 5th Corps was not due to the hard- 
ships of the campaign, but to climatic causes. This 
brings us to a consideration of the nature and causes 
of what has been referred to as the "hardships" of 
the Santiago campaign. The causes naturally fall 
under two heads: (1) Those which may be regarded 
as uncontrollable — the result of climatic conditions, 
or of military necessity, and (2) those discomforts at- 
tributable to deficiencies in kind or quantity of cloth- 
ing, food, and medical supplies. 

1. Of the climatic and uncontrollable cause, little 
need be said. The suffering from the intense heat, 
heavy tropical rains, lack of roads, and indigenous 
maladies followed logically the despatch of an expe- 
dition to the tropics at that season of the year. Our 
army would not have been sent to one of the most un- 
healthful sections of Cuba at the worst season of the 
year but for the fact that the Spanish admiral took 
refuge in Santiago Harbor. But in this, as in all 
campaigns, the enemy creates the problems, and no 
campaign ever furnishes a complete guide for an- 
other. 

2. Of what had been charged with regard to the 
shortcomings in clothing, food, and medical supplies 
I think it can be shown that the deficiencies in this di- 
rection are almost, if not wholly, due to causes for 

283 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

which the climate and physical conditions were chiefly 
responsible. 

With respect to clothing : It has already been shown 
that the department had no reserve supply on hand 
when war was declared. We may add, also, that the 
question of clothing suitable for use in the tropics had 
never been raised or considered. Immediately after 
the declaration of war the Quartermaster's Department 
undertook to secure khaki uniforms. When it was 
found that there was no khaki cloth made in the United 
States, and that no establishment here could make it, 
contracts were let, as an emergency makeshift, for the 
manufacture of uniforms of duck and drill — the only 
available substitutes. Despite the best efforts of the 
Quartermaster-General, the first delivery of these trop- 
ical suits only amounted to 5,000 (exclusive of Colonel 
Wood's regiment) before Shafter's army sailed from 
Tampa, but by the second week in July canvas uni- 
forms for the entire 5th Corps reached Siboney. While 
some discomfort resulted from this failure to furnish 
canvas uniforms immediately, it is not in order to blame 
the Quartermaster's Department. The regular army 
was clothed as it had always been for campaigns in 
Texas, Arizona, and the almost tropical arid plains of 
the Southwest. Under the circumstances, the worst 
that can be said in this connection is that some incon- 
venience resulted, but no death nor any hardship 
worthy of the name. 

In spite of the calamitous newspaper reports to the 
contrary, and the statements of amateur soldiers ac- 
companying the 5th Corps, there was never a day at 
Santiago when the troops at the front were not sup- 
plied with the three most important components of the 

284 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

army ration— coffee (and sugar), bacon, and hard 
bread," although the most of them threw away their 
haversacks, containing three days' rations, as they 
went into action. This is always the case where an 
army goes into action carrying its complete outfit. 
The usual way is to stack everything but guns and 
ammunition and the least clothing possible. Amer- 
icans, however, had never before campaigned where 
everything left behind was stolen. The full ration al- 

* I do not wish to depreciate, and I certainly would not belittle, the 
discomforts experienced by General Shafter's troops in Cuba. And 
yet the hardships of the brief Santiago campaign are not comparable 
to what almost every soldier repeatedly went through during the Civil 
War. 

General Grant has described in his Memoirs the condition of the 
Federal army as he found it after Rosecrans's defeat about Chat- 
tanooga. It must be remembered that these conditions existed within 
the boundaries of the United States — on our own territory — and after 
the Civil War had been in progress two and a half years (the fall of 
1863). General Grant says (pp. 24 and 25, vol. ii.) : 

" The country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten 
thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to 
draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the 
sick. The men had been on half rations for a considerable time, with 
but few other supplies except beef, driven from Nashville across the 
country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for 
the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much 
in the condition of the few animals left alive there — ' on the lift.' In- 
deed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, 
with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on ' half rations of 
hard bread and beef dried on the hoof.' 

" Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were with- 
out sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. 
What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines 
was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to 
draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only 
way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to 
cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up 
the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting 
a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or 
poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their 
camps." 

285 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

lowed by law included, in addition to articles just men- 
tioned, fresh meat, beans, rice, potatoes, onions, toma- 
toes, etc. Of these, four months' supplies were taken 
on the transports. The reinforcements that sub- 
sequently arrived brought with them supplies of all 
kinds for the same period. There was aboard the 
transports, therefore, no lack at any time of the full 
ration allowed by law for the entire army. It was sim- 
ply a question of transportation — from the ships to the 
shore, and thence to the front. The unusual and har- 
assing difficulties attending this operation have al- 
ready been discussed. 

During the campaign there was a lack of surgeons 
and hospital supplies. Attention has already been 
invited to the fact that, after the assignments to vol- 
unteer organizations and other details, there were left 
but fifty-nine surgeons of the regular army available 
as regimental surgeons with the regular troops. Thirty- 
six of these were sent with Shaffer's army. In ad- 
dition, there were fifteen volunteer surgeons with the 
volunteer regiments, and twenty contract doctors, giv- 
ing a total of seventy-one surgeons for an army of 
approximately 17,000; about four to every 1,000 men. 
The number proved to be inadequate; but it was 
thought by those in charge of the expedition that the 
Santiago campaign would be of very short duration, 
and not likely to result in many casualties or much 
sickness. Admiral Sampson said, on June 7th, that 
the fleet and city "would be ours in forty-eight hours" 
with 10,000 men; the major-general commanding, in 
his instructions to General Shafter, said: "It is not 
expected that you will go but a short distance inland." 
Moreover, it was not deemed advisable by the Surgeon- 

286 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

General to send from the United States at that time 
more regular surgeons; they were needed for the vast 
army of volunteers then assembling in camps for the 
expedition against Havana, and to instruct the inex- 
perienced volunteer surgeons coming into the service. 
This matter, as with others of a professional nature, 
was left to the judgment of the Surgeon-General of the 
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THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



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289 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The large number of wounded and the epidemic of 
sickness that occurred were unexpected* by officers 
best qualified to judge such matters. There was, 
therefore, a lack of medicines, tents, ambulances, 
cots, and litters. And yet it appears that with each 
regular regiment leaving Tampa three months' med- 
ical supplies were taken. Full equipment for four 
divisional hospitals was organized, while, as a re- 
serve, one-half of the supplies in the medical depot at 
Tampa were sent on the Seguranca. Every rational 
provision appears to have been made by the medical 
department for medicines and supplies. The deficien- 
cies in both seem to have been due to an insufficient 
number of transports to take all the hospital equipment 
and ambulances, and to the inadequate means of trans- 
porting supplies from the vessels off Siboney to the land. 

General Shafter left Tampa under imperative orders 
to sail at once. Owing to the limited number of trans- 
ports at his disposal, he was confronted with the ques- 
tion as to whether he should sacrifice troops to am- 
bulances. To take the full number of ambulances 
on hand for the four divisional hospitals, he would 
have been compelled to devote one entire ship to that 
purpose, and that would have entailed the abandon- 
ment at Tampa of 1,000 to 1,500 men. He deter- 
mined to take troops. He intended to rely upon 
his supply wagons for conveying the wounded and 
sick, if necessity demanded. For this decision and 
the results which flowed from it General Shafter 

* In his testimony before the War Investigation Commission (vol. 
vii., p. 3199) General Shafter said : " We had been led to believe the 
force at Santiago was very small ;" and, again, " I had no idea we were 
gomg to have 1,500 men wounded." 

290 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

has frankly assumed the entire responsibility. He 
should have left the Miles shields and siege-train 
and taken ambulances instead. The deficiency in 
medicines was due to a combination of causes; to 
the failure, in the first instance, to land the regi- 
mental medical chests from the transports, and to 
the unexpected epidemic that suddenly seized the 
army during the latter part of July. The chief sur- 
geon of the 5th Corps is responsible for the state- 
ment that two-thirds of the regimental chests, with 
supplies for three months, were not removed from the 
transports until after Santiago had fallen; and the 
records of the War Department show that the medical 
supplies on six of the transports of the original expe- 
dition were not unloaded until the 30th of July. More- 
over, at least two vessels, the Grande Duchesse and 
the Mobile, returned to the United States with a large 
quantity of medical stores aboard which should have 
been unloaded at Santiago. These supplies were 
not finally unloaded until the vessels made a second 
trip to Santiago, when the urgent necessity for medi- 
cal supplies had passed. No excuse can be given for 
the carelessness in shipping these supplies, or for not 
putting them ashore with the army. Some conception 
of the quantities of medicine shipped to Santiago may 
be formed when it is stated that, in addition to the 
material previously landed, the hospital ship Relief 
reached Siboney, July 8th, with 700 tons of medicine 
and hospital equipment, and that there was, besides, 
the Red Cross ship State of Texas. Moreover, further 
supplies, nurses, and surgeons arrived on the 24th, 
and the Olivette, with large quantities of medical stores 
and hospital outfit, reached Santiago August 3d. 

291 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The shortage in medical and hospital supplies, up 
to the date of the surrender — July 17th — in addition 
to the carelessness in shipping, was due to the same 
causes that embarrassed the delivery of food on the 
firing line — that is, to the lack of means for unloading 
the ships, resulting from the loss of lighters, heretofore 
mentioned, and the difficulty of transporting material 
of all kinds from Siboney to San Juan Ridge. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that every man 
wounded in the fight of Las Guasimas, El Caney, and 
San Juan, either had upon his person, or was at once 
furnished with, the "first-aid packet." To the im- 
mediate use of this antiseptic dressing must be as- 
cribed the low mortality among the wounded, which 
was only seven per cent, for the entire campaign. 
The mortality for the entire 5th Corps while in Cuba 
was but 659, of which 243 were killed in battle or died 
from wounds. The deaths from disease, 416 (includ- 
ing forty-six from yellow-fever), are remarkably small 
when it is understood that the army was subjected to a 
tropical-fever epidemic, and that during the brief cam- 
paign nearly ninety per cent, of the entire 5th Corps 
was stricken down with one or another form of tropical 
fever. 

Reference has been made to the loss of the lighters 
and barges accompanying the original expedition, 
as well as the accidents to those subsequently sent. 
Brigadier-General Charles F. Humphrey, Chief Quar- 
termaster of the 5th Corps, has stated that, in the light 
of his experience, it would have been better to have 
taken more steam-lighters and barges for disembark- 
ing the troops and supplies, though he says that but 
for the accidents to the lighters and barges the diffi- 

292 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

culties in getting material to the shore would have 
been avoided. However, a part of the time the sea off 
Siboney and Daiquiri was so rough that it was impos- 
sible to do any unloading whatsoever. Two hundred 
and two wagons, including seven ambulances, to- 
gether with eight pack-trains, formed the transporta- 
tion taken with the 5th Corps. Undoubtedly this 
would have been sufficient but for the impassable 
roads. General Shafter stated in his testimony be- 
fore the War Investigation Commission: "There was 
no lack of transportation, for at no time up to the sur- 
render could all the wagons I had be used." 

The roads were so bad the pack-mules could take 
but one-half of their accustomed loads a great portion 
of the time. Moreover, by the 10th of July, when the 
transportation of supplies and ammunition had fallen 
entirely upon the pack-trains, half of the expert pack- 
ers were disabled by heat-exhaustion and disease. In 
consequence of this, two whole pack-trains were put 
out of service. These conditions were aggravated by 
the necessity of feeding 5,000 Cubans of General Gar- 
cia' s army. And yet, embarrassed as he was from 
bad roads, and the consequent impossibility of using 
all his wagons, transportation, and pack-mules, after 
the 5th of July, General Shafter was called upon to 
feed 20,000 Cuban refugees at El Caney or see them 
starve. 

Considered from any point of view one may elect, 
the Santiago campaign was without precedent. 
General Shafter was informed that "time is the es- 
sence of the situation," and he was instructed by the 
major-general commanding the army to "limit the 
animals to the least number for artillery and trans- 

293 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

portation." General Shafter was selected for the ex- 
pedition, as he had established in the Civil War a rep- 
utation as a "rough-and-ready" campaigner. He 
left Tampa before his expedition was thoroughly pre- 
pared because of Admiral Sampson's urgent and jus- 
tifiable message to the effect that " every consideration 
demands immediate movement/' upon which the Pres- 
ident based his instructions of the evening of June 7th 
"to sail at once." The emergency demanded an im- 
mediate movement on Santiago, and thorough prep- 
aration was sacrificed to that estimate of the situation. 
The fact that he was delayed a week on account of 
the " Ghost Fleet " does not affect this statement. His 
army, its supplies and animals, were aboard the trans- 
ports during that time, momentarily expecting orders 
to sail, and little could be done outside of a rearrange- 
ment to relieve the congestion on some of the vessels. 
When the army reached Santiago the necessity for 
precipitate action was intensified by local conditions 
and the question of health, in spite of innumerable 
difficulties of the most harassing nature. " The cam- 
paign," said General Ludlow, in his testimony before 
the War Investigation Commission, "was a race be- 
tween the physical vigor of the men and the Cuban 
malarial fever that lay in wait for them, and if Gen- 
eral Shafter had awaited to do all these things [con- 
structing roads, docks, etc.], the army would have 
been on its back before the surrender instead of after, 
and we could not have taken Santiago as we did." 
Two weeks' delay, with disease as an ally, would have 
defeated the 5th Corps. A general less aggressive or 
less sensible to the necessity of an impulsive campaign 
would have failed by detaining his army in Cuba for 

294 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

preparations. Neither the necessity nor the conditions 
permitted a campaign on the lines laid down by tactics 
and military precepts. Moreover, the problems to be 
met were entirely new. The American army had 
never before operated under similar conditions, not 
excepting the Mexican War. The Santiago campaign 
saw the regular army assembled together for the first 
time since 1865. New weapons, and new tactics re- 
sulting therefrom, were quantities that could not be 
determined in advance, in the absence of any experi- 
ence. This campaign furnished the first instance of a 
conflict between two armies each equipped with maga- 
zine rifles of great range, small caliber, and smokeless 
powder. 

Eighty -nine newspaper correspondents accompa- 
nied General Shafter's expedition, or about six to a 
regiment of 1,000 men. Not five per cent, of these 
representatives of the press had ever seen a battle, and 
very few, if any, were experienced war correspondents. 
The hardships of war were entirely new to them, and 
a large proportion of the reports in the daily press 
should have been read at the time with this understand- 
ing. Many of the accounts criticising the conduct of 
that campaign were absolutely without foundation in 
fact. I refer to such statements as the reports of the 
alleged massacre of Spanish prisoners in our posses- 
sion by Cubans; the starving of our troops in the 
trenches, etc., etc. 

It is to be said of the operations of the 5th Corps that 
throughout the entire campaign not a complaint was 
received by the War Department from any officer or 
enlisted man in the regular army. The reasons for 
this are too apparent to require explanation. The reg- 

295 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ular soldier endured with Spartan fortitude and cheer- 
fulness any and all discomforts which the operations 
of an army in the field invariably carry with them. 
General Lawton and General Wood, both good types 
of the American regular soldier, have testified that 
they endured on more occasions than one greater hard- 
ships in Indian campaigns than the Santiago expe- 
dition entailed. 

But what are the facts, after all? Shaffer's army 
landed in Cuba, June 22d-24th. The surrender of the 
Spanish garrison in Santiago occurred July 16th (the 
formal capitulation the next day). June 24th to July 
1 6th, a total of twenty-three days, represents the length 
of time covered by the siege and actual hostilities. 
The losses in battle during the entire period, including 
the engagements of Guasimas, Caney, and San Juan 
Ridge, amounted to the total of but 243 killed, officers 
and men, and 1,445 wounded. 

After all that has been said or written of the Santia- 
go campaign, it must be admitted that the expedition 
was successful beyond the most sanguine expectation.* 
Landing on a hostile coast, in a tropical country, at 
the worst season of the year, in an open roadstead, with 
a heavy surf beating upon a coral shore, the American 
forces drove the enemy from his intrenched outposts, 
forcing him back from line to line, until finally he 
took refuge in his last and strongest defences, im- 
mediately surrounding the city of Santiago. The re- 
sistless advance of that army forced the Spanish fleet 

* " Such a disembarkation," says Admiral Sampson in his report 
(see p. 864, Report of Secretary of Navy for 1898), " in the face of the 
enemy and upon a surf-bound coast of the character of this, must be 
regarded as a very successful piece of work." 

296 



RESUME OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

out of the harbor and secured the surrender of 24,000 
prisoners, almost as many arms, over 1,000,000 rations, 
and a territory embracing practically all that part 
of Cuba east of Aserradero. And this capture of the 
Spanish army, consisting of a much larger force than 
our own, was accomplished without the loss of a pris- 
oner, without the loss of a gun, and without the loss of 
a color, notwithstanding the fact that during a period 
of nearly two weeks, when the question of keeping up 
communication with the base of supplies was most 
serious, our army fed, in addition to its own forces, 
5,000 Cubans and 20,000 helpless men, women, and 
children, whom the fortune of war had thrust into our 
keeping. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

IN discussing the general plans of campaign, we 
have already seen that the major-general commanding 
the army regarded the capture of Puerto Rico more 
important than that of Santiago. There is no doubt 
but that this was his best judgment, and, furthermore, 
that he believed it would require a large force to take 
the island. His telegram of June 6th from Tampa, 
in which his views on this matter were expressed, has 
already been quoted. It will be remembered that in 
that despatch he suggested that Santiago be left " safe- 
ly guarded," while he, with the remainder of the 5th 
Corps, and the assistance of the navy, captured Puerto 
Rico, " before it can be reinforced." He proposed that 
this expedition should be immediately increased by 
30,000 men. He also recommended that when Puerto 
Rico was taken, a sufficient force be left to hold it, 
while the balance of his army return and capture San- 
tiago, which he believed could be " easily accomplished." 
The President promptly disapproved the plan, and 
directed that Santiago be taken first. 

The day following (June 7th) this telegram was sent 
to General Miles at Tampa : 

" As you report that an expedition to Puerto Rico with 30,000 
troops can be ready in ten days, you are directed to assemble such 
troops at once for the purpose." 

298 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

In order that he might confer with the President and 
Secretary of War concerning his plans, after Shafter 
had sailed the general was directed to return to Wash- 
ington. This was on the 15th of June. After re- 
peated conferences, the general was furnished detailed 
and specific instructions for the organization of his 
army. His orders thus read: 



" War Department, 
" Washington, June 26, 1898. 
" Major-General Nelson A. Miles, U. S. A, Washington, D. C. 

" SIR,— By direction of the President an expedition will be 
organized with the least possible delay under the immediate com- 
mand of Major-General Brooke, U. S. A., consisting of three 
divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the 1st and 3d 
Army Corps, and two divisions from the 4th Army Corps, for 
movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. The command under Major-General Shafter, or such 
part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will 
join the foregoing expedition, and you will command the forces 
thus united in person. 

" Transports for this service will be assembled at Tampa with 
the least possible delay. The naval forces will furnish convoy 
and co-operate with you in accomplishing the object in view. You 
will place yourself in close touch with the senior officer of the 
navy in those waters, with the view to harmonious and forceful 
action. 

" Estimates will be made by you immediately on the several 
staff departments for the necessary supplies and subsistence, 
such estimates to be submitted to the Secretary of War. 

" For the information of the President, copies of all orders and 
instructions given by you, from time to time, will be forwarded 
on the day of their issue to the Adjutant-General of the army. 
Also daily report of the state and condition of your command will 
be made to the Secretary of War direct. 

"It is important that immediate preparation be made for this 

299 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

movement and, when ready, report to this department for further 
instructions. Very respectfully, 

" R. A. Alger, 
" Secretary of War." 



General Miles acknowledged receipt of his orders 
in a formal note of June 27th as follows : 

" I assume that it is expected that I, as general commanding 
the army, will give the necessary instructions for the equipment 
of the expedition with cavalry, light artillery, siege train, wagon, 
and pack transportation, reserve ammunition and ammuni- 
tion train, engineer battalion, signal corps, balloon material, 
pontoon train, intrenching tools, hospital supplies, etc., which 
will be needed to effectively equip an expedition of the character 
contemplated." 

On July 5th the general sent the following commu- 
nication : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, D. C, July 5, 1898. 
" The Honorable the Secretary of War. 

" SIR, — As the object for which the army was sent to Santiago 
de Cuba has been accomplished — viz., the forcing of the Spanish 
fleet out of the harbor and its destruction by the navy,* I deem 
the present time most favorable for proceeding immediately to 
Ptierto Rico. I consider it of the highest importance that we should 
take and keep that island, which is the gateway to the Spanish 
possessions on the Western Hemisphere, and it is also important 
that our troops should be landed there as early as possible during 
this month. There are now about 4,000 men on transports at 
Key West, approximately 7,000 will soon be at Charleston, S. C, 

* In his despatch of May 30th to Shatter, General Miles says : "Go 
with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capt- 
uring harbor and fleet." (See p. 63, chap, vi., " Embarkation at 
Tampa.") 

300 








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THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

and there are already 20,000 at Santiago. If this force is not 
sufficient, the transports can return for more if required. 
" Very respectfully, 

" Nelson A. Miles, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

This proposition to withdraw our army from the 
siege of the garrison and city of Santiago was, of 
course, not approved. 

Three days after the date of this letter General Miles 
sailed from Charleston with from 3,000 to 4,000 men as 
reinforcements for General Shaffer's army. He did 
not return to the United States until after his Puerto 
Rican campaign. 

It was the original plan, as expressed in the order 
to General Miles on June 26th, to use whatever avail- 
able force General Shafter might have, after the capt- 
ure of Santiago, as part of the Puerto Rican expedition. 
Soon after the general reached Cuba, July nth, it be- 
came evident that, owing to the presence of 3^ellow- 
fever in the 5th Corps, no part of that army could be 
used in Puerto Rico. The Secretary of War suggested 
to the general, in a telegraphic note of July 14th, that 
he return to the United States for the purpose of per- 
sonally superintending the organization and despatch 
of this Puerto Rican army, in accordance with the 
President's instructions, twice communicated to him. 
This suggestion, however, the general did not follow. 

On the 1 8th of July the general thus cabled : 

" Playa, July 18, 1898. 

"(Received 11. 19 A.M.) 
Secretary of War, Washington. 

" On board U. S. S. Yale, Guantanamo, July 18, 1898. — I con- 
sider it of highest importance that some officers of the navy, with 

301 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

efficient force, should proceed with me immediately to Puerto Rico, 
in order to seize wharfs and commanding positions at and in 
vicinity of Point Fajardo, Cape San Juan. We can land and 
take position to cover the deployment of the troops as fast as they 
arrive. After consultation with Admiral Sampson, that place 
was considered best. I can land there or on one of the islands. 
One transport can remain and balance return, including Yale. 
It has abundance of coal to go there and return to New York. 
Not safe to transfer these troops to transports that have men on 
who have been exposed to fever. I hope that you will ask that 
Admiral Schley be designated and directed to co-operate with 
my movement and support my command. Will remain at cable 
station and can talk freely with you. MILES, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

In answer to this despatch, final orders, resulting 
from the altered circumstances, were made known to 
General Miles as follows : 

" Adjutant-General's Office, 
"Washington, July 18, 1898— i.io p.m. 
" Major -General Miles, on board Yale, Guantanamo Playa. 
" In reply to your telegram of this date, the Secretary of War 
directs you land troops now on Yale and other transports at such 
points in Puerto Rico as you may designate. He gives you the 
fullest discretion, but your determination of time and place of such 
landing should be made with full knowledge that reinforcements 
cannot reach you from five to seven days from this date. Ad- 
miral Sampson will be ordered to give you such assistance as you 
and he may regard as necessary. The Secretary of War further 
directs that, on your landing on the island of Puerto Rico, you 
hoist the American flag. Ernst's brigade, from Charleston, 
should sail to-day, and so should the troops from Tampa; so 
that it is quite possible that, by your leaving orders at Santiago, 
or giving them direct, these reinforcements may reach you earlier 
than herein stated, but the Secretary of War and the President 
did not think it well for you to consider them sure at an earlier 
date. H. C. Corbin, 

" Adjutant-General." 

302 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

At this time, although 30,000 troops were assem- 
bling under Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Schwan, 
to reinforce General Miles, he thus cabled the War De- 
partment : 

" Playa del Este, via Haiti, July 20, 1898. 

" (Received 8.25 P.M.) 
" Secretary War, Washington. 

" There is an excellent battalion of about 500 marines here. If 
the President would authorize, would like to take them with my 
command to Puerto Rico, as they are anxious to go and the navy 
has no further use for them. MILES. " 

To this message the following reply was sent: 

" July 20, 1898. 
" General Miles, Playa del Este, Cuba. 

" I do not think well of your suggestion about marines. We 
have army enough for our work. Do not take Colonel Humphrey 
away from Santiago. R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

After the tedious delay caused by the discussion 
regarding the character of the convoy, General Miles 
set sail from Guantanamo July 21st. Before sailing 
he indicated the strength of the command accompany- 
ing him by this despatch : 

" From Playa del Este, July 21, 1898. 
" Secretary of War, Washington. 

" The following troops are with me aboard transports Guan- 
tanamo harbor en route to Puerto Rico : four light batteries, 3d 
and 4th, Lomias battery B, 5th Artillery, 6th Illinois, 6th Massa- 
chusetts, 275 recruits for regiments 5th Corps, 6th Signal Corps, 
7th Hospital Corps — 3,415 all told ; others expected daily. 

" Miles." 

303 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

These troops were commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Garretson, of General Henry's division. 

Point Fajardo, a cape on the northeast coast of 
Puerto Rico, was selected by General Miles and Ad- 
miral Sampson as the best landing-place for the 
expedition. July 26th the War Department was in- 
formed, through an Associated Press despatch, that 
the forces under General Miles, which left Guantanamo 
Bay July 21st, had landed at Port Guanica, on the 
southwest coast of Puerto Rico. This was the first 
intimation of a change that reached Washington. 
Guanica is but a short distance west of Ponce, and 
almost diametrically opposite the place originally 
selected for the disembarkation — Point Fajardo, on 
the northeast coast. The press despatches referred to 
were to this effect : 

" The United States expedition under the command of Major- 
General Nelson A. Miles, commanding army of United States, 
which left Guantanamo Bay during the evening of Thursday 
last, July 2ist, was landed here— Port of Guanica— safely to-day, 
after a skirmish with a detachment of the Spanish troops and a 
crew of thirty belonging to the launch Funistas, auxiliary gun- 
boat Gloucester, formerly Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan's steam-yacht 
Corsair. Four Spaniards were killed and no Americans were 
hurt. The troops were pushed forward promptly in order to 
capture the railroad leading to Ponce, which is only about ten 
miles east of this place." 

General Miles had wisely insisted upon a large 
convoy for his expedition on the grounds that there 
was " nothing to prevent the small Spanish gunboats 
coming out of the harbor of San Juan and attacking 
the transports en route." 

The announcement that he had suddenly changed 

304 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

his destination caused much anxiety, as two expedi- 
tions, to form part of the Puerto Rican command, 
were then at sea en route to Point Fajardo, and without 
any convoy whatsoever. Major-General James H. 
Wilson had sailed from Charleston with his command 
(3,571 officers and men) July 20th, and Brigadier- 
General Theodore Schwan had left Tampa on the 24th 
with 2,896 officers and men. Fear was entertained 
that these unprotected transports with their troops 
might be attacked by some of the small gunboats 
then thought to be in San Juan Harbor, and this 
message was therefore sent him : 

" Washington, July 26, 1898. 
" Major-General Miles, Puerto Rico. 

" Conflicting reports here as to your place of landing. Why 
did you change? Doraco, near Ensenada, about fifteen miles 
west of San Juan, is reported an excellent place to land. The 
Yosemite went in there and remained several days. Did you send 
ships to direct Schwan and Wilson, now en route, where to find 
you? General Brooke will leave Fortress Monroe to-morrow. 

" R. A. Alger, 
" Secretary of War." 

To which General Miles replied: 

" Via Bermuda, St. Thomas, July 26, 1898. 
" Secretary of War, Washington. 

" Circumstances were such that I deemed it advisable to take 
the harbor of Guanica first, fifteen miles west of Ponce, which 
was successfully accomplished between daylight and eleven 
o'clock. Spaniards surprised. The Gloucester, Commander 
Wainwright, first entered the harbor ; met with slight resistance ; 
fired a few shots. All the transports are now in the harbor, and 
infantry and artillery rapidly going ashore. This is a well-pro- 
tected harbor ; water sufficiently deep for all transports, and heavy 
vessels can anchor within a few hundred yards of shore. The 

305 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Spanish flag was lowered and the American flag raised at eleven 
o'clock to-day. Captain Higginson, with his fleet, has rendered 
able and earnest assistance. Hope to move on Ponce in a few 
days, that being the largest city in Puerto Rico. Notification has 
been sent to transports going to Cape San Juan, and all transports 
and supplies should be directed to this port or Ponce until further 
notice. Troops in good health and best spirits. No casualties. 

" Miles, 
" Major-General Commanding Army." 

Later he wrote, in further explanation of the change 
in his movements: 

" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Port of Ponce, Puerto Rico, July 30, 1898. 
" The honorable the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

" SIR, — This command was made up of detachments of troops 
sent from Santiago, Tampa, Charleston, and Newport News, 
and it was not intended at first to make more than a rendezvous 
for the purpose of organizing the command at Guantanamo, or 
one of the islands near Cape San Juan. On the representation 
of one of the naval officers, however, Point Fajardo was selected. 
It was later found that this point was more of an open roadstead 
than a safe harbor, and, further, that it was well known that we 
were to land there, the Spaniards being thus enabled to concentrate 
their forces in that vicinity before our arrival. In addition to 
this, I found later that the road was not suitable there for wagons 
or artillery. Before leaving Guantanamo, however, I had expect- 
ed lighters, steam tugs, etc., to be sent from Santiago, and also 
a construction corps from New York. None of these arrived, nor 
did we meet them, as expected, in the Windward Passage. This 
left the command without lighters and no wagon transportation. 
The above are some of the reasons why I decided to take the harbors 
of Guanica and Ponce, where we were least expected, and from 
which latter point there is a macadamized road, which cost the 
Spanish government millions of dollars, and over which it is 
only seventy miles to San Juan. 

" We have now landed in a perfectly healthy country, well 

306 






THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

settled, and where, if necessary, a large amount of beef can be 
obtained and also transportation, and under the circumstances, in 
my mind, much more suitable and more important, in a strategic 
way, than the other point ; besides ample time will be furnished 
here for thoroughly organizing the expedition before the march, 
and for creating a favorable impression upon the people. Every 
precaution has been taken to notify transports coming to proceed 
to this point, a large number of which have arrived. 

" Marching across the country, rather than under the guns 
of the fleet, will have in every way a desirable effect upon the in- 
habitants of this country. At least four-fifths of the people hail 
with great joy the arrival of United States troops, and requests 
for our national flag to place over public buildings come in from 
every direction. 

" I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

• " Nelson A. Miles, 
" Major-General Commanding." 



General Wilson sailed with his command to Point 
Fajardo where he received word of the change in plans, 
and thence moved to Ponce, arriving there on the 28th. 
General Schwan, with his command, reached the same 
place two days later. Fortunately they met with no 
hostile ship or accident. 

The change in destination was undoubtedly war- 
ranted by the circumstances and subsequent events, 
and General Miles's action in the matter was both 
wise and commendable. It probably saved a battle. 

General Guy V. Henry's division, of which the ex- 
pedition leaving Guantanamo July 21st was largely 
composed, arrived off Guanica July 25th, and began 
disembarkation the same day. The difficulties in 
landing experienced at Siboney and Daiquiri b} r Gen- 
eral Shafter's corps were not met with here. Guanica 
had a protected harbor, with deep water close ashore, 

307 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

so near, in fact, that pontoon bridges could be pushed 
out from the transports to the shore line. Moreover, 
a large number of lighters were found in the harbors 
of Guanica and Ponce. They were seized and used 
for the disembarkation of troops and supplies. 

In addition to General Henry's division, which left 
Guantanamo accompanied by General Miles, there 
were three other expeditions forming the Puerto Rican 
command. These were the troops under Major-Gen- 
eral Wilson, which landed at Ponce July 28th; the 
command of Brigadier-General Schwan arriving at 
the same place two days later; and the forces under 
Major-General Brooke, which sailed from Newport 
News for Puerto Rico July 28th. When he reached 
Ponce, General Brooke was directed to disembark his 
troops at Arroyo, a short distance east of that place. 

The arrival of General Brooke gave a total force, in 
Puerto Rico, of 15,199 men,* and 106 mortars, howit- 
zers, field, and siege-guns. 

On July 26th, the day following the disembarkation 
at Guanica of the force accompanying General Miles, 
Brigadier-General Garretson's brigade, of General 
Henry's division, had a spirited skirmish. The next 
day the same command had an affair at Yauco, which 



* I am informed by the office of the Adjutant-General of the army 
that General Miles rendered no " return " of his troops in Puerto Rico. 
These figures are based upon the despatch of the major-general com- 
manding, dated July 21st, in which he states that his force all told at 
Guantanamo numbered 3,415 ; the report of General Wilson of July 
20th to the effect that he had 3,571 officers and men on transports ready 
to sail ; the report of General Schwan of July 23d that 2,896 officers 
and men of his command would sail next day; and the despatches 
of July 28th from Major-General Brooke and Brigadier-General Hains 
announcing that their commands consisted respectively of 1,272 and 
4,045 officers and men — a total of 15,199. 

308 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

was at once occupied in the advance on Ponce, where 
the command arrived July 28th. Our casualties were 
four wounded. The Spaniards are reported to have 
lost three killed and thirteen wounded. The American 
flag was raised over Ponce, where the people received 
our troops with unfeigned enthusiasm and cordiality. 
The small force of Spanish soldiers in the vicinity fell 
back in the mountains, which run the full length of 
the island. 

Ponce is said to be the largest city of Puerto Rico, 
having a population of 22,000, and a jurisdiction of 
47,000 people. It is connected with San Juan, the 
capital city, by a most excellent military road, seventy 
miles long. This, the best and principal highway of 
the island, equal to any in the United States, passes 
over sierras, hills, and heights. The enemy took up a 
strong position on the Ponce-San Juan road at Coama 
and Aibonito. These places they thoroughly forti- 
fied, although naturally they are well provided for de- 
fence, as Aibonito has an elevation of nearly 3,000 feet. 

The interval between the landing of the several ex- 
peditions and the 8th of August was devoted to prep- 
arations for the campaign. The forces accompany- 
ing Generals Henry, Wilson, and Schwan were 
assembled at Ponce and vicinity, where headquarters 
of the army were established. In general terms the 
plan of campaign consisted of operations in the west- 
ern part of the island, to drive out the Spanish garri- 
sons there, combined with a direct movement against 
San Juan, the principal objective. The execution of 
the advance across the island on San Juan, and the 
expulsion of hostile detachments from the southern 
and western parts of the island, required four separate 

309 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

military movements. These forces were thus organ- 
ized: 

Major-General John R. Brooke, in command of the 
1st Corps. Immediately under him was Brigadier- 
General P. C. Hains, commanding the 2d Brigade, 
1st Division, 1st Army Corps. This brigade consisted 
of the 4th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry ; 3d Illi- 
nois Volunteer Infantry; 4th Ohio Volunteer In- 
fantry; Troop H, 6th Cavalry; Philadelphia City 
Cavalry; Battery B, Pennsylvania Artillery; Bat- 
tery A, Missouri Artillery; Battery A, Illinois Artil- 
lery; 27th Indiana Artillery; battalion Signal Corps; 
two dynamite-guns. 

Major-General James H. Wilson commanded the 1st 
Division, 1st Corps. His command consisted of the 
16th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry; 3d Wisconsin 
Volunteer Infantry ; 2d Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry; 
Battery F, 3d Artillery; Battery B, 5th Artillery— 
Brigadier-General 0. H. Ernst, 1st Brigade, 1st Di- 
vision, 1st Corps. 

Brigadier-General Guy V. Henry was in command 
of what was known as a "Provisional Division," con- 
sisting of one battalion 19th Infantry; 6th Massa- 
chusetts Volunteer Infantry, 6th Illinois Volunteer 
Infantry; Troop B, 2d United States Cavalry— Brig- 
adier-General G. A. Garretson, 1st Brigade, Provision- 
al Division. 

Brigadier -General Theodore Schwan commanded 
what was known as the "Independent Brigade," 
consisting of nth Infantry; 1st Kentucky Volunteers 
(joined him after engagements had been fought); 
Troop A, 5th Cavalry; Battery C, 3d Artillery; Bat- 
tery D, 5th Artillery. It was proposed that, in the 

310 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

final movement on San Juan, his brigade should form 
part of Henry's "Provisional Division." 

In addition to the forces of these four separate or- 
ganizations, the garrisons of Ponce and vicinity con- 
sisted of two battalions 19th Infantry; 1st Illinois 
Volunteers ; Battery M, 7th Artillery ; Battery C, 7th 
Artillery; Battery G, 5th Artillery; Battery B, 5th 
Artillery; detachments of Provisional Battalion En- 
gineers, battalion Signal Corps, and United States 
Engineers. 

In detail, the plan of campaign required a move- 
ment against the Spanish strongholds at Coama and 
Aibonito by General Brooke and General Wilson, and 
a concerted advance by Generals Henry and Schwan 
over the western portion of the island northward to 
Arecibo, a small town on the north coast, about thirty- 
five miles from San Juan, with which it is connected 
by a railroad. 

General Brooke disembarked August 3d, 4th, and 
5th, at Arroyo, forty-five miles east of Ponce, and 
thence moved to Guayamo, a short distance westward. 
His objective point was to be Cayey, a small town on 
the military road running from Ponce to San Juan, 
and in the rear of Aibonito. He was to intercept the 
Spanish forces, should they attempt to withdraw from 
Aibonito, against which General Wilson was to ad- 
vance on the main road direct. In moving to Guayamo 
from Arroyo, August 5th, the troops under General 
Hains met with some slight opposition, our casualties 
being four wounded. The place was taken, and the 
small garrison driven to the hills on the north, in the 
direction of Cayey. The native inhabitants received 
the American forces with warm expressions of wel- 

311 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

come. In reconnoitring the mountain road from 
Guayamo to Cayey, August 8th, some opposition was 
offered by the enemy. The Americans had eight 
wounded. In their reconnoissance it was developed 
that the Spaniards had taken up a strong position to 
the north of Guayamo, to intercept our advance to 
Cayey. On the morning of the 13th of August a well- 
developed flank movement, under General Hains, 
was in progress, when notification of the suspension 
of hostilities, caused by the signing of the protocol 
the day before, was received. A few hours more and 
the Spanish force would have been completely sur- 
rounded. The Spanish losses have been never as- 
certained. 

By the 9th of August the command under General 
Wilson had advanced along the military road to Coamo. 
The Spaniards here were too strongly intrenched to 
warrant a direct assault. A successfully executed 
turning movement by Brigadier-General Ernst drove 
the enemy from his position, with a loss to the Span- 
iards of two officers and four men killed and thirty 
wounded. Five officers and 162 men were taken pris- 
oners. General Wilson's loss was six wounded. The 
success at Coamo was followed by an advance on Ai^ 
bonito, a position of great natural strength, and one 
which the Spaniards had strongly fortified. The 
enemy had placed batteries upon the heights of El 
Penon and Asomanti, so effectively commanding the 
direct approaches that a flank movement was again 
regarded as necessary. The absence of roads and 
the rough character of the country made this much 
more difficult than at Coamo. After two days had 
been spent in reconnoissance, a successful attempt 

312 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

was made to develop the enemy's strength by artillery 
fire, and to divert his attention from our real purpose. 
The effort to turn the Spanish right, which began 
early August 13th, was checked by receipt of informa- 
tion that the peace protocol had been signed. The 
total casualties in General Wilson's command were 
two men killed, two officers and three men wounded. 

On the 8th of August General Henry, commanding 
the Provisional Division, started for Arecibo. He 
was accompanied by Brigadier-General Garretson's 
brigade. His objective point was to be reached by a 
mountain-pass which the Spaniards had neglected 
to fortify or guard, leading through Ad juntas and 
Utuado. This movement would have cut off the re- 
treat to San Juan of the Spanish forces at Lares and 
Arecibo, against which General Schwan's brigade 
was advancing via Mayaguez. Bad roads and the 
mountainous country impeded the progress, and it 
was not until August 12th that Utuado was reached 
by a battalion of the 19th Infantry. Further move- 
ment was checked the next day by news of the signing 
of the protocol. The command had met with no op- 
position and had suffered no casualties. 

Brigadier-General Schwan's brigade consisted en- 
tirely of regular troops: the nth Infantry, Troop A, 
5th Cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. It fell to 
the lot of this brigade to have the heaviest fighting in 
Puerto Rico by our troops. 

General Schwan's instructions thus read: 

" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Port Ponce, Puerto Rico, August 6, 1898. 
" GENERAL,— The major - general commanding the army 
directs me to transmit to you the following instructions : 

313 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" You will proceed from Ponce with six companies of the nth 
Infantry to Yauco, moving by rail if desirable. You will also 
move by wagon road Troop A, 5th Cavalry, and two batteries of 
light artillery. At Yauco you will take the remainder of the 
nth Infantry and two companies of the 19th and proceed to Sabana 
Grande, San German, Mayaguez, thence to Lares and Arecibo. 

" At Yauco you will take with you all the wagon transporta- 
tion brought from Guanica. 

" You will drive out or capture all Spanish troops in the western 
portion of Puerto Rico. You will take all necessary precautions 
and exercise great care against being surprised or ambushed 
by the enemy, and make the movement as rapidly as possible, 
at the same time exercising your best judgment in the care of 
your command to accomplish the object of your expedition. 

" It is expected that at Arecibo you will be joined by the balance 
of your brigade. Such rations and supplies will be taken as you 
decide to be proper and necessary. 

" Report frequently by telegraph. Very respectfully, 

"J. C. GlLMORE, 
" Brigadier-General U. S. V." 
" Brigadier-General Theodore Schwan, 

" Commanding Brigade, Ponce, Puerto Rico." 

General Schwan's command, numbering, all told, 
1,447 men, left Yauco, where it was organized, on the 
9th of August. His orders contemplated a march of 
from sixty to seventy miles (from Yauco to Arecibo 
via Mayaguez), through a rough and rolling country, 
over poor roads, and in the face of an enemy at least 
equally strong in numbers. It was reported that the 
Spaniards had 1,362 troops in the vicinity of Mayaguez 
— all regulars save 252 volunteers — and that they 
were prepared to resist our advance. General Schwan 
was accompanied by a few native Puerto Rican scouts, 
whose service proved of great value. 

Sabana Grande was occupied without opposition 

3M 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

August 9th, and on the morning of the next day Gen- 
eral Schwan's command entered San German. Here 
it was learned that the entire Mayaguez garrison had 
started for San German, and was then moving out to 
give battle. Schwan at once determined to advance 
and meet the Spanish forces. When half-way be- 
tween San German and Mayaguez, southwest of the 
little hamlet of Hormigueros, the advance of our cav- 
alry was fired upon, though without effect, by the en- 
emy's outposts, concealed in the underbrush off the 
road. The Spaniards were strong in numbers and 
position, and were intrenched on a range of low hills, 
completely commanding the valley of the Rio Grande, 
along which the main body of our troops was advanc- 
ing. The first and second lines of the enemy were 
well screened, and his guns were so placed as to in- 
flict the greatest injury upon our troops. With much 
coolness and skill, General Schwan planted his artillery 
on the hills to the left, opposite the Spanish position; 
a portion of the advance guard moved to a detached 
knoll on the enemy's right, doing much damage with 
the Gatlings; the infantry advanced to the centre for 
the frontal attack; and at the same time the cavalry 
executed a skilful flank movement. Attacked in the 
front by artillery and infantry, enfiladed on the right 
by Gatlings, and threatened on the left by cavalry, 
the enemy was forced to evacuate his position, com- 
pletely out - manoeuvred, although he enjoyed the 
choice of position, and lay strongly intrenched, with 
a force almost equal in numbers to our own. The 
Spaniards' loss was estimated at not less than fifteen 
killed and thirty -five wounded. Ours was two en- 
listed men killed, one officer and fourteen enlisted 

315 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

men wounded. That night (August loth) General 
Schwan's command occupied the enemy's camp, and 
the next morning, without opposition, marched into 
Mayaguez. 

Although Mayaguez had been prepared for a de- 
fence, upon our approach the garrison fled in the di- 
rection of Las Marias. Pursuit was begun at once, 
but the Spaniards were not overtaken until the next 
day (August 12th), when a part of Schwan's command 
came across them, retreating towards Lares. Seven 
hundred of the Spanish force had been cut off by the 
sudden rising of the Rio Prieto. They were com- 
pletely routed, demoralized, and disorganized. We 
took forty prisoners, including the colonel, the lieu- 
tenant-colonel, and a lieutenant. Five killed and 
fourteen wounded were reported. 

A movement which would have led to the capture 
or destruction of the entire Spanish command was 
well advanced when news of the signing of the proto- 
col checked further operations. In the mean time the 
entire western end of the island had been cleared, the 
Spanish forces in the vicinity had been completely 
defeated, and the city of Mayaguez, the third in size 
and importance on the island, had fallen into our 
hands. 

The campaign in Puerto Rico was over. It had 
lasted two weeks, and consisted of six skirmishes. 
Our total loss was four killed and forty wounded, of 
which latter four were officers. 

At no place in Puerto Rico were the Spaniards en- 
countered in large numbers, nor did they offer much 
resistance when met. This was in part due to the 
clever tactics adopted by the individual American 

316 



THE EXPEDITION TO PUERTO RICO 

commanders at each of the engagements, and in 
part due to the general plan of campaign, for which 
General Miles should receive full credit. The cam- 
paign in Puerto Rico had been well conceived and 
skilfully executed. 



CHAPTER XIX 
THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

THE declaration of war with Spain found the Asiatic 
squadron, under Admiral (then commodore) Dewey, at 
Hong-Kong. Soon after the destruction of the Maine 
the commodore had been notified that, in the event of 
war, it would be his duty to see that the Spanish 
squadron did not leave its Asiatic station, and that 
he would also be expected to undertake offensive op- 
erations in the Philippines. 

On the 24th of April, 1898, Dewey's flotilla con- 
sisted of the Olympia, Boston, Raleigh, Baltimore, 
Concord, and Petrel, together with the revenue-cutter 
McCulloch, and the supply-ships Nanshan and Zafiro. 

The commodore had been in constant communica- 
tion with the United States consul at Manila, Mr. 
Oscar F. Williams, and from him learned much con- 
cerning the condition and movements of the Spanish 
squadron, as well as of the character and strength of 
the land batteries about Manila. The American 
fleet was therefore prepared and expectant when this 
momentous order flashed half-way around the world 
on the day following the first call for volunteers : 

" Washington, April 24, 1898. 
" Dewey, Hong-Kong. 

" War has commenced between the United States and Spain. 
Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations 

3i8 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capt- 
ure vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. LONG." 



In order that he might be in possession of the latest 
information regarding the movements of the Spanish 
fleet, Commodore Dewey delayed his sailing until the 
arrival of the American consul from Manila, who was 
then on his way to Hong-Kong. On the 25th of April 
the commodore had left the latter place for Mirs Bay, 
China, near by, as a result of Great Britain's neutral- 
ity proclamation. 

The Spanish fleet had assembled at Subig Bay, on 
the west coast of the island of Luzon, and here the 
enemy at first intended to await the arrival of the 
American squadron and give battle. Towards Subig 
Bay, then, Dewey directed his course. The destina- 
tion of our fleet had been conjectured by the Spanish 
agents in Hong-Kong, and cabled to the Spanish au- 
thorities at Manila, who in turn forwarded the infor- 
mation to Admiral Montojo, in Subig Bay. The 
Spanish admiral, who had but three days before sailed 
from Manila to Subig Bay, " to cover the entrance to 
the port," upon the receipt of this information forth- 
with retraced his course to Manila, " in order to accept 
there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.' ' 

Luzon, the most northern, as well as the largest and 
most important island of the Philippine group, is by 
nature divided into two parts, the greater of which runs 
in a general direction north and south, and the lesser, 
or boot-shaped portion, which is joined to the other by 
a narrow neck of land, lies generally northwest and 
southeast. The axes of the two parts of the island 
form an obtuse angle. On the southwest coast of the 

319 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

larger part of Luzon, and a little above the elbow of 
the island, lies Manila, the capital and chief city, 
founded over three hundred years ago (in 1571). The 
city is by nature well provided for defence, since it lies 
at the western extremity of the harbor bearing its name, 
and thirty miles from the entrance. The harbor is al- 
most landlocked, with an entrance of but three miles 
in width — less than half the range of a modern high- 
power gun. The channel leading to the harbor is 
further naturally defended by two islands, one of 
which, Corregidor, rises 600 feet from the sea — a veri- 
table Gibraltar — and the other, Caballo, has an alti- 
tude of over 400 feet. These islands form two chan- 
nels leading to Manila Bay, the south channel, or 
that between Caballo and the mainland, being known 
as Boca Grande. 

After the Boston and Concord had carefully recon- 
noitred Port Subig on the afternoon of April 30th, 
and ascertained that the enemy was not there, Dewey 
slowly proceeded towards the entrance to Manila Bay, 
thirty miles south. Although the information in the 
possession of our navy was to the effect that the en- 
trance to the bay was well fortified by high-power guns, 
and that the channel was strewn with mines, yet, 
nothing daunted, about midnight, April 30th, at the 
head of his flotilla, the American commodore fearlessly 
steamed through the Boca Grande, under the very 
shadow of Caballo Island. If there were any tor- 
pedoes or mines, they did not explode, and the few 
shots from the batteries on the island and the main- 
land, fired when the fleet had nearly passed through the 
channel, were without effect, and were only answered 
by the Boston and the revenue-cutter McCulloch. 

320 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

The Spanish admiral arranged his fleet in battle 
array off the arsenal of Cavite, where he would re- 
ceive the support of the two strong land batteries in 
the vicinity, as well as the three shore batteries of 
Manila. 

As soon as day broke the firing began from one of 
the Spanish forts. The American commander knew 
that the Spanish fleet was ready for his attack; that 
between him and it was a mined field; and that the 
enemy was supported by five shore batteries, which 
were reported to be armed with modern high-power 
guns. Not one of Dewey's vessels was an armor- 
clad, and yet with dauntless courage he advanced to 
the attack, his own flag-ship in the lead, nor hesitated 
when two mines exploded in his front. Under his 
personal supervision and direction the fleet fought as a 
unit. 

With great skill and resolution Commodore Dewey 
bore down upon the Spanish squadron, huddled under 
cover of the land batteries, and opened fire. Three 
times his ships circled in front of the Spanish vessels, 
and each revolution brought it nearer to the enemy. 
The battle raged furiously until the commodore was 
erroneously informed that his fleet was running short 
of ammunition for the 5 -inch rapid-fire guns. He 
withdrew his squadron for redistribution of ammu- 
nition, and to give his gallant crews an opportunity 
for breakfast and rest. In one hour and fifty-four 
minutes he had sunk the Reina Christina, the Cas- 
tillo,, and the Don Antonio de Ulloa, while the remain- 
der of the Spanish fleet was in flames. 

At quarter-past eleven the American fleet returned 
to the attack. It required but an hour and fifteen 

321 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

minutes to complete the work of destruction, and, says 
Admiral Dewey, "at 12.30 P.M. the squadron ceased 
firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, 
burned, and deserted." His flotilla of six* vessels, the 
Olympia, Boston, Raleigh, Baltimore, Concord, and 
Petrel, not one of which, as has already been stated, 
was an armor-clad, or could have withstood the armor- 
piercing shell of the Spaniards, had sunk, burned, or 
captured the following Spanish vessels: 

Protected cruisers — Isla de Luzon, burned; Isla de 
Cuba, burned. Unprotected cruisers — Reina Chris- 
tina, sunk; Castilla, sunk; Don Antonio de Ulloa, 
sunk ; Velasco, burned ; Don Juan de Austria, burned. 
Gunboats — General Lezo, burned ; Marquis del Duero. 
burned. Armored transport — Isla de Mindano, burned. 
Armed surveying vessel — Argos, burned. Transport 
— Manila, captured. Gunboat — Callao, captured. 

Dewey announced the result of his engagement with 
a simplicity in keeping with the greatness of his vic- 
tory. He modestly reported : 

" The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. 
Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following 
Spanish vessels : Reina Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de 
Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General 
Lezo, Marquis del Duero, El Curreo, Velasco, "f one transport, 
Isla de Mindano, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite 
arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men 
were slightly wounded. I request the department will send im- 
mediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. 

* The revenue- cutter McCulloch and the supply-ships Nanshan 
and Zaftro, of course, took no part in the fight. 

t The list of vessels destroyed and captured was subsequently 
amended to read as given. 

322 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at 
Hong-Kong." 



It has been said by those who would detract from 
Admiral Dewey's victory that the Spanish fleet was 
composed of obsolete vessels, that it was outclassed 
in the number and size of its guns, and that the victory 
at Manila Bay, after all, was nothing more nor less 
than the triumph of the strong over the weak. Let 
us look at the facts, as they will bear the closest scru- 
tiny. The Spaniards had the choice of position. Had 
they but possessed the energy or genius of the Ameri- 
can navy the shore batteries and mines at the entrance 
of the harbor, or during the engagement off Cavite 
arsenal, could certainly have done great damage to a 
fleet of six vessels manoeuvring at times within a 
range of a mile. The steel cruiser Reina Christina, 
as well as the steel protected cruisers Isla de Luzon 
and Isla de Cuba, and the iron cruiser Don Juan de 
Austria, were all built within a year of the time the 
Baltimore, Concord, and Petrel were constructed. And 
although the guns of the Spanish fleet did not quite 
equal in number or caliber those of Dewey's fleet, the 
combined guns of the Spanish squadron and the shore 
batteries which took part in the fight exceeded in num- 
ber and caliber those of the American ships. The 
Spaniards had two protected cruisers, five unprotected 
cruisers, and two gunboats, a total of nine vessels, 
opposed to our three protected cruisers, one partially 
protected cruiser, and two gunboats; their vessels 
were manned by a crew of 1,875 against 1,709 of the 
American fleet. This number for the Spanish strength 
does not include, of course, the forces engaged in the 

323 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

five shore batteries which fought against us. With 
such possibilities under the control of any other nation 
than Spain, the American squadron would have 
been outclassed. Yet, look at the comparative re- 
sults : The entire Spanish fleet was burned, sunk, 
or destroyed — utterly annihilated; not one of Dewey's 
ships was appreciably injured or damaged; the Span- 
ish admiral reports his loss at 381 killed and wounded; 
Admiral Dewey had but seven men slightly wounded, 
none killed. History furnishes no parallel for such 
a complete, crushing, and overwhelming victory. The 
Spaniards had on their ships, among other batteries, 
fourteen modern guns of approximately 6 -inch cali- 
ber, and twenty -two modern guns of approximately 
5 -inch caliber, and, notwithstanding the range was 
at times but 2,000 yards, still not a vessel of our fleet 
was materially injured. The Spaniards had within 
two of the number of rapid-fire guns carried on our 
fleet. 

Compare our freedom from injury with Admiral 
Montojo's account of the effect of the American sea- 
man's marksmanship against his steel cruiser and 
flag-ship, the Reina Christina, the best vessel in the 
fleet. 

" The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectify- 
ing his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 
7.30 one shell destroyed completely the steering-gear. I ordered 
to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the mean- 
while another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action 
nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen-masthead, bringing 
down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. 
A further shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hos- 
pital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated 
there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling 

324 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand 
steering-gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to 
flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. 

" Immediately amidships several shells of smaller caliber went 
through the smokestack, and one of the large ones penetrated 
the fire room, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve 
men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard 
bow gun ; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by 
another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on deck. 

" The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until 
there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt 
for firing them, as the gun crews had been frequently called upon 
to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out 
of action." 

One hundred and fifty men were killed and ninety 
wounded on this vessel alone. 

If that encounter determined anything it decisively 
confirmed the superiority of the American officers 
and seamen over the Spaniards, and from whatever 
point of view the battle of Manila Bay is considered, 
the victory must be classed, and ever will be classed 
by the American people, with Nelson's heroic battles 
or with the glorious exploits of John Paul Jones. 

After the destruction by Admiral Dewey of the en- 
emy's fleet in Philippine waters, the land forces of 
the Spaniards in Manila could obtain neither rein- 
forcements nor supplies. Outside of the city of Manila 
the country was infested with hostile Filipinos, and 
the presence of Dewey's fleet in the Bay made im- 
possible any hope of relief from the home govern- 
ment. The Spanish troops in the Philippines num- 
bered about 21,000. all of which, save about 1,000, 
were in Manila. Of the 20,000 in Manila, 15,000 were 
Spanish regulars. 

:,- 5 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Admiral Dewey reported that he could take the city 
at any moment, or that he could reduce the defences 
without difficulty, but that he considered it useless 
to do so until the arrival of land forces sufficient 
to retain permanent possession. Thus came 
about the necessity, within two weeks of the dec- 
laration of war, for the hasty preparation of a 
military force to invade a comparatively unknown 
territory. 

Although the determination to send an army of 
occupation to the Philippines was reached before 
Dewey's victory occurred, and orders for assembling 
volunteers at San Francisco with this object in 
view had been given as early as May 4th*, the news 
of the success of Manila Bay greatly hastened the 
preparations for this army. It was part of the gen- 
eral plan of campaign "in further prosecution of the 
measures adopted by this government for the purpose 
of bringing about honorable and durable peace with 
Spain." But a military movement to the Philippines 
was regarded as secondary in importance to the pro- 
posed operations in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Upon 
the receipt of the news announcing Dewey's victory 
orders were immediately issued for the mobilization 
at San Francisco of an army of 12,000, consisting 
chiefly of Western volunteers. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the War Department was already deeply engaged 
in the preparation on the Atlantic coast of expeditions 
to Cuba and Puerto Rico, the necessity for the early 
despatch of a large force 7,000 miles from our base of 

* Owing to the cutting of the cable between Hong-Kong and Manila 
the announcement of Dewey's victory did not reach Washington 
until May 7th. 

326 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

supplies imperatively demanded the solution of new 
and perplexing difficulties in the way of mobiliza- 
tion, equipment, and transportation. 

In the order of seniority Major-General Wesley Mer- 
ritt, then in command of the Department of the East, 
was ranked by no other officer in the army except Major- 
General Miles. When the despatch of an army to 
the Philippines became an immediate necessity, Gen- 
eral Merritt was ordered to Washington. It was left 
to his choice as to whether he would command an 
expedition to Cuba, the army of occupation to the 
Philippines, or remain in command of the Department 
of the East, which would include the fortifications 
and a large number of troops to be assembled prac- 
tically along the entire Atlantic coast — a detail involv- 
ing a large command and many responsibilities. As 
has already been stated, at this time (before May 15th, 
1898) it was proposed to send but a small force to Cuba, 
principally for the purpose of reconnoissance. Gen- 
eral Merritt chose the command of the troops desig- 
nated for the Philippines. 

Additional information as to the number of the 
Spanish forces in the city of Manila made it advisable 
to increase to 20,000 the strength of the 8th Corps — 
for such was the designation given to the Philippine 
expedition. 

General Merritt arrived at San Francisco during 
the latter part of May, and devoted his entire time and 
energy to the instruction, organization, and equip- 
ment of his command. The success of his expedition, 
and the clever manner in which every feature of it 
was developed and conducted, bear testimony to this 
officer's skill and efforts. 

327 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

A discussion of the military operations in the Philip- 
pines naturally falls under the following three heads, 
and will be so treated : 

1. The assault and capture, August 13th, 1898, of the city of 
Manila by General Merritt's army of approximately 10,000 men, 
co-operating with the fleet of Admiral Dewey. 

2. The relations of the American troops under General Otis, 
numbering about 20,000, with the insurgent forces during the 
period following the fall of Manila, and the unprovoked assault 
of Aguinaldo's men upon our army, February 4th, 1899. 

3. The operations since February 4th, 1899, of the American 
forces under General Otis in quelling the Tagalog rebellion. 
(These operations will be discussed only to August 1st, 1899.) 

The harassing difficulties of limited railroad facil- 
ities, inadequate harbor accommodations, and the ne- 
cessity for embarking at once a large body of men, 
such as General Shafter had confronting him at 
Tampa, were not experienced at San Francisco. San 
Francisco is a government depot for army supplies, 
and the harbor and railroad facilities of that port were 
in no way taxed by the mobilization and the embarka- 
tion of the 8th Corps there. But the question of secur- 
ing sufficient transports was indeed a serious one. 
Only threats of pressing into service some of the ves- 
sels which were of American register made it possible 
for the government to secure even part of the t >nnage 
required. The charter or purchase of all suitable ships 
carrying the American flag still left unprovided for, 
many thousands of troops. This lack of transport 
accommodation, which was only finally corrected by 
sending vessels from the Atlantic coast, coupled 
with the imperative necessity for despatching some 
troops immediately to the Philippines, resulted in the 

328 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

movement of the 8th Corps by seven instalments, ex- 
tending over a period from May to October. Only 
three of these expeditions reached Manila in time to 
take part in the assault and capture of that city. 
They were: 

First expedition, commanded by Brigadier - General 
T. M. Anderson: 1st California Volunteer Infantry; 
2d Oregon Volunteer Infantry; five companies 14th 
United States Infantry; detachment California Volun- 
teer Artillery. Sailed May 25th, arrived Manila June 
30th; 115 officers and 2,386 men. 

Second expedition, commanded by Brigadier-General 
F. V. Greene: 1st Colorado Volunteer Infantry; 
1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry; 10th Pennsylvania 
Volunteer Infantry; four companies 18th United States 
Infantry; four companies 23d United States Infantry; 
two batteries Utah Volunteer Artillery; detachment 
United States Engineers. Sailed June 15th, arrived 
Manila July 17th; 158 officers and 3,428 men. 

Third expedition, Brigadier-General Arthur MacAr- 
thur. Major-General Wesle}' - Merritt accompanying: 
four companies 18th United States Infantry ; four com- 
panies 23d United States Infantry; four batteries 3d 
United States Artillery acting as Infantry; one com- 
pany United States Engineers; 1st Idaho Volunteer 
Infantry; 1st Wyoming Volunteer Infantry; 13th 
Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; 1st North Dakota 
Volunteer Infantry; Astor Volunteer Battery; de- 
tachments of Hospital and Signal Corps. Sailed June 
27th and 29th, arrived Manila July 25th and 31st; 
197 officers, 4,650 men. Total force for the three ex- 
peditions was, therefore, 470 officers and 10,464 men. 

The city of Manila is divided into two parts — the 

3 2 9 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

intramural and the extramural sections. The old 
or walled portion of the city is strongly defended by 
nature and fortifications. It was here that the Spanish 
headquarters were centred. "Manila Intramuros/' 
as the Spanish term the walled city, has in general 
the shape of the sector of a circle. Along the north side 
runs the River Pasig, about 350 feet in width and not 
f ordable. On the west and southwest the city is bound- 
ed by the sea, but the arc of the sector is entirely on 
land securely defended from attack by high and thick 
walls, which are further protected by citadels, bul- 
warks, and moats, which can be flooded by opening 
sluices leading to the river and the sea. Strong walls 
also run along he two sides bounded by the bay and 
river. The new, or extramural, city is separated from 
Manila proper by the Pasig River, and although its 
houses and streets are continuous and contiguous, 
sections of it bear different names, as if they were 
separate suburbs, such as Binondo, Tondo, Santa 
Cruz, Quiapo, San Miguel, etc. 

About a half-mile south of the walls of Manila along 
the beach is the suburb Ermita, and still farther south, 
about one and one-fourth miles, lies Malate. Some- 
what less than a mile inland from the last-named 
suburb is the little hamlet of Cingalon. Here it was 
that the severest fighting took place in the assault on 
the city, August 13th. Still farther along the beach, 
one-half to three-fourths of a mile south of Malate, 
Fort de San Antonio Abad is located. Westward from 
this fort ran the Spanish trenches, strong in position 
and construction, and completely encircling the city 
and its suburbs. A second line of defence to the rear 
followed the road joining Malate and Cingalon. 

330 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

That portion of the shore of the Bay of Manila off 
which our fleet lay and where the operations on land 
took place is shaped like a fish-hook — Manila forming 
the eye and Cavite Arsenal the point. A good road 
along the beach following the outline of the fish-hook 
connects Manila with the naval port at Cavite, mak- 
ing the distance about fifteen miles by land and seven 
miles by sea. This highway, known as the Calle 
Real, passes through Ermita, Malate, and runs by 
Fort de San Antonio Abad. Another approach to 
Manila, known as the Pasay Road, parallels the Calle 
Real about one-half mile to the west. It passes through 
Cingalon, and where it crosses the Spanish trenches, 
one and one-fourth miles south of Cingalon, is located 
block-house No. 14, placed at an elbow in the trenches 
as they turn to the north in the circumvallation of 
the town. 

Almost the entire section of Manila Province south 
of the city, included between the Calle Real and the 
Pasay Road, is practically impassable for troops on 
account of the bamboo thickets, marshes, thorn en- 
tanglements, and flooded rice -fields. Any attack 
upon the Spanish trenches and city must of necessity 
be made along the beach and the two roads mentioned. 

General Merritt found both a difficult and delicate 
task confronting him on his arrival in Manila Bay, 
July 25th. The 6,000 American troops which had 
already reached the Philippines under Generals An- 
derson and Greene were partly quartered at Cavite 
Arsenal and partly in camp near the beach three 
miles south of Manila and only one-third of that dis- 
tance from the Spanish first line of defence. The 
troops under General MacArthur (a little over 4,000), 

33i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

sailing from San Francisco approximately at the 
same time as General Merritt, did not arrive until 
July 31st. 

The Spaniards had a force in Manila nearly twice as 
large as that under General Merritt ; they were strong- 
ly intrenched and protected from attack, and the 
country over which any hostile approach to their 
works could be made by a land force was fraught 
with many and great difficulties. But these were 
not the only embarrassments which opposed General 
Merritt. Another and most unusual situation con- 
fronted him : How to deal with the Filipinos, who sur- 
rounded the city in motley hordes, unable to capture 
Manila by themselves, but ready to take advantage 
of any American victory for the purpose of looting 
the town, in accordance with their native custom. 
Moreover, their trenches had been placed half-way 
between General Greene's camp and the Spanish 
lines, from which their position measured but 800 
yards. 

General Merritt thus refers to the "peculiar con- 
ditions of our relations with the insurgents" as he 
found them on his arrival : 

" Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the true leader 
of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite" 
from Hong-Kong and, with the consent of the naval authorities, 
began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards 
in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some 
success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed 
an independent government of republican form, with himself 
as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the en- 
tire edifice of executive and legislative departments and sub- 
division of territory for administrative purposes had been ac- 
complished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military 

332 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

possession of many points in the island other than those in the 
vicinity of Manila. 

" As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor 
offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my in- 
structions from the President fully contemplated the occupation 
of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that ' the 
powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and 
immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabi- 
tants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communica- 
tion with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of 
the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a 
position to issue a proclamation to enforce my authority, in event 
that his pretensions should clash with my designs. 

" For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city 
were pressed and military operations conducted without reference 
to the situation of the insurgent forces." 

The wisdom of this action was demonstrated by- 
subsequent events. 

General Merritt directed General Greene to arrange 
with the Filipino general in charge of the trenches 
in his front on the Calle Real to evacuate them in his 
favor. This he skilfully accomplished without com- 
promising our future relations by any promises and 
without incurring the open hostility of these forces. Our 
troops advanced bej^ond the trenches of the Filipinos 
on the night of July 30th, and constructed trenches 
of their own about 100 yards nearer the Spanish 
lines. 

Observing that the Americans had intrenched in 
front of the position formerly occupied by the natives, 
on the night of July 31st the Spaniards opened a spirit- 
ed attack upon our position, then held by two battalions 
of the loth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, a bat- 
tery of the 3d United States Artillery acting as in- 

333 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

fantry (about 200 strong), and a battery of the Utah 
Volunteer Artillery. The firing was very heavy for 
several hours, although it does not appear that the 
Spaniards left their trenches. Our casualties were 
ten killed and forty-three wounded — a greater loss 
than was incurred during the entire Puerto Rican 
campaign and almost as heavy as at Las Guasimas. 
The enemy again attacked our position with much 
vigor on the nights of August 1st, 2d, and 5th, our 
losses aggregating, for these four nights of passive 
resistance, fifteen killed and fifty-three wounded. 
During this trying period General Merritt requested 
Admiral Dewey to open with his ships on the Spanish 
trenches. The admiral was unwilling to do this, fear- 
ing some of his ships might be injured by the guns of 
the forts, and that the firing from his fleet might bring 
on a general engagement, which he was anxious to 
avoid in view of the delicate and complicated situa- 
tion then confronting him. He preferred to await 
the arrival of his monitors then on the way. 

The forces accompanying General Mac Arthur were 
unable to land until the 7th of August, owing to the 
heavy surf and strong gales. When, at last, after 
eight days' delay, his command was ashore, General 
Merritt organized his army in the Philippines, now 
aggregating approximately 10,000, into a division, 
at the head of which he placed Brigadier-General 
Anderson. This division embraced two brigades, the 
first under Brigadier-General MacArthur, consisting of 
the 23d United States Infantry, two battalions; 14th 
United States Infantry, one battalion; 13th Min- 
nesota Volunteer Infantry; 1st North Dakota Volun- 
teer Infantry, two battalions; 1st Idaho Volunteer 

334 




> 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

Infantry, two battalions; 1st Wyoming Volunteer 
Infantry, one battalion ; Astor Battery. 

The second brigade, commanded by Brigadier- 
General F. V. Greene, consisted of the l8th United 
States Infantry, two battalions; 3d United States Artil- 
lery, four foot batteries; Company A, Battalion United 
States Engineers; 1st California Volunteer Infantry, 
1st Colorado Volunteer Infantry, 1st Nebraska Volun- 
teer Infantry, 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry ; 
Light Battery A, Utah Volunteer Artillery; Light 
Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery. The 2d Oregon 
Volunteer Infantry and the California Heavy Ar- 
tillery remained at Cavite. 

The Monterey having arrived on the 4th of August, 
General Merritt and Admiral Dewey determined to 
demand the submission of the besieged city. On 
the 7th of August the general-in-chief commanding 
the Spanish forces in Manila was notified in a joint 
letter "that operations of the land and naval forces 
of the United States against the defences of Manila 
may begin at any time after the expiration of forty- 
eight hours." This was acknowledged in a courteous 
note by the Spanish general; whereupon the exodus 
from the city began, and the foreign squadrons withdrew 
from the harbor. Two days later General Merritt and 
Admiral Dewey demanded the surrender of Manila, 
suggesting to the Spanish general, as he could not 
escape and as the destruction of the Spanish fleet 
made impossible the hope of any succor or supplies, 
that he should yield to the inevitable and avoid the 
horrors of a bombardment. The Spanish general 
requested time to submit the matter to his home gov- 
ernmen t. As both G eneral Merritt and Admiral Dewey 

335 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

believed that he could gain nothing but time in grant- 
ing this request, permission to communicate with 
the Spanish government was denied, and prepara- 
tions were begun at once for a joint assault on the 
city. 

The tactical scheme of the battle on land was de- 
vised by Generals MacArthur and Greene. The prep- 
aration of the plan was in accordance with General 
Merritt's instructions, and when submitted was ap- 
proved by him. The general features of the assault 
involved a combined artillery attack from the navy 
and the few small guns of the Utah and Astor bat- 
teries, which comprised the only artillery General Mer- 
ritt had. The troops were directed to hold themselves 
in readiness to move on the enemy in front, "oc- 
cupying the intrenchments after they were so shaken 
as to make the advance practicable without a serious 
disadvantage to our troops." 

General Greene's brigade formed the left of the line 
in front of Fort de San Antonio Abad and the Span- 
ish trenches in the vicinity. When ordered to do so, he 
was to advance along the Calle Real and the beach, 
to pass through Malate and Ermita in succession, and, 
proceeding across the Pasig, to occupy that portion of 
Manila on the north of the river where were the custom- 
house and large warehouses. His duty was to pro- 
tect the lives and property of New Manila, and prevent 
the Filipinos from entering that part of the city for 
the purpose of loot. General MacArthur was directed 
to capture block-house No. 14, and, driving the en- 
emy from the trenches in his front, advance to Cin- 
galon along the Pasay Road, place guards in and 
raise the American flag over Malate and Ermita, and 

336 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

keep the natives from entering either of these suburbs 
or the city for the purpose of securing booty. 

This disposition of the two brigades, if successful, 
would form a complete cordon around Manila, sur- 
rounding the Spaniards and confronting the Filipinos. 
It was believed that the firing on Fort de San Antonio 
Abad and the trenches by the navy and artillery 
would speedily bring the enemy to a realization of the 
futility of further resistance and the necessity for sur- 
render to prevent a bombardment of the town. In- 
deed, General Merritt hoped that the city might be 
captured without loss of life on our part, and es- 
pecially enjoined his general officers to attempt no 
advance until ordered to do so from his headquarters, 
which he had established on the navy supply-ship 
Zafiro, that he might the better see and follow, from 
offshore, the movements of our troops and the enemy's 
endeavors. 

The navy opened fire upon the Spanish forts and 
batteries at 9.30 on the morning of the 13th of August. 
This was followed in a few minutes by the guns of the 
Utah battery, with General Greene's brigade on the 
left of the American line, his fire being directed against 
Fort de San Antonio Abad and the trenches in his front. 
At the same time the Astor Battery, on the right, ac- 
companying General MacArthur's brigade, attacked 
block-house No. 14 and the Spanish trenches. 

The first shots from the navy and land batteries 
seemed to silence the artillery fire of the Spaniards in 
Fort de San Antonio Abad, and in less than three- 
quarters of an hour General Merritt ordered an ad- 
vance. On the left this movement was led by the 1st 
Colorado Volunteer Infantry and the 3d Artillery, 

337 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

acting as infantry. At the signal the soldiers of these 
two organizations swarmed out of their trenches, 
passed swiftly along the beach and the Calle Real, 
and, with very little resistance, were soon in possession 
of the Spanish fort. The remainder of General Greene's 
brigade quickly followed, and, after some slight skir- 
mishing and desultory firing on the part of the Span- 
iards, occupying something over an hour, it passed 
through Malate and Ermita, reaching the walls of 
Manila almost simultaneously with the hoisting there 
of the white flag of surrender. The movement of 
the Americans had been so swift that they arrived 
at the walls of the city in advance of 1,000 Spanish 
troops, then retreating from the outer trenches in the 
direction of Santa Ana on the right. 

General Merritt had planned and conducted his 
fight irrespective of the presence or attitude of the 
Filipinos, and, in order to avoid any possible misun- 
derstanding in the future, he had even gone so far on 
the night of August 12th as to request Aguinaldo " to 
prevent his soldiers from joining in the attack and 
entering the city." In spite of this request, however, 
when General Greene's advance-guard reached the 
walls of Manila, they were followed there by a consid- 
erable force of the natives, who, by their superior knowl- 
edge of the roads, rushed ahead of our troops and 
opened fire at once upon the five or six thousand Span- 
ish soldiers on the walls of the city, regardless of the 
fact that at that time the Spaniards had ceased firing, 
and the white flag was flying from the fortifications. 
This unprovoked attack precipitated a renewal of the 
firing upon our troops on the part of the enemy, re- 
sulting in the death of one and the wounding of two 

338 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

other soldiers of the 1st California Volunteers. After 
quieting the hostile and excited Filipinos, and assur- 
ing himself that there was little likelihood of further 
trouble, General Greene moved his brigade across the 
Pasig, in accordance with the original plan, and so 
disposed his troops as to fully protect the people and 
property of New Manila. His losses were one enlisted 
man killed and five wounded. 

The 1st Brigade, under General Mac Arthur, forming 
the right, since it did not have the support and assist- 
ance of the navy, met with much more resistance. 
Little difficulty was experienced in driving the Spanish 
from block-house No. 14 and from the trenches in our 
front. General MacArthur's advance on the Spaniards 
second line of defence was made when he knew by 
the cheering of General Greene's men on the left that 
a forward movement was in progress. The enemy 
had, however, taken up a strong position outside of 
the little hamlet of Cingalon, and here occurred the 
most stubborn resistance and the fiercest fighting ex- 
hibited by the Spaniards during the day. However, 
in this, as in every other engagement of the war, the 
Spanish troops seemed unable to withstand the re- 
peated and persistent assaults of our soldiers. The 
13th Minnesota, the 23d Infantry, and the Astor Bat- 
tery chiefly bore the brunt of this engagement, which 
lasted an hour. After many deeds of heroism and 
intrepidity on the part of General Mac Arthur's men, 
they finally drove the Spanish troops back from their 
trenches and towards the walled city. 

The country south and east was now cleared; and 
to the north and northeast General Greene's brigade 
covered every avenue of escape for the Spaniards or for 

339 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the approach of the Filipinos. The enemy, in the city 
of Manila, had signalled that he had had enough, and 
the horrors of a Filipino horde let loose in the town to 
indulge in its expected carnival of loot, arson, and 
rapine, had been avoided. 

General MacArthur's losses were three officers wound- 
ed, four enlisted men killed, and thirty-five wounded, 
making a total of five killed and forty-three wounded 
during the assault and capture of the city. The Span- 
ish losses have never been ascertained. Our trophies 
as a result of the articles of capitulation, which were 
signed the next day, August 14th, amounted to 13,000 
prisoners, 22,000 stands of modern arms, 10,000,000 
rounds of ammunition, and $900,000. 

In not a few of its features the siege and capture of 
Manila is comparable to the Santiago campaign. 
The landing of 10,000 troops was made under great 
natural difficulties, resulting from a high and dan- 
gerous surf, which, as we have seen, actually prevent- 
ed for eight days the disembarkation of the troops 
accompanying General MacArthur, and numbering 
nearly 5,000. Part of General Merritt's army was in 
the trenches from July 30th to August 13th — fourteen 
days — practically as long as General Shaffer's army 
occupied the trenches before Santiago. In Manila, 
however, the heat was greater and the rains heavier 
than in Cuba, and at times the trenches had no less 
than two feet of water in them. Here, under the con- 
stant strain of four night attacks and many other 
threatened assaults, the American regulars and vol- 
unteers endured the trying hardships without shelter 
or protection and without complaint. The nervous 
tension during this period was certainly as great as, 

340 



THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 

if not greater than, at Santiago, where the trenches 
were occupied for much of the time of the siege under 
flag of truce. The Spanish army of regular veterans 
exceeded our own in numbers. A third of the cir- 
cumference of the globe separated our little army from 
its base of supplies. Moreover, the attitude of the 
native forces during this period was so uncertain and 
at times so hostile that it was even feared that the 
Filipinos might be included among our enemies. Our 
landing was made during the season of the highest 
temperature, but, for the same reasons that applied to 
the Santiago campaign, all the troops in the Philippines 
could not be furnished with khaki uniforms before 
leaving the United States. And, for these same rea- 
sons that applied to the Santiago campaign, only 
the simplest components of the army ration could 
be placed on shore or furnished the army before Manila 
fell. Although the full allowance of every component 
of the ration was on the ships, only sugar and coffee, 
bacon and hardtack could be landed, and once, when 
the surf was unusually heavy, the troops ashore were 
twenty-four hours without food. The watchful vigil 
in the flooded trenches resulted in the destruction of 
many pairs of shoes, and 300 men of General Merritt's 
army marched into Manila barefooted. Conceive the 
remarks of the yellow press had this incident, so com- 
mon in war, occurred at Santiago instead of at Manila ! 

Yet there were no complaints from those sturdy 
heroes. Every general officer who has written of the 
battle and the trying period preceding has highly 
commended their fortitude, their cheerfulness, and 
their patience under all conditions. 

Notice of the signing of the peace protocol, August 

34i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

12th, did not reach Manila until August 16th, owing 
to the destruction by Admiral Dewey of the Spanish 
cable between Manila and Hong-Kong. As General 
Merritt had been ordered to Paris to attend the sessions 
of the Peace Commission, he left Manila on the 30th 
of August, and turned over the command of the mili- 
tary forces to Major-General Elwell S. Otis. General 
Otis had arrived in Manila Bay with 1,700 men, form- 
ing part of the 8th Corps, August 21st. 

Before passing to a consideration of the second 
phase of the Philippine situation — the period included 
between the fall of Manila August 13th, 1898, and the 
assault of the Tagalog insurgents upon the American 
troops February 4th, 1899 — a discussion of the partic- 
ulars which lead up to Aguinaldo's presence in the 
Philippines will not be out of place 



CHAPTER XX 

OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

SPAIN'S colonial policy in the Philippines was 
marked by the same barbarous cruelt3 T and inhumanity 
that had for so long a time characterized her govern- 
ment in Cuba. In the Philippines, as in Cuba, we 
find events moving in the same old cycle : a merciless 
tyranny on the part of Spain, followed by insurrection 
on the part of the native inhabitants; then liberal 
promises by the Spanish government; an immediate 
repudiation of those promises when it was believed 
that the force of the rebellion had been broken; and 
finally a return to its former inhuman practices; and 
the inevitable repetition follows. 

In 1896 an insurrection had broken out on the island 
of Luzon. The rsbellion originated in the prov- 
ince of Cavite to the south of Manila, and was 
confined to the Tagals, a tribe which comprises about 
one-fifth of the total population of the island. The 
revolution was led by a native of Cavite province, 
Emilio Aguinaldo, then said to be about twenty-eight 
years old — a Tagal of mediocre education, but pos- 
sessing much native shrewdness and no little military 
ability. It should be distinctly understood, however, 
that the insurgents were not fighting for indepen- 
dence and did not make at any time during this re- 
bellion any claim for independence. They demanded 

343 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

a redress of grievances, which were indeed serious 
enough and of sufficient duration to warrant a revolt. 
The insurgents were poorly armed and could do little 
towards pressing their claims beyond conducting a 
guerilla warfare and harassing the Spaniards in their 
rural outposts. When confronted or pursued by a 
Spanish force the Tagalog revolutionists would retire 
to their mountain fastnesses, there to remain until 
opportunity arrived for further raid upon the Spanish 
outposts. 

This state of affairs lasted until the latter part of 
1897 without either side making progress in the settle- 
ment of the rebellion or of the questions demanding 
reform. Finally, the Governor-General of the Philip- 
pines, Primo de Rivera, a soldier of pacific tempera- 
ment, offered to grant the reforms for which the in- 
surgents were fighting. 

The rebellious subjects demanded : 

1. Expulsion or secularization of the monastic 
orders. 

2. Representation in the Spanish Cortes. 

3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in 
public administration. 

4. Freedom of the press. 

5. General amnesty for all rebels. 

General Rivera further agreed to pay the insurgents 
the sum of $800,000 (Mexican) on the condition that 
Aguinaldo and thirty of the principal rebels would 
leave the country. These conditions Aguinaldo in- 
cluded in a treaty signed on the 14th of December, 
1897, at Biac-Na-Bato. This treaty proves that the 
"Supreme Leader" of the Philippine insurgents was 
then making no claims of Filipino independence, and 

344 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

that he recognized Spanish sovereignty. One ar- 
ticle of that treaty thus reads : 

" Don Emilio Aguinaldo, in his quality as supreme leader of 
those in the island of Luzon now waging open hostilities against 
their legitimate government, and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and 
Don Mariano Llanera, who also exercise important commands 
in the forces mentioned, are to cease their hostile attitude, sur- 
render their arms that they are using against their fatherland, 
and are to surrender to the legitimate authorities, claiming their 
rights as Spanish Filipino citizens, which they desire to preserve. 
As a consequence of this surrender they obligate themselves 
to cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow 
them and those who recognize them as leaders and obey their 
orders." 

Aguinaldo and thirty of his companions retired 
to Hong-Kong and received half of the promised 
bounty. The remainder of the money was never paid, 
and it is hardly necessary to say that the prom- 
ises of reform were not kept. Probably it was never 
intended that they should be. The Spanish authori- 
ties in the Philippines returned to their same policy 
of cruelty, wanton massacre of the Filipinos, and secret 
deportation of political suspects, while the friars grew 
more arrogant, powerful, and odious than before. 

As a result of these violated pledges and repeated 
acts of inhuman tyranny, the insurrection had again 
broken out in Luzon early in 1898. Aguinaldo and his 
associates were still in exile. 

About the time of the declaration of war between 
the United States and Spain, Aguinaldo, who had 
been living at Saigon, Siam, went to Singapore. Here 
he secured a conference with the United States Consul- 
General, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, on the 24th of April. 

345 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The insurgent leader expressed a desire to return to 
the Philippines for the purpose of assuming absolute 
control over the revolutionary forces, and promised 
that, if permitted to go to Luzon, he would conduct 
his troops in strict compliance with the rules of civil- 
ized warfare. He also stated, referring to the Presi- 
dent, that he would lead his forces " as our commander 
would direct. " Aguinaldo's request was communi- 
cated to Admiral Dewey, then at Hong-Kong. Hong- 
Kong for a long time had been the real centre of the 
Filipino revolutionary headquarters, and here it was 
that their Junta sat and transacted its business. 
Members of this body repeatedly presented themselves 
at the American Consulate requesting that Aguinaldo 
be permitted to return to the Philippines, pledging 
that the revolutionary troops would "obey the laws 
of civilized warfare," and that Aguinaldo would " obey 
unquestioningly the commander of the United States 
forces in the Philippines." Moreover, many officers 
of the revolutionary party in Luzon in and about 
Manila had visited our consul there, Mr. Williams, 
and voluntarily gave him assurance that they would 
"swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag." 
These statements had been repeated to Admiral 
Dewey before he received the despatch from Consul- 
General Pratt at Singapore conveying Aguinaldo' s 
request that he might be allowed to return to the 
Philippines. Dewey granted the request, but Aguinal- 
do did not reach Hong-Kong until after the American 
fleet had sailed for Manila. He appeared, however, 
at the American Consulate and renewed his petition 
for permission to join the insurrectionary forces which 
were then confronting the Spanish troops in Luzon. 

346 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

Their strength was estimated at about 8,000. Our 
Consul-General at Hong-Kong, Mr. Rounsevelle Wild- 
man, secured from Aguinaldo a confirmation of the 
promises already made by the Junta, and these pledges 
were later renewed by Aguinaldo after he had landed 
near Manila. 

Aguinaldo and thirteen other Filipinos took passage 
on the McCulloch when that vessel was returning to 
the fleet after filing at Hong-Kong the news of Dewey's 
victor} 7 of May 1st. They arrived in Manila Bay May 
19th. Admiral Dewey permitted the forces over which 
Aguinaldo then took command to occupy Cavite, which 
he had captured from the Spaniards on the 3d, and to 
take possession of the arms there secured. 

The report that Dewey saluted the Filipino flag, or 
officially recognized that flag or the insurrectionary 
"government/' is repudiated by the admiral, and not 
supported by any evidence. 

The fear of the bombardment of Manila by the guns 
of our fleet, coupled with the dispiriting effect of Dewey's 
signal victory over the Spanish squadron, made it 
possible for Aguinaldo to soon gain several victories 
over the Spanish troops about Manila, with the arms 
and ammunition secured from the Cavite arsenal. 
Although the insurgents had no less than 30,000 troops, 
they were neither able nor courageous enough to at- 
tempt the assault of the besieged city wherein were 
only 13,000 Spanish regulars. This same force the 
Spanish subsequently surrendered to our army and 
navy when we had scarce 10,000 men. 

Immediately upon landing at Cavite, Aguinaldo 
disclosed his real purpose — to establish an independ- 
ent Filipino government, with himself at the head. 

347 






THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

On the 24th of May he issued a proclamation, in which 
he said, among other things, " The great nation, North 
America. . . . has come to manifest even here a protec- 
tion which is decisive as well as disinterested towards 
us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization 
to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land." The 
promise of independence here made in the name of the 
United States was entirely without authority, and was 
not given Aguinaldo by any official or officer under 
our government. Indeed, Aguinaldo "freely admit- 
ted, in a private conversation with the members of his 
cabinet," says the first Philippine Commission, "that 
neither Admiral Dewey nor any other American had 
made him any such promise." On the 1 8th of June 
he issued another proclamation, establishing a dicta- 
torial government, with himself at the head. In this 
paper he refers to the independence of the Filipinos as 
the ambition of his life ; and yet only two days before, 
on the 16th of June, Consul Williams states that Agui- 
naldo personally informed him that "his friends all 
hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony 
of the United States of America." This is not the 
first instance in which the wily Tagal made profes- 
sions to the Filipinos differing from those given the 
representatives of the United States. 

In less than a week, by another proclamation, he 
established a revolutionary government, with its cap- 
ital at Cavite, and followed this on the 6th of August 
with a message to the foreign powers, asking for 
recognition of the "republic." 

On the 20th of June, General Anderson, with the 
first detachment of the army, arrived in Manila Bay. 
Aguinaldo was requested to evacuate Cavite, which 

348 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

request he unwillingly complied with, although this 
arsenal had been captured by Dewey. Here our troops 
encamped, as it was the most suitable place for the 
purpose. General Anderson says, in an official re- 
port, that the Tagalog general " did not seem pleased 
at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, 
that he could take the city with his own army, with 
the co-operation of the American fleet." 

The change in Aguinaldo's demeanor now became 
apparent. His patriotism had been but a veneer to 
hide his ambition. He moved his "government" to 
a neighboring town in the same province — Bacoor — 
and secretly threw every obstacle he could in General 
Anderson's way. The latter found it exceedingly 
difficult to get the necessary horses, buffaloes, and 
carts for army-transportation purposes. Even when 
he offered pay for these things, the natives replied that 
under General Aguinaldo's orders they were not per- 
mitted to dispose of their wagons, etc. Aguinaldo 
himself did not offer to assist our troops when attempt- 
ing to land under most difficult circumstances. On the 
other hand, he assumed such an arrogant and hostile 
attitude towards the Americans that Admiral Dewey 
reported to Washington, "Merritt's most difficult 
problem will be how to deal with the insurgents under 
Aguinaldo, who has become aggressive and even 
threatening towards our army." The landing, July 
17th, of the second detachment of United States troops, 
under General Greene, was followed by a letter from 
Aguinaldo to General Anderson, in which the latter was 
warned not to disembark on Filipino soil any additional 
troops of the United States without his knowledge and 
consent. Of course, no attention was paid to this ri- 

349 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

diculous demand. The arrival of General Merritt, 
with the forces under General MacArthur, July 25th 
and 31st, naturally did not tend to make Aguinaldo's 
attitude towards the Americans any less aggressive. 

Before General Merritt left the United States he had 
been enjoined to make no alliance, political or other- 
wise, with the Tagalog insurgents. Hence his de- 
termination to conduct the assault on Manila without 
the assistance of Aguinaldo or his forces. Moreover, 
Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt when he 
reached Manila Bay; he did not offer his services or 
the support of his troops; and he did not assist any 
one of the three expeditions in landing, or in providing 
their necessary transportation, for which they had to 
depend entirely upon the country. There was no co- 
operation and no alliance between the American forces 
and the insurgents. Manila was taken without their 
assistance or support. Indeed, as has already been 
related, General Merritt addressed a note to the Taga- 
log general requesting that the insurrectionary forces 
be restrained from taking part in our proposed assault 
on the city the next day, and asked that they be not 
allowed to follow the American troops into the city. 
Whether Aguinaldo was unwilling or unable to check 
the troops in their anxiety to loot is not known, for 
they did attempt to enter the city in the wake of our 
victorious army. 

Immediately after the fall of Manila, Aguinaldo 
demanded joint occupation of the city. This was re- 
fused, and he later admitted that joint occupation was 
impossible. He had probably made this request to 
pave the way for his subsequent demands. General 
Merritt requested Aguinaldo to withdraw his troops 

350 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

from the suburbs of Manila, where they had followed 
our forces, and where they had taken up a position 
with every apparent intention of remaining. To this 
proposition Aguinaldo reluctantly consented, and his 
men were finally withdrawn from the suburbs of Ma- 
nila beyond a certain line, where they took up a posi- 
tion which General Merritt had indicated they would 
be permitted to occupy. Here they at once threw up 
intrenchments confronting our lines, their excuse 
being that this proceeding was necessary in order " to 
be prepared to meet the soldiers of Spain should she 
return to her late possessions." In the mean time 
the insurgent government had been moved from its 
second "capital" at Bacoor, on the south, to Malolos, 
on the Manila and Dagupan Railway, about thirty 
miles north of Manila. 

The interval between the capture of Manila and 
the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris by the 
commissioners of the United States and Spain, Decem- 
ber ioth, 1898, was a trying and tedious one for our 
army. The relations between the two forces, which 
were strained from the beginning, owing to Aguinaldo's 
attitude, now became intensified and aggravated. 
The insurgents continued to strengthen their lines, 
which completely encircled our own, and the revolu- 
tionary government at Malolos issued, with a remark- 
able rapidity, edicts, proclamations, and manifestoes. 
The time was well employed by Aguinaldo and his 
followers to discredit the motives and habits of our 
people, and a feeling of keen antagonism, founded upon 
false reports, was fomented everywhere. In the mean 
time the American troops remained quietly in the city 
of Manila, holding fast to what had been captured, 

35i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

and efficiently guarding the city, its inhabitants, and 
its property, in accordance with the terms of the articles 
of capitulation. 

After the signing of the treaty of peace at Paris 
the forces under Aguinaldo could no longer maintain 
the position that their trenches were being held and 
strengthened to oppose the forces of Spain. Instead 
of withdrawing and peacefully awaiting the decision 
of Congress with respect to their "civil rights and 
political status," as provided by the treaty, they con- 
tinued to throw up intrenchments and to mount 
guns with the muzzles pointed towards our troops. 
It now became evident that Aguinaldo intended that 
the insurrection against Spain for the correction of 
grievous abuses should be transferred to the United 
States in a demand for independence. 

For the purpose of manifesting to the native Fili- 
pinos the intentions of the government of the United 
States, General Otis, in accordance with the Presi- 
dent's instructions, issued a proclamation on the 4th 
of January, 1899, in which the Filipinos were inform- 
ed that it was the purpose of this government to give 
them " in every possible way the full measure of in- 
dividual rights and liberty which is the heritage of a 
free people," and that they "would receive the bless- 
ings of good and stable government," in which repre- 
sentative men of the Filipino people would be given 
responsible and authoritative positions. The next 
day appeared a counter-proclamation from Aguinaldo, 
as illy advised as it was malign in intent. In this 
document he complained : 

I. That he had been ignored in the articles of capitulation, 

352 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

and that his forces had been compelled to evacuate the suburbs 
of Manila. 

2. That the naval authorities had seized his launches in 
Manila Bay. 

3. That his commissioners had been received in an insolent 
manner by Admiral Dewey. 

4. That Consul - General Pratt at Singapore had promised 
him independence. 

5. That the "American General " had ordered forces to Iloilo, 
" for the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors 
of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my govern- 
ment." 

All this he charged as evidence of broken faith on 
the part of the United States, and concluded : " Thus 
it is that my government is disposed to open hostili- 
ties if the American troops attempt to take forcible 
possession of the Viscayan Islands." 

Realizing the inadvisability of this proclamation, 
an effort was made to recall it on the day of issue and 
substitute in place thereof another more moderate 
in tone and in its claims. In this second proclama- 
tion, which appeared on the same day — January 5th 
— Aguinaldo confined his protests to General Otis's 
subscription under the President's proclamation as 
"Military Governor of the Philippines;" stated that 
he had never recognized the sovereignty of the United 
States, and that his original intention in returning to 
the Philippines was for the purpose of securing the 
independence of the people; that the army and navy 
of the United States had recognized the belligerency 
of the Filipinos ; and concluded with a protest against 
"this intrusion of the United States government on 
the sovereignty of these islands." 

As a result of the threat to commence hostilities 

353 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

against the United States, contained in the first of 
Aguinaldo's proclamations, 40,000 people are said 
to have left Manila within a fortnight. 

For some time prior to Aguinaldo's open threat of 
war Manila had been in a high state of fomentation 
and anxiety. Some of its most intelligent, influential, 
and wealthy citizens had communicated with General 
Otis, expressing the hope that a conflict would be 
avoided, and tendered their services with that object 
in view. General Otis informed them that he would 
appoint a commission to treat with any representatives 
selected by Aguinaldo, as general of the insurrection- 
ary forces, but that he could not recognize the so-called 
Filipino republic. Moreover, which is of more im- 
portance, in a letter written to Aguinaldo at the time 
on this matter General Otis informed him that the 
troops of the United States were under strict orders 
from the President not to bring on a conflict with the 
native forces. 

The commissioners on the part of General Otis 
were : Brigadier-General R. P. Hughes, Colonel Joseph 
F. Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Crowder. 

Aguinaldo designated the following soldiers and 
civilian to represent him : Florentino Flores, Euf rasio 
Flores, and Manuel Arguelles. 

The commission met in Manila on the day of their 
appointment — January 9th — and sat until the 25th. 
From the outset it was difficult for the representatives 
of General Otis to secure information from the com- 
missioners on the part of Aguinaldo as to exactly 
what they wanted. They admitted that their govern- 
ment could not exist without the assistance and pro- 
tection of the United States, but to what extent we should 

354 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

exercise that protection they were at first either unable 
or unwilling to define. Finally, after being repeated- 
ly informed that the question of sovereignty could 
not be discussed, as that was a matter for Congress 
to determine, they grew unreasonable in their de- 
mands and illogical in their arguments, and stated 
that they would accept nothing but "absolute inde- 
pendence under United States protection;" that the 
military forces of the United States should at once 
be withdrawn from the Philippines; and that the navy 
should remain for their protection until they should 
order it away. 

During the meetings of this commission and ever 
since the signing of the treaty of peace, December 
loth, the conditions of that treaty were under discus- 
sion in the Senate and throughout the United States 
generally. The division of opinion in this country 
regarding the question of acquiring sovereignty over 
the Philippines, together with the encouragement 
received from certain individuals in the United States, 
through letters and messages; the passivity of our 
troops in Manila ; the declaration of General Otis that 
the forces of the United States would not be allowed 
to bring on a conflict— all conspired to give Aguinaldo 
what Admiral Dewey described at the time in a personal 
letter as the "big head." His own arrogance and 
that of his troops increased rapidly and expressed 
itself in repeated insults to our officers and men guard- 
ing Manila, where the insurgent troops were allowed to 
freely pass, if unarmed. The soldiers of Aguinaldo 
strutted about the streets of Manila in the presence of 
our troops, whom they taunted and openly charged 
with cowardice. The patience and passive submis- 

355 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

sion to these insults on the part of our soldiers is re- 
markable and almost as creditable as their subsequent 
heroism in battle. While this condition lasted nearly 
six months and grew more intolerable with the in- 
crease of its days, a few incidents will suffice to show 
the magnanimous fortitude and forbearance of our 
army. 

After the fall of Manila, when the armed natives had 
taken up their position outside of the city in a line of 
works confronting and encircling our own, it was 
mutually agreed that the officers and soldiers of either 
army would be permitted to pass within the lines of the 
other, if unarmed. On the 9th of October, notwithstand- 
ing this agreement, which had been strict^ respected 
by General Otis's forces, Major -General Anderson, 
while on a pleasure excursion up the Pasig River, was 
stopped and insolently forbidden to pass the insur- 
gent lines by one of Aguinaldo's pickets. Repeated 
and persistent efforts were made to draw the fire of 
our pickets, and, although the limits of the territory 
under American jurisdiction were distinctly marked 
on a map and acknowledged by Aguinaldo, the in- 
surgents, says General Otis, "entered far within our 
lines and defied our troops to resist their approaches." 
Under cover of darkness, one of Aguinaldo's men 
approached an American picket whom he attempted 
to assassinate with a knife. He met the fate his 
treacherous conduct merited. Another effort was 
made to kill one of General Otis's pickets while on 
guard well within the limits of our own territory, but 
fortunately the shot fired at him did not take effect. 
During the first days of February a party of our en- 
gineers, making a topographical survey many yards 

356 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

within the lines agreed as coming under the control 
of the American forces, was seized and taken prisoner 
to Malolos, without reason or excuse. On the night 
of the 2d of February a strong detail of Filipino soldiers 
defiantly confronted one of our remote pickets, well 
within the limits of our acknowledged jurisdiction, 
and there remained during the entire night openly 
taunting our imperturbable men in an attempt to draw 
their fire. And, finally, on the night of February 4th, 
growing bolder and more persistent in their efforts to 
bring on a conflict, a strong detail of Filipino soldiers 
again appeared at one of our outposts on the east of 
the city and at the west end of the Santa Mesa bridge. 
The detachment was led by one of Aguinaldo's offi- 
cers who attempted to pass and push back our picket 
then a hundred yards or more within our lines. 
Private Grayson, Company D, 1st Nebraska Vol- 
unteers, challenged the Filipino and his detachment, 
and, after giving his third warning, fired, killing the 
lieutenant while he still persisted in his attempt to 
force our picket -line. Immediately the insurgents 
opened fire upon our troops from their entire line of 
works surrounding the city and many miles in length. 
Aguinaldo had accomplished that which he had so 
long conspired to bring about. By an overt act he 
had succeeded in drawing the fire of our picket. The 
Americans had "fired the first shot." And this was 
their signal for assaulting us along the entire line of 
their works. That evening (the firing began at 8.30) 
Aguinaldo issued a grandiloquent order to the Filipino 
army, intended for European consumption, in which 
he stated : " I have a clear conscience that I have en- 
deavored to avoid it [the conflict] at all costs, using 

357 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of 
occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations 
and many sacrificed rights." 

The assault upon our troops on the night of Feb- 
ruary 4th was unprovoked by any act on the part of 
our military, was premeditated, and deliberately 
brought on by the forces of Aguinaldo. It is no de- 
fence of Aguinaldo to say that he took advantage 
of a military situation in the Philippines and a polit- 
ical situation in the United States which seemed most 
favorable to the success of his assault. The govern- 
ment of the United States had broken no pledges with 
the Filipinos, for neither it nor any of its representa- 
tives had made promises of any character whatso- 
ever. The treaty of peace which provided for a trans- 
fer of sovereignty had not yet been approved by the 
Senate, and even if approved as the treaty stood Feb- 
ruary 4th, it provided that the "civil rights and po- 
litical status " of the Philippines " shall be determined 
by Congress/' 

In only two of his proclamations or manifestoes does 
Aguinaldo claim that he was made any promises by 
representatives of this government; the first in his 
proclamation of May 24th, already referred to, and 
which statement he subsequently admitted to his cab- 
inet officers was unwarranted ; and second, in his re- 
called proclamation of January 5th, wherein he states : 
" I hoped that, once the Paris Conference was at end, 
my people would obtain the independence promised 
them by Consul-General Pratt at Singapore." While 
the secret denial to his cabinet officers of any authority 
for the promise of independence, made to the Filipinos 
in his proclamation of May 24th, would also cover this 

358 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

claim, it may be well to refer to other evidence to dis- 
prove it. 

The statement has been so often made, repeated, 
and reiterated in the United States that Aguinaldo was 
promised independence by the civil and military of- 
ficers of this government, and that thereby Aguinaldo 
was grossly deceived when he was " brought " to Luzon, 
that the allegation merits circumstantial denial to 
show how unwarranted it is. 

The only representatives of the United States com- 
petent to make promises in the name of this govern- 
ment with whom Aguinaldo came in contact before 
he reached Manila were Consul-General E. Spencer 
Pratt at Singapore, Consul-General Rounsevelle Wild- 
man at Hong-Kong, and Admiral Dewey. After 
Aguinaldo landed at Cavite he had repeated conversa- 
tions with Consul Oscar F. Williams, who had been 
the representative of the United States at Manila prior 
to the war with Spain. Each of these gentlemen, 
sworn officers of the government all, have emphatically 
and specifically denied that they at any time prom- 
ised Aguinaldo, or any of the Filipinos, independence, 
or that thej^ had made promises to him or to them of 
any kind whatsoever. This feature of the discus- 
sion has such an important bearing on the matter 
that I quote in full the official refutation of each officer 
made either to the State or to the Navy Department. 

Admiral Dewey says: "No alliance of any kind 
was entered into with Aguinaldo, nor was any 
promise of independence made to him then (when he 
reached Cavite) or any other time." 

Consul-General Pratt says: "I declined even to 
discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the 

359 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAiN WAR 

future policy of the United States with regard to the 
Philippines; I held out no hopes to him of any kind, 
committed the government in no way whatever, and, 
in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the 
assumption that the government would co-operate 
with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of 
any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said 
co-operation, it would consider itself pledged to rec- 
ognize any political claims which he might put for- 
ward." 

And Consul - General Wildman, of Hong-Kong, 
speaking for himself and Consul Williams, of Manila, 
says: "We made him no pledges and extracted from 
him but two — viz., to obey unquestioningly the com- 
mander of the United States forces in the Philip- 
pine Islands, and to conduct his war on civilized 
lines/' 

These are the statements of the sworn officers of 
our government and the admiral of our navy, and, 
if Aguinaldo had not voluntarily confessed the falsity 
of his claim of promises of independence to the con- 
traty, their statements would need no corroboration. 

But there is additional testimony to disprove the 
assertion that any agreement was made between this 
government or any representative thereof and Agui- 
naldo. The War Department has in its possession 
an original document bearing date of January 4th, 
1899, and signed by Mabini, of Aguinaldo's cabinet. 
The document is in the nature of official instructions 
to one of Aguinaldo's emissaries, and thus reads in 
part: 

" The chief of the Philippine people has not made any agree- 
ment with the government of the United States." 

360 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

Neither is it true that Aguinaldo or the Filipinos 
were ever regarded or treated as our allies. On this 
point the statement of Admiral Dewey to the Navy 
Department, under date of June 29th, 1898, is interest- 
ing. He says : 

" The United States is not bound in any way to assist insur- 
gents by any act or promise, and he (Aguinaldo) is not to my 
knowledge committed to assist us." 

When Aguinaldo reached the Philippines, May 19th, 
Dewey completely controlled Manila city and bay 
with the guns of his fleet. The Filipinos already 
confronted the Spaniards in Manila before Aguinaldo 
arrived, and by means of the arms placed in their hands 
inflicted no little loss upon the Spaniards. But there 
was no co-operation between our fleet and the Tagalog 
forces. Without any promise by word or act Dewey 
permitted the Filipinos to harass the Spaniards under 
his guns pending the arrival of our troops. Aguinaldo 
did not assist our troops in landing; neither did he 
assist our troops after they had landed in preparing 
for the assault on Manila; General Merritt purposely 
refrained from negotiating or communicating with 
him or his representatives ; and when the time came 
for the attack on Manila he requested that the insur- 
gent troops should be restrained from taking any part 
in the affair ; and finally the city of Manila was capt- 
ured by the combined effort of the American army and 
navy without the support or assistance of Aguinaldo 
or his troops. 

The evidence, therefore, leads conclusively to these 
statements : 

361 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

1. No promises of independence or promises of any kind 
whatsoever were made Aguinaldo or the insurgents before or 
during the war with Spain. 

2. The insurgents were not our allies ; they were never treat- 
ed as our allies ; and at no time was there any co-operation be- 
tween either the land or naval forces of the United States and 
the Tagalog forces under Aguinaldo. 

3. Manila and its suburbs were captured by the army and 
navy of the United States without the assistance or co-operation 
of the insurrectionary forces. 

4. The articles of capitulation provided for the surrender 
of Manila stipulated : " This city, its inhabitants, its churches 
and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its 
private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special 
safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army." The 
army of the United States was therefore in honor bound to occupy, 
protect, and defend that city from the insurgents, who wanted to 
loot and burn it, until the question of its final disposition should 
be determined. 

5. The treaty of peace signed at Paris, December 10th, 1898, 
provided for the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippines from 
Spain to the United States. The Senate of the United States did 
not recommend the ratification of that treaty until February 6th, 
1899, and the treaty did not legally become operative until rati- 
fications were exchanged between this government and that of 
Spain, April nth, 1899. 

6. Even before the Senate of the United States recommend- 
ed ratification of the Paris Treaty, while our troops were peace- 
fully occupying Manila in pursuance of the pledges contained in 
the articles of capitulation, which intrusted " its inhabitants, its 
churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, 
and its private property of all descriptions," to the " faith and honor 
of the American army," the insurgent forces under Aguinaldo on 
the 4th of February, while the approval* of the treaty by the United 
States was still very much in doubt, deliberately provoked an 
assault, brought on a conflict, and attacked the American forces 

* The treaty passed the Senate by only one vote more than the 
necessary two- thirds. 

362 



OUR RELATIONS WITH AGUINALDO 

in Manila without cause or excuse, so far as the conduct of our 
troops was concerned. 



This premeditated and unwarranted assault on our 
forces by the Tagalog insurgents under Aguinaldo 
precipitated the present conflict in the Philippines. 
The defence of our troops and the protection of our 
pledges given upon the " faith and honor of the Amer- 
ican army" rendered imperative active operations 
on our part in the first instance. After February 6th, 
when the Senate recommended ratification of the 
Paris Treaty, the sovereignty over the Philippines 
became practically effective, and without discontinu- 
ance of the conflict it may be said that since then the 
troops have been employed in maintaining the sover- 
eignty transferred to the United States by the Treaty 
of Paris and in suppressing those who, before that 
transfer was accomplished, assaulted our forces. 



CHAPTER XXI 
THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

WAR in the Philippines had begun. The fire from 
the insurgent trenches, which opened upon our lines 
at 8.30 on the evening of February 4th, continued 
without intermission until midnight. The insur- 
gents did not advance from their works, doubtless 
waiting for the co-operation on the part of their sym- 
pathizers in the city, who had been secretly armed and 
drilled with the intention of uprising when this planned 
assault should take place. The Tagalog confederates 
of Aguinaldo in Manila are said to have numbered 
10,000, but their first attempt at concerted action, on 
the night of February 4th, was quickly and efficiently 
met by General Hughes's provost guard, which killed 
and wounded sixty of the rebels, thus substantially 
checking their work. 

At daybreak, February 5th, the insurgents again 
opened up their attack. An order was given for a 
general charge against the enemy's works on the 
north, south, and east of the city, and our troops, long 
waiting for an opportunity to resent the insults of the 
misguided Filipinos, carried the entire line of trenches 
surrounding the city, although outnumbered two to 
one. General Otis's effective forces in Manila amount- 
ed to approximately 14,000, while the insurgents are 
said to have had between 30,000 and 40,000. By five 

364 



THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

o'clock in the afternoon, when active hostilities ceased, 
General MacArthur's division, consisting of the bri- 
gades of Hale and H. G. Otis, had captured the reser- 
voir, San Juan del Monte, and all the block-houses, and 
held a line extending from a point opposite San Pedro 
Macati to the bay, about nine miles in length. Gen- 
eral Anderson's two brigades (King's and Ovenshine's) 
occupied a shorter but stronger line on the south, 
extending from Pasay to San Pedro Macati on the 
Pasig River. 

The navy rendered valuable and effective assistance 
along the bay on the 5th by shelling the enemy's 
works. 

Aguinaldo's troops were severely punished. By 
this fight they learned that the pledges of the American 
soldier to protect and defend the city and inhabitants 
of Manila upon his "faith and honor" meant some- 
thing more than the mere expression of that pledge 
in words. The insurrectionary troops were routed 
and demoralized. They had lost 3,000 in killed and 
wounded, 700 of whom we buried, and our hospitals 
were filled with their wounded. The American casu- 
alties were about 250, few of whom were killed. 

The insurgents soon recovered, however, and began 
to mass near Caloocan, two or three miles north of 
Manila, on the Manila and Dagupan Railroad. Gen- 
eral Luna, the ablest military leader of the Filipinos, 
who was subsequently assassinated, it is said, by Ag- 
uinaldo's order, commanded at Caloocan the Filipino 
rebels, numbering 4,000. On the nth of February, 
General MacArthur successfully dislodged and drove 
General Luna back in a spirited attack, in which the 
Montana, Kansas, and Pennsylvania volunteers es- 

365 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

pecially distinguished themselves. The small force 
available and the great length of our lines made it un- 
advisable for General MacArthur to follow up this vic- 
tory. The rebels, however, were still aggressively 
active in the vicinity of Manila, even yet hoping that 
they could take the city, supported by their sympa- 
thizers within our lines. 

On the 15th of February there was issued from Ma- 
lolos, where Aguinaldo's headquarters had been trans- 
ferred, an order to the insurrectionary rebels in Manila. 
The order prescribed " Death to the tyrants, war with- 
out quarter to the false Americans, who have deceived 
us," and the extermination of all "individuals " other 
than Filipinos was enjoined. These commands were 
followed, on the night of February 22A, by an upris- 
ing within our lines, which General Otis pronounced 
"successful in its inception and preliminary stages." 
Only the prompt and fearless suppression by the 
provost guard of the natives taking part in it pre- 
vented a massacre too horrible to contemplate. This 
endeavor cost the rebels 500 men in killed and wound- 
ed. The American losses were insignificant. The 
intended massacre of February 226., 1899, practically 
ended offensive operations of Aguinaldo's followers 
in and about Manila. 

The principal operations in the Philippines, after 
the engagements in the vicinity of Manila, extending 
from February 4th to 23d, consisted of two campaigns 
to the north in the valley of the Rio Grande de la Pam- 
panga, a raid across Laguna de Bay to the west, by 
Lawton, and the battle of Zapote Bridge to the south. 
These movements, which were not so much the result 
of a general campaign in the Philippines as of the ag- 

366 




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THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

gressive attitude of the rebels, were practically ter- 
minated in the middle of June, 1899. Vigorous op- 
erations in pursuing and attacking the forces under 
Aguinaldo were hampered by the lack of forces and 
the impracticability of campaigning during the rainy 
season. After his futile attempts to take the city, 
Aguinaldo still retained his headquarters at Malolos, 
i about thirty miles north of Manila, on the Manila and 
' Dagupan Railroad. Between the insurrectionary cap- 
1 ital and Manila, on the line of the railroad, the prin- 
cipal part of the Filipino forces remained. 

During the latter part of March the rebels were ob- 
served to be massing on the north of our lines not 
1 far from Caloocan. General Luna was in command, 
with 6,000 to 8,000 men. A "northern movement," as 
General Otis terms it, was therefore determined upon 
for the purpose of developing the enemy's strength 
and scattering his forces, before he could be sufficiently 
reinforced to render his threatening attitude danger- 
ous. In the mean time General Otis's army had been 
augmented by the arrival of the 20th and 226. Infantry, 
February 23d and March 4th-5th, and by the 14th and 
17th Infantry, accompanying General Lawton, March 
ioth-22d. As General Anderson had been made a 
brigadier-general in the regular army and ordered 
back to the United States, Major-General Lawton was 
assigned to the 1st Division of the 8th Corps, consist- 
ing of the brigades of Ovenshine, King, and Wheaton ; 
and Major-General MacArthur to the 2d Division, con- 
sisting of the brigades of Hale, H. G. Otis, and Hall. 

The northern movement was assigned to MacArthur's 
division, assisted by Wheaton's brigade of the 1st Di- 
vision. Operations began on the morning of March 

367 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

25th, General Whea ton's brigade on the left, a column 
under General MacArthur, consisting of Hale's and 
Otis's brigades, forming the centre, while Hall's com- 
mand acted as a protection for the right flank of the 
other operating brigades. It was hoped that the bri- 
gades under the division commander could march to 
Novaliches, to the northeast of Manila, swing to the 
left, and come in on the rear or on the left flank of the 
enemy's position in the vicinity of Polo, upon which 
General Wheaton was to attack direct. Owing to the 
almost impassable character of the country, the prog- 
ress of General MacArthur's column was much slower 
than expected, and the turning movement, by way of 
Novaliches, was finally abandoned on account of the 
impossibility of moving our artillery and transporta- 
tion over that route. In the mean time Wheaton's 
advance along the railroad had met with fierce resist- 
ance at Malinta, which place he captured on the 26th, 
after a heavy engagement in crossing the Tuliahan 
River, where the gallant Colonel Egbert, of the 22d 
Infantry, was killed. On the same day Wheaton's 
command joined the troops accompanying MacArthur, 
who had swung to the left without going as far east 
as Novaliches. The commands thus united assaulted 
and captured Polo, not without stubborn resistance, 
however, and finally, on the 31st of the month, MacAr- 
thur entered Malolos, after meeting and successfully 
defeating the enemy in numerous battles between 
Polo and the abandoned capital of the rebel chief. 
Malolos was set on fire by Aguinaldo's forces before 
they were driven out of the town. The insurgents fell 
back on Calumpit, eight miles to the northwest along the 
railroad, and Quingua, nearly the same distance north 

368 



THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

from Malolos. Aguinaldo moved his capital up the 
Rio Grande de la Pampanga, to San Isidro, in the 
province of Nueva Ecija. Malolos and the railroad 
line south to Manila have been held continuously since 
by our forces. 

Notwithstanding the northern movement, with Mac- 
Arthur's 11,780 men, had failed to get in the rear 
of the enemy, it had cleared the country north of Manila 
between Malolos as far east as Novaliches, and in- 
flicted a heavy loss upon Aguinaldo's forces. Our 
own losses, too, had been large, the casualties in kill- 
ed and wounded being 534. 

Despite the fact that the insurgents suffered great- 
ly in men and prestige as a result of the capture of 
their capital, it became evident that a determined 
effort was to be made to recapture Malolos, and if pos- 
sible to check any further northward movement on 
the part of the American forces. During the latter 
part of May their activity had reached such a stage 
that it was believed a demonstration against Malolos 
was threatened. 

The arrival in the Philippines of the two regular 
regiments accompanying General Lawton brought 
the forces under General Otis in Luzon to 16,500. A 
diversion movement was therefore determined upon 
to relieve the pressure on Malolos, and if possible to 
drive the enemy farther north. This expedition, 
which developed into the most masterly, swift, and 
difficult campaign of the war in the Philippines, was 
intrusted to General Lawton. 

The first objective was San Miguel, where Lawton 
was to march, by way of Novaliches and Norzagaray, 
the main part of his command, about 4,000 strong, 

369 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

while a detachment was to move over the railroad 
by way of Bocaue and then march to Norzagaray. 
On the date fixed for the arrival of the last-named 
place, General MacArthur was to attack Calumpit and 
then advance northeast to join Lawton in an attack 
on San Miguel. 

The almost impassable condition of the country 
over which Lawton' s troops had to pass delayed his 
march, so that he did not reach Norzagaray until the 
25th of May. The heat and absence of roads pros- 
trated many of the buffaloes drawing the supply-carts. 
These carts, therefore, had to be hauled by the troops. 
On the 24th, in accordance with the prearranged plan, 
MacArthur's troops captured Calumpit, after crossing 
both the Bagbag and Calumpit rivers under great 
difficulties and in the face of a destructive fire from 
the intrenched enemy. At the Calumpit River the 
enemy was especially stubborn in his resistance. Not 
until Colonel Funston, of the 20th Kansas, with Lieu- 
tenant Ball and Sergeants Enston and Barshfield, 
swam the river and had driven the enemy from his 
trenches could the insurgents be dislodged from their 
advantageous position. In spite of the fact that 
General Luna had 4,000 men firmly intrenched about 
Calumpit, and that two deep and swift rivers separated 
him from General MacArthur's troops, numbering less 
than those of the insurgents, Calumpit fell before the 
resistless assault of our men, who soon advanced 
along the railroad to San Fernando. 

In the mean time General Lawton was moving in 
the valley of the Rio Grande de la Pampanga with 
a swiftness and effectiveness that stupefied the in- 
surgents. In succession he had taken Novaliches, 

. 370 



THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

San Jose del Monte, Norzagaray, Angat, Balinag, 
San Luis, Maasim, Idlefonso, Arayat, and, finally, 
on the 17th of May, he marched into San Isidro, the 
second capital of the insurgents captured by our 
forces in less than two months. Aguinaldo and 
his government and the troops under General Pilar 
fled to Cabanatuan, up the valley to the north- 
east about fourteen miles, while what was left of 
General Luna's command fell back along the railroad 
to Tarlac. 

A line so far from our base of supplies and so great 
in extent could not long be held by the small force 
then in the Philippines. Moreover, the ratification by 
the Senate of the treaty of peace, February 6th, 1899, 
practically terminated the enlistment of sixty per cent, 
of the regular troops in the Philippines, as well as the 
entire volunteer force. The volunteers and the men 
forming the increase in the regular army had enlist- 
ed for two years or during the war with Spain. These 
men, therefore, were justly entitled to their discharge 
after the 6th of February. Then, too, the rainy sea- 
son had now set in, and this made any aggressive 
operations practically impossible in a country where, 
during the spring of 1899, forty-six inches of rain fell 
in one month alone. The railroad between San Fer- 
nando and Calumpit had been greatly damaged by 
the rebels in their retreat, and could not be repaired for 
some time; while General Mac Arthur's division, from 
the strain of battle, which had lasted now since the 4th 
of February — nearly three months — from the enervat- 
ing blaze of the tropical sun, and from the arduous 
character of the campaign generally, had almost 
collapsed. Thirty per cent, of his command are said 

37i 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to have reached San Fernando sick. In one regiment 
the surgeon reported that but ninety-six men were fit 
for duty. General MacArthur's division, therefore, 
fell back to Calumpit, and General Lawton gradually 
withdrew his forces from all places captured, south 
to Balinag. A line between these two towns, with a 
guard at Ouingua, now marked the northern limits of 
the territory under American control. Along this 
line and down the railroad from Calumpit to Manila 
outposts were to remain until the forces in the Philip- 
pines could be sufficiently augmented to begin opera- 
tions anew in the fall of 1899. 

General Lawton returned to Manila after his brill- 
iant campaign in the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva 
Ecija, and Pampanga, and immediately began to 
clear the country of Tagalog rebels east and south 
of Manila. Soon after his arrival in the Philippines, 
during the middle of April, he had made a raid 
across Lag una de Bay against Santa Cruz, which he 
captured, together with numerous insurgent steam 
launches — the particular object of his expedition. The 
insurgents, however, had again assembled east of 
Manila on the narrow neck of land between Manila 
Bay and Laguna de Bay along the Pasig River. 
Under Lawton's direction, Hall undertook a vigorous 
campaign up the Pasig River to Laguna de Ba} 7 , 
successfully meeting and defeating the enemy at Pasig, 
Taguig, Taytay, Antipolo, and Morong, where the 
insurgents had made a stand in strong numbers under 
the outlaw Pilar — the Fra Diavolo of the Philippines. 
This cleared the country upon which the city of Manila 
chiefly depends for its farm products. The expedition, 
which terminated on the 8th of June, was immediately 

372 



THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

followed Ity General Lawton in a successful effort to 
drive off the insurgents to the south, where they were 
massing within four miles of Manila. A strong force 
of rebels had assembled at Paranaque and also near 
San Pedro Macati, and here it was reported they pro- 
posed to stand until the last ditch, as a sort of relig- 
ious fascination had attached itself to the locality, 
from the fact that in Cavite province the insurrection 
against Spain first broke out. General Lawton, with 
the brigades of Wheaton and Ovenshine, met the 
enemy on the 13th of June at Zapote Bridge, and one 
of the most stoutly contested engagements of the en- 
tire Filipino war, before or since, took place. With 
a strong force and much determination the enemy 
resisted the attacks of our troops, and finally, resorting 
to American tactics, boldly advanced towards our 
position until within 130 to 100 yards of the Amer- 
ican lines. Although well armed and of stronger 
numbers, the Filipinos were soon driven back with 
much loss and great discomfiture. The insurgent 
troops were badly scattered to the east and west after 
"a beautiful battle/' as the brave Lawton pronounced 
it. The rebels, 3,000 strong, had lost in killed and 
wounded over one-third of their number. The Amer- 
ican casualties amounted to forty. 

The battle of Zapote Bridge and a repulsed assault 
on Malolos three days later by General MacArthur's 
forces, practically ended the war in the Philippines 
during the period coming under my personal observa- 
tion. The American forces had defeated the insur- 
gents in every engagement, and now occupied the 
richest and most thickly populated section of the 
most important island of the Philippines. 

373 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Any discussion of affairs in the Philippines would 
be manifestly incomplete which did not include the 
highest of eulogiums upon the Western volunteers who 
remained in the Philippines fighting for their country's 
honor after they were legally entitled to discharge 
and return to the United States. The ratification of 
the treaty of peace, February 6th, 1899, practically 
entitled all volunteer regiments and the individual 
members of the regular army, numbering many thou- 
sands who enlisted for the war, to immediate discharge 
from the army. And yet some of these volunteers 
did not leave the Philippines until four months subse- 
quent to that date, while several of the regiments re- 
mained defending their country's flag for seven months 
afterwards. This is an exhibition of sturdy patriotism 
which it seems to me has never been fully appreciated. 
No complaint ever came from these soldiers on account 
of the hardships, ever forming part of war, or for the 
delay in being returned to their homes after they were 
entitled to discharge. They yielded to the situation as 
cheerfully as they endured the great and fatiguing 
privations of hauling guns and carts over the mountain- 
passes and through the trails of muck and mire under 
the enervating blaze of a tropical sun when even 
the native draught animals had been overcome with 
heat exhaustion. The nation, indeed, owes these noble 
soldiers a debt which I trust Congress will not fail to 
recognize in some substantial way. The roll of honor 
includes the following organizations, besides every 
man in the regular service who enlisted for the war, 
who, though numerous to mention, are none the less 
entitled to the country's gratitude and praise: 

374 



THE TAGALOG REBELLION 

ROLL OF HONOR OF ENLISTED MEN 





ARRIVED IN PHILIPPINES 


LEFT PHILIPPINES 


1st California Infantry . 


June 


30, 1898 


July 


26, 1899 


A and D, California Artillery 


Nov. 


22 


" 


26 ' 




1st Colorado Infantry . . 


July 


16 " 


" 


18 




1st Idaho Infantry . 




July 


31 " 


" 


30 ' 




51st Iowa Infantry . 




Dec. 


7 " 


Aug. 


25 




20th Kansas Infantry . 




Nov. 


3 " 


Sept. 


3 ' 




13th Minnesota Infantry 




July 


3i 


Aug. 


11 ' 




1st Montana Infantry . 




Aug. 


24 " 




22 ' 




1st Nebraska Infantry. 




July 


17 " 


July 


1 




Troop Nevada Cavalry 




Dec. 


10 " 


Sept. 


29 ' 




1st North Dakota Infantry . 


July 


3i " 


July 


30 ' 




2d Oregon Infantry 


June 


30 " 


June 


14 ' 




10th Pennsylvania Infantry. 


July 


17 " 


July 


11 ' 




1st South Dakota Infantry . 


Aug. 


24 " 


Aug. 


11 ' 




1st Tennessee Infantry . . 


Nov. 


29 " 


Oct. 


8 ' 




A and B, Utah Artillery. . 


July 


17 " 


July 


1 




1st Washington Infantry. 


Nov. 


22 " 


Sept. 


5 ' 




1st Wyoming Infantry . 


July 


31 " 


July 


30 




Wyoming Battery .... 


Dec. 


6 " 


July 


30 " 



CHAPTER XXII 
THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

THE Commission appointed by the President at 
my request" to investigate the conduct of the War 
Department in the war with Spain, commonly known 
as the War Investigation or the Dodge Commission, 
met on the 24th day of September, 1898.1 Up to the 
21st of December, 1898, this Commission had taken 
testimony in seventeen towns and cities and in many 
different camps, granting, wherever it went, to the 
citizens, soldiers, or ex-soldiers, an opportunity to 
appear for complaint or testimony of any kind re- 
garding the conduct of the war. The Commission 

* "September 8, 1898. 
" To the President. 

" I have the honor to ask that a Board, consisting of from five to 
seven members of the most distinguished soldiers and civilians that 
can be selected, be appointed by you, with full power to investigate 
thoroughly every bureau of the War Department, in connection with 
the mustering, clothing, supplying, and arming of troops, transporta- 
tion, the letting of contracts and chartering vessels, and all expen- 
ditures of every kind, as well as of orders issued by this department 
—indeed, that everything connected with the army be thoroughly in- 
vestigated for your information. R. A. ALGER, 

" Secretary of War." 

t This Commission consisted of General Grenville M. Dodge, Presi- 
dent ; Colonel James A. Sexton, Colonel Charles Denby, Captain 
Evan P. Howell, ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Brigadier-General 
John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. ; General James A. 
Beaver, Major- General Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A. (re- 
tired) ; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, and Mr. Richard Weightman, Secretary, 

37 6 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

visited numerous camps in which there still were 
many thousands of soldiers, both regulars and volun- 
teers, who were invited to give their evidence without 
regard to rank or service. On the 2 1st of December 
the major-general commanding the army of the 
United States appeared before the Commission, then 
sitting in Washington, and made his statements with 
respect to the canned fresh and refrigerated beef fur- 
nished to the army during the war. General Miles 
refused to be sworn or affirmed, as every other of the 
495 witnesses had been, declaring in substance that 
he would " make his statements without being sworn, 
and was responsible for what he said." 

Although the Commission had been sitting nearly 
three months, the charges with respect to canned 
and refrigerated beef were now made for the first time; 
and, stranger and more inexcusable and more un- 
soldierly still, during all those months, with this pre- 
tended knowledge of facts which, if they existed, 
should have been made known to the Secretary of 
War, for the protection of the army, General Miles 
had never mentioned the subject. Nor did I ever hear 
a rumor of chemically treated beef being purchased 
for the army until the general's testimony was given 
before the Commission. These allegations are as 
follows : 

" CAPTAIN HOWELL. I want to ask you, general, is that 
canned beef a part of the ration? 

" GENERAL MILES. It was made part of the ration during this 
war, to the extent of sending to Puerto Rico, as I say, nearly 200,000 
pounds of it. 

" Q. I mean by that, was it fixed by Congress as a part of the 
army ration? 

" A. No, sir. 

377 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" Q. Who fixed it, then, as a part of the array ration? 

" A. You will have to ask some one here in Washington. 

" Q. I want to know how it became part of the army ration. 
If he does not know, who should (referring to General Miles)? 

" A. You had better ask the Secretary of War or the Com- 
missary-General ; I think they can tell you. I know it was sent 
to the army as food, and the pretence is that it was sent as an 
experiment. . . . There was sent to Puerto Rico 337 tons of 
what is known as, or called, refrigerated beef, which you might 
call embalmed beef. . . . Now, if you want to ascertain the 
cost to the government of this so-called refrigerated beef — em- 
balmed beef— -take the original cost. ... I do not know 
what may have been injected into it. . . . The understand- 
ing is that this is a secret process of preserving beef. ... It 
may be that they are still sending the stuff down there. I don't 
know. ... If I was furnished for any expedition in this 
country, or any other, with such stuff, I would prohibit the men 
from taking it. ... I do not think that beef such as was sent 
to Cuba and Puerto Rico would be good in any country in the 
stomach of any man. . . . They could get some bacon, but 
that is not considered suitable food for the tropics. . . . You 
ask about food. In my judgment that was one of the serious 
causes of so much sickness and distress on the part of our troops." 

Not content with these grave and scandalous charges, 
thus made public for the first time before the War 
Investigation Commission, General Miles permitted 
himself to be interviewed on the following day, De- 
cember 22d, at Cincinnati, Ohio, when he made these 
charges : 

" The part in my testimony of yesterday of 337 tons of refrigerat-| 
ed beef and 198,000 pounds of canned fresh beef, which was un- 
fit for food, is only an item. This quantity was sent to one town 
in Puerto Rico. How much more was sent I do not know. . . . 
Yes ; or it might do for one man to try it on his own stomach ; 
but to feed an army, that was more than an experiment. . . . 

37* 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

As I stated in my testimony, I believe the action of these chemicals 
was largely responsible for the sickness in the army. I have 
medical authority for this statement, and believe it to be true." 

General Miles was given an opportunity to officially 
deny this interview, but he did not do so. His writ- 
ten and official reply was evasive and equivocal. When 
he appeared before the Court of Inquiry, to be hereafter 
referred to, he was unable under oath to repudiate that 
interview. 

The allegations that unsuitable food, not a part of 
the legal ration, had been furnished to the army under 
pretence of an experiment, and that refrigerated beef, 
treated with poisonous chemicals, had been and was 
being supplied to our army of 275,000 men, were in- 
deed serious, implying, as they did, criminal incom- 
petency on the part of the Commissary Department, 
if not wilful negligence and dishonesty. 

Upon Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan the 
charges fell with the suddenness and sharpness of a 
blow from an assassin's knife out of the dark. Gen- 
eral Eagan had been an officer of the regular army for 
thirty-six years. He had risen from a second-lieu- 
tenancy to the highest rank in the Commissary De- 
partment to which his ambition could aspire. Gallant 
and fearless on the battle-fields of the Civil War and 
the hostile Indian plains of the West, he had a record 
for soldierly qualities of which any officer might well 
be proud. With energy, honesty, and zeal, he had ad- 
ministered his department during the war with Spain; 
a fitting climax to a long and honorable career in the 
service of his country. 

No other suppty bureau of the army had excelled 
the Commissary Department in promptness, efficiency, 

379 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

and successful administration during the war. I nev- 
er entered the War Department, whether early in the 
day or late at night, and called for the Commissary- 
General that he did not report at once. I never gave 
him an order that was not immediately carried out to 
the letter. Indeed, his zeal and anxiety for the sol- 
diers in camp and field were so great that his efforts 
in their behalf, during the long and weary days and 
nights of the hot summer, nearly resulted in his pros- 
tration from overwork. The charges of General Miles, 
made so publicly and so positively, and the manner 
in which they were for the first time made known, 
seemed to General Eagan, in his nervous condition, the 
more magnified and horrible. Upon hearing them, 
he exclaimed: "General Miles has crucified me upon 
a cross of falsehood and misrepresentation." 

General Eagan had already been examined by the 
War Investigation Commission when General Miles's 
hearing occurred; but, when the testimony of the lat- 
ter appeared in the newspapers, General Eagan im- 
mediately requested a rehearing. This was granted 
him on the 1 2th of January, 1899. After being sworn, 
General Eagan said: 

" I desire to say here that the first intimation I ever had that 
this beef was chemically treated beef — embalmed beef — was read 
by me in the newspapers as coming from the senior Major-General 
of the army, Nelson A. Miles. When I read it I could not believe 
it. The statements in the newspapers were so utterly at variance 
with the truth that I expected to see an immediate denial from 
General Miles." 

General Eagan read his reply to the War Investi- 
gation Commission from a carefully prepared type- 

380 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

written manuscript. Lashed to the quick by the al- 
legations contained in General Miles's testimony, and 
in his subsequent interview, which appeared on De- 
cember 23d in a New York newspaper, his indignation 
exceeded the limits of his self-control, and in his ef- 
forts to deny the charges made, his language became 
vituperative, extravagant, and highly improper. I 
believe that, had General Eagan's health not been 
seriously impaired by overwork and anxiety, the two 
objectionable paragraphs— of 300 words, out of an 
aggregate of 12,000 words contained in his reply — 
would never have been written or uttered. Even yet, 
divested of its offensive adjectives in the two para- 
graphs referred to, his reply to General Miles remains 
unanswerable in its logic and incontrovertible in its 
facts. 

The allegation that I had inspired or had any knowl- 
edge of General Eagan's intended attack upon the 
statement of General Miles, is absolutely untrue. He 
did not make known to me the nature of his proposed 
answer to the charges. Neither did he consult me in 
the matter. He gave me not the slightest hint of the 
nature of his proposed statement before the War 
Investigation Commission. I never saw the reply, 
nor did I know its character until a copy of it was hand- 
ed to me by a member of the press. Had General 
Eagan submitted his manuscript to me, he would 
undoubtedly at this writing still be in full possession 
of the rank and privileges of the office of Commissary- 
General of the United States Army. As it was, even 
the self-prejudicial and intemperate presentation made 
by General Eagan convinced the Commission that 
there was no foundation in fact for the charges and 

381 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

insinuations deducible from the terms "pretence of 
experiment" and "embalmed beef." 

As soon as I learned of General Eagan 's statement 
before the Commission, I sent for him. I informed 
him of my surprise and mortification at his conduct. 
"Why did you not permit your friends to read your 
testimony? Why did you not show it to me and there- 
by have prevented the disgrace that is now sure to 
come upon you and the uniform you wear? You had 
no right/' I continued, " to make use of such unbridled 
language at a time and under circumstances which 
will assuredly result in associating the President's 
name and my own with such a disgraceful episode." 

The language of General Eagan could not be over- 
looked. He was tried by court-martial for conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and for con- 
duct to the prejudice of good order and military dis- 
cipline; of these charges and specifications he was 
found guilty, and recommended to be dismissed from 
the service. The sentence of the court, however, was 
commuted to suspension from rank and duty for six 
years until his retirement— " in view of his gallant 
conduct in battle upon more than one occasion, which 
merited and has received the warm commendation of 
his superiors, and of his long and honorable record of 
service, extending over a period surpassing in dura- 
tion that usually allotted to a generation; having re- 
gard, also, to the mitigating circumstances which 
were developed during the trial of the case, and in def- 
erence to the recommendation of clemency submitted 
in his behalf." 

The suspension of General Eagan from the functions 
of his office until his retirement, stripped the service of 

382 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

an honest and able officer. His court-martial was not 
the outcome of General Miles's charges, but the result 
of intemperate and unmilitary language, conceived 
in an indignation pardonable, perhaps, in its exist- 
ence, but unpardonable in its mode of expression.* 

General Miles seemed to be pleased with the noto- 
riety which his startling statements before the Com- 
mission and his subsequent newspaper interview 
gave him; for again, on the 31st of March, 1899, in 
New York City, he published, through representatives 
of the Associated Press, and of a metropolitan paper, 
additional charges. This unmilitary and question- 
able method of making in public grave and scandal- 
ous charges regarding a brother officer and the work 
of his department — charges which subsequent and 
careful investigation proved both unwarranted and 
untrue — seemed to appeal to certain characteristics 
of the Major-General Commanding to which reference 
here would be out of place. 

The interview, which appeared on the morning of 
February 1st, General Miles was called upon to deny 
under oath; and, as he was unable to do so, part of 
his statements in it were used by the Court of Inquiry 
as a basis for investigation. I quote two paragraphs 
proven to be part of the statements made by General 
Miles to the reporters : 

" I have overwhelming evidence that the embalmed beef was 
treated with chemicals in order to preserve it. I have affidavits 
from men who saw the beef undergoing treatment or embalm- 
ing process. . . . Now, as to the canned roast beef, that was 
different from the embalmed beef. The canned roast beef was 
the beef after the extract had been boiled out of it. You have 

* General Eagan has since been reinstated in the service. Imme- 
diately thereafter he was placed on the retired list at his own request. 

383 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

seen the advertisements ' Beef Extract, one pound contains the 
substance of from four to five pounds of prime beef.' Well, this 
is the beef after the extract has been taken from it. They put this 
beef pulp up in cans and labelled it ' canned roast beef.' The sol- 
diers report that the canned beef was nauseating. If swallowed, 
it could not be kept on the stomach." 

It is proposed to treat General Miles 's allegations 
specifically and in detail. His charges with respect 
to canned roast beef were, that it was not a part of the 
army ration, and (by inference) had been issued to the 
army by the Secretary of War and the Commissary- 
General without authority of law ; and that it was the 
meat residue — a beef pulp which was left after the ex- 
tract had been taken from it. With respect to refrig- 
erated beef, he alleged that it was "embalmed beef," 
which had been artificially preserved by injecting 
chemicals into it; that he had overwhelming evidence 
that the " embalmed beef " was treated with chemicals 
to preserve it; and that the refrigerated beef would not 
be "good in any country in the stomach of any man." 

He also said, generally, that bacon was not consid- 
ered a suitable ration for the tropics, and that the beef 
furnished the army was the cause of much sickness 
and distress; that it was largely responsible for the 
sickness in the army, and that he had medical author- 
ity for this statement. 

General Miles should have known that neither the 
Secretary of War nor the Commissary -General could 
legally alter or add to the ration of the army. The 
ration is fixed by law, and its components can be 
changed only by the President of the United States. 
An examination of the records of the War Department, 
or inquiry of the Commissary-General, would have 

3*4 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

speedily developed the fact that canned fresh beef (or, as 
it is known, canned roast beef) had been a recognized 
part of the army ration for nearly a quarter of a cen- 
tury. If General Miles did not know that canned 
fresh beef was a part of the army ration, then he dis- 
played an ignorance in an important matter of his pro- 
fession that is, to say the least, most remarkable; if 
he did know that canned fresh beef was a recognized 
part of the ration, then his allegation to the contrary 
is so much the more reprehensible. 

On the 1st of August, 1878, canned fresh beef first 
became a part of the travel ration of the United States 
army, then under the command of General Sherman, 
and while the Honorable George W. McCrary was 
Secretary of War. This fact was made known in a 
public order issued by the War Department : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Adjutant-General's Office, 

" Washington, August 1, 1878. 
" General Orders No. 59. 

" By direction of the Secretary of War the following order is 
published to the army : 

" 1. The following issues may be made to troops travelling 
upon cars or transports, or in the field, when it is impracticable 
to cook their rations — viz : Seventy-five pounds of canned fresh 
or corned beef, and sixteen three-pound cans or six one-gallon 
cans of baked beans, or fifteen pounds of cheese per hundred 
rations — the issues of canned beef to be in lieu of the meat, and 
the beans and cheese in lieu of the vegetable ration authorized 
by existing regulations and orders. None of the above-mentioned 
articles will be sold by companies or detachments as savings. 

" By command of General Sherman: 

" E. D. TOWNSEND, 

" Adjutant-General." 
38.S 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Canned fresh beef was again specifically referred to 
in General Orders, under dates of November, 1879, 
of September 28th, 1881, January 19th, 1888, and Feb- 
ruary 8th, 1888. The last-mentioned order changed 
the Army Regulations and included in those regula- 
tions a reference to canned fresh beef : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Adjutant-General's Office, 

" Washington, February 8, 1888. 
" General Orders No. 8. 

" By direction of the Secretary of War, paragraph 2150 of the 
regulations is amended to read as follows : 

" 2150. A ration is the established daily allowance of food for 
one person. For the United States army it is now composed 
as follows : Twelve ounces of pork or bacon or canned beef (fresh 
or corned), or one pound and four ounces of fresh beef, or twenty- 
two ounces of salt beef ; eighteen ounces of soft bread or flour, or 
sixteen ounces of hard bread, or one pound and four ounces of 
corn meal. To every 100 rations, fifteen pounds of beans or 
pease, or ten pounds of rice or hominy ; ten pounds of green coffee 
or eight pounds of roasted (or roasted and ground) coffee, or two 
pounds of tea ; fifteen pounds of sugar ; four quarts of vinegar ; 
one pound and eight ounces of adamantine or star candles ; four 
pounds of soap ; four pounds of salt ; four ounces of pepper ; and 
to troops in the field, when necessary, four pounds of yeast powder 
to the 100 rations of flour. 

" By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan, 

"R. C. Drum, 

" Adjutant-General." 

The statements of General Miles, that canned fresh 
beef was not a part of the army ration, and that it was 
issued as the "pretence of an experiment/ ' were not 
only contrary to fact, but were made absolute^ with- 
out a particle of evidence or excuse. If General Miles 
really believed his serious charges, his conduct is all 

386 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

the more blameworthy, in that he apparently made no 
effort to assure himself of their truthfulness, nor to re- 
port them to the Secretary of War before publicly utter- 
ing them. 

If we are to believe written evidence to the contrary, 
it does not appear that General Miles was even honest 
in making his dilatory charges that the tinned beef 
was issued as the "pretence of an experiment," and 
that it was not a part of the ration. On the 17th of 
June, 1898, his most confidential staff officer signed 
a letter by " direction of the Major-General Command- 
ing the army/' instructing the depot commissary at 
Tampa to furnish to General Nunez 10,644 pounds of 
canned roast beef, to be issued from the " subsistence 
stores of the army." If we are to accept the reading 
of this letter as correct, it proves that General Miles 
knew that canned fresh beef was a part of the ration; 
that he knew there was a large quantity of it at Tampa 
for issue to the troops; and that he so far approved 
of its use as to direct that the ration be furnished in 
large quantities to our allies. The letter is as follows : 

Headquarters of the Army, 

" Tampa, Fla., June 17, 1898. 
" Major A. L. Smith, Department Commissary, Tampa, Florida. 
" SIR, — The Major-General Commanding directs that you 
transfer to General Nunez, of the Cuban army, on board the 
steamer Florida, at Port Tampa, for issue to the insurgent forces, 
the following subsistence stores : 

Lbs. 
48 barrels Pork 9.6oo 

336 crates Bacon 67,275 

19 cases Beef, Canned, Boiled No. 4 . . . 456 

37 " Beef, Canned, Roasted No. 6 . . . 444 

406 " Beef, Canned, Roasted No. 2 . . 9,744 

387 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Lbs. 

159 barrels Corn Meal 31,164 

189 sacks Beans 18,900 

(176 barrels.) 

3 sacks Potatoes 48,760 

22 " Green Coffee 3,330 

24 " Sugar (issued) 2,400 

" Yours very respectfully, F. MlCHLER, 

" Assistant Adjutant-General." 

It was never intended by the Commissary Depart- 
ment that canned beef should be used other than as 
an emergency or travel ration. General Eagan's 
predecessors in office had, twenty years before the 
Spanish-American War, highly recommended its use, 
and it had been officially included in the regular travel 
ration. Canned fresh beef has, ever since the Civil 
War, been a part of the regular navy ration, 500,000 
pounds of this food having been used annually in our 
navy before the war with Spain. For years, large 
quantities of canned fresh beef have been shipped to 
the European armies, France alone purchasing 25,- 
000,000 pounds of one firm in the United States, while 
Great Britain has secured from the same establish- 
ment, for her army and navy, no less than from 10,- 
000,000 to 15,000,000 pounds. With a legal warrant 
for its use, the approval of at least two previous com- 
missaries-general, its extended use abroad, and its 
large consumption in our own navy, General Eagan 
was certainly fortified in his belief that it could be ef- 
ficaciously used by our troops. Moreover, the present 
Commissary-General, then Colonel J. F. Weston, in 
a letter to General Eagan, under date of March 24th, 
1898, thus refers to canned fresh beef : 

" The Armour Company is putting up a roast beef and boiled 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

beef canned. It is from strips, and about what I wanted so far 
as process, but not so good, as it does not include the whole ; still 
it is good. I have made hash, also stew, from it that was fit for 
the immortal gods and not beneath the notice of a general, using 
a little bacon, potatoes, onions, flour, and condiments ; just what 
a soldier has. It makes a good, palatable, hearty meal, and I 
am entirely safe in saying that we, in this way, can furnish fresh 
beef to any number of men concentrated in Florida or Cuba at 
about 10.5 cents per pound. It will not be steak, or choice roast ; 
still it will be fresh beef. It can be furnished without loss, and 
that is more than can be said of cattle on the hoof or in refrigera- 
tor cars ; it will be healthful, which is not the case if killed at once ; 
a necessity if furnished on the hoof. To me it presents a solution 
of a difficult problem, a problem that must be met; there is no 
substitute." 

Fresh canned beef was preferred over corned canned 
beef, because of the fact that the salt in the latter pro- 
duces thirst — a decided objection in a tropical country ; 
but the tinned beef should have been used only when 
cooked with vegetables and properly seasoned. In 
this statement lies the secret of the source of complaint 
against canned fresh beef. The only fault found 
with the ration was that it was unpalatable when 
served without additional cooking and without vege- 
tables and condiments. The ration was not used to 
any great extent in the camps in the United States, 
but only on the transports to Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
and for a short time in Cuba by part of Shafter's army 
in the trenches, where objection to its use could also be 
raised on account of the inability to cook and serve it 
suitably. A few issues were also made in Puerto Rico. 
And yet, despite the improper preparation of the food, 
owing to unavoidable circumstances resulting from 
military necessity, no complaints of its unpalatability 

389 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

reached the War Department. The chief commissary 
of the Shafter expedition testified under oath that, 
while he was in Cuba, he " never heard a single, soli- 
tary complaint." General Shafter testified to prac- 
tically the same effect; and the chief surgeon of the 
5th Corps says that there did not come to him any 
complaint of the use of the tinned beef. 

While General Miles's charges that canned fresh 
beef was not a part of the legal ration, and that it was 
furnished as a pretence of experiment, could be and 
were so easily disproven by records and incontrovert- 
ible facts — of which he could have readily been made 
cognizant, had he been as thorough in his prior in- 
vestigations as he had been positive in his charges — 
his allegation that the meat was the "pulp" from 
which the extract of beef had been taken, while not 
believed, required painstaking and careful investiga- 
tion. It was immediately determined that no expense 
or effort should be spared to ascertain the truth or 
falsity of this charge. The most expert and scientific 
men in the country were, therefore, employed by the 
government to further the investigation — such prrysio- 
logical chemists as Professor R. H. Chittenden, of 
Yale, and Professor W. 0. Atwater, of Wesleyan Uni- 
versity, as well as Dr. W. D. Bigelow, a chemist in the 
United States Department of Agriculture. 

The Court of Inquiry visited several of the large 
packing-houses, accompanied by Dr. Bigelow. The 
results of personal examinations and of the investiga- 
tions of the experts employed, conclusively showed 
that there was not one jot or tittle of evidence or ex- 
cuse for the statement that canned fresh beef was the 
pulp after the beef extract had been removed. The 

390 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

methods obtaining in all packing-houses for the prep- 
aration of this product are practically the same. After 
passing an inspection by the officials of the Agricult- 
ural Department, representing the government at all 
of these establishments, the beef is cut up into small 
sections, boiled for fifteen or twenty minutes, placed 
in cans, after the tendons and gristle have been cut 
away, sealed, subjected to a sterilization process, 
under a temperature of 215 to 225 ° Fahrenheit, 
for two or three hours, then punctured to allow 
the gas to escape, and again sealed. This process 
does not extract any of the nutritive or muscle-forming 
elements of the meat, the only losses incurred in it 
being "water, fat, soluble ash, and meat bases. Of 
these the fat is useful in supplying fuel for body-heat, 
and the meat bases have some value as a tonic."* In- 
stead of being "pulp/' or residuum of any character 
whatsoever, canned fresh beef is a concentrated 
product. 

While General Miles's specifications did not include 
any statements regarding the use of preservatives in 
the tinned meat, a number of cans sent to Havana, 
Santiago, and Puerto Rico with the army were fur- 
nished by General Miles and carefulfy analyzed. No 
trace of any preservatives or chemicals were found in 
them. 

The imputations with respect to canned fresh beef 
were most carefully and thoroughly examined and 
reported upon by two impartial tribunals, one being 
composed of eminent citizens, ex-soldiers, and a dis- 
tinguished general officer of the regular army (I refer 

* Report of Dr. W. D. Bigelow, Assistant Chemist, U. S. Depart- 
ment of Agriculture. 

391 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to the War Investigation Commission) ; the other, the 
Court of Inquiry, consisting wholly of officers of the 
regular army of high rank and unimpeachable integ- 
rity, especially assembled to investigate this question. 
There was no subject to which the Dodge Commission 
devoted more time or more thoroughly investigated 
than the assertions of the senior Major-General of the 
army. This Commission personally visited many 
large camps and numerous cities, receiving and court- 
ing testimony on this important matter wherever it 
went. The Court of Inquiry was even more thorough 
in its research; its visits included the large packing- 
houses where the canned meat is prepared. What did 
these tribunals find? That there was no foundation 
for the charge that canned fresh beef was not a part of 
the ration, nor that it had been furnished as the pre- 
tence of experiment, nor that it was the pulp from beef. 
The Court of Inquiry properly found that canned 
fresh beef was an unpalatable ration, without condi- 
ments, when not cooked and when not served with 
vegetables. In the haste under which the Santiago 
expedition left Tampa, proper provision for cooking 
the food of the men on the transports seems to have 
been either neglected or impossible. General Miles 
arrived at Tampa on June 1st, for the purpose of ren- 
dering such assistance to the commanding general 
of the Santiago expedition as his military experience 
and high rank could or was supposed to give. He 
was the special representative of the President and 
War Department, delegated to overlook that expedition 
and assist in its preparation and embarkation. He 
remained at Tampa until June 15th, the day after 
the 5th Corps sailed. During his stay at Tampa, 

392 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

there arrived there no less than twenty days' rations 
— for Shafter's army of nearly 17,000 — of canned 
fresh beef alone, or fifty car-loads. If General Miles 
did not look into the question of food for the Santiago 
expedition ; if he did not consult with the commanding 
general of that expedition concerning the ration to 
be taken with the troops and its method of prep- 
aration; if he did not consult with the chief com- 
missary of that expedition concerning this im- 
portant feature of the campaign, he was as culpable 
as though he had failed to inspect all other important 
matters, such as ammunition, transportation, etc., 
and he must share whatever responsibility attached 
to the use of the canned fresh beef on the transports. 
There was no shortage in vegetables, since nearly 
2,000,000 rations of potatoes, onions, and canned to- 
matoes were shipped to Cuba with General Shafter's 
army; and, before the end of July, this supply had 
been increased to nearly 4,000,000 rations of vegeta- 
bles. The unexpected delay of eight days on the 
transports off Tampa, resulting from the fright of the 
ghost fleet, prolonged the use of the canned beef on 
the transports and intensified the dislike for it, which 
was created by improper cooking facilities and lack of 
accessibility to the vegetables. 

The use of the ration in the trenches before Santiago 
has never been fully explained. While only part of 
the army used canned fresh beef during the siege, it 
seems strange that any regimental commissary should 
have drawn it at Siboney if, after its use on the trans- 
ports, the troops objected to it, and when there was 
plenty of bacon available. No less than 1,230,317 
rations of bacon were at Siboney and on the trans- 

393 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ports off shore. The men in the trenches were con- 
fronted with the same unfavorable conditions which 
had already attended the use of the beef ration on the 
transports. It could not be properly cooked, and the 
difficulties of communication between Siboney and 
the Santiago trenches made it impossible to transport 
any large quantities of vegetables before July 17th. 

Besides finding that canned fresh beef was unsuit- 
able when not cooked with vegetables, the Court of 
Inquiry also expressed the opinion that the purchase 
of 7,000,000 rations by the Commissary-General, during 
the first two months of the war with Spain, was a 
" colossal error for which there is no palliation." This, 
of course, is a question for judgment as between the 
Court of Inquiry and General Eagan. The latter has 
stated, however, that 7,000,000 rations would pro- 
vision a force of 275,000 men, for which it was pur- 
chased, for only twenty-five and five-eleventh days. 
No canned fresh beef was purchased after June. The 
entire force of the army was intended to be used in 
active military operations, its disposal to depend on 
the development of the war. It was expected that at 
least a large portion of this force would constitute 
armies of invasion. Under these conditions, travel 
rations must be provided. The Commissary-General 
was by law confined to canned fresh beef, or corned 
beef, as the meat component to the travel ration. At 
the time this quantity of canned fresh beef was pur- 
chased, the investment of Havana by an army of 70,- 
000 was in contemplation, besides expeditions to the 
south coast of Cuba, to Puerto Rico, and to the Philip- 
pines. It was also proposed to open up communica- 
tion with the insurgent army, then estimated at 100,- 

394 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

000, and to feed them, as well as the thousands of 
Cuban reconcentrados, whose numbers were at that 
time greatly overestimated. The ration was not a 
perishable article, and I do not think that the expres- 
sion "colossal error," as applied to this purchase, was 
entirely warranted. Moreover, the Navy Department, 
for its force of 13,121 officers and men, prior to the war, 
purchased annually 500,000 pounds, or 667,000 rations, 
of this same canned beef. This would be at the rate 
of 14,000,000 rations a year for a naval force the 
size of the army during the war. Again, the War 
Department is now* sending to the Philippines 160,000 
rations of canned fresh beef a month, for a force some- 
thing less than 70,000! This is at the rate of approx- 
imately 2,000,000 rations a year for a force about one- 
fourth the size of the army for which General Eagan 
provided 7,000,000 rations during the war with Spain, 
when he expected to feed, and did feed, also our Cuban 
allies, besides many starving Cuban reconcentrados. 
The most optimistic estimate fixed the duration of the 
war with Spain at hardly less than a year. That the war 
was fought out in three months should not be charged 
up against General Eagan's forethoughtfulness, es- 
pecially since nearly all of the canned beef purchased 
by him has been consumed by the army.t thereby caus- 
ing the government no financial loss in the matter. 

General Miles 's charges with respect to refrigerated 
beef were much more serious than his imputations 
regarding canned beef. His allegations, in substance, 
were that the beef furnished the army had been ar- 

* November, 1900. 

t Some was distributed to the destitute Cubans. A few cans were 
spoiled as a result of being punctured and letting in air, less than 
one-half of one per cent, in all. 

395 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

tificially preserved by injecting into it chemicals which 
were injurious to health; that he had overwhelming 
proof that this "embalmed beef" had been treated 
with chemicals; and that the refrigerated beef, such 
as was furnished our army, would not be "good in 
any country in the stomach of any man/' It is signif- 
icant to observe, at the outset, that the War Investi- 
gation Commission says: "Of the witnesses ex- 
amined by this Commission, General Miles and Dr. 
Daly are the only ones who make this charge" of 
chemically treated beef. Astounding as this state- 
ment may seem, General Miles did not base his al- 
legations upon personal experience or submit any 
proof in support of them. His startling and scan- 
dalous accusations appear to have been based en- 
tirely upon the verbal statements of Dr. W. H. Daly, a 
volunteer major and surgeon upon his staff during 
the war with Spain, and upon a single letter subse- 
quently sent him by Dr. Daly. The letter is as follows : 

"Washington, D. C, September 21* 1898. 
" TJie Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, 
Washington, D. C. 

" SIR, — I have the honor to report, in the interest of the service, 
that in the several inspections I made in the various camps and 
troop-ships at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga, and Puerto 
Rico, that I found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved with 
secret chemicals, which destroys its natural flavor, and which 
I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops. 

" While on duty at headquarters of the army at Tampa at the 
time of the embarkation of the ' Shafter expedition,' Colonel 
Weston, the efficient chief commissary, showed me a quarter of 
beef that had already, as a test, been sixty hours in the sun with* 

* Dr. Daly claimed in his evidence before the War Investigation 
Commission that this letter should have been dated October 21. 

396 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

out being perceptibly tainted, so far as the sense of smell could 
detect. 

"It is impossible to keep fresh beef so long untainted in the 
sun in that climate without the use of deleterious preservatives, 
such as boric acid, salicylic acid, or nitrate potash, injected into 
it in quantities liable to be hurtful to the health of the consumer. 

" At Ponce, Puerto Rico, much of the beef I examined arriving 
on the transports from the United States was also of the same 
character, being apparently preserved by injecting chemicals to 
aid deficient cold storage. 

" Where efficient cold storage is impossible transporting beef 
alive is the method that should receive the fullest consideration 
by the government as being safest for the health of the consumer. 
When detailed to take charge of the transport Panama, for con- 
veying convalescents to the United States, I obtained 2,000 pounds 
of fresh beef from the commissary at Ponce. It looked well, but 
had an odor similar to that of a dead human body after being 
injected with preservatives, and it tasted when first cooked like 
decomposed boric acid, while, after standing a day for further in- 
spection, it became so bitter, nauseous, and unpalatable as to 
be quite impossible for use. I was therefore obliged, owing to 
its condition, and the just complaints of the sick about it, and 
the disgustingly sickening odor it emitted when being cooked, and 
its mawkish, flat taste when served, and the safety of my patients 
— 255 convalescent soldiers on board — to organize a board of 
survey, condemn and throw 1,500 pounds, all we had, over- 
board ; consequently the convalescents were entirely without 
much-needed fresh beef, making the duty of bringing the men 
to the United State:, in an improved condition a very difficult 
matter. 

" In my inspection of the 4th United States Volunteer Infantry 
at Jacksonville recently I observed the same odor and taste upon 
the fresh beef, but not so marked, and at camp of 6th United States 
Volunteer In r antry at Chickamauga I also, at several inspections, 
observed it markedly. I there inspected a lot of beef just issued 
to that regiment, and, while it looked well, was of a sickening 
odor, like a human body dead of disease and injected with pre- 
servatives, and when cooked was quite unpalatable, consequently 
likely to prove an efficient cause of ill-health. The men complain- 

397 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ed of its insipid and mawkish flavor that high seasoning could 
not conceal. 

" Believing that the Commissary Department has been im- 
posed upon by the misdirected commercial spirit of persons fur- 
nishing beef, I respectfully recommend that the matter be in- 
vestigated by experts making a quantitative and qualitative 
chemical analysis of the several preservatives suspected to be 
used by getting samples of beef furnished for export to Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. 

" If the question arises that a report should have been made 
by me earlier, I beg to say that I have endeavored, with all my 
opportunities, to first inform myself, by observation, of the con- 
ditions above noted sufficiently to warrant my drawing the at- 
tention of the adjutant-general at headquarters of the army to the 
matter. Very respectfully, 

" W. H. Daly, 
" Major and Chief Surgeon U. S. V." 

The processed beef at Tampa exhibited by a Mr. 
Powell, referred to in Dr. Daly's letter, was brought 
to Tampa by the inventor of the method by which it 
was treated, on his own responsibility and at his own 
expense. Neither the process nor the meat he furnish- 
ed, nor the inventor, Mr. Powell himself, bore any re- 
lation to the contractors who supplied the army with 
beef, then or since. The inventor requested permis- 
sion to exhibit his artificially preserved beef, and was 
allowed to do so in his private capacity. He requested 
and received permission to put two quarters of his 
own beef on one of the transports. It spoiled when 
at sea a few days later, and was thrown overboard. 
None of it was ever issued to the troops. Mr. Powell 
never again approached the government in the matter, 
and he has stated under oath that his secret process was 
neither used then nor since by the contractors who 
furnished refrigerated beef to the army. Upon this 

398 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

single exhibit, his individual experience in eating some 
of this meat at Tampa and some refrigerated beef in 
Puerto Rico, and upon the alleged chemical tests made 
by himself of meat claimed to be refrigerated beef, this 
doctor based his opinions and his evidence. Dr. Daly's 
"observations," as he terms these experiences, at 
Tampa, in Puerto Rico, and subsequently at several 
of the camps in the United States, were confined al- 
most exclusively to his sense of smell and taste — es- 
pecially the latter. In his testimony before the Dodge 
Commission, he stated that he took some of the meat 
treated by the Powell process, cooked and ate it; that 
he afterwards became sick and had a taste in his 
mouth similar to that experienced when, on a hunt- 
ing trip out West, he had eaten some antelopes and 
elk treated with boric and salicylic acids. He also 
claimed to have experienced the same taste when he 
ate some of the refrigerated beef in Puerto Rico. This 
led him to infer that the Powell meat, and also the re- 
frigerated beef in Puerto Rico, had been treated with 
the same chemicals as the antelope and elk meat al- 
ready mentioned. As a matter of fact, the inventor 
of the Powell process of treating meat swore that the 
beef exhibited by him at Tampa and eaten by Dr. 
Daly was treated by fumigation, and that neither 
boric nor salicylic acid was used at all in the opera- 
tion. Dr. Daly made himself further ridiculous, in 
his letter to General Miles, by referring to the taste 
and smell of decomposed boric acid in the meat con- 
demned by the board on the Panama. Scientific evi- 
dence was submitted to the effect that boric acid does 
not decompose when used as a meat preservative, and 
that it has neither taste nor odor. 

399 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The beef placed on board the Panama had been 
taken from a refrigerator ship, removed to the shore, 
kept there several days, and then put on the Panama 
with some native Puerto Rican beef. Proper care had 
not been used to protect this meat from spoiling, and 
when several days out from Ponce, the beef became 
bad, a Board of Survey condemned 963 pounds (not 
1,500 pounds, as claimed by Dr. Daly). The Board 
of Survey, consisting of three officers, two of whom 
were surgeons, reported simply that the beef was " rot- 
ten and unfit for use," and that it was "not in prime 
condition when received in the hurry of leaving Ponce." 
Dr. Daly approved the proceedings of the board and 
directed "that the tainted meat be at once thrown 
overboard." No mention is made in this board's 
report of any suspected treatment with chemicals, 
and Dr. Daly does not refer to it in his endorsement 
on the board's report. Without consulting any of 
his brother officers, or making known to them his sus- 
picions that the beef had been chemically treated, he 
claims to have taken two samples of the meat from 
a kettle in which some beef was cooking on the ship, 
and, upon his return to the United States, to have made 
a chemical analysis thereof, and to have discovered 
traces of boric and salicylic acids. But he could es- 
tablish no connection between the material which, 
he alleges, contained these acids and the refrigerated 
beef furnished by the contractors. As soon as Dr. 
Daly offered his testimony, the War Investigation 
Commission sent telegraphic instructions to Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and several places in the United States 
for samples of refrigerated beef then in the hands of 
the troops, and furnished by the same contractors who 

400 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

had supplied all the beef during the war. These sam- 
ples were sealed in jars, brought to the United States, 
and tested by expert chemists. Of the twenty-nine 
specimens thus secured and analyzed, not one developed 
the presence of so much as a trace of boric, or salicylic, 
or any other acids or adulterants. They were all 
pure beef. 

Dr. Daly also claimed, in the course of his testimony 
before the Dodge Commission, that he repeatedly tested 
(only by his two senses already referred to) the re- 
frigerated beef at some of the camps of Puerto Rico, 
and that he got the "same taste." Yet Colonel Hui- 
dekoper, a surgeon upon General Miles' s staff, who 
made repeated observations of the troops, their 
camps, and the food used in Puerto Rico, testified 
that he found no complaint regarding the meat; and 
he visited the camps in Puerto Rico at practically 
the same time that Dr. Daly did. Dr. Daly also 
alleged that the beef at Chickamauga was ap- 
parently artificially preserved. The records show 
that 5,100,000 pounds of refrigerated beef were 
supplied to the troops at Chickamauga during the 
war with Spain. So far as my knowledge goes, not 
a single complaint was ever made regarding the beef 
furnished, either to General Brooke or to General 
Breckinridge, or to any person whomsoever. In- 
deed, Dr. Daly was the only witness who ever testified 
that refrigerated beef was artificially preserved with 
chemical, or "doctored" at all; and General Miles's 
allegations seem to have been based entirely upon 
the flimsy experience of this single officer's defective 
taste and his highly questionable "observations" on 
the Panama. At the time the Panama incident occur- 
2c 401 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

red, Dr. Daly himself admits that his observations 
had been in progress for three months. He did not 
communicate his suspicions to the board which con- 
demned and threw overboard the spoiled meat, which 
he claims to have suspected of being treated with 
chemicals, although the opportunity was an excel- 
lent one to have conclusively proven either the truth 
or error of his opinion. Neither did he submit his al- 
leged samples of that meat to the government experts 
and chemists for examination and test, but secretly 
took them to his home, and made an analysis him- 
self, to which he did not even refer in his official report 
on this matter to General Miles. He did bring to 
Washington a residue claimed to have been taken from 
the Panama, which contained traces of boric and 
salicylic acids, but this meat was not proven to be 
refrigerated beef. The circumstance is suspicious, 
and does not reflect credit upon General Miles's only 
witness. 

Upon the unsupported and conclusively disproved 
testimony of this single officer General Miles based 
his statements which led to a scandal as thoroughly 
unwarranted as it was unequalled in the history of 
our army. 

The War Investigation Commission thus reported: 

" The Commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef 
furnished by contractors, and issued to the troops during the 
war with Spain, was subjected to or treated with any chemicals 
by the contractors or those in their employ." 

The Court of Inquiry went even further, and stated : 

" The board has recorded its opinion that the refrigerated beef, 
furnished under contracts for the use of the armies, was not ' doc- 

402 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

tored ' or treated with any other agent than cold air. If any such 
treatment had been applied, it is the opinion of the Court that a 
knowledge of it could not have been concealed from the Com- 
missary-General and his officers." 

Again it says: 

" The use of refrigerated beef on shore, after the troops had 
secured convenient harbors and landing facilities, was wise and 
desirable. The Court believes that there was no better food 
available or practicable." 

With reference to General Miles's general charges 
that bacon was "not considered a suitable food for 
the tropics," and that the food furnished was the cause 
of the sickness in the army, little need be said with re- 
spect to bacon other than that it now continues to form 
one of the principal components of the ration furnish- 
ed to the troops serving in the tropics and in Cuba. 

The allegation that the food furnished the army was 
the cause of much sickness seems to have been as little 
investigated, or to have had as little warrant for its 
utterance, as the other disproved charges. Although 
on the transports for fourteen days, during which 
time canned fresh beef was the principal meat ration, 
the Shafter expedition of nearly 17,000 men landed in 
Cuba with only 150 sick. It is the concurrent testi- 
mony of every officer that the army landed in Cuba 
in excellent condition, notwithstanding the heat and 
confinement on the transports. It was not until Au- 
gust 1st, fifty-three days after the 5th Corps had em- 
barked at Tampa, that sickness became alarming; 
and then the causes of that sickness were indisputably 
traced to the climate and the diseases indigenous to 
the tropics. Kent's division of 4,44 2 > on tne Iotn da Y 

403 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of July, had but 214 sick, and five days afterwards 
this had fallen off to 200; and when the sickness in 
Shafter's army grew to such proportions as to cause 
concern, Lawton's division, which had subsisted al- 
most entirely on bacon as the meat component of its 
ration, had the same percentage of sickness as Kent's 
division, which had subsisted almost entirely on canned 
fresh beef. The 1st Volunteer Cavalry had had little 
canned beef in Cuba, and yet its sick-rate was prac- 
tically the same as Kent's and Lawton's divisions. 
Moreover, we have already seen from General Wood's 
statement, which is supported by the records of the 
War Department, that every regiment that came to San- 
tiago after the war, even when provided with floored 
tents and boiled water, had practically the same amount 
of sickness as Shafter's army. The nature and ex- 
tent of the sickness in Cuba and Puerto Rico among our 
soldiers were almost entirely due to climatic causes. 
There was no evidence to support General Miles's 
statement that the food caused the sickness, but there 
was and is incontrovertible evidence to disprove it. 

In matters of professional detail, the President and 
the Secretary of War must of necessity rely upon the 
Major-General commanding the army, the Adjutant- 
General, the Inspector-General, and the other bureau 
chiefs. But it is the especial duty of the Inspector- 
General's department to discover and report upon : 

" All that pertains to the efficiency of the army, the condition 
and state of supplies of all kinds, of arms, equipments, etc., etc., 
and report with strict impartiality in regard to all irregularities 
that may be discovered. From time to time they will make such 
suggestions as may appear to them practicable for the cure of any 
defects that may come under their observation." 

404 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

The Inspector-General of the army was with General 
Shafter's corps at Tampa; he accompanied that ex- 
pedition to Cuba; he was at the front during the en- 
tire period occupied by that army in the trenches ; and, 
finally, he was, from August 2d until the abandonment 
of that camp, in command of the army and camp at 
Chickamauga. Tampa, the transports to Cuba, the 
trenches before Santiago, and Chickamauga were 
designated by General Miles as the particular places 
where bad beef, both canned and refrigerated, was 
issued. And yet, on the 1st of November, 1898, the 
Inspector-General made no mention in his official an- 
nual report of any complaints against either canned 
or refrigerated beef, but specifically stated: "The 
Commissary Department has conducted its busi- 
ness, so far as I have been able to observe, in a most 
satisfactory manner in this war;" and again: "The 
quality of the food furnished is generally reported ex- 
cellent, and there has been no complaint as to the 
quantity." 

The army had won its battles in Cuba and the Philip- 
pines; Puerto Rico had peacefully come into our hands 
after a few skirmishes; the protocol had been in op- 
eration for over four months, and even the treaty of 
peace had been signed at Paris. Then came the major- 
general commanding the army of the United States 
with his charges. While the allegations of General 
Miles were not based upon fact, and were conclusively 
disproven by two separate tribunals, unimpeachable 
in their composition and methods of investigation, the 
irreparable damage had been done. A brother-officer, 
suffering under the lash of such cruel, unwarranted, 
and unjustified imputations, while exonerated from 

405 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the heavy odium of those charges, was, as a result of 
them, sacrificed on the altar of his own passion, right- 
eous in its existence, but inexcusable in its expression. 
But this, serious as it is, was not the worst result of 
General Miles' s conduct. A false impression had 
been created throughout the country as to the food 
furnished the army, which may never be removed. 
I doubt if the war with Spain will ever be referred to 
in this generation without the odious hue and cry of 
the day of "rotten beef." Such is the persistency 
with which false rumor clings to any great event. 
The charges of General Miles, twice proven false in 
spirit and substance, are therefore the more heinous 
in their effect. 

But why should arguments or statements be em- 
ployed to demonstrate the efficacy of both canned fresh 
and refrigerated beef? This fact alone would prove 
that proposition had not testimony and evidence al- 
ready done so: 160,000 rations a month of canned 
fresh beef and 742,000 pounds a month of refrigerated 
beef are now being supplied the army of the United 
States in the tropics!* 

General Miles had been directed, in the order of 
June 26th, 1898, instructing him to organize the Puerto 
Rican expedition, to make a " daily report of the state 
and condition of your command ... to the Secretary 
of War direct." He was at Tampa for two weeks 

* These data are based on a letter received from the War Department 
bearing date of November I2th, 1900. In that communication it is 
stated that, of the 742,000 pounds of refrigerated beef, 217,000 pounds 
a month are sent to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and the remainder, 525,000 
pounds, to the Philippines. The latter is frozen beef from Australia, 
but does not differ from refrigerated beef proper, except that the re- 
frigerators in which it is shipped are kept several degrees lower in 
temperature. 

406 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

before the Shafter expedition sailed, and at Tampa 
there were no less than a half-hundred car-loads of 
canned fresh ("roast") beef; when he left the United 
States, July 7th, he accompanied the troops to Cuba 
on the transports; he spent the greater part of three 
days at the front with General Shafter's army; he 
was again on the transports to Puerto Rico, with part 
of his command (3,415 officers and men), and these 
troops, when they reached Puerto Rico, had then been 
on the ships without intermission from July 8th to 
July 26th, eighteen days, during which time canned 
fresh beef (" roast beef ") formed the principal part of 
their meat ration. General Miles remained in Puerto 
Rico from July 26th until September 1st. With ex- 
ceptionally favorable opportunities, therefore, for ob- 
serving the effects of the canned beef, and with ex- 
pressed instructions to make a daily report of the state 
and condition of his command to the Secretary of War 
direct, he did not in any of his communications hint 
to the President, Secretary of War, or Commissarj 7 - 
General that improper or unwholesome food was being 
furnished the army, although he did make request by 
cable that his entire command be at once supplied with 
"blue rosettes, aigrettes, and cords for infantry hats." 
Three and a half months after his return to the United 
States, and after his command had been disbanded, 
he made his charges relative to canned beef. 

In respect to refrigerated beef, his chief and only 
witness swore that he made known to the general 
early in August his belief that the refrigerated beef 
was "embalmed." His letter specifjdng in detail this 
belief was received by General Miles not later than 
October 22d. And yet the general neither reported 

407 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the fact nor the rumor to the President, Secretary of 
War, or Commissary-General, nor did he take any steps 
to investigate or correct the issue to the army of beef 
which he said was "embalmed" by injecting delete- 
rious chemicals into it, and which he described as "un- 
fit in any country in the stomach of any man," until 
his verbal statement was made before the War Inves- 
tigation Commission on December 21st, four and a 
half months afterwards. 

His annual report bore date of November 5th, 1898, 
a half-month after the receipt of the Daly letter, and 
three and a half months after Dr. Daly made known 
to him his belief that the refrigerated beef was treated 
with chemicals. General Miles made no mention in 
his annual report of either refrigerated ("embalmed") 
or canned beef, but only stated (p. 36) that his com- 
mand in Puerto Rico "suffered to some extent on ac- 
count of exposure and the usual climatic effects 
incident to the country" — and that "a large portion 
of the troops returned in good condition to the United 
States." 

If General Miles believed that "beef pulp" was be- 
ing issued to the troops under " pretence of an experi- 
ment" — and that expression can mean nothing but 
fraud and experimenting upon the lives of the men of 
our army, than which no graver charge save wilful 
murder could be made — or if he believed that 275,000 
men of our army were being fed upon "embalmed" 
beef, why did he not take steps to immediately stop 
the issue of such alleged unwholesome food? So far 
as I am aware, there are not even now any formal 
charges on file in the War Department from him in 
this matter. 

408 



THE MILES-EAGAN CONTROVERSY 

Why did he fail to notify at once, in the interest of 
the brave men whom he commanded and who were 
intrusted to his care, the President, his Commander- 
in-Chief, or the Secretary of War? An officer who 
permits in silence what he believes to be hurtful and 
unlawful food to be served to the men under his com- 
mand in the field certainly forgets the first duty of a 
soldier. The Court of Inquiry went further than to 
prove that General Miles's allegations were not sus- 
tained. It specifically stated : " The Court also finds 
that the major-general commanding the army had 
not sufficient justification for alleging that the refrig- 
erated beef was embalmed, or was unfit for issue to 
troops. It also finds that he committed an error in 
that, having belief or knowledge, as claimed, that the 
food was unfit, that it caused sickness and distress, 
that some of it was supplied under pretence of experi- 
ment, that other beef was embalmed, he did not im- 
mediately report such knowledge or belief to the Sec- 
retary of War, to the end that a proper remedy might 
be promptly applied/' The Court also says, evidently 
referring to General Miles, " It has been developed in 
the course of the inquiry, as recited in this report, that 
in some instances certain individuals failed to per- 
form the full measure of duty, or to observe the pro- 
prieties which dignify high military command." 

General Miles won deserved fame as a fighting sol- 
dier during his active career, and it has often been re- 
marked of him that he looked carefully after the well- 
being of his soldiers. Time and circumstances must 
have wrought great changes in him in this respect, 
for his anxiety about the food which was furnished to 
his men must have been an after-thought, and pro- 

409 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ceeded from a motive apart from their interest. Had 
I consciously permitted a ration of food which I be- 
lieved to be bad to be served to a soldier on duty in 
the field under the flag of this republic, I should not 
dare to hope or ask to be forgiven. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

CAMPS AND DISEASE 

DURING the war with Spain no site for a camp, 
whether for mobilization, instruction, or recuperation, 
was selected until after a careful examination, inspec- 
tion, and favorable report had been made thereof by 
one or more officers of the regular army.* 

There was no national camp occupied by our troops 
during the summer of 1898 that was in itself unhealthy. 
There was a much smaller per cent, of sickness, in- 
deed, among the troops encamped in the United States 
than there was during the same season in 1 861 ; there 
was relatively less sickness than there is now among 
the British soldiers in South Africa; there was rela^ 
tively less sickness than there has ever been in any 
war of modern times. And yet, even with this excel- 
lent record, much of the camp sickness was pre- 
ventable. During the war typhoid-fever occurred in 
every camp in the United States; typhoid-fever be- 
came epidemic in every camp, State or national; 
more than ninety per cent, of the volunteer regiments 
developed this disease within eight weeks after their 

* Miami is an exception to this statement. Five thousand troops 
were sent to that place upon the urgent request of General Miles, al- 
though its fitness for a camp had been reported adversely upon by 
General Wade, as well as by a board of officers especially sent to 
examine into the site. As a result of its unsuitableness, Miami was 
soon abandoned. 

411 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

enrolment; and the deaths from this camp scourge 
alone amounted to more than eighty per cent, of the 
total deaths from disease.* 

With this statement of the facts, the question arises, 
What was the cause? The answer is simple and of 
easy demonstration. Generically described, the cause 
of the sickness was CAMP POLLUTION; specifically, 
the cause was due to ignorance or neglect on the part 
of officers, coupled with the inexperience of the newly 
enlisted soldiers. It is an axiom of military life, that 
there is nothing of which the recruit is so prodigal as 
his health. This fact, and the liability to the occur- 
rence of camp diseases wherever large bodies of men 
are assembled, impelled the War Department to 
issue a circular to the army which dealt with the 
questions of camp sanitation and hygiene. These 
instructions were sent to every camp and issued to 
the troops upon their arrival: 

" War Department, Surgeon-General's Office, 
" Washington, April 25, 1898. 
" Circular No. 1. 

" In time of war a great responsibility rests upon medical of- 
ficers of the army, for the result of a campaign may depend upon 
the sanitary measures adopted or neglected by commanding gen- 
erals of armies in the field. The medical officer is responsible 
for proper recommendations relating to the protection of the health 
of troops in camp or in garrison, and it is believed that, as a rule, 
medical officers of the United States army are well informed as 
to the necessary measures of prophylaxis and the serious results 
which infallibly follow a neglect of these measures, especially 
when unacclimated troops are called upon for service in a tropical 
or semitropical country during the sickly season. In Cuba our 

* See report of Board on Typhoid-Fever, to be hereafter referred to. 

412 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

armies will have to contend not only with malarial fevers and 
the usual camp diseases— typhoid-fever, diarrhoea, and dysentery 
— but they will be more or less exposed in localities where yellow- 
fever is endemic and under conditions extremely favorable for 
the development of an epidemic among unacclimated troops. 
In view of this danger, the attention of medical officers and of 
all others responsible for the health of our troops in the field is 
invited to the following recommendations : 

" When practicable, camps should be established on high and 
well-drained ground not previously occupied. 

" Sinks should be dug before a camp is occupied or as soon 
after as practicable. The surface of fecal matter should be cover- 
ed with fresh earth or quicklime or ashes three times a day. 

" New sinks should be dug and old ones filled when contents 
of old ones are two feet from surface of ground. 

" Every man should be punished who fails to make use of the 
sinks. 

" All kitchen refuse should be promptly buried and perfect 
sanitary police maintained. 

" Troops should drink only boiled or filtered water and coffee 
or tea (hot or cold), except where spring water can be obtained 
which is pronounced to be wholesome by a medical officer. 

" Every case of fever should receive prompt attention. If 
albumin is found in the urine of a patient with fever, it should 
be considered suspicious (of yellow-fever), and he should be placed 
in an isolated tent. The discharges of patients with fever should 
always be disinfected at once with a solution of carbolic acid (five 
per cent.) or of chloride of lime (six ounces to gallon of water) or 
with milk of lime made from fresh quicklime. 

" Whenever a case of yellow-fever occurs in camp, the troops 
should be promptly moved to a fresh camping-ground located 
a mile or more from infected camp. 

" No doubt typhoid-fever, camp diarrhoea, and probably yellow- 
fever are frequently communicated to soldiers in camp through 
the agency of flies, which swarm about fecal matter and filth of 
all kinds deposited upon the ground or in shallow pits and directly 
convey infectious material, attached to their feet or contained 
in their excreta, to the food which is exposed while being prepared 
at the company kitchens or while being served in the mess tent. 

413 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

It is for this reason that a strict sanitary police is so important 
Also because the water supply may be contaminated in the same 
way or by surface drainage. 

" If it can be avoided, marches should not be made in the hot- 
test part of the day — from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M. 

" When called upon for duty at night or early in the morning, 
a cup of hot coffee should be taken. 

" It is unsafe to eat heartily or drink freely when greatly fatigued 
or overheated. 

" Ripe fruit may be eaten in moderation, but green or overripe 
fruit will give rise to bowel complaints. Food should be thorough- 
ly cooked and free from fermentation or putrefactive changes. 

" In decidedly malarious localities from three to five grains of 
quinine may be taken in the early morning as a prophylactic, but 
the taking of quinine as a routine practice should only be recom- 
mended under exceptional circumstances. 

" Light woollen underclothing should be worn, and when a 
soldier's clothing or bedding becomes damp from exposure to rain 
or heavy dews the first opportunity should be taken to dry it in 
the sun or by fires. GEO. M. STERNBERG, 

"Surgeon-General United States Army." 

To further insure these methods of sanitation, fol- 
lowed in the regular army and referred to in this cir- 
cular, a regular army officer of high rank and long 
experience was placed in command of every national 
camp in the United States. Especial attention is in- 
vited to this fact. 

Camp Thomas at Chickamauga Park, Tennessee 
(commanded by Major-General John R. Brooke, U.S. A.), 
was the largest. Whatever can be said of the con- 
ditions of that camp apply to all, though the epidemic 
of typhoid-fever was more widespread there than else- 
where. It may, therefore, be regarded as a type, and 
the statements which follow, although directly ap- 
plicable to it, apply to all. 

414 



• CAMPS AND DISEASE 

This camp was selected upon the recommendation 
of the major-general commanding the army, who, 
through his adjutant-general, notified the War De- 
partment that he had been " informed by Colonel Smith, 
a member of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Mil- 
itary Park Commission, that there are ample facilities 
in the park for camping any number of troops." The 
selection of that camp site was believed to be a good 
one because of its location, convenience, suitability, 
healthfulness, and pure water supply. Malarial and 
typhoid fever were practically unknown in the coun- 
ties in which the park was located. It had been one 
of our best camps for a much larger army for a longer 
period and with much less of supplies during the Civil 
War. The climate is salubrious, the country is roll- 
ing and well drained, and the territory under the con- 
trol of the government covered approximately ten 
square miles. 

In August, 1898, when the number of sick through- 
out the camps became great, a board of medical officers 
was appointed to examine into and report upon the 
causes of the existence and spread of typhoid-fever. 
The board was composed of Major Walter Reed, surgeon 
regular army; Major Victor C. Vaughan, division 
surgeon U. S. V.; and Major E. 0. Shakespeare, 
brigade surgeon U. S. V. This board visited the 
national camps, and obtained, as far as possible, the 
sanitary and medical history of all regiments. Later 
it devoted eighteen months to a study and analysis 
of the medical records of the army of 1898. The re- 
port of this board shows what all others familiar with 
the facts have stated, that the location and site of the 
camp at Chickamauga Park was healthy; that the 

415 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

water was primarily good; that the food furnished 
there was abundant and wholesome; and that typhoid- 
fever was brought to Camp Thomas by the volunteers 
and spread by their neglect of the rules of sanitary 
and military hygiene heretofore described. The rec- 
ords of their investigation cover the regiments and 
organizations of the 1st and 3d Corps, an aggregate of 
44,803* men. 

The board found that of the forty-eight regiments 
which constituted the two corps referred to, four reached 
Chickamauga Park with developed, recognized cases of 
typhoid-fever, and five others arrived with cases other- 
wise diagnosed, but whose subsequent history showed 
that they were cases of this disease. It was further 
discovered that five regiments developed typhoid-fever 
in the first week, and that eleven other regiments had 
probable cases. That is, twenty-five regiments, or over 
one-half of the forty-eight at Chickamauga, devel- 
oped typhoid-fever within a week after they reached 
the park. Moreover, this disease appeared among 
twelve other regiments within the second week, and 
at the expiration of one month only two regiments 
of the forty-eight were free from typhoid-fever. A 
member of the board has expressed the opinion, as a 
result of his studies, that ninety per cent, of the vol- 
unteer regiments came to Camp Thomas bringing 
typhoid-fever with them. 

The record of that camp shows that during July 
and August it became highly unsanitary. No at- 



* From the establishment of Camp Thomas to its abandonment, 
approximately 80,000 men passed through the camp, although that 
number was not assembled there at any one time. It probably did 
not exceed 56,000. 

416 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

tention seems to have been paid to the circular issued 
by the Surgeon-General, and as a consequence the 
germs of typhoid-fever were soon spread throughout 
the entire camp. Of the 44,803 men of the 1st and 3d 
Army Corps at Chickamauga, coming under the ob- 
servation of the Typhoid-Fever Board, there were no 
less than 4,068 cases of recognized typhoid-fever, and 
5,892 cases of fever which, while not diagnosed as 
typhoid, are so regarded from their subsequent his- 
tory. Of these 9,960 cases (practically one-fifth of the 
army at Camp Thomas under investigation), there 
were 713 deaths. 

And yet these unhealthy conditions are not charge- 
able to the site or fitness of Camp Thomas for assem- 
bling a large body of soldiers. The existence there of 
camp fevers was due to neglect of camp sanitation. 

General Brooke was in command of Camp Thomas 
from April 20th to July 23d; General Wade, from 
July 23d to August 2d; and General Breckinridge, 
from the 2d of August to the abandonment of the camp 
in the latter part of that month. None of these officers 
ever reported to the War Department that the sanitary 
condition of the camp was alarming, as it had become 
before the 1st of August, and it was not until I sent 
my personal aid, Major George H. Hopkins, Assistant 
Adjutant-General, U. S. V., that I learned of the real 
state of affairs. Upon the report and recommenda- 
tions of this officer, made to me direct, I ordered the 
immediate abandonment of the camp and the move- 
ment of the troops to other posts. 

Although the number of typhoid-fever cases at Camp 
Thomas was large, the percentage of deaths was re- 
markably small. The Board of Typhoid-Fever as- 

417 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

certained that the average death-rate from this dis- 
ease in nine large hospitals in Boston, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and New York was 9.24 per cent. The 
death-rate among the troops at Chickamauga from 
typhoid-fever was 7.38 per cent. This, however, is no 
excuse for the lack of care of the camps, and no cause 
for exultation as to the per cent, of the death-rate. 
These ratios show, however, that the military hospitals 
must have been good. Of the 713 deaths from this 
disease, out of a total of 9,960 cases, 352 died at some 
army hospital, and 315 died elsewhere, probably at 
the homes of the soldiers. The places of the deaths 
of the remainder are not known. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the conditions at 
Chickamauga were bad, they were grossly and 
maliciously exaggerated. Brigadier-General H. V. 
Boynton, U. S. V., who was and still is chairman 
of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Military 
Park Commission, was at Camp Thomas much of 
the time it was occupied by our troops. As the gov- 
ernment had expended $1,000,000 in making a public 
park out of that great battle - field, it was his duty 
to protect its interests and, at the same time, to ren- 
der such assistance as he could to the several com- 
manding officers in the way of boring wells, securing 
firewood, protecting the park, etc., etc. His experience 
at that encampment during the war and afterwards 
especially fits him to describe the conditions with re- 
spect to the camp and the soldiers there. I therefore 
quote at length remarks recently made by General 
Boynton upon this subject:* 

* Speech made at the re-union of the 35th Ohio, Miamisburg, 
September 20th, 1900. 

418 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

" Since I last met with you, my comrades, it has been my privi- 
lege to see a great army, assembled from all sections, under one 
flag, on the battle-field of Chickamauga. As you know, for the 
numbers engaged and the time of fighting, that was the bloodiest 
battle-field of modern times. As in your own, so in many bri- 
gades on each side, every other man was killed or wounded, while 
for the armies as a whole the casualty list embraced one-third 
of those engaged. Only iron veterans could do such fighting 
as that. 

" You remember that you marched the whole night before the 
battle opened, and went into it the next morning without break- 
fast and fought through the day without food or water till night 
— that the second day, after the thin shadow of a breakfast, you 
fought again till after dark, then marched five miles to a new 
line of battle at Rossville, which secured Chattanooga and gave 
the Union army the victory. Undoubtedly you have most vivid 
recollections of your experiences and your supplies, or the want 
of them, in that wonderful strategic campaign of five weeks in 
the enemy's country over a wide river and three mountain ranges.* 

" You have also in clear remembrance the horrible tales [during 
the Spanish-American War] of short rations, of spoiled beef, of 
inadequate hospitals, of the absence of medical supplies, of pol- 
luted water, of universal sickness, of an astounding death-roll, 
of the incompetency of every staff corps, and the imbecility and 
worse of the Secretary of War with which the sensational press 
of this country finally caused the honest people of this land to 
believe that inhumanity in every form to their boys and failure 
and neglect in every branch of military duty were the rule with- 
out exception at Camp Thomas. This belief at the time became 
a craze which swept over the country and could not then be checked 
by the truth, for the truth could secure no hearing. In its ori- 
gin it was pure and unadulterated journalistic diabolism. 

" Now, I want to tell my comrades who know that ground and 
had experiences of real war in that vicinity, how the 8o,ooof 
soldiers of the war with Spain who, from first to last, were as- 
sembled there, actually fared. I was on duty at Camp Thomas 

* The battle occurred November 23, 24, and 25, 1863. 

t A few regiments spent only two or three days at Camp Thomas. 

419 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

from the time the first regiment arrived until the last one depart- 
ed. Under special instructions from the Secretary of War, I was 
so placed as to be able to clearly see the whole inside management 
at that great camp where a third of the regular army and nearly 
a third of the entire army enlisted for the war with Spain assem- 
bled. Let it be remembered that, when war was declared, the Secre- 
tary of War and the staff corps under him who had been caring 
for an army of 25,000, were suddenly called upon to equip a quarter 
of a million soldiers for immediate field service. This herculean 
task was accomplished in two months, under Secretary Alger. 
Considering the circumstances of the case, it was a most marvel- 
lous and successful mobilization. When the work began the 
complete list of all military stores on hand in the quartermaster's 
department covered less than two printed octavo pages. Every- 
thing else that the government had on hand for war on land was 
in the same proportion. As a single example, the material for 
tents was not in the market, and the mills had to produce it. 

" First, it will interest you to know how these soldiers of the 
Spanish war travelled. You well remember the box, cattle, and 
platform cars in which you rode the very few times you were 
favored with railroad transportation. Few of you ever rode in 
a day coach, and I doubt whether a soldier of the Civil War ever 
saw a sleeping-car south of the Ohio. First came Colonel Andy 
Burt's infantry regiment of colored troops — you remember him on 
' Bob ' McCook's staff and wounded at Mill Springs. I went down 
to Shelmound to meet them. What do you suppose I found them 
in? Pullman sleepers, and first-class day coaches, to a man. 
And their horses and mules were in what were called patent palace 
stock cars. It required four sections of ten cars each to accom- 
modate this regiment. A short time after, there came a colored 
cavalry regiment. How do you think I found them travelling? 
In four sections, of ten Wagner sleepers each, upholstered through- 
out with blue plush, and every soldier had either an upper or a 
lower berth. There was nothing that I found to remind me of 
travel in that section when you and I explored it. And so this 
whole great army was assembled at Camp Thomas, and was car- 
ried away from there in Pullmans, Wagners, tourist Pullmans, 
and day coaches, every man in a day coach having an entire seat 
to himself. You know what tourist Pullmans are, with upper 

420 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

and lower berths as comfortable for travelling as the more elabo- 
rately furnished Pullman sleepers. 

" To sum up this subject, the War Department used 644 stand- 
ard Pullmans, 1,501 tourist Pullmans, and 3,285 first-class day 
coaches — all provided with ice-water by the barrel — for the trans- 
portation of the Camp Thomas troops alone. And the yellow 
journals insisted that the department was crowding the soldiers 
into cattle-cars — and insisted upon it, till the country believed it. 

" You remember where you bivouacked in the Dyer Field at the 
close of the first day's fight after twenty-seven hours' marching 
and fighting without a meal — bivouacked without fires when a 
white frost was settling down, and with only a few crackers and 
scraps of bacon and pork which could not be cooked because the 
enemy's lines were too close to admit of fires. Well, in the days 
which tried the souls of the sensational journals in the Spanish 
War, just back of where you bivouacked the commissary depart- 
ment had a bakery with a capacity of 66,000 eighteen-ounce loaves, 
and every soldier and civilian employe in that army got a loaf of 
it every day if he wanted it, and it was as good bread as I ever 
care to see on my own table. If they preferred hardtack, they 
got that. 

" As to fresh meat, seven days out of ten there were issued 
full rations of as good beef as ever came in refrigerator cars to the 
cities and towns of the North. Every quarter carried the tag of 
government inspection. There were 5,100,000 pounds of it is- 
sued there without the loss of a pound, except where some of it 
fell into the hands of regiments whose men did not know how 
to take care of fresh meat in hot weather, and whose officers did 
not know how to tell them. And let me say to you here that, in 
spite of all the sensational charges with which the humane and 
honest people of the country were driven wild, there never was a 
pound of embalmed beef issued to a single soldier of the Spanish 
War— not a pound— for the good reason that the government never 
purchased a pound of beef that had been embalmed. I state this 
on my personal responsibility to substantiate the truth of what I 
say against anybody, of any rank. 

" For the other three days, the troops had bacon. If you sup- 
pose it was the old ' sides ' which we used to receive, sent down 
in freight cars, stacked up like cord- wood, you will make a mis- 

421 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

take. It was family bacon, in sealed tin cans such as you buy 
at the first-class family groceries. 

" Then there were three vegetable rations extra — potatoes, 
onions, and canned tomatoes. Each regiment could choose 
which it would have. It required eighteen car-loads of potatoes 
for each ten days' issue, and for hauling each issue of rations 
to the camp required 750 six-mule teams, and every component 
of the ration was better than we ever saw in our soldier days. 
These are all facts. Yet the country was made to believe that 
its soldiers were given spoiled food, and short rations even of 
that. 

" As to canned beef and canned roast beef, the brand was the 
same, and from the same firms, as was used by the navy through- 
out the war, and as is being used now both by the army and navy 
in all our operations the world around. The English army 
used this beef in Egypt, and is using it in South Africa. Of course 
there were some spoiled cans, but the percentage was too small 
to express in appreciable figures. I doubt whether there is a 
person here who has not known of spoiled canned goods in his 
own house. It must be remembered that the War Department 
was keeping house with 274,000 boarders. 

" Let me tell you about the field hospitals. Representing the 
camp, which, as you all know, is in one of the healthiest regions 
of the United States as a ' pest hole,' and the hospitals as in 
terrible condition, was the quickest way and the shortest way 
which the diabolical journals of sensationalism found to the hearts 
of the people. They made the country believe their falsehoods, 
and deceived many an honest journal into accepting them. It 
was also the easiest way for officers to hide their neglect of all 
sanitary measures, to charge consequent sickness upon the loca- 
tion and the water. 

" I say to you, my comrades, upon my personal honor, that those 
hospitals which received the severest press denunciations at Camp 
Thomas were better and more fully supplied than any which 
we saw in the Civil War — and the Army of the Cumberland had 
some pretty good ones. Those at Camp Thomas had cots with 
woven wire coverings and hair mattresses. There was crowd- 
ing at times, and at times a lack of nurses, and everything did 
not move as smoothly as a church fair, but there was no lack either 

422 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

of supplies or care or excellent attention, beyond what was in- 
separable from the rapid organization of a great camp. 

" Because typhoid-fever became prevalent the camp site and 
the water were condemned. But, at last, an able medical com- 
mission, after patiently tracing every early case of fever in the 
camp, has ascertained that the regiments brought this infec- 
tion with them. As to the water, the thirteen regiments and 
ten batteries of the regular army drank it, as did the large park 
force engaged in clearing up the ten square miles of camps, in- 
cluding all the hospital sites, without a single case of fever de- 
veloping among them. These regular soldiers, one -third of 
the whole regular army, who knew how to take care of them- 
selves, never lost a man from any camp disease whatever. 

" The death-rate at Camp Thomas is the best test of all the 
sensational stories with which the country was deceived, enraged, 
and driven wellnigh crazy. The journals attacking the War 
Department told you that the soldiers there died off like sheep. 
So you will expect to hear rather startling figures— and you will. 
The muster-out rolls, as you well know, show every death and 
its cause. I have them all for that army. As thus shown, the 
death-rate at Camp Thomas, from the arrival to the departure of 
the troops, was a trifle less than one-half of one per cent. 

" You will be interested to know how this sensation was 
worked up in one regiment— the 8th New York. The governor of 
that State, with patriotic purpose, stirred by the stories of neglect, 
epidemic, and malignant disease, sent the surgeon - general of 
the State to examine and report. He arrived in the evening. That 
night the word ran around the camp : ' All who want to go home 
report at sick-call in the morning.' When the call was sounded, 
400 responded, and lined up before this astonished surgeon-gen- 
eral. Besides this, they brought a man on a cot, into whose 
eyes they had injected belladonna to make him stare, and told 
the surgeon that he was paralyzed and a specimen of hospital 
inattention and want of accommodation, since he had been left 
out on the ground under the trees the night before because of a 
crowded hospital. When the troops moved from Camp Thomas 
there were medical stores enough left behind to fit out fifty reg- 
iments with full field supplies for active campaigning. 

" But these statements are enough to show veterans of our 

423 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Civil War the vast gulf between the truth and the conditions 
which the country was made to believe existed at the time. 

" Next to the falsehoods about rations and hospitals, the sen- 
sational writers stirred the country up over what they were pleased 
to call the frightful and criminal inefficiencies of the staff corps. 
It was my privilege to be on duty in the War Department while 
these attacks upon ' bureaucracy ' and Secretary Alger were 
at their height. I regard it as high privilege to stand before my 
comrades and declare that, in spite of all charges to the contrary, 
the work of the War Department, and of every one of the staff 
corps, in promptly mobilizing a quarter of a million men was, 
considering the situation, and the empty military store -houses 
when war was declared, wonderful and creditable to a degree 
that language can scarcely express. It will constitute one of 
the proudest chapters in the history of the War Department and 
of the Republic. In this affirmation I desire to be understood 
as including the offices of the Secretary of War and the Adjutant- 
General, and the quartermaster, commissary, medical and ord- 
nance corps. Of course, there were lacks at times. Every true 
soldier knows that these are inseparable from war conditions. 
But the quartermaster's and commissary's departments could not 
furnish cradles and trundle - beds and Mother Winslow's Sooth- 
ing Syrup on the spur of the moment, and so it was impossible to 
check the squalling of the few who imagined they were going into 
a summer encampment, and found themselves in war camps in- 
stead. And the sensational journals became the willing organs 
of all this baby business. But the country did not then under- 
stand that these attacks had political origin, and as it was not 
deemed expedient to make direct attacks on a War President, the 
scheme was devised of striking him by attempting to discredit 
his War Department and the management of the war." 

The circumstances leading to the selection of the 
site at Montauk Point and the history of the army- 
there, make it necessary to treat that camp separately. 
Montauk Point was primarily a camp of recuperation 
only. 

Reference has already been made to the fact that 

424 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

contracts were let on the 2d of August for boring 
wells, piping water, supplying lumber for the tent 
floors and hospitals, and numerous quartermaster 
and other supplies. On the evening of the next day 
General Shafter's alarming despatch was received, 
announcing the necessity for the immediate return of 
his command to avoid further spread of yellow -fever 
and to save the lives of the soldiers comprising prac- 
tically the whole army in Cuba, sick or convalescent 
with tropical fevers. The order for the return of the 
entire army was given on the same day (August 3d). 
The plans and instructions already prepared for a de- 
tention camp of 5,000 and a hospital of 500, in addition to 
a general camp, had to be changed accordingly. Brig- 
adier-General S. B. M. Young was placed in command 
of the camp, arriving at Montauk Point August 5th. 
General Young had commanded, under General Wheel- 
er, the dismounted cavalry forces at Las Guasimas, 
and shortly thereafter had returned to the United 
States invalided. 

On the 6th of August lumber for the tent floors and 
hospitals reached Montauk, and the boring of the 
wells began. The full strength and energy of every 
supply department of the military establishment was 
employed to meet the emergency. In less than a week 
after the arrival of the contractors' materials on the 
ground, the troops from Santiago began to land, but 
before a soldier reached Camp Wikoff from Cuba 
wells had been bored, water had been piped to the sites 
selected for the camps, and 10,000 tents had been 
erected. In the mean time supplies of all kinds had 
been accumulated on the ground. On the 15th of 
August General Wheeler landed at Montauk. He 

425 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

was immediately directed to proceed to Washington. 
Upon his arrival he was ordered to return to Montauk, 
"take command of the troops, and, without consider- 
ing expense, have the men taken care of." 

Camp W 7 ikoff was located on Long Island, 125 miles 
from New York City, and connected therewith by a 
single-track railroad. Owing to the presence of yel- 
low - fever among the troops, two camps had to 
be prepared — a detention camp, in which the 
commands arriving from Cuba were placed for 
five days, and a general camp. Ninety per cent, 
of the officers and soldiers of General Shatter's com- 
mand reached Montauk sick or convalescent. No 
less than 10,000 men passed through the hospitals, 
and a number equally as large was sick in quarters 
or received medical attention and assistance. In a 
remarkably brief time 2,000,000 feet of lumber reached 
Montauk for the hospitals and floors of tents; tents 
were erected for the entire command of 25,000;* nu- 
merous wells dug; twelve miles of pipe were laid, so 
that each regiment drew water from a faucet in its 
midst; a laundry plant was erected; a disinfecting- 
plant constructed; a distilling-plant set up; a bakery 
established; numerous diet kitchens formed, which 
were presided over by the best chefs that could be 
found in New York and Boston; and, in fact, every 
provision was made by the supply bureaus of the War 
Department for the comfortable reception and treat- 
ment of the soldiers, without regard to expense or the 
ordinary processes of War Department administration. 

* Approximately 22,000 troops came from Cuba and a little over 
3,000 from Tampa. (See chapter entitled " The Round-Robin In- 
cident.") 

426 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

I made two visits to Montauk — the first while Gen- 
eral Wheeler was in command, and later when he 
had been superseded by General Shafter. Both 
of these officers were personally instructed by me not 
to regard precedent, regulations, or expense in provid- 
ing for every possible comfort and care of the soldiers. 
It was further ordered that the sixty-cents-a-day hos- 
pital allowance, in lieu of ration, should be granted 
every soldier who seemed to require it at the discretion 
of the commanding officers. As a result of these or- 
ders, although there was no authorit}^ of law for the 
purchase or gratuitous issue of such material, the fol- 
lowing articles of food, among other things secured, 
were procured and issued through the Commissary 
Department, in addition to the hospital supplies pur- 
chased with the sixty-cent allowance per day just re- 
ferred to: 

Ice 1,085,200 pounds 

Milk 54,86o gallons 

Halibut 3,ooo pounds 

Lima beans 47,047 

Tea 250 " 

Apples (canned) 6,020 3-pound cans 

Apples (canned) 1,774 gallon cans 

Apples (evaporated) 21,550 pounds 

Apricots (evaporated) I4,5 00 

Butter 34,799 

Corn (canned) 13,889 cans 

Cocoa 1,080 pounds 

Soda crackers 9,950 

Ham (sugar-cured) 19,9^7 

Evaporated cream 3 I , I 4° cans 

Oatmeal 31,985 pounds 

Peaches (evaporated) 18,025 

Peaches (canned) 14-973 cans 

Pears (canned) 14,869 

Pease (canned) 16,128 

Prunes 9,925 pounds 

Beef soup 7,500 cans 

427 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Chicken soup 11,490 cans 

Pickles 7,ioo gallons 

Oranges 300 crates 

Lemons 150 " 

Eggs 53,070 dozen 

This list does not include the enormous quantities 
of food received at Montauk from the public at 
large, including, among other delicacies and sweet- 
meats, turkeys, pheasants, squabs, eggs, milk, 
chickens, whiskey, wines, brandies, and champagne 
ad libitum. 

I directed that each soldier be provided with a cot, 
or bed-sack, whether in the detention or general camp. 
In addition, every man was to be furnished, before 
leaving camp, with a gratuitous issue of a new uni- 
form throughout, although there was no authority of 
law for such action. Some conception of the quarter- 
master's supplies sent to this camp, within a period of a 
little over thirty days after its establishment, can be 
formed from a perusal of this list: 



3,000 drawers, knit wool 


5,000 sky-blue trousers 


4,000 duck trousers 


10,000 common tents 


20,000 pairs leggings 


850 hospital tents 


20,000 blouses 


700 hospital flies 


40,000 drawers, summer 


1,000 wall tents 


20,000 campaign hats 


1,000 wall flies 


9,000 overcoats (3,000 cavalry, 


500 mattress covers 


6,000 infantry) 


20,000 bedsacks 


20,000 dark-blue shirts 


390 horses 


43,000 undershirts, S. M. 


632 mules 


20,000 shoes, calf 


118 escort wagons 


40,000 pairs stockings, cotton 


12 water wagons 


2,000 trousers, cavalry 


6 Dougherty wagons 


13,000 trousers, infantry 


5 carriages 


16,000 ponchos, rubber 


I buckboard 


30,000 woollen blankets 


33 ambulances 



In addition to the above-mentioned transportation, 

428 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

198 horses and fifty-nine wagons were employed un- 
der emergency contract. As clothing ran short, requi- 
sitions were made by telegraph for additional supplies, 
which were at once forwarded. 

With these provisions for the reception and treat- 
ment of the Santiago army at Camp Wikoff, the ques- 
tions are pertinent — What was the cause of the caustic 
criticism of that camp and its management? Why 
were there charges of gross negligence in providing 
for the comfort and care of our heroes forming Shatt- 
er's army? 

The widespread publication of the "Round Robin" 
and the Roosevelt letter, heretofore referred to, had 
put the people of the United States in a frame of mind 
to believe anything adverse with respect to the con- 
ditions and proper treatment of the soldiers. It was 
not then known that General Shafter's telegram, pre- 
ceding the "Round Robin," was as much a surprise 
to the War Department as the information it contained, 
made known through the "Round Robin" and the 
other letter, was to the country. Nor was it then 
known that within an hour after the receipt of the 
alarming news respecting the condition of the Santi- 
ago troops, conveyed by General Shafter's cablegram, 
and before the receipt of the "Round Robin," that 
army was ordered to return to the United States at 
once. A wave of indignation, caused by a misappre- 
hension, swept over the United States, and every act 
of the War Department was interpreted from this dis- 
torted point of view. In its psychological aspects 
this universal hysteria was not unlike other incidents 
in the history of our country wherein sentiment smoth- 
ers reason and loose opinion runs riot. Approximate- 

429 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ly 22,000 men reached Montauk from Cuba, and of 
this number probably 20,000 were invalids or conva- 
lescents — sick, enfeebled, and emaciated by the ruthless 
ravages of the Cuban malarial or yellow fever. The 
sight of these noble men thus returning, after their 
signal victories on a foreign soil, was indeed disheart- 
ening, and one never before witnessed by citizens of 
this country. Without stopping to analyze the causes, 
their condition was forthwith charged to the War 
Department. The truth did not prevail, because it 
could not secure a hearing. Camp Wikoff was thrown 
open to the public, and here flocked kind-hearted men 
and women to serve the troops, and incidentally ex- 
press their horror at the condition of the soldiers, of 
the camp, and of its management. Most of these 
persons had never before seen a military camp; none 
of them had ever before seen an army returning from 
a campaign in the tropics; and none had ever before 
inspected a field hospital in time of war and while 
filled with the sick. 

Major Ira C. Brown, executive officer of the hospitals 
at Camp Wikoff, thus testified, when he was asked by 
the War Investigation Commission how he accounted 
for the great number of complaints made of that camp : 



" By the statements of people who talked mostly of things they 
knew the least about, principally women, who are sympathetic. 
They were nervous and flashy about certain things. They came 
there, having never seen a hospital and never seen a sick soldier, 
or anything of the kind. It was not a condition that would in- 
spire a poet, but it was nothing unusual except as to the num- 
bers. It was practically as bad in Tampa, only there was not 
as large a number, and they thought the soldiers were terribly 
abused because they did not have feather-beds and lamb chops, 

430 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

and all that sort of thing. The fact of giving typhoid-fever patients 
liquid diet led them to think we were starving them. There was 
a case where a woman got into a ward where a man had dysen- 
tery and gave him oranges. He had had hemorrhages, and 
we had just got his dysentery checked. We had had a hard time 
to stop it, and it went through him whole. That is one of the 
things we had to contend with. The ' hero worshippers ' want- 
ed hands to hold and brows to rub, and they would get in, and 
you could not keep them out." * 



* One of the very trying problems during the latter part of 1898 
was the constant appeals from parents and friends to grant furloughs 
to men who were convalescent and desirous of returning to their homes. 
To this end the department was besieged day and night by letters and 
personal applications. 

Many soldiers, under the stimulating hope of going to their home, 
appeared to be stronger than they really were, and when the number 
in the hospitals was so large, the surgeons were too easily persuaded 
to grant furloughs to those who should not have been permitted to 
leave the camp. I recall one instance. A prominent citizen in west- 
ern Massachusetts telegraphed to the War Department asking that 
a young man of his town be granted a furlough from Montauk Point. 
The order was issued on the condition that the surgeon in attendance 
should regard it safe for this soldier to travel. The young man was 
granted his furlough, went to his home, received the congratidations 
of his townspeople, was feted, and in the excitement which followed 
probably over-exerted himself and possibly ate things which he should 
not have eaten. In one week from the day of his arrival home he was 
dead. 

All medical authorities are unanimously of opinion that a con- 
valescent typhoid-fever patient should eat no solid food. The appe- 
tites of the patients, however, are often beyond their control. When 
free from the restraint of doctors or nurses they are apt to yield to the 
pangs of hunger and take more or less solid or improper food. On the 
night of September 2d, 1898, in company with the President, I visited 
Montauk Point. We arrived at the railroad station on Long Island, 
just opposite New York City, at ten o'clock that evening. A train had 
just come in from Montauk with a large number of furloughed con- 
valescents. It was supposed that they were quite able to travel to their 
homes when they left camp, yet on the way to Brooklyn, 125 miles 
from camp, three had died, and when the train reached Brooklyn twenty 
were unable to walk and had to be carried into the Red Cross station 
established near by. Upon our arrival at Montauk I inquired into 
the cause. It was reported that many good people had visited the 
men in the trains and had given them to eat and drink that which 

431 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

He further remarked in the course of his testimony : 

" But when was there a camp in the world in which so much 
was done so well? The death-rate was only two per cent. ; and 
I have searched the records and you cannot find a hospital in 
the world with a record like that. Everybody that came to it 
was sick." 

It was a noticeable feature of the criticisms of Mon- 
tauk and other camps that those who were most vigor- 
ous in their fault-finding and denunciations knew 
the least about the facts, and when subsequently 
called before the War Investigation Commission were 
compelled to admit that they had no personal knowl- 
edge of the facts, and that the statements so publicly 
and so often made by them were based upon mere 
hearsay. One incident of this kind is furnished by 
the conduct of the Rev. Teunis S. Hamlin, pastor 
of the Church of the Covenant, Washington, D. C. In 
the open pulpit of his church, a place above all where 
one would expect to hear uttered only truth, he thus 
remarked as part of the Sunday address to his congre- 
gation on the 18th of September, 1898, just after he 
had returned from his summer outing : 

" Whether there have been deliberate crimes against the lives 
of our soldiers or the blunders of ignorance and incompetence 

they ought not to have had and which the men, in their uncontrollable 
desire for food, partook of. They were literally killed by kindness. 
As a result of what was learned at Montauk orders were immediately 
given that no more furloughs should be granted to men unless it was 
absolutely certain that it was safe for them to travel. 

It is not unlikely, however, that a great many deaths occurred 
among furloughed soldiers, convalescent from typhoid and Cuban 
fevers, as a result of eating food that should not have been taken by 
the men for weeks, perhaps, after leaving the hospital. 

432 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

that are as bad as crimes, the public does not yet know. But 
it does know that in Cuba they were but half clothed, half fed, half 
sheltered, half doctored when wounded or sick. It does know 
that in camps, within sight of our great cities, one of them with- 
in sight of our national capital, they have been decimated by 
perfectly preventable diseases and have died untended and un- 
comforted. It does know that the transports have renewed the 
horrors of the ' middle passage/ and that men have starved while 
supply-ships floated aimlessly for weeks and months upon the 
ocean and trains loaded with food and medical supplies stood 
unopened upon the rails. It does know that somehow our soldiers 
have become objects of public charity. Meanwhile the War Of- 
fice ' pleads the baby act.' A Cabinet officer, a Senator, and 
a general pronounce the water at Montauk ' good ' after tasting 
it ; the head of the department, in a public letter, shields himself 
by throwing all blame upon his subordinates, in the same breath 
saying that there really is no blame after all, and that war is not 
a picnic. The American public understands this perfectly; ex- 
pected deaths, sickness, and suffering ; is slow to believe evil of 
those in whom it delights to take unqualified pride. But it is 
capable of a righteous indignation. It is feeling that indigna- 
tion profoundly to-day. Will the feeling evaporate and the need- 
less and cruel sufferings of thousands of brave men be forgotten? 
Or will what is now a feeling issue in even-handed justice, after 
calm investigation into all the facts, in adequate penalties, no 
matter upon whom they may fall? The issue of all this will sharp- 
ly test our national character ; will disclose our love of both justice 
and humanity. If it shall also bring the Congress to realize the 
evil of meddling with administrative functions, abolish politics 
from the army and navy, and make it impossible that men without 
experience or capacity should have human lives intrusted to their 
care, then the martyrs of our camps and transports will not have 
died in vain." 

After the War Investigation Commission was con- 
vened, I suggested that Dr. Hamlin be invited to ap- 
pear before it and substantiate his statements. He 
was called upon to submit his evidence and thus re- 

433 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

plied in a letter to the Secretary of that Commission, 
October 8, 1898 : 

" The sermon to which you allude as preached by me on the 
18th ultimo was upon the great events of the summer. The 
paragraph that touched subjects covered by your commission's 
work is illustrative of a trait of national character, and based upon 
what then passed current as public knowledge. I had and 
have ' no experience/ but spoke upon information found in rep- 
utable papers . . . and statements issued from officials of 
the War Department and found in the public press. A reading 
of the paragraph will show that it dealt only with matters of pre- 
sumably public knowledge." 

Vice-President Hobart was so incensed at this minis- 
ter's sermon that he gave up his pew and immediately 
left the Church of the Covenant. 

Another incident of the same kind is afforded by 
the letters and newspaper interviews of Mr. Robert B. 
Roosevelt, of New York City. This gentleman, I 
understand, has the reputation of being a worthy and 
respectable citizen in the community where he resides. 
He was one of many, however, who were influenced 
by the exaggerated and untrue statements that found 
their way into the press. 

In his communications to the President and the 
War Investigation Commission, he made use of such 
expressions as "intentional cruelties"; "cruel suf- 
ferings of the soldiers in consequence of shortcom- 
ings in the medical, quartermaster, and commissary 
branches of army administration"; "untold horrors 
and cruelties at the hands of unfeeling nurses and 
attendants in the hospitals"; and claimed that the 
soldiers "were starved in a land of plenty, were un- 
cared for when sick, left without attention when wound- 

434 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

ed, were abused, maltreated, in some cases practically 
murdered." 

Admitting that Mr. Roosevelt believed all that he 
charged in his letters, it is interesting to note his con- 
duct when he was invited to appear before the War 
Investigation Commission for the purpose of sub- 
stantiating his statements. I quote his testimony in 
full: 

"Statement of Robert B. Roosevelt 

" Robert B. Roosevelt appeared at the request of the commission 
and made the following statement : 

" By General Dodge : 

" Q. Do you wish to be sworn, Mr. Roosevelt? 

" A. Well, I have no objection ; but I can't give any testimony 
of my own knowledge. All I have heard is pure hearsay. I 
can probably supply you with the names of additional witnesses 
if you want some witnesses ; but personally I have no testimony. 
As I told the gentleman at the door, I have no knowledge. I 
wasn't in the war at all. My nephew,* Colonel Roosevelt, was 
in the war. 

" Q. Have you any more witnesses besides those you fur- 
nished us? 

" A. I can probably give the others if it is desirable. 

" Q. Are there any more you think it is necessary for us to ex- 

* Colonel Roosevelt thus swore before the War Investigation Com- 
mission regarding the treatment of his regiment at Montauk Point : 

" Our regiment was admirably treated. As far as my own regi- 
ment is concerned, (we) were well treated — admirably treated. Again 
and again I would ask them how they were being treated, and they 
would answer me, ' This is heaven.' They were getting chicken 
bioth ; they were getting milk. We got so much milk and goodies and 
things like that that we finally had to stop receiving them. I would 
take them around and give them to other regiments. My troop com- 
manders and the regimental commanders who reported to me when 
I was brigade commander would report that they would not use any 
more delicacies ; that they didn't want any more and couldn't use any 
more." 

435 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

amine outside of those which you have given us — any that will 
have additional knowledge ? 

"A. I only sent the names of the witnesses as to those mat- 
ters which we had presented in our statement to the President. 
Outside of that there was a vast field on which we could probably 
furnish a number of witnesses. We have a meeting of our com- 
mittee to-morrow. Will you gentlemen be here through the week? 

"Q. Yes. 

" A. Then I will submit a list of additional witnesses. 

" Q. When you submit the witnesses won't you be kind enough 
to state as to what they will be examined so we will know what 
line to take? 

"A. Yes." 

It is the universal testimony of the soldiers at 
Montauk that everything that could be done for 
them was tenderly and thoughtfully done. The 
regular army surgeons, the volunteer surgeons, the 
contract doctors, and the army nurses worked un- 
ceasingly and devotedly to alleviate the suffering and 
add to the comfort of the sick and convalescent. 

In this connection I desire to testify to the 
work of the trained nurses and that noble band 
of women, who, under Miss Clara Barton and her Red 
Cross flag, rendered such acts of tenderness and sweet 
mercy to the wounded and the dying, the sick, and 
the convalescent on the battle-field and in camp. Miss 
Barton, her corps of assistants, and the supplies on 
the Red Cross ship Texas were of inestimable assist- 
ance after the battle of San Juan. 

I have elsewhere referred to the enthusiastic tender 
of service on the part of the men in the United States 
in response to the first and second calls for volunteers. 
i would be wanting both in candor and in fairness 
did I not say, that the women were no less patriotic 

436 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

in their offers to render such duties as the government 
might see fit to assign them. The Daughters of the 
American Revolution, with characteristic patriot- 
ism and with a definiteness of purpose highly com- 
mendable, immediately set to work to organize a 
bureau for trained nurses. Of the many thousands 
from among those angels of mercy, this society ex- 
amined into each applicant's professional and moral 
fitness for the services these women were to perform, 
and was never lacking in fit candidates when the War 
Department called upon it for nurses. To the Daugh- 
ters of the American Revolution and Mrs. Whitelaw 
Reid, the executive officer for the New York Chapter, 
the nation and its soldiers owe, indeed, a debt of im- 
measurable gratitude. With grateful heart and sweet 
recollection many a soldier lad recalls the trim nurse 
who, with gentle grace, soft hand, and tender smile, 
seemed to make worth while the wound of battle or 
the tedium of sickness. The space within the covers 
of this book would not be sufficient for the bare men- 
tion of the labor and self-sacrifice of those women 
who served or offered to serve so unselfishly in such 
capacity as their sex fits them by the side of their 
fathers, their brothers, and their husbands. It is no 
exaggeration to say that they saved more lives than 
the enemy's bullets destroyed. 

I cannot resist the temptation to mention one name 
held in grateful remembrance by the War Depart- 
ment, as N I am sure it is enshrined in many a soldier's 
heart. Miss Helen Gould gave not only her time and 
personal services, but liberally of her wealth as well. 

The man with the gun is not the only hero in time 
of war. 

437 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The record of Camp Wikoff conclusively proves that 
most of the charges against it were without cause 
or reason. A camp of ten days' preparation for over 
25,000 men, of whom 20,000 are received sick within 
thirty days, only 126 of whom die, surely cannot be 
regarded as otherwise than creditable to those officers 
responsible for its establishment and control. Every 
prediction of a typhoid or other epidemic so frequently 
made in the press by "special representatives" and 
others, was unfulfilled. 

There is an abundance of evidence to prove that 
there was a determined and concerted effort on the 
part of certain newspapers to misstate, and to 
scrupulously avoid mention of, facts — and there were 
many — creditable to the conduct and supply of that 
camp. I have selected a few extracts from the sworn 
testimony of officers of the regular army and others 
bearing upon this point. These statements were 
made before the War Investigation Commission : 

" Corporal EDWARD G. STANTON, 2d Volunteer Engineers. 

" Q. You saw nothing, as a soldier or private there, that you 
had cause to complain of? 

" A. No, sir ; none whatever. The men were all sick when they 
came there. Of course some complained, but that was natural 
for men in their position. I know I had friends and relatives who 
wrote to me in regard to the terrible state of affairs that they saw 
in the papers. I wrote back immediately that they need have 
no fear. The New York Journal was responsible for a good 
deal." 

" Major A. W. CORLISS, 7th U. S. Infantry. 

" Q. Have you seen the complaints in the papers that have 
been made against the 7th? 

" A. I have seen some of them. 

" Q. Are they truthful or untruthful complaints? 

438 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

" A. What I have seen are exaggerated. I have seen no com- 
plaints against the regiment. I have seen some complaints in 
general. 

" Q. From the men— what complaints have you heard from 
the men? 

" A. I have never heard of any myself. I was speaking of 
what was in the papers. 

" Q. You have never heard any complaint from the men of 
their treatment, lack of food, water, or of lying out on the 
ground? 

" A. No, sir. 

" Q. Or about their treatment in the hospital? 

" A. No, sir. 

" Q. If there had been any such complaint would you be likely 
to know? 

" A. I would. 

" Q. How do you account for these complaints in the papers? 

" A. They just want to appear in print, I guess. 

" Q. So far as you saw, was there any truth in them? 

" A. Not a particle." 

" Major CHARLES B. NANCREDE, Chief Surgeon. 

" The doctors we had were far above the average of medical 
intelligence, and were the hardest working set of men I ever saw. 
Because he is a contract doctor he is no better or worse. 

" Q. You saw the unusual complaint from the people in the press 
of New York about Montauk and the way the above hospital was 
run, naturally, did you not? 

" A. Yes, sir ; I saw a good deal of it. 

" Q. What explanation can you give for that? 

" A. I was informed by a Boston reporter that the New York 
reporters were to roast everj^thing. 

" Q. Were those his instructions? 

" A. No ; I don't think the Boston papers roasted them so much, 

but he told me this voluntarily; I don't know whether reliable 

or not." 

" Captain ROBERT W. DOWDY, U. S. A. 

" Q. How much were ambulances used by officers and their 

friends to the detriment of the sick? 

439 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" A. I could state positively not at all, so far as came under 
my observation. The rumors that the newspapers circulated 
about that are mostly simple stories out of whole cloth. When 
ambulances were coming from the hospital back to the corral, 
which was near the station, no doubt many officers would ride 
down. I think it may be possible when out around the camp 
that drivers would take a fee from visitors, either going from one 
point to another, but, of course, I saw the ambulances more than 
any one else, and I can honestly state that I never saw them used 
for purposes not intended." 

"Captain JONATHAN M. PATTON, Assistant Quartermaster 

U. S. V. 

" Q. Did you see among the correspondents of the daily papers 
that were there in Montauk a very severe criticism as to the treat- 
ment of those who came there? 

" A. I think there was a great deal of injustice in those state- 
ments. . . . 

" Q. Captain, in general was there anything needed by the 
troops there from the quartermaster's department which you 
could not furnish — that was not furnished? 

" A. I don't know of a single, solitary thing that was ever 
asked for that was not furnished without a particle of hesitation, 
or without even waiting for a receipt for it; it was sent when it 
was asked for." 

" Colonel W. H. FORWOOD, Assistant Surgeon-General U. S. A. 

" A. There were complaints made by men sent up there. They 
were hired by newspapers to come up there and write articles for 
newspapers for the stipulated sum of $50, I think, usually, and 
they came up and wrote their articles. 

" Q. Newspaper men or doctors? 

" A. Doctors. Dr. Lee, of New York, was one, and being a 
very personal friend of mine, he came to me first, and I told him 
I wanted him to look around and into every hole and corner and 
criticise everything he could find, because criticism was valuable 
and we were not infallible, and we wanted to see ourselves as others 
saw us. I told him I wanted him to do it. He went around to 
look at things, and he made it flattering in some respects ; but when 

440 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

it was printed he was very much disgusted because the} 7 left all 
the favorable parts out. 

"Q. Did he get his $50? 

" A. Yes, sir. 

Another doctor came there, and he wrote a very scurrilous article. 
He said a great many things that were not true. He said the 
men were lying on the ground. 

" Q. Do you remember the name of that doctor? 

" A. I believe it was Stimpson. He said ' dirt ' kitchens, and 
it went out and it was published ' dirty ' kitchens. This did us 
a great deal of injustice. He came up there, he said, to inform 
the public, and he should have told the truth. He should have 
told the public the truth, but should have told them that those 
kitchens were presided over by the finest chefs that could be found 
in New York and Boston. They were provided by Miss Helen 
Gould, who came up there and offered me an unlimited amount 
of assistance. Each cook had an assistant, and we put them in 
the detention hospital and general hospital and the annex, and 
they presided over these kitchens during the whole history of the 
hospital. They gave their services to the benefit of preparing 
a diet. One of those men I interviewed, and I found that for three 
years and six months he had been private cook for W. K. Vander- 
bilt. He had been on that yacht that was sunk in the harbor. 
He was loaned— so were others— by the richest people in New York 
City. Instead of doling out government rations prepared by army 
cooks, the army ration was scarcely considered. We had bread 
and meat and flour, of course, but the army rations were supple- 
mented by everything you could find in the larder of the Waldorf 
in New York. " 

"Hon. W. H. BALDWIN, Jr., President of the Long Island 

Railroad. 
" The scare of no water was started deliberately and malicious- 
ly by a newspaper correspondent, who, by his own confession, 
had never been on the ground and never knew anything about 
it, and boasted of his enterprise in forcing the government to act."* 

* It is <o be said to the great credit of the management of this road 

44I 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" Brigadier-General S. B. M. YOUNG, U. S. A. 

" Q. As a matter of fact, did the men complain? 

" A. As a matter of fact, not at Montauk. Now, answering 
the question the general asked me, ' Did I have anything to do 
with the newspaper correspondents,' it was told me and shown 
to me, instructions that newspaper correspondents received at 
Montauk, that he must write on these subjects commencing with 
A, enumerating down to M. This gentleman (I honor him for it) 
informed his papers that they had made a mistake in the man ; 

that during the entire time of the existence of Montauk Camp, when its 
freight and traffic had been increased many times, there was not an 
accident or the loss of a single life. The president of the road went 
to Montauk and for days and entire nights worked without inter- 
mission. He thus further testified before the War Investigation 
Commission : 

" The other persons to whom I wish to refer in order to have you get 
the right view of our part in this matter are the men on the Long Isl- 
and Railroad. I talked with them when this first began and told them 
what was coming. I told them the difficulties, the serious situation 
of the government, the responsibility which they had to themselves 
and the government and to humanity, and I urged upon them loyal, 
cordial work and support, and I will say to you that the most beau- 
tiful picture I know of in connection with this whole war was the de- 
votion and the sacrifice and the hunger and the work and the life and 
everything that is beautiful of the men on that little Long Island one- 
horse railroad you are talking about. We lost five people ; they died. 
They didn't die from being at Montauk, but in three cases out of five 
from carrying and helping sick men. My own brother stayed there 
night and day from the beginning to the end of the camp, and stayed 
until the last troop went, and he was stronger than a bull and yet fell 
in utter collapse, and is to-day. It was life. It was not sordid motive, 
and there was not a sign of it from the beginning up to this moment 
in this whole camp. 

" Q. You are speaking of the operating men on your road? 

" A. Yes, sir. There were as many heroes there as there were in 
some of the places during the war. It was a fearful job and a fearful 
responsibility. We passed along with the daily criticism, fortunately, 
without paying attention to it, because it was untrue. The only fear 
I had was that the daily attack of newspapers, in their lack of in- 
formation — that it might embarrass our men and cause some serious 
wreck. Fortunately, by calmness and good judgment, the men hung 
together, and it was nothing but devotion to the cause that prompted 
the operation of our road under the circumstances. It was more than 
human." 

442 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

they would have to send another writer there. That man I spoke 
to and asked him — of course, I cannot give his name. 

"By General BEAVER: 

" Q. Can you give the name of the paper? 

" A. That would be giving the thing away, too. 

" By Colonel SEXTON : 

" Q. I think the people ought to have that. 

" A. The World. He said, ' Yes ; but it would cost me my 
place.' I said, ' No; they will not discharge you on that; you 
have too good a hold.' They did send other people there, and 
they wrote things purporting to be letters and complaints from 
men that we have investigated, and there was not a word of truth 
in it. 

" By Governor WOODBURY : 

" Q. They were manufactured letters? 

" A. Yes, sir ; manufactured letters ; names were not given 
half the time, but where they were given we found it was not true. 
I did not investigate, but told officers to investigate." 

" Major ROYCE D. FRY, Brigade Surgeon U. S. V. 
" A. That the reporters from the various papers in New York 
were sent there with instructions to find out everything bad, and 
if they found anything good to say nothing about it. It was 
an open secret. People do not make any bones about it, and if 
anything could be said in favor of the camp they didn't want to 
say it ; if there was anything bad or disreputable they wrote it up." 

" Captain GEORGE ALLEN DODD, U. S. Cavalry. 

" Q. Did you read in the public press while at Montauk Point 
the criticisms that were made upon that place? 

" A. Yes, sir. 

" Q. Please state whether, in your opinion, those were just 
or unjust. 

" A. I suppose you refer to this thing of men starving and 
going around lantern- jawed, not enough to eat, begging for some- 
thing to eat— absolutely false. It is false— everything of that 
kind. Those stories were gotten up by a lot of sensationalists. 

443 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

I don't know who they are or what they belong to, but there 
seemed to be an organized band of them there. They would 
come around and look at a man's tongue and ask him if he didn't 
feel badly — try to convince a man that he was sick, and all that. 
There was no suffering of that kind there. I have been over 
every inch of it time and again, in different places. The men 
themselves would laugh at those stories when they came out. 

" Q. Have you been engaged at any time during your term 
of service in Indian warfare? 

" A. I have ; yes, sir. I served for twelve years, and my service 
was west of the Missouri River, and I never crossed it. 

" Q. I don't know but you may have stated, I think you pos- 
sibly have, before in your testimony, but I will ask you the ques- 
tion again: Please state the comparative deprivation and suf- 
fering in some of the Indian campaigns in which you have 
been engaged and the campaign in Cuba during the war with 
Spain. 

" A. I stated, I think, something with regard to the percentage 
of sick that I had. I have suffered very much more in Indian 
campaigns than in Cuba ; men have suffered more ; enlisted men 
then had less to eat and not so well provided for in other re- 
pects." 

" Major HENRY B. HERSEY, ist Volunteer Cavalry. 

" A. No, sir. These reports, as far as my experience is con- 
cerned, are absolutely unfounded. I do not believe that any 
soldiers in the history of mankind have ever been taken care of as 
they were at Montauk. It was a standing joke among the boys 
when we were getting the papers to say, ' Let us see who are 
starving now.' They had to read the papers, and all laughed at 
the horrible cases of men dying in the grass with none to assist 
them, when they were just as happy and just as glad as they 
could be to know that they were being taken care of so well. We 
sent away loads of stuff from our camp. We sent over to the ioth 
Cavalry loads of stuff we could not use, because we had them 
brought to us from the friendly societies, and from the friends of 
officers of the regiment in such quantities that we could not begin 
to use them— the choicest kind of supplies; and we would send 
them over to the ioth, to those darky boys, because we could not 

444 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

use them. We felt in our hearts that they were good fellows, and 
they had done well." 

Another incident of the same kind is furnished by a 
letter from General Shaf ter, sent on his own volition : 

" Headquarters sth Army Corps, 
" Montauk Point, Long Island, 

" September 3, 1898. 
" MY DEAR GENERAL ALGER,— I have just seen the New 
York World of to-day, in which it refers to an interview with 
me day before yesterday. Every word which refers to charging 
incompetency or gross mismanagement of supply departments or 
that alleges that persons ordering the army to Cuba are re- 
sponsible for present condition of army is absolutely false. I 
not only never said this, but entertain no such opinion. I only 
spoke to the reporter on the success of the campaign and the 
natural difficulties to be overcome. 

" I suppose, general, you have gotten used to newspaper lies 
by this time and can appreciate the situation. I am, 

" Very respectfully, WM. R. SHAFTER. 

" Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, etc." 

The statements were so often, so persistently, and so 
positively made that the soldiers were being fed with 
improper food, that they were being starved, that 
they were criminally neglected, that every bureau of 
the War Department was incompetent and negligent 
— that many of our most intelligent and conservative 
citizens even came to believe the malicious and mis- 
chievous false rumors and reports when they had 
no opportunity to examine into the conditions per- 
sonally. 

This was especially true after General Miles 
charged that "beef pulp" was being furnished 
the army "under the pretence of an experiment," 
and that refrigerated beef ("embalmed beef") was 

445 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

being issued to the troops. It is not to be won- 
dered at that, until each and every one of these 
unwarrantable statements were proven to be false, 
many persons were misguided and deceived. Their 
indignation and resentment rightfully should have 
been directed towards the person who conceived and 
brought forth such a hideous creature of the imagina- 
tion. 

The persistent misstatements and exaggerations 
caused widespread and untold suffering and anxiety 
throughout the country.* Every charge of neglect, 
mismanagement, or abuse at Montauk from respon- 

* In an official report to the War Department, so recent as March 
14th, 1901, Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, then commanding United 
States troops in China, thus wrote of the baneful and pernicious effect 
upon soldiers resulting from careless and exaggerated newspaper 
statements : 

" And I may add, although perhaps it is not germane to the subject, 
that if correspondents have studied with care the effect produced upon 
soldiers by exaggeration of their hardships by comparison or other- 
wise, or the effect of frequent reference to their hardships and privations, 
they must have discovered that the effect is positively injurious to 
the soldier, the service, and the government, and is largely responsible 
for the absence from the evening campfire of the one-time songs which 
cheered and rested the men, following the long march, day of fatigue 
or battle ; for the absence of the camp joker, who provided the best 
substitute in the world for water, bread, meat, etc., when not plentiful 
or not present, owing to some incident of war or of the march, which 
every honest soldier knows is never the result of premeditation of his 
government or his officers ; for the marked decay of individual will- 
power, without which nothing difficult can be accomplished by an 
army ; for baleful countenances observed when hardships abound 
and difficulties accumulate, distress surrounds. Soldiers do not like 
sympathy ; sympathy is for women and children. Soldiers are men, 
but they do like fair commendation when deserving of it, and especially 
when their fortitude has been severely tested. Commend our soldiers 
for manfully undergoing privations and they will readily respond 
again ; but prate of their privations, deficiencies, and heavy burdens 
and they soon learn to dread the hour that shall disturb their ease ; 
the spirit becomes one of submission rather than one cheerfully em- 
bracing the opportunity to exhibit their endurance and their stamina." 

446 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

sible sources (and from a good many irresponsible 
newspapers) received immediate consideration and 
thorough investigation by the War Department at 
Washington or by those in command at Camp Wikoff. 
Exceedingly few of the charges, on investigation, 
proved warranted or were considered to be the result 
of neglect or abuse. 

With this evidence of a concerted attempt to dis- 
credit the efforts of the supply bureaus of the War 
Department and the commanding generals of Camp 
Wikoff, little more need be said to prove that much of the 
criticism was unjust and that more was untrue. On 
the other hand, it is interesting to note what the three 
commanding generals at Montauk had to say for it 
several months afterwards. These statements were 
made before the War Investigation Commission under 
oath. 

Major- General Wheeler said: 

" We had that wonderful result of 22,000 soldiers coming from 
the yellow-fever district, with the yellow-fever supposed to be in 
some of the ships, and some of them infected, and yet not the 
spread of a single case of fever. 

" If there were any camp horrors the commander of the camp 
would certainly be the responsible person because he had ample 
authority to rectify any wrongs and give the proper comfort to the 
soldiers. I do not know of any complaints from soldiers at that 
time. There were a number of individual instances of suffering 
on the part of the soldiers, but they were very few in comparison 
to the great number of soldiers there and to the great amount 
of sickness. I went through the hospitals and made it a special 
point to ask in every ward if there was anything that they want- 
ed that they did not have, and the answer was always speaking 
in gratitude of the good care they were receiving." 

447 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 
General Young said : 

" I have never seen its equal. I hope never to be called upon 
to make such efforts again. The country looked upon us to do 
this, and we were going to make a success of it, and I think we 
did make a success of it." 

And General Shaf ter said : 

" I thought it was the best camp I ever saw." 

Returning now to the camps of instruction and 
mobilization, the evidence is overwhelming that the 
sickness among the soldiers encamped in the United 
States during the summer of 1898 was the result of 
ignorance, inexperience, and carelessness on the part 
of both officers and men. The fact that typhoid-fever 
was prevalent in every camp, whether of 1,000 or 50,000 
men, indicates what other indisputable evidence con- 
clusively demonstrates. 

An interesting comparison can be made between 
the records of disease among the volunteers and 
regulars. The 15th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, 
consisting of forty-six officers and 1,279 nien, was 
encamped alone in its own State on the Fair Grounds 
at St. Paul during July, and at Fort Snelling during 
August. In July this regiment had 131 sick, and in 
August its sick list had grown to the astounding num- 
ber of 602, nearly fifty per cent, of the entire command ; 
260 of these cases were typhoid-fever. Other volun- 
teer regiments remaining in their own States upon the 
camping-grounds selected by their several governors 
met with a similar experience, notably the 203d 
New York at Camp Black, Long Island, and the 35th 
Michigan at Island Lake, Michigan. On the other 

448 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

hand, about 12,000 men of the regular army were at 
Chickamauga in April and May, part of these troops 
remaining there for a full month. Not a case of ty- 
phoid-fever or other camp disease developed among 
them, and but two deaths occurred, one from accident 
and the other from pneumonia. 

The experience of the regulars and volunteers dur- 
ing the Santiago campaign is especially interesting 
on this point. General Shatter sailed from Tampa 
on the 14th of June with 14,412 regulars and 2,465 
volunteers (1st Volunteer Cavalry, 2d Massachusetts, 
and 71st New York). General Duffield's volunteer 
brigade (consisting of the 9th Massachusetts, the 
33d and 34th Michigan) reached Cuba on the 27th of 
June and the 1st of July; and the 1st District of Colum- 
bia and the 1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry arrived 
at the front on the nth of July. These additional 
volunteers brought General Shafter's command to 
14,412 regulars and 7,443 volunteers. The deaths 
from disease during the time the 5th Corps was in 
Cuba amounted to 210 regulars and 206 volunteers — 
practically as many volunteers as regulars, although 
there were only about half as man}^ volunteers as 
regulars. This large ratio of deaths from disease 
existed among the volunteers in spite of the fact that 
three volunteer regiments did not arrive until about 
a week after the entire command landed and two other 
volunteer regiments did not reach the front until the 
nth of July. One regiment of regulars, the 24th 
Infantry (colored), lost many men from disease because 
that gallant regiment was detailed to nurse the sick 
with yellow-fever.* 

* The number of cases in the Yellow-Fever Hospital at Siboney in 

449 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Again, another interesting comparison of disease 
among regulars and volunteers can be made from 
the records of sickness of troops remaining in the 
United States. And in this connection it should be 
remembered that by far the larger proportion of the 
regulars in the United States were recruits, as 14,412 
of the regular army alone accompanied the Santiago 
campaign. But the regulars in the United States had 
the benefit of the instruction and discipline of regular 
army officers. As a result of this fact and the ex- 
ample of the regular soldiers in camp, the Surgeon-Gen- 
eral reports that from May, 1898, to June, 1899, the 
death-rate among the regulars in the United States 
was but 17.43 per thousand of strength, while the 
death-rate among the volunteers equalled 26.67 per 
thousand of strength. Moreover, and this statement 
is even more significant, the Surgeon - General re- 
ports that in the United States the regular troops lost 
but 7.78 per thousand of strength from typhoid-fever 
while the volunteers lost considerably over twice as 
many, or 1 8. 2 1 per thousand of strength. 

If further evidence were wanting these facts would 
conclusively demonstrate the proposition that the 
large amount of sickness among the volunteers was 
the result of their own inexperience and carelessness. 
But the records of the medical department furnish ad- 
ditional proof of this statement. Three or four months 
of camp life give both officers and men a knowledge 
of camp sanitation and of the simple rules necessary 

July and August, 1898, was 549, with forty-six deaths (Report of 
Surgeon-Generals, 1898, p. 128). One hundred and sixty-seven of 
these cases and twenty-three — just half — of the deaths occurred in the 
24th Infantry. 

450 






CAMPS AND DISEASE 

for the preservation of their health and strength that 
neither text-books nor instruction when enforced by 
rigid discipline can give. The mortality from disease 
in the camps of the United States reached its acme 
in September, and then its fall was both rapid and 
great. The ratio per thousand of deaths from disease 
was as follows : May, 1898, .26; June, 1898, .44; July, 
1898, 1.72; August, 1898, 5.21; September, 1898, 5.89. 
In October it fell to 3.17; in November it was but 1.51, 
and continued to fall until in April, 1899, it was 
but .71.* 

That a clean camp and an observation of the few 
simple rules of hygiene laid down by the medical de- 
partment of the army will prevent much sickness and 
save many lives, is a maxim of military life demon- 
strated long before the occurrence of the war with 
Spain. Camp life during that war and since has add- 
ed strength to that miKtaty aphorism as exemplified 
in numerous experiences. The command of Brigadier- 
General J. P. Sanger at Matanzas, Cuba, when I 
visited that camp in the spring of 1899, consisted of 
two regular regiments and four volunteer regiments: 
10th U. S. Infantry, 2d U. S. Cavalry, 8th Massa- 
chusetts, 12th New York, 160th Indiana, and 3d Ken- 
tucky. 

These troops were in camp under General Sanger's 
command from January until June, 1899. Two of 
the volunteer regiments were at Matanzas two months, 
two were there four months, and the regular regi- 
ments, four and five months respectively. Sanitation 
and camp hygiene received the most careful consid- 

*See the interesting pamphlet of Surgeon-General Sternberg en- 
titled Sanitary Lessons of the War. 

451 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

eration. General Sanger had the gratifying result 
of but one death, and that from drowning, during 
the entire six months he was stationed at Matanzas. 

Notwithstanding the alarming reports made with 
respect to the deaths at Chickamauga; notwithstand- 
ing the exaggerated reports of deaths from disease 
in the camp near Washington and other camps; not- 
withstanding the false charges respecting the con- 
ditions at Montauk, the ratio of mortality from disease 
during the war with Spain was much less than the 
first months of the Civil War, despite the fact that 
a large part of the army of 1898 campaigned in the 
tropics. Upon this point the Surgeon-General thus 
writes :* 

" In comparing the death-rates from disease during the year of 
the Spanish- American War, May 1st, 1898, to April 30th, 1899, and 
the first year of the Civil War, May 1st, 1861, to April 30th, 1862, 
note should be taken in the first place that the mean strength in 
May, 1861, was only 16, 161, as compared with 163,726 men in 
service in May, 1898. The mustering-in of volunteer troops was 
more slow in 1861 than during the recent war, so that it was not 
until September and October, 1861, that the mean strength as- 
sumed proportions equal to that of corresponding months of the 
Spanish War. Although the number present in the camps of 
1861-62 after October, 1861, was largely in excess of those ag- 
gregated during the past year, the average annual strength 
during both wars did not differ greatly. Nevertheless, the deaths 
from disease in 1861-62 numbered 10,522, while in 1898--99 they 
amounted only to 5,438. The death-rate per 1,000 of strength 
mounted gradually month by month in 1861-62, and indeed it 
did not reach its acme until February, 1863, when the rate of 6.39 
was reached. In 1898, on the other hand, the acme, 5.89, was 
reached suddenly in September, but owing to the sanitary meas- 

* Sanitary Lessons of the War. 
452 



CAMPS AND DISEASE 

Bres adopted, the fall during October and November was as 
apid as had been the rise. 

" The comparatively small number of medical officers of the 
regular army available for duty in the large camps occupied by 
our volunteer troops at the outset of the war proved to be entirely 
inadequate to control the sanitary situation in these camps, and 
as a result of the conditions existing, the mortality from typhoid- 
fever in our armies during the year ending April 30th, 1899, has 
been more than twenty-two times the annual mortality in our 
regular army during the. decade immediately preceding the war 
period. As compared with the first year of the Civil War, how- 
ever, there is a decided improvement, the typhoid mortality for the 
first year of the Civil War having been 1,971 per 100,000 of mean 
strength, and for the Spanish-American War, 1,237 P er 100,000. 
Moreover, as shown by the chart, the vigorous sanitary measures 
enforced enabled our troops to quickly free themselves from the 
ravages of this infectious disease, and while the line of typhoid 
mortality continued to ascend during the first year of the Civil 
War and subsequently, it rapidly fell after the middle of Septem- 
ber last, and for the last six months of the period under considera- 
tion has been remarkably low. Indeed, in the history of large 
armies the record has never heretofore been equalled." 

The comparison is even stronger if we consider the 
period from the 1st of May until the end of September 
in 1861 and 1898. Taking all organizations which 
were in service from ninety days to five months during 
the Rebellion and whose records are sufficiently com- 
plete to enable a definite statement to be made with 
regard to them, it is found that the total strength of 
these organizations amounted to 157,484 officers and 
men, and that the deaths in action, or of wounds re- 
ceived in action, numbered 367, while the deaths from 
disease, or causes other than wounds received in action 
numbered 2,356, making the total deaths from all causes 
2,723. From the commencement f the Spanish War. 

453 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

in the latter part of April, until the 30th of September, 
1898, there were 274,717 officers and men in service. 
The deaths in action or wounds received in action 
during this period numbered 345, and the deaths 
from disease, or causes other than wounds received 
in action, numbered 2,565, making the total deaths 
2,910. In this connection it should be remembered 
that a good part of our army during this period was 
operating in a tropical country at the worst season 
of the year. These figures show a ratio of deaths 
from all causes, per 1,000 of total strength, of 17.29 
in the organizations under consideration for the War 
of the Rebellion, and 10.59 f° r the troops in service 
during the Spanish War. But what is more signifi- 
cant, the ratio of deaths from disease alone, or causes 
other than wounds received in action, is 14.96 for 
those organizations in the War of the Rebellion, and 
only 9.34 for the troops in the war with Spain.* 

I repeat the statement, that the records of any army 
in the world do not show as small a mortality percent- 
age from disease as the army of the United States 
during the war with Spain. 

* From a statement prepared in October, 1898, by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral F. C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Record and Pension Office, U. S. 
War Department. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

CONCLUSION 

IT is doubtful if any nation rated as a first power 
ever entered upon a war of offence in a condition of 
less military preparation than was the United States 
in 1898. At that time there were not sufficient reserve 
supplies in the possession of the War Department to 
fully equip 10,000 men in addition to the regular army 
as it then stood. 

In discussing the unpreparedness for war, in an- 
other chapter of this book, it has been shown that the 
small number of Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifles and 
carbines — and the small arm was the only element 
of equipment of which there was a reserve — was barely 
sufficient to meet the needs of the increase in the reg- 
ular army to 61,000. The entire body of volunteers, 
outside of the three volunteer cavalry regiments, were 
at first furnished with single-loading Springfield .45- 
caliber rifles, because there was no other weapon in the 
possession of the War Department. 

We saw also that the government of the United States 
did not provide smokeless powder for the Springfield 
rifles, nor for the field artillery in the early part of the 
war, simply for the reason that it had none to provide. 
No type of smokeless powder, indeed, had been adopt- 
ed even for either of these important adjuncts of war. 
The issue of smokeless powder subsequently was de- 

455 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

pendent upon the output of the few plants in the United 
States capable of manufacturing it. We have also 
seen that the War Department did not even own or con- 
trol a single transport, and there was no troop-ship 
on the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans available to the 
United States ;* that many elements of field, siege, 
and sea-coast artillery were in a transitional state; 
that the military establishment was palpably deficient 
in trained artillerists; that the regular army had not 
been mobilized since the Civil War; one-third of a 
century had elapsed since the army, as a whole, or 
any great part of it had been brought together; that 
there was no strategic staff, and no large number of 
officers who were experienced in the concentration of 
troops, or in battalion, division, or corps manoeuvres; 
that there was no place in the United States especially 
adapted or prepared for army mobilization, and that 
neither the army nor any officer in it had any ex- 
perience in meeting, or operating under, the new con- 
ditions incident to a campaign in the tropics. 

To these causes, most of which may be directly 
ascribed to the failure of Congress to provide for the 



* The generosity of the government of the United States in providing 
for the care and comfort of our soldiers when the War Department has 
the money and the time at its disposal to meet the conditions confront- 
ing it, is well exemplified in the vessels fitted up during and soon after 
the war with Spain. These ships, for their kind, are the most com- 
plete in appointments of any troop-ships afloat. They are provided 
with ice-plants, distilling apparatus, carbonating plants, cold storage 
large enough to take fresh meat and vegetables from New York 
to Manila, a steam laundry, a hospital, a contagious hospital ward, 
electric lights and fans throughout, a spring mattress for each of the 
1,200 to 2,000 soldiers, and other conveniences to be found only in 
the most complete metropolitan hotels. Six troop-ships of this class 
are the Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, Logan, and Thomas. 
They are of modern design, with twin screws and fin keek. 

456 



CONCLUSION 

emergency of war, must be added another : the statutes 
under which the military establishment operated were 
not elastic enough to permit of large purchases of sup- 
plies necessitated by the sudden expansion of the 
army to a war footing. 

When the crisis, so often predicted by military ex- 
perts, at last came it found us totally unprepared for 
war and with problems to be met at home and abroad 
which were both unusual and difficult.* 

The effort has been made frequently to draw com- 
parisons between the efficiency of the army and that 
of the navy during the war. The conditions do not 
admit of comparison. At the commencement of hos- 
tilities in 1898 the full number of men authorized by 
law for the navy was but 12,500. This was sub- 
sequently increased to 24,123 men— the maximum 
attained August 15th, 1898. The number of naval 
officers allowed by law in April, 1898, was 921. By 
August this force had been increased to a total of 1,035 
commissioned officers. 

In April, 1898, the enlisted strength of the army was 
26,040. In August, this force had been increased to 

* Touching on this matter, the junior Senator from Massachusetts 
thus spoke on the floor of the Senate in January, 1901 : 

" Mr. President, Any one who has studied carefully the history 
of the Spanish War and events connected therewith knows perfectly 
well all the troubles which befell us at that time in the way of trans- 
ports, in the way of organization, all the things that led to the outcry 
here were owing to defective organization. I never shared, I never 
had any sympathy with, the wolfish cry which went up to punish 
individuals for faults which were due to a system. 

" The system was bad. It was owing to us— to Congress-to the 
lack of interest in the newspapers, to the lack of interest among the 
people, that we had a bad system. It was not fair to pick out a man 
here and a man there and hold him up and crucify him before the 
American people and before the world because he could not suddenly 
transform a bad system into a good one." 

457 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

263,609 men; and the number of officers in the army 
in April, 2,143, had been augumented to 11,108 volun- 
teers and regulars. Of this number approximately 
8,000 were appointed by governors of States, in ac- 
cordance with law, and not by the War Department 
or the President or under the regulations of either. 
These figures in themselves show how unfair and 
impossible is a comparison between the two branches 
of the service for the period under consideration. 

Moreover, the augmented naval force of 24,123 men 
was housed, rationed, and provided with every com- 
fort a ship affords and not subjected to the exposure 
of camp life or the influences of tropical diseases on 
land. Aboard ship the sailor has shelter from heat 
and storms, cooling facilities, sewerage and the abun- 
dant pure water supply that the regular army would 
have in time of peace in barracks. The ship has its 
refrigerators, its hospital ward, and every convenience 
contributing to the creature comforts always at hand. 

With practically the same comforts in war as it had 
in peace and with its force scarcely doubled no com- 
parison can be made justty with the army, which was 
increased ten times its original size with all the neces- 
sary equipment, and which had to operate in the field 
through a tropical country where disease lurked at 
every step. 

These statements are not to be interpreted as either 
an attempt or a desire to cast reflection upon the record 
of our navy — magnificent and incomparable as it is 
— but only to show that the increase and control of 
the navy during the war are not comparable to the 
conditions surrounding the increase and control of the 
army. 

458 



CONCLUSION 

As has been shown, whatever criticisms can be 
justly directed towards the operations of the army dur- 
ing the first stages of the war have for their causes 
lack of military preparation. The provisions for sud- 
denly expanding the regular army or for quickly 
creating an army for service on a war basis were 
either non-existent or so crude as to be of little value. 
The failings naturally flowing from this condition of 
unpreparedness have been largely charged to faulty 
army organization. In my opinion these criticisms 
are in the main unjust. 

What was needed was not reorganization so much 
as development along the lines upon which the army is 
now organized. No military structure can be re- 
garded faulty in its basic principles which success- 
fully quelled the greatest civil war of modern times, 
for the organization of the army was practically the 
same in 1898 as it was in 1861-65. Nor is it proper to 
say that the triumph of our army of 1898 was not be- 
cause of, but in spite of, the military system. The 
achievements of our army both in equipping and 
mobilizing a large force under great difficulties and in 
conquering an enemy on a foreign shore, were the 
direct result of the sterling qualities of the regular and 
volunteer soldier and the system under which they 
operated. The regular army was the nucleus for 
this work. It was the nucleus of the regular army 
officers and men, both of the staff and line, who so 
quickly equipped and trained the vast number of 
eager and patriotic men and officers forming the 
volunteers. 

On the merits of this work the War Investigation 
Commission has said : 

459 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

" After thirty-three years of peace, during a great part of which 
the army did not exceed 26,000 men, it suddenly became neces- 
sary to arm, clothe, feed, and equip more than a quarter of 
a million. 

" The sudden emergency which called our people to arms after 
an interval of half a century of peace with all foreign powers was 
met by the War Department with earnestness and energy. The 
situation found the country unprepared with any large stock of 
arms, ammunition, clothing, supplies, and equipments. That 
they were duly provided and that the numerous demands on the 
industries of our people were met so promptly will remain one of 
the marvels of history." 

This statement refers alone to the concentration, 
accoutrement, and movement of troops in the United 
States. The record of the army in the field is even 
more creditable. 

Shafter's expedition to Cuba was at one and the 
same time the most successful in its purpose and the 
most free from loss of any expedition to the tropics 
ever made by this or any other country. Because of 
the minimum deaths from disease and bullets and the 
magnitude of its victories, the achievements of the 
5th Corps are without a parallel. 

It may be interesting, in this connection, to briefly 
mention the other campaigns to territories on the Car- 
ibbean Sea during the last century and a half. 

In 1741 the English sent an expedition against 
Santiago under Admiral Vernon. A landing was 
made at Guantanamo, July 13th, with a military force 
estimated to be between four and five thousand men 
under the command of General Wentworth. At no 
time was the resistance met of such a character that 
it could not have been easily overcome. On the 9th 
of August, however, when the army had advanced to 

460 



CONCLUSION 

within sixteen miles of Santiago, the forward move- 
ment was stopped and all further effort to take the 
town abandoned, owing to the fact that the army had 
been overcome with disease incident to the tropics. 
Two thousand men, or nearly fifty per cent, of the 
entire command, are said to have died before the rem- 
nant of the army got back to its ships. 

Twenty-one years later, in 1762, Great Britain sent 
another expedition to Cuba. This time Havana was 
the objective point. The history of this army is ex- 
ceedingly interesting for the reason that the troops 
composing it were about equal in numbers to those of 
Shaffer's original force to Santiago, and from the ad- 
ditional fact that the English began their siege of 
Havana at the same season of the year during which 
the 5th Corps operated in Cuba and for the same length 
of time, almost to a day. The British expedition con- 
sisted of about 14,000 men, reinforced by 2,700 colonial 
troops sailing from New York. The expedition ap- 
peared off Havana June 16th. By the first of July 
the effective force of the army of nearly 17,000 had 
been reduced one-third by disease, and at the end of 
the siege, August 13th, the total losses are said to have 
been 2,754, of which less than 400 were deaths from 
bullets. Of the 2,700 colonial troops nine-tenths are 
reported to have died of tropical fevers in Cuba or 
while returning to America, although these soldiers 
were sent back to the colonies immediately after the 
siege. 

In 1 80 1 Napoleon sent an expedition of approxi- 
mately 25,000 men to San Domingo under the com- 
mand of his brother-in-law, General Leclerc. The ex- 
pedition landed on the 20th of June, and when finally 

461 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

abandoned the losses from tropical diseases alone 
amounted to upwards of 20,000. 

The campaign of Mexico, in 1846-48, affords an- 
other interesting comparison. General Scott's losses 
from disease are reported to have been 10,000 men, or 
thirty-three per cent. The deaths at one time amount- 
ed to 1,000 a month. There returned to the United 
States but 400 men of an Indiana regiment originally 
1,000 strong, which had not been in action. 

Contrast the losses from disease of these four expedi- 
tions with that of Shafter's army. His corps of 17,000 
landed in Cuba on the 22d of June, and the last of his 
troops sailed from Santiago August 25th. The total 
deaths incurred from disease, in spite of the yellow- 
fever epidemic, amounted to but 416. At the same 
time that army drove Cervera from Santiago Harbor; 
forced the surrender of an intrenched enemy exceeding 
in numerical strength that of our own army; secured 
the control of the entire eastern portion of the island 
of Cuba; and acted as one of the most potent influ- 
ences in causing the Kingdom of Spain to speedily 
sue for peace. 

With its record in the United States, and these un- 
equalled achievements in Cuba, the organization of 
the army would seem to be built upon a sure founda- 
tion. The sufficiency and efficacy of that military 
structure is further confirmed by recent events in 
China and the work that has been in progress in the 
Philippines for the past two years. 

The Philippine campaign affords a neat demonstra- 
tion of the proposition that the general principles upon 
which the army is now organized are sound and suf- 
ficient. This brings us to a comparison between the 

462 



CONCLUSION 

difficulties which had to be met and overcome during 
the first three months of the war with Spain — the 
entire duration in fact of that war — and the control 
of all departments of the army after the War Depart- 
ment had expanded to meet the wants of the national 
military force when so greatly increased and while 
operating on a foreign soil under new and unusual 
difficulties. 

Violent and abusive criticism was the only reward 
the officers of the general staff received during those 
three trying months when every possible effort and 
personal sacrifice was made to meet an almost im- 
possible task, while on the other hand an ungenerous 
silence now greets their successful operations in the 
Philippines. 

By virtue of the acts of Congress of April and 
May, 1898, authorizing an increase in the regular 
army and the muster-in of volunteers, all these addi- 
tional troops, regulars and volunteers, were entitled to 
release from the military service upon the declara- 
tion of peace. The unwarranted provocation of hos- 
tilities on the part of the Tagals in the Philippines 
after the close of the war necessitated a large increase 
over our regular army on a peace basis to maintain 
the national honor. Congress, therefore, March 2d, 
1899, again authorized an increase in the regular army 
to 65,000 men and the recruitment at large of 35,000 
volunteers. Although this involved an approximate 
augmentation of the army of the United States to 
about 72,000, the war had made it possible to have in 
store an accumulation of military supplies sufficient 
to at once equip this force. The machinery of the 
War Department ran smoothly in the recruitment, 

463 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

equipment, and transportation half round the world 
of 70,000 of these new troops. Twelve of the twenty- 
five volunteer regiments composing the 35,000 volun- 
teers were mustered-in and equipped before July 31st, 
1899. When I left the War Department, therefore, 
August 1st, 1899, the organization for enlisting and 
equipping the remaining thirteen volunteer regiments 
was already created and in operation. The enlist- 
ments at large for the remainder of the volunteer force 
continued with this machinery of War Department 
administration. The regular army had already been 
increased to approximately 65,000 — 64,729 exactly by 
the end of June, 1899 — the maximum authorized by 
the act of March 2d, 1899, heretofore referred to. 

Attention is invited to these facts to show how rapid- 
\y, smoothly, and successfully the army can be in- 
creased when the supplies, transports, etc., are on 
hand, and when there are at the control of the War 
Department the necessary experienced officers in the 
several staff departments. 

The same Surgeon-General who was so maliciously 
charged with neglect and incompetence during the 
war has been and is now successfully providing for an 
army nearly four times the size of the regular army 
in 1898, operating in a tropical climate in the face of 
an enemy 12,000 miles from the seat of government. 
The same Quartermaster-General who was severely 
criticised and abused in 1898 has since then trans- 
ported half way round the globe a force over three 
times the size of the regular army in 1898, and is now 
transporting supplies of all lands that distance for a 
force of 70,000, without accident, without complaint, 
and without, I venture to say, one-half of the anxiety, 

464 



CONCLUSION 

annoyance, and labor it caused to send Shatter's army 
of 17,000 one-twelfth of that distance. The identical- 
ly same kind of commissary supplies that caused 
such vituperation and scurrility in 1898 are now 
being daily furnished the troops in the Philippines 
and Cuba without complaint. The same kind of re- 
frigerated beef, furnished by the same American 
packers who supplied the army in 1898, is still rationed 
our troops in large quantities ; and the identically same 
kind of canned "roast" beef, about which so much 
opprobrium was cast in 1898, is now sent our troops 
in the Philippines at the rate of 160,000 rations a month, 
and no complaint whatever, I am informed, reaches 
the War Department because of its use. This is due 
to the fact that the soldiers have learned how to pre- 
pare the food palatably, for it is both a palatable and 
nutritious food, or the United States, Great Britain, 
Russia, Germany, and Japan would not be constantly 
supplying it to their soldiers in the field, as they are 
now doing. 

It was upon these three supply departments — the 
Quartermaster, Commissar} 7 , and Medical bureaus — 
that the abuse and slander of 1898 so heavily fell. 
And yet, see how time and a reasonable opportunity 
to demonstrate their efficiency have proven the in- 
justice and unfairness of the charges of incompetence 
and maladministration. No army in the world is so 
well and so efficiently provided with commissary sup- 
plies as our force in the Philippines; the finest fleet 
of transports afloat is that which flies the Stars and 
Stripes; no soldier could be better or more generously 
clothed than the troops of the United States army; 
and the soldier who is wounded or becomes sick while 

465 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

maintaining the honor of the American Flag, no mat- 
ter where he is, receives treatment equal to that, I 
venture to say, of any municipal hospital in the 
United States. 

Despite the total lack of preparation; despite the 
failure of the militia to meet expectations in the mat- 
ter of equipment; despite the natural inertia in the 
supply bureaus of the War Department, resulting 
from thirty-three years of peace; despite the necessity 
of embarking an expedition to tropical islands of the 
Atlantic and Pacific, with no provisions at the outset 
for doing so — notwithstanding these great and new 
problems, the line and staff of the regular army and 
the eager volunteers accomplished what it is no 
vain boast to claim could not have been done by any 
other nation on the face of the earth, under the same 
circumstances. All honor for the completeness and 
celerity of our victory over the Kingdom of Spain be- 
longs to the people of the United States, for the Amer- 
ican soldier and the American sailor is but the Ameri- 
can citizen in uniform. 



THE END 



3477-2 



